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5.15. Means and variances for BL, CM, LB, and amygdala varying by stratification. 145
5.16 Smmnary table of correlations between socio-ecological variables and brain area 149 
(controlling for tlie effects of body mass).
5.17 Simimary table of correlations between socio-ecologicsl variables and brain area 149 
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Chapter I
General Introduction
'^Although in practice we cannot, o f course, collect, data on every relevant aspect o f an 
animal's biology, we do need to he aware that concentrating on one issue to the 
exclusion o f all others is to risk doing no more than tinkering with Natttre, It is a bit like 
tryirig to understand how a car \vorks simply by fiddling with the carburettor. ”
Dunbar (1988, p. 5)
LO Background to study
The experiments presented in this thesis were designed primarily to determine the 
role of the temporal cortex of the macaque in coding aspects of visual social 
communication, such as the perception of social signals. Over 100 years of research, 
beginning with Brown and Shafer (1888) have revealed how different areas of the brain 
function in recognising and controlling aspects of social behaviour in human and non­
human primates. During this time, three areas of the brain have been proposed to perform 
such functions; the anterior temporal cortex, the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex. This 
thesis will show that there are good anatomical reasons for these three areas to be so 
heavily involved in social processes. It must be stressed however, that the brain and body 
act as a whole in all forms of social behaviour. The neuroendocrine system controls 
hormone levels; cortisol and adrenal levels in times of social stress, testosterone and 
oestrogen levels during sexual behaviour, and levels of oxytocin and prolactin to provide 
adequate milk during child-rearing. The visual system enables recognition of the different 
individuals performing in a social interaction, the hippocampus and ventral temporal 
cortex aid in remembering previous interactions and the motor system produces the 
external response behaviour.
1.1 Reasons for study and the techniques used
There have been over 100 years of research in this area, but the precise functions 
of the above brain regions are still veiy sketchy. Linking a discreet physiological event 
with its associated behaviour is one of the most important areas of modern psychological 
and neuroscientific research. Relating a precise physiological event to an exact 
anatomical location can only be performed using two different methodologies. Event- 
related potentials provide useful temporal information concerning the onset and 
continuation of a stimulus, but spatial localisation of function is very poor. The new 
imaging techniques, such as Positron Emission Tomography (PET) and Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI) are examples of the new importance of relating function with 
structure. Many brain scientists (psychologists and neuroscientists) have jumped on the 
neuroimaging band-wagon and have feverishly applauded the arrival of these techniques, 
but there are inherent difficulties associated with using this methodology. One reason for 
the furore concerning PET and MRI was from the animal rights movement. All research 
must be for the ultimate good of humans, and a technology that would reduce or halt 
altogether the need for brain research on animals would be seen as a step forward. 
Unfortunately, only a few research questions can be answered using these techniques, 
and the answers need to be analysed properly. Particular concerns are that temporal 
information is unreliable due to the length it takes to collect reliable data, and function 
can only be resolved at fairly gross levels, dependent on the statistical probability levels 
of the investigating team. Questions relating to animals are difficult, if not impossible to 
answer using neuroimaging techniques, without anaesthetising the subjects. 
Anaesthetising subjects removes at least 90% of the questions you would want to ask 
using PET and MRI.
Physiology is still the method of choice when good temporal and spatial 
resolution is required (see Figure 1.1). The relatively new field of primate neuroethology 
is beginning to make progress in finding links between small distinct events at the single­
cell level and higher forms of visual and motor behaviour.
Figure 1.1. Diagrammatic representation of the spatial and temporal characteristics of a 
variety of neuroscientific methods. The y-axis displays the spatial resolution of the 
methods employed. The x-axis displays the possible lengths of time with which the 
individual methods may be used. For example, single-unit physiological recording has 
very good spatial resolution (single cell), and good temporal reolution (millisecond 
accuracy and can be used continuously for many days). ERP’s have very good temporal 
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1.2 Why use the rhesus macaque?
There are three important reasons for w^mgMacaca midatta as a subject in the 
experiments reported in this thesis. The rhesus monkey is an extremely social animal. It 
would be futile to attempt a study of the neural basis of social behaviour if the 
experimental subject lived a solitary existence in it’s natural environment. As will be 
discussed in Chapter II, the rhesus monkey lives in very large social groups, with defined 
dominance hierarchies, and complex forms of social communication, such as 
vocalisations and facial expressions. Rliesus monkeys are also highly visual animals. They 
are alert, have colour vision similar to humans, and use a wide range of facial 
expressions, postures, gestures and other visual social signals in their communication.
The plethora of knowledge on the dynamics of rhesus monkey social behaviour is 
essential to this study.
The physiology and anatomy of the rhesus monkey brain, and in particular the 
neocortex has been extensively mapped. Knowledge of the monkey brain’s anatomical 
connectivity, neurochemistiy and electrophysiological properties of cells is extensive.
Part of this knowledge has been gained with the express reason that the macaque monkey 
is the only commonly used experimental animal which is phylogenetically close to humans 
(see Figure 1.2 for cladisitic diagram of primate phylogeny). Our closest living relatives, 
chimpanzees are not used comprehensively for research, and not at all for basic 
neuroscience research. Many quarters believe that using the great apes purely for 
research purposes is unethical for the reason that they are genetically close to humans.
Neurophysiological and behavioural methods have been successfully used in 
rhesus macaques for over 40 years. These methods are well known throughout the 
neuroscience community and have been extensively developed. As an experimental 
animal, the rhesus monkey is relatively easy to look after when compared to other 
experimental primates. They are hardy animals, being extremely resistant to disease. 
Rhesus monkeys are also highly intelligent and can be trained to perform a wide variety 
of perceptual and cognitive tasks which are incorporated into the neurophysiology and 
behaviour experiments.
Figure 1.2. Diagrammatic representation of the phylogeny of the primate order, 
including prosimians, Old and New World monkey, lesser and great apes. The lengths of 
the branches (on the “primate family tree”) are approximations of lengths of biological 
time since the presence a common ancestor to two extant species, derived from 
molecular biological studies (Waddell and Penny 1996). For example, the common 
ancestor to common chimpanzees {Pan troglodytes) and bonobo chimpanzees {Pan 













1.3 Justification for the multi-disciplinary approach
This thesis is a little unusual in that it incorporates data from four main areas; 
connectional anatomy, behaviour, neurophysiology and evolution. The empirical data 
from the behavioural and neurophysiological experiments are new, whereas the data from 
the connections and evolutionary anatomy experiments were derived from previously 
published sources. It is justifiable to use such sources when the data is re-analysed or 
analysed in different ways from the original sources.
In science there appears to be a general trend in collecting data for data’s sake. 
These data are then used either as the basis for research closely related to the original 
research, forgotten or written up as part of a review. Data should be published so that it 
can be used to help answer the questions of many researchers. Anatomy is one subject 
which appears to “rest on it’s laurels” and not use data which has taken years, vast 
expense and a large number of animals to collect. The basic premise of anatomy is to 
discover whether area X connects to area Y. This in itself is valuable information, but 
more can be done with this data. A new method will be described in chapter IV which 
uses a systems level approach to look at how connectional anatomy can ask questions of 
neural organisation, gross brain structure and behaviour.
Questions are rarely asked as to how a certain behaviour or brain region has 
evolved. It may seem common sense that two closely related species with similar brain 
stmctures would also have similar behavioural repertoires. The liver, for example, 
performs the same flmction in closely related species, but does the brain and behaviour 
also perform the same or similar flinctions in closely related species. The comparative 
method (Haiwey and Pagel 1991) allows the evolutionaiy analysis of behavioural and 
anatomical traits to determine whether a basic assumption is tme for a complete set of 
data. In chapter V, the results of the connectional systems analysis allow further 
questions to be developed about how social behaviour is coded and whether the neural 
coding of this behaviour can be localised at a relatively gross level.
1.4 Thesis overview
Chapter II reviews three areas of investigation; primate social behaviour and 
cognition, brain coding of social behaviour and human social cognition deficits after brain 
assault or psychopathology. The first section describes studies of visual social 
communication from three areas, primates observed in the field, behavioural studies of 
captive primates and experimental studies performed in the laboratory. The second 
section describes the histoiy of studies attempting to relate non-human primate social 
communication to specific brain stmctures, such as the amygdala, temporal and 
prefrontal cortices. The final section complements the first two sections by first 
discussing aspects human social cognition and the so-called theory of mind mechanism. It 
then discusses how specific brain lesions or psychopathology such as autism and 
schizophrenia can also cause deficits in human social cognition. These deficits will be 
assessed and compared with those seen in non-human primates.
Chapter III briefly reviews the anatomy and connectivity of the amygdala and 
superior temporal sulcus, two brain regions said to be primarily involved in recognition of 
social signals, as highlighted in Chapter II.
The connections of the amygdala and superior temporal sulcus are analysed using 
a novel method in Chapter IV, using published details of connections to determine 
whether the connection patterns of these areas are related to their probable function. 
Chapter V further tests the validity of the data derived in Chapter IV by testing the 
hypothesis that the amygdala (and the component parts of the amygdala) have different 
functional roles to play in primate social behaviour, and these role have changed 
throughout primate evolution. These hypotheses were tested using comparative 
anatomical and socio-ecological data of prosimian and simian primate species from the 
literature.
Chapter VI contains details of all the neurophysiological methodology used in 
collecting the data for Chapters VII and VIII.
Chapter VII is the first of the empirical physiology chapters. An individual needs 
to recognise in which direction another individual is attending or moving to and which 
object it is attending to or interacting with. Such simple calculations are essential
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precursors for some higher aspects of social cognition, such as determining others’ 
intentions and predicting their subsequent behaviour. The basic physiology of neurons in 
the recorded areas of the anterior temporal cortex and superior temporal sulcus (STS) 
are also reported.
Chapter VIII is the second empirical physiology chapter. One important aspect of 
social perception that is often overlooked is how an individual recognises a face of the 
same species when all faces have the same basic configuration (two eyes, nose in the 
centre, mouth underneath, two ears to the sides, etc.). Cells responsive to different and 
similar animal species are reported.
Chapter IX looks at one aspect of human and non-human primate social 
perception and cognition; the recognition and use of gaze. This chapter details a 
behavioural experiment studying this form of behaviour in two rhesus macaques, and 
discusses similar abilities across other species. The results of this final empirical chapter 
bring together the results of the previous chapters, by proposing that processing others’ 
gaze may be dependent on neural systems in the superior temporal sulcus and amygdala.
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C hapter II
Primate Social Neuroethology 
a literature review
"the study o f visual signals may eventually provide an insight into how primates think"
Zeller (1987, p. 439)
“All I  need to do is to be alert to those moments when another living being shows signs 
o f emotion or interest. It will not be long before I  discover the things which seem to be 
important to him, not because he has communicated them to me by language, but 
because I  myself have observed and remember^ed. them....a signal without an intrinsic 
content may acquire meaning in my mind by what I  observe at the time. The ability that 
two living beings have to pick out the moments o f each other’s special, active attention 
is itself a language....social animals may have an active, intelligent, flexible means o f 
communication long before the development o f language and even without any code o f 
common sigfials. ”
Wiener (quoted in Menzel 1971, p. 221)
2,0 Introduction
One of the traits that separate primates from other mammals is the advanced form 
of social behaviour they employ. This is especially true for Homo sapiens. That is not to 
say that other mammals (such as rodents, carnivores, etc.) do not use elaborate forms of 
social behaviour (Packer and Ruttan 1988). Indeed, some carnivore and rodent species 
possess groups comprising more individuals than those seen in many primate social
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groups. The difference between primates and non-primate mammals is the complexity of 
their social behaviour or social cognition. The primate brain has evolved radically in 
complexity when compared to other mammals and the increased intricacy of social living 
may have induced this (Humphrey 1976, Byrne and Whiten 1988).
The form and function of social communication in primates is ultimately more 
complicated than seen in other mammals, whatever sensoiy channel is used; auditory, 
visual, olfactory or tactile. An important aspect of social communication (in any animal) 
is the recognition, use and production of social signals. For a social signal to function 
correctly it must a) be directed at a particular recipient or recipients, b) provide some 
form of information, and c) have an adaptive value.
The modality of signal preferred by a given species is wholly dependent on 1) the 
environment in which they live (arboreal or terrestrial), 2) their lifestyle (nocturnal or 
diurnal), 3) group social structure, 4) predation risk, 5) body morphology (correct 
apparatus for producing and receiving social signals) and 6) brain structures adapted for 
producing and comprehending signals. For example, capuchin monkeys live a largely 
arboreal lifestyle, with low predation risk and relatively large stable groups. Language 
would be an ideal form of communication for these primates, however, they lack the 
appropriate neural (Broca's and Wernicke's areas, amongst others) and morphological 
structures (malleable lips and vocal tract) required for language to be selected as a form 
of communication. This is an extreme example, but it highlights the fact that a number (or 
all) of points 1 to 6 need to be present before a certain form of communication can 
evolve. The costs and benefits of each mode of communication is evaluated in Table 2.1.
Anthropoid monkeys and apes are mainly terrestrial living primates and because 
of this, use visual communication above all other forms of communication (perhaps with 
the exception of auditoiy/vocal communication). The rhesus monkey (the main subject of 
this thesis) uses primarily visual communication. This chapter discusses ethological, 
behavioural and neurobiological studies of recognition, comprehension and production of 
visual signals for social communication, in human and non-human primates.
Table 2.1. Cost and benefits of different methods of primate communication. The different 
modality used to transmit information is described as well as the costs and benefits of using the 
method of communication.
Modality Costs Benefits
Olfactory -Imprecise as to the recipient 
(infonnation may be received by a large 
number of conspecifics or predators) 
-Slow acting
- Can be transmitted over long distances
- Not constrained by light levels
- Can be individualised (e.g. specific 
scents)
- Can be used to communicate over time 
(e.g. scent-marking territory)
Auditory - Imprecise as to the recipient 
(information may be heard by a large 
number of conspecifics or predators)
- Cannot be used to transmit information 
over time (however, language?)
- Fast
- Can be transmitted over long distances
- Not constrained by light levels
- Can be individualised
- Can be used to transmit large amounts 
of different types of information
- Can be used to communicate about the 
presence of objects and events
Tactile - Constrained by length of limbs (i.e. 
cannot be used to communicate over 
long distances)
- Relatively short acting
- Limited in the forms of information 
which can be communicated
- Precise as to the recipient
- Can be used to communicate specific 
information
- Not constrained by light levels
Visual - Constrained by light levels
- Bright colours can alert other 
conspecifics or predators
- Precise as to the recipient
- Can be used to transmit information 
over time (e.g. individual recognition or 
sexual swellings)
- Can be used to transmit large amounts 
of different types of information
- Can be used to communicate about the 
presence of objects and events
-Fast
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2.1 Primate Social Behaviour & Communication
2.1.1 What is social communication?
It is appropriate to describe what social communication is before discussing the 
role that visual signals may play in this form of behaviour. This may appear to be simple 
to answer, but this very question has caused debate and controversy for behavioural 
biologists, neuroscientists, linguists, psychologists and anthropologists alike. A working 
definition of social communication would be advantageous at this stage of the review, but 
discussions of the histoiy of the term communication will not be discussed here as they 
have been dealt with in much more detail and with finer clarity elsewhere (Marier 1977, 
Krebs and Dawkins 1984, Dawkins 1987, Gomez 1994, Hauser 1996).
Dawkins' (1981) definition of communication will be used here; "Animal A is said 
to have communicated with B when As behaviour manipulates B's sense organs in such a 
way that B's behaviour is changed (pp. 79)." Cheney and Seyfaith's work on vervet alarm 
calls (1990a), provides an example of this. Velvet A gives an alarm call to vervet B, and 
velvet B iiins into the trees, looks down to the ground, or mns into the bushes, 
depending on the precise nature of the call given. Vervet B's behaviour has been changed 
by vervet As behaviour (alarm call). Dawkin’s definition is useful in this context, as there 
is an emphasis on the function of communication changes, from reflexive and involuntary 
to volitional and intentional. The underlying function of communication does not change. 
It may be added that information of some sort is communicated when Animal A changes 
Animal B's behaviour, or this may be the underlying reason why animal B's behaviour 
changes (as a consequence of that information). The information transmitted could take 
one of many forms, such as an alarm call notifying others of the presence of a predator, 
or the emitter's emotional state concerning that predators proximity, a facial expression 
of threat, a pheromone signalling sexual receptivity, or sentences transmitting gossip 
about an unseen third party.
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2.1.2 Morphological and ecological constraints on visual social communication
This section will discuss the morphological and environmental changes which 
would have enabled certain uses of visual communication to be selected for over others.
It is viable to use such information to discuss behaviour in similar ways as 
paleoanthropologists trying to discuss the behaviour of extinct hominids from fossil 
remains, geological and environmental data and archaeological artefacts (Mithen 1996).
The morphology of the primate face has changed dramatically from prosimians to 
New World monkeys (e.g. squirrel and capuchin monkeys), Old World monkeys (e.g. 
baboons and macaque monkeys), lesser apes (e.g. gibbons and siamangs) and the great 
apes (e.g. orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees and humans). Figure 2.1 shows the proposed 
evolutionaiy history of the primates and how the primate faces differ between species. 
There is a diverse range of inter-group differences in facial anatomy; the small face of the 
loris with the proportionally large foi*ward facing eyes, the long snout of the ring-tailed 
lemur, the dog-face of the hamadiyas baboon, the prominent nasal features of the 
proboscis monkey, the malleable lips of the chimpanzee and the large throat pouches of 
the adult male orangutan, as a collection of examples (Jolly 1972).
What should be clear from any discussion of the evolution of external facial 
morphology is the reduction in the protmsion of the face from monkeys to apes, in 
particular, the reduction in jaw size and length of the snout or nose. All the great apes, 
including humans have relatively flat faces whilst retaining some prominent features. For 
example, the human face has high cheekbones, a conspicuous nose and eyebrows framing 
the eyes. Such features could all function to highlight the region around the eyes (the eye 
brows), moving the eyes (the cheekbones and musculature) or directing attention to the 
eyes (the nose). For example, these changes may have provided a shift in emphasis from 
the shape of the face (and it's orientation) to the eyes as sources of information about 
attention direction. Determining the direction of another’s attention is easier to establish 
from larger visual cues, such as the head. Flattening the face of the great apes could have 
reduced the amount of information that could be transmitted by the head alone. The eyes
Figure 2.1. Drawings displaying the range of diversity of primate faces, including (a) 
ring-tailed lemur {Lemur catta\ (b) aye-aye {Daubentonia madagascariensis\ (c) 
common marmoset {Calliihrix jacchus\ (d) olive baboon {Papio anuhis) (e) capuchin 
monkey {Cebus apelld), (f) Japanese macaque {Macaca fuscatd), (g) whitehanded 
gibbon {Hylobates lar\ (h) orangutan {Pongo pygmaeus), (i) gorilla {Gorilla gorilla), (j) 


















are much smaller than the head, but they present a more precise indicator of where 
another is looking (see Chapter IX).
The primate face has also evolved an elaborate system of facial musculature 
which aids in producing clear facial expressions (Huber 1939, 1961, see Figure 2.2). For 
example, in the rhesus monkey, the muscles surrounding the eyes {Mttsctdaris orbicularis 
oculi) enable the gross movement of the eyes and with the M  frontalis (the muscle 
controlling the eyebrow ridge), the monkey can produce threatening stares. The 
Zygomaticus muscle mass and theM  triangularis provide the jaw with the 
manoeuvrability to masticate, but would also function in lip-smacking and teeth 
chattering (Huber 1931). T heM  obliqui et transversi and theM. Auricularis posterior 
connected to the back of the ears, may also function in threat sequences and submissive 
behaviour.
Other parts of the body, such as tails and extremities are important tools in social 
communication (Hinde and Rowell 1961, Bertrand 1969, Sade 1973). Non-ape species 
may use the orientation of another's body to decipher where they are attending. Apes 
would also have to use such cues if a second individual's head and eyes were occluded 
from view, too small to distinguish with any degree of accuracy, or hidden in shade or 
darkness. It would appear to be relatively easy to determine the direction in which a body 
is pointed if a quadrupedal stance is adopted. Humans rarely adopt this posture, 
remaining in a more upright bipedal stance. Monkeys and apes may not require a better 
means of inferring attention direction than head direction or body posture. Body 
orientation, head direction and eye gaze direction are in congraent directions for the 
majority of time spent foraging, grooming, eating, playing and fighting.
Body size would also appear to be a constraint on what information is gained 
from the eyes, head and body. Bigger eyes (or head, or body) are easier to see, and 
therefore easier to gain information from. It would seem reasonable to suggest from 
other allometric measures that as body size increases, so does the size of the head. This 
is, however, not necessarily tme for eye size. Solitary pro simian species without a 
substantial need for social communication via the visual channel, have small bodies and 
heads, but very large eyes (relative to the size of the face). Although an anatomical
Figure 2.2. Drawings displaying the superficial facial musculature of the rhesus 
macaque {Macaca mulatta); (a) lateral, (b) posterior and (c) fronto-lateral views. 
Adapted from Huber (1961).
(a)
A /, he I id s  (minor) 
M. occipitalis
A /, untitragicus










Buccal pouch with muscle coat 
Deviating bundles o;platystna
Piatysma fM. platystna colli et facieit
M. auricularis ant. et sup.XL occipitalis
Mm. ohliqui et tram versi
XL auricularis po.^terior
XL antitragicus
Nuchal portion o f  plastysm a
XL orh ito-auricularis




Crossed bundles of platvsm a
Buccal pouch with muscle coat from
buccinator
16
change may be beneficial or detrimental to a particular behaviour, this does not mean that 
the presence of such a morphological change is in a causal relationship with that 
behaviour. For example, the increased size of the eyes in prosimians are attributable to a 
nocturnal use of vision, but would also be advantageous to those primates using complex 
forms of visual communication in a different environment (diurnal primates).
The change in face and body anatomy has not been paralleled by the eyes. 
Although size differences are plainly apparent, the actual morphology of the eyes 
themselves does not appear to differ between the many species of primate. The most 
obvious contrast between species is the relationship between the dark iris/pupil and the 
white or light brown sclera. A high level of dark iris compared to sclera has been 
reported for the majority of primate species (Kobayashi and Kohshima 1997). The major 
extent of the visible eye is taken up by the dark iris and a very small part by the white 
sclera. Humans, in contrast have a large extent of white sclera, either side of the dark 
central iris (when looking forward). This ratio may be one of the factors which has 
allowed humans to use the orientation of other's eyes for learning about objects in the 
environment (referential communication), whereas non-human primates may be less 
reliant on such cues (see later discussions).
The morphology of the body, face and eyes provide a set of constraints for 
primates’ use of gaze in a communicative capacity. Another set of constraints are 
provided by the ecology of the environment in which the primates survive. The transition 
from an arboreal (tree-living) to a terrestrial (ground-dwelling) environment caused a 
dramatic change in the sensoiy emphasis of communication. Tree-dwelling prosimians 
and New World monkeys mainly use two forms of social communication; audition 
(vocalisations) and olfaction. A forest environment is very dark, not just at night, but also 
as the large overhanging branches cause almost total darkness during the day. Both of 
these forms of communication have two distinct disadvantages from visual 
communication. They are indirectly focused (anyone within range can hear a call, or smell 
an odour, including predators), and would seem to be limited to communicating about 
emotional state ("I'm ready to mate") or spatial position ("I'm over here"), and less
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appropriate for communicating information about objects in the environment (unless used 
in conjunction with visual communication, "Look at that fmit tree").
The move from an arboreal to a terrestrial environment also caused a massive 
change in lifestyle; nocturnal to diurnal. Visual communication is basically impossible at 
night and is curtailed during the day, in the dark of the forest. Although a nocturnal 
existence does have some distinct advantages over a diurnal one (predator avoidance, 
ease of catching sleeping prey, food abundance, etc., van Schaik and van Hooff 1983), 
the reduction or complete absence of visual social signals halts other (perhaps better) 
forms of social communication from developing. This would restrict the amount of 
information which individuals could communicate, and this would have the knock on 
effect of limiting social group size (van Schaik 1983).
2.1.3 Primate social structure
Animals cannot live a wholly solitaiy existence. They must interact with at least 
one other member of their species to procreate. Sex is the most obvious and^  important 
expression of social behaviour. Interaction between animals, however, does not have to 
be for social or sexual reasons; for example, as a rabbit fleeing a fox, or a lion stalking a 
zebra.
Social interactions keep a group together and relatively stable. Effective social 
communication aids in successful social interactions, and therefore assists in maintaining 
group stability. A minor digression; why does a group form the size it does? Many 
theories have been proposed as to why group life is beneficial (in an evolutionary sense) 
compared to a solitaiy existence (Jolly 1972, Smuts et al 1987). Territoriality, intrasexual 
competition, predator pressure, food density and food distribution are some of the 
suggested reasons (van Schaik and van Hoof 1983). Beneficial may be the wrong term, 
as other less social species survive (and have survived and adapted) for millions of years, 
and do so to this day. Larger groups may have been beneficial to a certain species during
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a particular 'Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation' (EEA), i.e. during a particular 
evolutionary time and in a particular environmental niche (Tooby and Cosmides 1992).
Primates are one of the most diverse collection of species in the animal kingdom. 
They inhabit a wide variety of ecological niches, from the jungles of east and west Africa, 
the rainforests of Borneo, South America and Asia and the snow-topped mountains of 
Japan (Jolly 1972, Smuts et al 1987). Although the primates are considered successful 
due to their abundance, a large number of species are close to the verge of extinction 
(such as the mountain gorillas, bonobos, orangutans, lion-tailed macaques, langurs and 
ring-tailed lemurs).
Primates differ, not only in their location, habitat and anatomy, but also in their 
social structure and methods with which they maintain this stmcture. Rliesus macaques 
live in relatively large social groups with sizes ranging from 9 to 80, with few males and 
large ratio of females with infants, and a collection of mixed sex juveniles (Melnick and 
Peral 1987). Males tend to leave the group once they have reached sexual maturity, so 
they will have a greater chance of breeding success without competition. The males are 
hierarchically organised depending on their age, size, fighting ability and length of time in 
the group (de Waal 1987; Wrangham 1987). The dominant male has the choice of the 
breeding females and this pre-determines the hierarchical status of the females. Infants 
and juveniles are organised by their mother’s social status.
The social group remains stable by a variety of methods. Affiliative behaviours 
such as grooming, co-operation and aggressive behaviours keep the hierarchy of the 
social group stable. Reconciliation behaviour may help group stability, as alliances are 
formed and after fighting, protagonists spend substantial efforts to “make-up" (Walters 
and Seyfarth 1987, de Waal 1989). (It is noted that rhesus macaques are not as 
conciliatory as other primate species studied, such as stumptailed macaques, chimpanzees 
and bonobos; de Waal 1989.) The majority of grooming occurs between kin, especially 
between mothers and their infants. Dominant females tend to be groomed by subordinate 
females and females also groom the dominant male. The dominant male can also be 
groomed by less dominant males, mainly as a gesture of appeasement. Appeasement may 
also take the form of mounting; the lesser dominant male, will allow himself to be
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mounted by the dominant male to diffuse aggressive situations. The social group has been 
defined as having "a high level of communication between its members, with a steep 
falling off between members and non-members" (Jolly 1985).
2.1.4 Social perception
Are faces special for primates? This may seem an obvious question at first glance; 
of course faces are special. Are we, however, answering this question from an 
anthropomorphic viewpoint? We know that faces are special for humans; they convey 
information about emotional states which in turn guide the behaviour of others. Do non­
human primates use information from the face in the same or similar ways as humans? 
The goal of this section is to review and evaluate the experimental and behavioural 
evidence that non-human primates process faces in similar ways to humans, and that 
neuroscientific studies of monkey face processing may be useful models of the neural 
mechanisms of human face recognition (see also Section 2.2,3).
Faces provide large amounts of information about an individual's species, sex, 
identity, age, health, emotional state and who and what they are directing their attention 
to. Studies of laboratoiy primates have provided a wealth of information about how 
primates perceive faces. How primates respond to faces in their natural environment will 
be treated later in this section.
Primate faces are a distinct class of objects, with a basic uniform staicture (two 
forward eyes located near to the top of the face, a nose underneath, a mouth underneath 
the nose and two ears on either side of the face at the external barrier of the face). As 
faces are so uniform in their structure, and because they are so important in social 
communication and identification, they have been the subject of psychological studies in 
human and non-human primates for a number of years. A wealth of information exists in 
the realm of human face processing; it is reviewed in a number of sources (Bruce and
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Young 1986, Brace and Green 1990, Johnson and Morton 1991, see also papers in 
Brace et al 1992).
Monkeys can discriminate faces of other monkeys very easily and manipulations 
of colour, orientation, size, illumination and posture do not effect these responses 
(Rosenfeld and Van Hoesen 1979). Vocalisations and corresponding facial expressions 
were associated with the presentation of the novel faces, suggesting that the monkeys 
were classing the faces as faces, not random objects. There is some disagreement 
concerning monkeys ability to recognise inverted faces. In the human literature, humans 
discriminate inverted faces slower than upright faces (Yin 1969, Valentine and Brace 
1986). The same inversion effect has been replicated for squirrel monkeys viewing human 
faces, but not for squirrel monkeys viewing squirrel monkey faces (Phelps and Roberts 
1994) The face inversion effect has also been replicated for rhesus monkeys, where there 
is an inversion effect for rhesus monkeys viewing human faces, but not for rhesus 
monkeys viewing rhesus monkey faces (Wright and Roberts 1996). This difference 
between species faces has been partially attributed to monkey behaviour. Rliesus and 
squirrel monkeys spend large amounts of time in the canopy of trees, upside-down. 
Humans, in comparison rarely spend time in this position, so the mechanisms requiring a 
quick analysis of inverted faces would not have been adapted for. Chimpanzees do not 
spend large amounts of time upside-down and Tomonga, Itakura and Matsuzawa (1993) 
found that an inversion effect similar (but to a lesser degree) to the human face inversion 
effect was present in a chimpanzee viewing chimpanzee and human faces.
Monkeys also prefer faces to either have all component parts of the face present 
or all component parts to be in the correct configuration (eyes at the top, mouth at the 
bottom, etc.). Keating and Keating (1982) studied the eye movement responses of rhesus 
macaques viewing schematic faces, where the component parts were jumbled. They 
found that monkey subjects looked less at jumbled faces, and less at the eye region when 
the eyes were in inappropriate positions. Keating and Keating (1982) had previously 
found that rhesus monkeys spent longer looking at the eye region than any other part of 
the face (see also Chapter IX). Mistlin (1988) tested stumptailed macaques’ emotional 
reactions to 3-D faces with scrambled features. More appeasement gestures (teeth-
21
chattering) were elicited when viewing faces with normal configurations of features than 
jumbled features, suggesting that the subjects could discriminate between faces on the 
position of the internal components of the face. This effect was lost when the superior 
temporal sulcus was removed (Mistlin 1988). The eyes were also important when rhesus 
monkeys viewed photo-fit pictures of human faces. Keating and Keating (1993) again 
measured eye movement responses to rhesus monkeys viewing pictures of humans. The 
individual parts of the face could easily be removed or rearranged. They found that the 
eye region gained the highest amount of attention, but that when this region was removed 
(or other single parts of the face) face recognition was not disturbed. Only removal or 
alteration of the eyes and the brows affected face recognition.
The final area where monkeys have been tested is their responsiveness to differing 
facial expressions. Primates use a wide variety of facial expressions in a number of 
different contexts (see van Hoof 1962, Andrew 1963 a, b, Bolwig 1964, Redican 1975 for 
reviews). The main expressions used across all primate species are threat, grimace, yawn 
and lipsmack. Facial expressions are not just methods for conveying a producer’s 
emotional state, they can also be interpreted as providing clues to another’s intentions.
For example, a subordinate monkey may attempt to surreptitiously mate with a high- 
ranking female. The alpha male witnesses this attempted clandestine mating, and 
subsequently threatens the subordinate animal. The information provided in the 
dominant’s threatening gesture is not just emotional (i.e. “you have attempted to mate 
out of rank, I am angiy” ), it may also provide information about the alpha male’s 
intentions (“if you don’t appease me, I will attack”).
Facial expressions can also be used to transmit information about objects in the 
environment. For example, Mineka and colleagues studied obseiwationing conditioning of 
snake fear in laboratoiy raised rhesus monkeys. The young monkeys were not initially 
fearful of the snakes, or objects which looked like snakes. After observation of their 
parent’s fearful expressions directed towards the sankes, the young rhesus monkeys 
became fear conditioned to the presence of snakes and snake-like objects. Interpreting 
that the fearful expressions were directed towards the snakes and linking fear to the 
snake would be essential for conditioning.
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The ability of rhesus monkeys to use facial expressions to transmit information 
about imminent outcomes, was studied by Miller (1967, 1974). Two monkeys were first 
tested individually, then simultaneously in view of each other. First, the monkeys had to 
make a particular response when one of two stimuli was presented. When stimulus A was 
presented, the monkey had to pull a handle to avoid a shock, and when stimulus B was 
presented they had to pull a different handle to gain a food reward. The monkeys were 
then tested together (in separate primate chairs). One of the monkeys could see the two 
stimuli, but had no access to the two handles, and the second monkey had access to the 
handles, but could not see the stimuli, only a video picture of the other monkey. The 
monkey with access to the handles had to pull the correct one for both animals to receive 
a food reward and for the second monkey not to receive a shock. The monkey learned to 
respond to the facial expressions of the second monkey when the monkey was familiar, 
but responses were poor when the second monkey was unfamiliar to the first.
It therefore appears that rhesus monkeys, at least, are capable of transmitting 
information about unpleasant experiences to conspecifics, by the use of expressive 
behaviour (e.g. facial expressions. Can monkeys transmit similar levels of information 
about unpleasant foods to others? Pig-tailed macaques and spider monkeys were tested in 
the laboratoiy and the wild for their ability to warn others about the poor quality of foods 
they had eaten (Fairbanks 1975). It is ultimately important that information about inedible 
or toxic foods is transmitted to the whole group to avoid illness, reducing the 
reproductive capabilities of the group members. No evidence of social learning was found 
when a pig-tailed monkey modeller tried a distasteful food (a dragged fig) in the 
presence of three observers. The observers did not change their eating behaviour in 
reaction to the modeller’s behaviour after eating the food. This result was replicated 
when a novel food was presented; hesitancy increased, but the observers still tried the 
novel food. Free-ranging spider monkeys would try novel foods (bread coloured red, 
green, yellow or blue), even after observing another individual’s reaction to the 
distasteful foods.
Fletemeyer (1978), however, found that a hierarchy existed within chacma 
baboon society, which determined which individual tried a novel food first. Whilst
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attempting to capture these wild baboons (using drugged oranges), the alpha dominant 
male would approach the orange, unpeel it and then discard it. Subadults and juveniles 
would then approach the orange, but be threatened away by the alpha male. The most 
dominant individual, therefore appeared to determine whether the food was safe, through 
individual experience and then transmit this information to conspecifics. Fletemeyer 
(1978) suggested that:
social coimmmication behaviour manifested in a network o f threat-avoidance 
responses by conspecifics is highly adaptive to a baboon troop because it is a more 
efficient and safer means o f assessing the quality o f edible items than is individual 
experience ” (p. 223).
Faces are a special categoi-y of objects for laboratoiy primates, but what is the 
evidence that faces are just as important for free-ranging monkeys and apes? A certain 
number of gestures, postures, facial expressions and body movements are associated with 
primate social behaviour (Hinde and Rowell 1961). Non-human primates engage in at 
least three types of social behaviour, where they require such special forms of visual 
communication; agonistic, affiliative and sexual behaviour. In the monkey, the eye region 
of the face is o f particular importance (see Chapter IX for review) for affiliative and 
threatening behaviours (Redican 1975, Keating and Keating 1982) and sexual behaviours 
(Linnankoski et al 1993). Eye expressions that comprise agonistic gestures include the 
stare, apprehensive looking, eye-contact avoidance, feigned indifference, feigned interest, 
and ignore (Hinde and Rowell 1962, van Hoof 1962, Bertrand 1969). The direct look 
without the raising of the eyebrows seen in the agonistic stare, is a friendly gesture. 
Linnankoski et al (1993) found in stump-tailed macaques that direct eye-contact from the 
female caused sexual arousal in males culminating in masturbation. Facial expressions 
provide more information about the 'internal' states (feelings and intentions) of an 
individual, than most forms of visual social signal. During agonistic encounters, a monkey 
employs a large number of facial expressions (van Hoof 1962, 1967, Andrew 1963, 
Bolwig 1964, Redican 1975). The attack face is displayed when the monkey is ready to 
attack, usually after the monkey has displayed an open mouth threat face, a pant threat
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face or a bared teeth threat face (Bertrand 1969). Each of these faces has a particular 
meaning in the aggressive act. Appeasing facial expressions include the bared teeth threat 
face, grin face, teeth chattering face and the lip-smacking face (Bertrand 1969, 
Maestripieri 1996 a, b). As stated above, facial expressions are also employed in friendly 
situations, for example, the pout face, play face, laughing face and the kiss. The direct 
look can not only function in aggressive encounters, but also in affiliation (de Waal 
1989). Although this eye expression is similar to the antagonistic stare, it is employed 
without pushing the ears back or the head pushed forward, as would be seen in 
aggressive stares. There are many different gestures, postures and motions which are 
used to display emotional/social states in macaques (Hinde and Rowell 1961). Agonistic 
gestures include pulling, pinching, grabbing or plucking fur; pushing and kicking, 
dragging, branch shaking, repeated bouncing and rocking, and submissive gestures 
include chasing, withdrawing or displacing, moving away, fleeing or crouching and 
remaining passive (Bertrand 1969). Affiliative gestures and postures are easier to 
evaluate and include grooming (fur kneading), embrace or arms around another monkey, 
huddling, sitting in close proximity to another and keeping company.
Sexual gestures form an important part of social behaviour. Problems in 
interpreting and recognising sexual signals lead to problems in breeding. Sexual signals 
are often used in conjunction with olfactory cues; this may be to substantiate the message 
transmitted by the visual cues, so that the correct information gets through to the chosen 
mating partner. Visual sexual signals include presenting to the prospective sexual partner. 
Presenting has a multitude of functions, a solicitation to mate, rank recognition, a 
permission-seeking gesture, an appeasement gesture, an enlisting and excitement gesture, 
a particular play pattern, a signal for dorsal clinging and a solicitation for grooming 
(Bertrand 1969). To dissociate the particular intention of the presentation, the present 
must be given in a particular context, with an individual’s history. This is possible via a 
specific presenting sequence by the mounter, consisting of perineal investigation, hip 
touching, forced lifting of the mountee’s hindquarters, sitting, crouching, or walking 
away, then looking at the mountee and then possibly harassing the mountee. Other sexual 
signals in macaques include genital mbbing, penis and labia presenting, genital
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manipulation and masturbation (Bertrand 1969, Bolwig 1978). Also in relation to visual 
sexual signals, monkeys must have sufficient colour vision to react to the deep reddening 
of the females genital region during oestrous.
Monkeys and other non-human primates use particular locomotor patterns, which 
can be used and interpreted in a communicative manner. Examples include quadrupedal 
walking, cantering, canning gaits, bipedal stance and mn, climbing up and down, leaping, 
swimming, jumping, hanging by arms or legs, ainning, and sliding (Bertrand 1969). 
Maternal behaviour also has a variety of expressions, gestures and postures connected 
with it. Grooming, obviously is a specific part of the maternal process; as are licking and 
cleaning. Mothers also cradle their infants and the infants cling ventrally to their mothers 
or climb on top of them.
A wide variety of these various social signals must be interpreted by others in the 
social group for the sui-vival of the individual members (Zeller 1987, 1992). For example, 
an infant needs to interpret their own mother’s actions to gain food, and to know where 
they can seek protection. Others must know when they are being threatened or attacked, 
whether to retaliate, to retreat, or to defend themselves. They must also know the other 
individuals in the social group and their particular positions in the hierarchy of the group 
(see Chapter VIII), so as to avoid such conflicts and to possibly solicit help from others 
(Cheney and Seyfarth 1990c). It would also be beneficial to know and predict the 
intentions of others in the troop. This may be knowing that another intends to mate, that 
a threat is only in play, or that a chase is from an aggressor and not in play; so that 
appropriate actions can be taken. This is discussed below and in Chapters VII and IX.
2.1.5 Social cognition
It is important, not only to perceive the signals of a second party with whom 
communication is desired, but also to understand the presented signals of the second 
individual and the context with which the signals are displayed. Whether monkeys and 
apes understand the signals of others, rather than just reacting to them; is a controversial
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area of what has been termed “cognitive ethology” (Griffin 1978, see also papers in 
Harre and Reynolds 1984 and Ristaii 1991).
A useful example of this form of argument is vei*vet alarm calls and predator 
avoidance. A number of experiments by Cheney and Seyfarth (reviewed in 1990c, see 
also Seyfarth, Cheney and Marier 1980a, b) have led to discussions of social cognition, 
or understanding of the complexities of the social world in monkeys and apes. Cheney 
and Seyfarth studied the different form of alarm calls that veiwet monkeys use when in 
the presence of predators. These calls have the subsequent action of alerting conspecifics 
to the presence of different types of predators. Veiwet monkeys have three natural 
predators, eagles, leopards and snakes and each predator is represented by a different 
alarm call. When a snake call is vocalised by a member of the troop, the other monkeys 
which heard the call look down on the ground to look for a snake. Likewise, if a vervet 
uses an eagle call, the other vervets look into the sky and run into the vegetation. If a 
vei*vet spies a leopard and gives a leopard call, other veiwets look where the caller is 
directing their attention and ran in the opposite direction.
The question remains, are vervet vocalisations in response to the appearance of 
predators, emotional reactions to a predator, or are they part of a deliberate altraistic 
warning system used to refer others to the presence of a predator (voluntary signalling)?. 
Two issues are raised here. First, for the signaller to use alarm calls as part of a warning 
system, they must have intended to have given the call, and within the vicinity of 
conspecifics. If this was the case, a lone vervet confronted with a predator would either 
not call or would not continue its calling. (An emotional call would be short and not 
continuous.) Cheney and Seyfarth (1985b) tested the alarm responses of velvets in an 
enclosure to the presence of an unknown human. Usually, a vervet in a group would call 
in the presence of such an aversive stimulus. When a lone veiwet was sectioned and 
presented with a similar stimulus, it did not call. Cheney and Seyfarth (1990c) also 
describe an incident where a single velvet was separated from her troop and was being 
followed by a leopard. When the monkey was chased by the predator, she was totally 
silent, making no leopard calls. If the call were emotional reactions, the monkey would be
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expected to call. (It is possible that the monkey in this instance was too frightened to 
respond vocally.)
Second, for the call to have meaning to other group members, the vervets must 
have the ability to understand the nature of the call (and to not just respond to any call 
given). This would appear to be the case, as an appropriate behavioural response is 
elicited from the vervet troop, rather than a random response (Seyfarth et al 1980a). A 
random response would develop from a call with no informational content; a call which 
was a basic emotional reaction to a stimulus.
To determine that the alarm calls were informational in content, Cheney and 
Seyfarth (1990c for review) used play-backs of different alarm calls when no predators 
were present. Initial responding was as predicted; the monkeys acted as predicted to the 
individual calls, i.e. miming into the bushes after hearing the play-back of an eagle call, or 
looking at the ground after hearing a snake call. The monkeys, however, began to 
become habituated to the same call of the same individual (who would be “ciying wolf’). 
If  the same individual provided a different call, the response was as active as previously 
described (Cheney and Seyfarth 1982, 1988). This experiment also suggests that the 
vei*vets can identify others by their alarm calls (as they could interpret the same alarm call 
as coming from the same individual).
In discussing whether monkeys understand others signals as intentional or as 
‘outcrops of their minds’, a slight digression is required. Dennett (1987) has proposed a 
theoretical framework to be used in all discussions of non-human primate mental 
attribution. Dennett suggested that “the intentional stance” would be a useful framework 
for interpreting experimental and obseiwational studies of primate social cognition. The 
intentional stance works on a number of (possibly infinite) levels. Premack and Woodruff 
(1978) were the first to coin the phrase, theoiy of mind (mental state attribution, 
mindreading, folk psychology, etc.; for discussion see Whiten 1994, 1997a, b). The 
intentional stance is the same as theoiy of mind; the proposition that others have beliefs, 
desires, goals and these mental states can be inferred from others behaviour. Evidence for 
and against a non-human primate theory of mind is evaluated in Chapter VII (see also 
Povinelli and Eddy 1996c, Whiten 1997a, b, Tomasello and Call 1997).
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There are a number of levels o f mtentionality with which an individual can 
interpret another’s mental state (Dennett 1983). The lowest level {zero-order 
intentionality) suggested that Monkey X produces an emotional reaction to a stimulus, 
such as an alarm call. Firsl-order intentionality suggested that Monkey X wants to 
produce the alarm call (as discussed earlier). Higher orders of intentionality are, Monkey 
X wants to produce the alarm call so that Monkey Y believes there is a predator present 
{second-order intentionality). Third-order intentionality becomes more difficult to 
interpret; Monkey X wants Monkey Y to believe that Monkey X wants Monkey Y to 
escape the predator. Dennett suggests that human can interpret up to six-orders of 
intentionality without getting into great difficulty.
This is a useflil method for thinking about social cognition, but is basically weak 
in that it is almost impossible to prove experimentally. The work of Cheney and Seyfarth 
and others, have provided monkeys with at least first and possibly second-order 
intentionality. The difference between non-human and human primates appears to be the 
differences between recognition and understanding of a) behaviour and b) mental states. 
This difference is discussed further in Chapter IX.
Social cognition requires not only the ability to understand others’ behaviour (and 
mental state), but probably more importantly, their social position. As has been discussed 
earlier, monkey and ape groups are organised hierarchically; the most dominant male has 
the most access to females for breeding, and is usually the most aggressive or most able 
to form coalitions (de Waal 1982, Byrne and Whiten 1988). The females are also 
hierarchically organised, due to physical attributes, access to the alpha males and ability 
to form coalitions with others (males and females). Monkeys are particularly apt at 
recognising others’ social relationships (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990b). Dasser (1988) 
reports an experiment where long-tailed macaques discriminated mother-infant pairs from 
other female-infant pairs (for full discussion of this experiment see Chapter VIII).
Monkeys and apes have the ability to recognise others dominance (or 
subordination) from cues such as physical strength, amount of grooming received and 
given, access to mates, access to food and the attention afforded by other group members 
(Chance 1967). For example, Monkey X receives the largest amount of attention from
29
other group members, is large and copulates the most. It can therefore by reasonably 
inferred that this animal was the most dominant in this particular troop. Monkey and apes 
must have adapted to make this inference, as inappropriate action against a more 
dominant animal could be fatal. This appears to be the case (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990b,
c).
The ideas presented in this section are basic to the rest of this thesis. Monkeys 
(and apes) can recognise others social relationships, kin and individuals and recognise 
their social signals. The next section discusses how the monkey brain may achieve this 
level of recognition.
2.2 Neurobiology of Primate Social Behaviour
2.2.1 Criteria for the inclusion of area X as part of the "Social Brain"
Before discussing the evidence for and against the inclusion of certain brain 
regions as belonging to the “social brain”, a number of criteria need to be flilfilled. The 
following list is not exhaustive, but is a useful guide to the warrants of inclusion. At least 
one or more of the following is required for inclusion.
1. Lesions to area X or ablating the primaiy input source to area X disrupts normal social 
behaviour (see below).
2. A number of cells in area X respond to social stimuli, or to stimuli which can be 
interpreted as functioning in social behaviour or cognition, decision-making and social 
memoiy or whose output produces some aspects of social behaviour (see Chapters VII & 
VIII).
3. (a) Profuse anatomical connections of area X and other regions which ftinction in 
social behaviour (see Chapter V). (b) At least one of the inter-connected areas should 
extensively connect with appropriate input and output structures, which code sensoiy.
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motor and regulatoiy processes (such as visual, auditory, somatosensory and motor 
cortices, hypothalamus and brainstem, see Chapter IV)
4. Area X has an evolutionaiy adaptation for social behaviour coding, i.e. area X codes 
for social behaviour in a sample of species with a distinct evolutionaiy history. 
Neuropsychological studies suggest that the human brain uses the same areas as the 
monkey brain for coding social behaviour. The evolutionaiy history can be further tested 
using comparative anatomical and ecological analyses (see Chapter VI).
5. Pharmacological agents known to cause changes in social behaviour, act on area X 
(amongst others, see section 2.2.4).
6. The social behaviours which are related to the function of Area X are definable within 
the context of the typical responses shown by all animals in the species. Using a 
hypothetical example; if all members of a species have the same lesion of area X and all 
the individuals have identical attributes (e.g. age, sex, social status, medical condition, 
etc.), then the same effects on social behaviour would be seen throughout the group. This 
proposition is unfortunately very difficult to test empirically.
Three regions of the macaque brain will be discussed using the above criteria to 
determine whether the evidence suggests their involvement in coding aspects of social 
behaviour. The following literature review will put the area into context by discussing the 
neuropsychological (criterion 1) and neurophysiological (criterion 2) evidence for their 
inclusion. The third section will discuss a possible evolutionaiy continuity between 
monkeys and humans by discussing lesion effects on social behaviour in human patients 
(and neuroimaging data on normal human subjects).
Criterion 3(a) will be discussed in Chapter IV where the connections of these 
three brain regions are analysed using a new statistical method called non-metric 
multidimensional scaling (NIVIDS). Criterion 3 (b) is discussed in Chapter III and the 
evolutionaiy stability of the previous proposal (criterion 4) is tested in Chapter V using 
comparative and ecological data for a range of non-human primates.
Criterion 2 is further tested using neurophysiological methods (described in 
Chapter VI) by testing whether single cells in one of these regions (anterior temporal 
cortex) respond to a range of stimuli which aid in social recognition, interaction and
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cognition. Chapter VII evaluates a complex level of processing, i.e. where others are 
attending, moving and what they are interacting with. Social interaction is improbable 
when another’s attention is directed elsewhere. Chapter VIII looks at neurons which may 
contribute to signalling which species individuals are interacting with; a primaiy level of 
social interaction. Such levels of visual processing may contribute to the perception of 
another's intentions and plans as suggested by a theory of mind (see Chapter IX).
2.2,2 Lesions of the Social Brain
As can be seen from the examples above, monkeys, apes and humans use a 
variety of complex methods to facilitate interactions with members of their social group. 
How is this information recognised and processed in the primate brain? Brothers (1997) 
has stated that the brain is an organ designed for processing such social interactions. This 
idea is certainly not a new one; this section aims to review and evaluate the last 100 years 
of research in this area and to provide a theoretical framework for some of the empirical 
work in the rest of this thesis.
Brown and Shafer (1888) performed the first study to find a correlation between 
brain lesion and a profound loss of social function. Ablation of the junction between the 
temporal and the occipital lobes in the rhesus monkey brain caused substantial 
disturbances in visual and emotional behaviour. These findings were replicated, 
substantiated and expanded in the 1930's by Kluver and Bucy, who lesioned the anterior 
temporal cortex (Kluver and Bucy 1937, 1938, 1939). The lesion they produced was 
quite large and included the hippocampus, uncus, amygdala, tail of the caudate nucleus 
and most of the anterior temporal cortex (including the inferotemporal cortex, entorhinal 
cortex, parahippocampal gyrus, rhinal cortex and superior temporal cortex (Kluver and 
Bucy 1939). This lesion caused a marked and distinct behavioural and emotional change 
post-operatively, in a number of monkeys, each with well defined symptoms. In what has 
now been termed the Kluver-Bucy syndrome (KB-syndrome), the monkeys developed 
symptoms of psychic blindness (or the tendency to approach animate and inanimate
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objects without hesitation); excessive oral tendencies (the monkeys examined all objects, 
foods and non-foods by mouth rather than hand, with all the objects being examined 
again and again as if novel); hypenmtamorphosis (or the tendency for the monkey to 
attend and react to every visual stimulus); visual agnosia (a disturbance in general object 
recognition); emotional changes (such as the complete absence of fear and anger); and 
hypersexuality (such as excessive masturbation, copulation and fellatio, either when alone 
or in the presence of other monkeys). It is impossible to say that these deficits were 
purely due to effects of social behaviour as the subjects were all housed singly. It is also 
difficult to say exactly which brain regions were involved in which deficits as such a large 
area of cortex and subcortex was removed. These issues have been addressed in more 
recent experiments.
The symptoms of the KB-syndrome have been replicated in a series of 
experiments by Horel and colleagues (Horel and Keating 1969, 1972; Horel and 
Misantone 1974; Horel, Keating and Misantone 1975). The lesions made during these 
studies were restricted to either the bilateral whole temporal lobes; the unilateral 
temporal lobe, contralateral occipital lobe and sectioning the corpus callosum; the 
amygdaloid complex, or transecting the visual inputs to the temporal lobe from the visual 
cortex. These different lesioned animals were then compared for their abilities in tasks 
designed to test for components of the KB-syndrome. They discovered that partial 
symptoms of the KB-syndrome could be fractionated by combinations of these lesions. 
By ablating the middle and inferior temporal gyms (inferotemporal cortex), the visual 
deficits seen in the KB-syndrome could be clearly differentiated. The visual tests used 
were a visual pattern discrimination task, and a food/non food discrimination. The 
temporal cortex lesioned group were found to be severely impaired in the pattern 
discrimination test, but not in the food/non food test. By ablating the amygdala, the 
emotional deficits seen in the KB-syndrome were plainly apparent (for example, 
decreases in attack, escape and submissive behaviours, but no change or slight increases 
in approach behaviour; Horel and Keating 1975). Hypoemotionality was only present 
after amygdala only lesions, suggesting that the amygdala was the next logical stage in 
processing visual information which was then granted emotional value. The temporal
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cortex lesioned group did not show any emotional disturbances, but only displayed 
disturbances of complex pattern recognition.
This interpretation would appear to be correct from the anatomical connections 
o f both of these regions (see Chapters III and IV) and the properties of neurons in these 
two regions. Horel and Keating (1972) also determined that it was the visual input to the 
amygdala which was causing deficits in the KB-syndrome, in particular the emotional 
deficits. They determined this by lesioning the temporal lobe on one side, lesioning the 
contralateral occipital cortex and disconnecting all possible visual inputs to the amygdala, 
such as transecting the circumstriate cortical belt, lesioning the anterior commissure, 
lesioning the contralateral temporal lobe and cutting the corpus callosal connections 
between the temporal lobes. They again tested lesioned monkeys on a two-choice task of 
non-food versus food; a ten choice task of ten food objects versus ten non-food objects, 
and emotional responsiveness tests (including assessment of tactile and oral reactivity). 
After the bilateral total temporal lobectomy, the monkeys displayed the symptoms of 
hypoemotionality, orality and psychic blindness. The visual deficits seen in the bilateral 
temporal cortex ablation animals were the same as in the unilateral, disconnection animals 
(i.e. there was no difference between ablating the temporal cortex from eliminating all 
visual input into the temporal cortex). Responses to emotional stimuli by the unilateral 
temporal lobe lesion group were different to the disconnection animals. These animals 
displayed a deficit in emotional behaviour, but this deficit recovered dramatically over 
time (Horel and Keating 1972, Horel and Misantone 1974). The authors suggested that 
this recoveiy was not due to re-routing of visual information through the intact callosum 
or into the intact temporal lobe (see also Horel and Keating 1969), but may have 
occurred through learning, as the recovery was only specific to post-operatively 
presented objects.
Downer (1961) was the first to suggest that it was the visual information 
processing in the amygdala which contributed greatly to the emotional and social deficits 
of the KB-syndrome. In split-hrain monkeys, with the optic chiasm, anterior commissure 
and the corpus callosum cut. Downer lesioned the temporal pole, containing the 
amygdala, and sutured the eye on the contralateral side to the lesion. This caused some
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symptoms of the KB-syndrome (visual agnosia and hypoemotionality). Downer then 
opened the sutured eye and sutured the ipsilateral eye to the lesion. This completely 
obliterated the symptoms of the KB-syndrome and restored pre-operative levels o f visual 
discrimination and aggression. Downer then proposed that it was the amygdala which 
was receiving visual information (the deficits in aggression were only seen with visually 
presented stimuli, not in reaction to vocalisations). A unilateral amygdalectomy was then 
performed on a monkey with a transection of the optic tract, anterior commissure and 
corpus callosum, thereby preventing the passage of visual information across the 
hemispheres. The eye contralateral to the amygdalectomy was sutured, and the animal 
became placid, as no visual information was reaching the intact amygdala. The eye was 
then opened, and the animal became aggressive again, as visual information was not able 
to making its way to the amygdala. The eye on the ipsilateral side of the amygdalectomy 
was sutured and the animal remained aggressive (as visual information was going to the 
intact amygdala). Finally, the contralateral eye to the lesion was then sutured and the 
ipsilateral eye opened and the animal again became placid. (Downer 1961). For a 
diagrammatic representation of the above experiments, see Figure 2.3.
These results and those of Horel et al. suggested that the major deficits of the 
KB-syndrome were dependent wholly on bilateral lesions to the amygdala, or eliminating 
visual inputs to the amygdala and that the original findings of Kluver and Bucy may have 
been only due to amygdala ablations. In all the above studies, the behavioural reactions of 
the lesioned subjects were directed to human observers in a non-social setting, and 
studies concentrated on collecting data on emotional reactions rather than complex social 
information processing (effects of amygdala lesions on this level of processing will be 
described later).
Weiskrantz (1956) found that lesioning the amygdala and re-secting the temporal 
pole o f rhesus monkeys caused a reduction in motor activity (the subjects became 
physically sluggish), approached all presented items (e.g. sticks, gloves, human obseiwers; 
all previously aversive stimuli) and were generally tame and unexcitable. Again, these are 
some of the symptoms of the KB-syndrome. Walker, Thomson and McQueen (1953) 
also replicated the symptoms of the KB-syndrome of apathetic attitude, no apprehension
Flgair® 2.3. Schematic representations of the various experiments performed by Downer 
(1961) to study the effects of unilateral amygdala lesions, commissurectomy and eye 
sutures on aggressive behaviour in rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatto). In the NORMAL 
condition, visual information reaches the amygdala via the visual cortex on the ipsilateral 
and contralateral sides. If the amygdala is lesioned unilaterally, the commissure is 
lesioned, and the eye is sutured on the contralateral side to the amygdala lesion; visual 
infoimation can not reach the intact amygdala. The animal does not react aggressively to 
threat stimuli, and becomes TAME. If the amygdala is lesioned, the commissure is 
lesioned and the eye on the ipsilateral side to the amygdala lesion is sutured; the visual 
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of previously feared objects and a reduction in aggression, by ablating the medial 
temporal lobe (including the amygdala and the cortex surrounding it, such as the uncus, 
the rhinal cortex and superior temporal sulcus). There was also an increase in signs of 
affection and affiliation, such as grooming, and licking other monkeys. One interesting 
example of the reverse of this was seen with a mother and her “perverted maternal 
instinct” (Walker et al 1953) towards her infant, which included indifference, biting and 
slapping and rebuffing.
Other deficiencies are observed after amygdala ablation, some of which are part 
of the KB-syndrome, but not immediately explainable in terms of deficits in emotion 
processing. Schwartzbaum et al (1961) showed that a bilateral amygdalectomy caused a 
dramatic increase in locomotor activity , which they described as a "disturbance in the 
habituation of motor activity". Amygdalectomised monkeys also do not form 
discrimination-reversal learning sets (which normal laboratoiy monkeys do), and this may 
be due to a change in the responsiveness of the monkey to novel items which has been 
discussed by others (Barrett 1969, Schwartzbaum 1965, Schwartzbaum and Poulos 
1965, Gaffan and Harrison 1987, Gaffan et al 1988, Gaffan and Murray 1990, Sarter and 
Markowitsch 1985).
More recently, Aggleton and Passingham (1981), have tried to replicate the 
symptoms seen in the KB-syndrome, but by performing subtotal lesions of the amygdala 
to further fractionate the KB-syndrome into precise anatomical locations within the 
amygdala. The separate lesions removed either the basolateral complex (BLA), the lateral 
nucleus (LAT), the dorsal amygdala (DAM) or corticomedial complex, and the whole 
amygdala (AMX, controls). The monkeys were tested on a variety of formal tests, e.g. 
food choice from two presented foods, hypermetamorphosis (a free choice of a variety of 
edible and inedible items), emotional responsiveness to frightening stimuli (such as snakes 
or the experimenter), and approach behaviour towards a food reward next to an aversive 
stimulus (an experimenter). All animals with subtotal lesions did not eat (but did touch) 
meat or faeces, did not show abnormal choices between edible and inedible objects, and 
did not mouth inedible objects. Changes in levels of emotionality were slight. BLA 
lesioned animals displayed high levels of aversive/submissive behaviour, one DAM
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lesioned animal displayed hypoemotionality, whereas a second DAM lesioned animal 
showed increased aggression. Monkeys with subtotal lesions tended to use more 
submissive gestures overall, such as lipsmacking. These animals also showed increased 
tendencies to approach previously fearedl objects such as human observers. In contrast, 
animals with total amygdala lesions showed all the signs of the KB-syndrome, they ate 
meat frequently, showed signs of coprophagia, had an excessive exploratoiy behaviour 
(handled and mouthed more inedible objects before edible foods), displayed a remarkable 
fall in emotionality, and showed an increase in approach behaviours and submissive 
gesturing (also seen with subtotal lesions).
There are a number of possible explanations for these results. Sensory 
information reaches the amygdala via the basolateral complex (visual information to the 
lateral and lateral basal nuclei, auditoiy and somatosensory information to the accessory 
basal nucleus). Lesions of cells within these areas should eliminate this information from 
reaching the rest of the amygdala. In contrast, these subtotal lesions appeared to have 
little effect on producing the symptoms of the KB-syndrome seen after total amygdala 
lesions. Aggleton and Passingham (1981) used radio-frequency lesions to destroy 
amygdala tissue. This method destroys fibres of passage through the amygdala which are 
important routes by which sensoiy information may travel to other areas of the brain 
(such as temporal pole and orbitofrontal cortex) and cell bodies. Ibotenic acid lesions 
would be required for lesions of cell bodies, without damage to fibres (Amaral, personal 
communication). It is therefore possible that some fibres were damaged after subtotal 
lesions and that the deficits seen were a direct consequence of fibre damage, not 
amygdala damage. . The subtotal lesions may not have removed all tissue within an 
amygdala division and this remaining tissue may also have been sufficient to perform 
certain functions.
The next section discusses the evidence that the amygdala is involved not only in 
basic emotional processing, but is also essential for normal social functioning in dyadic, 
triadic and larger groups of social monkeys. Rosvold et al (1954) lesioned the amygdala 
in monkeys to determine the effect on social behaviour, particularly social interaction and 
dominance hierarchy. The hierarchies of the social groups were determined from a peanut
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feeding situation, where a peanut was either offered to one individual or placed between 
two individuals. The dominance was determined from the frequency of individuals 
gaining food. This method for establishing dominance relationships has been questioned 
(Bernstein 1981) and is unorthodox when compared to other methods, such as noting 
bouts of aggression or fearfulness between different parties (Martin and Bateson 1993). 
The dominant individual was then given a bilateral amygdalectomy. The animals were 
also examined in individual cages for their aggressiveness or fearlessness behaviour, 
threatening and fight behaviour and pellet taking behaviour. The dominance hierarchy of 
the group before surgeiy was Dave > Zeke > Riva > Herby > Benny > Aimie > Shorty > 
Larry. Dave, the dominant male had a bilateral amygdalectomy and became submissive to 
all, but the least dominant animal (Lany). He did not try to retrieve food and did not 
react aggressively to, or retaliate against animals who attacked him. The second monkey 
in the hierarchy, Zeke, then became the most dominant male. Zeke then received a 
bilateral amygdalectomy and became subordinate to all, but Dave and Larry. This allowed 
the next dominant animal, Riva, to become the dominant monkey. Throughout all the 
social encounters. Riva was an aggressive animal, and when he received a bilateral 
amygdalectomy he remained aggressive. This situation has been explained by the fact that 
in all the previous social hierarchies, the next dominant animals after the most dominant 
animal had been aggressive. The next dominant animal after Riva, Herby, however was 
placid and unassertive, so Riva had no direct competition from appropriately placed 
males, and therefore remained aggressive. When looking at the effects of brain lesions on 
social behaviour, it became important to study individual interactions and the 
personalities of the group members before surgeiy.
Plotnik (1968) studied the effects of anterior temporal lobotomies (mainly just the 
amygdala, but in one instance the amygdala and some of the inferior orbitofrontal cortex) 
on squirrel monkey social dominance ranks and aggressiveness. Plotnik attempted to 
replicate the results of Rosvold et al (1954) by determining whether individual 
personalities would determine the dominance hierarchies after each individual’s surgery, 
using a competitive scenario. Plotnik found, however that the stability of the dominance 
hierarchy after surgeiy depended on individual animals. White who was dominant before
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surgery, still remained dominant, but less aggressive. The next dominant monkey, Green, 
became more aggressive towards the next monkey in the hierarchy, Red. Similar patterns 
of increases in aggression emerged for every subsequent monkey after they received an 
amygdala lesion. All monkeys became tamer towards humans, approached and sniffed all 
objects and produced less fear of previously avoided objects (as would be suggested by 
the KB-syndrome).
The proposition that the amygdala is the seat of social behaviour in non-human 
primates has received attention from a number of experimenters. All the previously 
described studies of amygdala lesions have been performed in the laboratory on animals 
born in captivity. As with most investigations into brain-behaviour relationships there are 
costs and benefits related to where the experiments are carried out. Laboratoiy 
experiments afford high levels of control over large numbers of possible variables, but 
lack the richness of natural behaviour. Experiments in the wild in contrast have low levels 
o f experimental control, but the results derived are closely related to the natural 
behaviour of the obseiwed animals (in the wild there are many situations which cannot be 
controlled during the life-histoiy of an animal). Both methods have something to offer 
this field of research.
Kling has been the major proponent for investigations of amygdalectomised 
monkeys in their natural habitat (or reconstmctions of their habitat). Dicks, Myers and 
Kling (1969) studied rhesus monkeys in a semi-natural setting (the rhesus monkey colony 
of Cayo Santiago, Caribbean Regional Primate Centre). They trapped 7 males from a 
large group of 85 and performed bilateral amygdalectomies on these monkeys. The 
subjects were then released back to their social group and obsei*ved. The lesioned 
monkeys became solitai'y and indifferent to the other members of the group and did not 
appear to respond correctly when attacked (which was frequently). As a number of these 
operates died alone, location unknown, it was not known whether the lesions affected the 
whole of the amygdala, part of the amygdala or another part of the brain altogether.
Experimenters have also attempted to study the effects of amygdala lesions on 
free-ranging monkeys. Kling, Lancaster and Benitone (1970) studied a group of free- 
ranging vervet monkeys in Zambia, and asked the question “would amygdalectomised
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animals survive in their natural environment, and would previous social interactions be 
re-established?” (Kling et al 1970). Amygdalectomy in the caged vervet caused anorexia, 
hyperorality, coprophagia and a reduction in fear of humans; all symptoms of the KB- 
syndrome (Kling and Carpenter 1968). They found that amygdala lesions in free-ranging 
vervets did not cause characteristics of the KB- syndrome; instead the monkeys did not 
eat or drink after lesions and no oral behaviour was obsei*ved. Post-operatively, the 
vervets displayed a lack of responsiveness to other group members and did not exhibit 
any threatening or aggressive gestures to approaching monkeys. Although the monkeys 
were mainly given friendly and affiliative gestures from other monkeys, they withdrew 
from their social group and showed a negative response to social interactions. This may 
be related to ideas that the amygdala places salience on incoming sensory information 
that allows an animal to respond appropriately to intended social communication. An 
animal may respond in a threatening manner to every gesture directed towards it and so 
would fail to facilitate and maintain social interactions and bonding. It would also seem 
clear that the KB-syndrome (in vervet and rhesus monkeys) is dependent on a solitary 
existence, as it’s effects are diminished within the social context.
Stump-tailed macaques {Macaca speciosa) appear to be docile and passive, 
compared to the aggressive rhesus macaques (Bertrand 1969, Orbach and Kling 1964). 
Kling and Cornell (1971) suggested that it may be species-specific behaviours which are 
compromised by lesioning the amygdala, giving rise to reductions in aggression, in the 
naturally aggressive rhesus macaque. Predictions about the stump-tailed macaque were 
difficult to make as at the time of this study, the species was little studied, and their 
passivity was thought due to “freezing behaviour” rather than “flight behaviour” usually 
seen in response to human presence (Bluiton-Jones and Trollope 1968). Kling and 
Cornell (1971) recorded instances of social behaviour (aggression, threatening behaviour, 
sexual behaviour and affiliative behaviour) pre-operatively and after bilateral amygdala 
(and uncus) lesions. The dominance hierarchy was also noted. Post-operatively, the 
monkeys (independent of social status) had many or all of the symptoms of the KB- 
syndrome. There were behavioural differences associated with dominance. The most 
dominant animal remained dominant, a sub-adult female fell in rank and other animals in
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the group either fell in dominance or retained their rank. This reinforced the idea that 
social behaviour must be studied in animals who are members of an established social 
group with a stable hierarchical system (Kling and Steklis 1976).
Amygdala lesions have also been shown to effect monkey sexual behaviour 
(another aspect of the KB-syndrome is hypersexuality). This is probably due to the 
extensive inter-connectivity between the amygdala (centro-medial complex) and the 
hypothalamus (see Amaral et al 1992 and Chapter III). As in previous reports, amygdala 
lesions cause increased coprophagia and uriposia, mouthing of non-food objects and 
decreased fear responses (KB-syndrome). Kling and Dunne (1976) also showed that 
there was a massive increase in normal and abnormal sexual behaviour after amygdala 
lesions and when introduced into small social groups (of lesioned and non-lesioned 
animals). The operated animals performed heightened levels of autofellatio, heterosexual- 
, homosexual- and self-masturbation and homosexual mounting (males and females). 
Sexual behaviour was almost non-existent when the lesioned animals were returned to a 
established large social group (Kling and Dunne 1976). Kling (1968) also studied the 
effects of giving injections of testosterone to juvenile macaques with amygdalectomies, 
Kling found that solicited mounting and erections increased between males (before 
testosterone was given), as did sham-biting, grooming and rough and tumble play. Adult 
aggressive behaviour was not seen. After testosterone, there was another increase in 
sham-biting, but a decrease in grooming and other behaviours.
Finally, there is an apparent sex difference in the effects of amygdala lesions in 
different species of monkeys. In rhesus macaques, the females become the most 
aggressive, and in some instances are so violent to the males, the attacks on them prove 
fatal (Kling 1974). The same pattern occurs for stump-tailed macaques, where male 
aggression and fear responses are drastically reduced after amygdalectomy (Kling 1974). 
In vervets, female aggression after amygdalectomy is high and directed towards males, 
who do not appear to retaliate (or know how to respond and therefore, retaliate 
appropriately).
The amygdala appears to be one area of the primate brain which influences 
various aspects of social behaviour. It is not known precisely which aspects these are (i.e.
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whether deficits in social communication; interpretation or response, fear/danger 
processing, affiliation or aggression). Kling and Steklis (1976) suggested that the 
amygdala is part of a functional system intimately involved in the neural coding of social 
behaviour. The system is comprised of the anterior temporal cortex (temporal pole), 
which passes information to the amygdala, which in turn outputs to the orbitofrontal 
cortex. The next two sections will discuss the available evidence that the anterior 
temporal lobe and prefrontal (orbitofrontal cortex) are part of this circuit.
The original lesions producing the KB-syndrome were directed to the anterior 
temporal lobes. As stated earlier, lesioning the amygdala alone is sufficient to cause the 
majority of deficits seen in the KB-syndrome. The cortical parts of the temporal lobe may 
also contribute to primate social perception and cognition. The evidence for this 
proposition is clear when discussing the response characteristics of neurons in this region 
(see below and Chapters VII and VIII). The cortex of the anterior temporal lobe appears 
to be heavily involved in the visual recognition of complex biological objects, such as 
hands, bodies and faces (in the ventral cortex, inferotemporal cortex and the superior 
temporal sulcus; Bioice et al 1981, Desimone et al 1984, Perrett, Rolls and Caan 1982) 
and the auditoiy recognition of complex sounds, such as vocalisations (in the dorsal 
cortex, superior temporal gyrus; Winter and Funkenstein 1973, Ploog 1981, 
Rauschecker, Tian and Hauser 1995).
Franzen and Myers (1973) lesioned the anterior temporal cortex (leaving the 
amygdala and hippocampus intact) in rhesus macaques. The lesions had many effects on 
social behaviour. Early post-operatively, the monkeys displayed increased cage activity, 
increased approach to human observers (i.e. decreased fear), decreased food intake 
(maybe due to inappropriate responses to food items) and forced rejection of infants. 
When the operate monkeys were released into a social group, they showed decreases in 
dominance and aggressive behaviour (although increased aggression towards humans), 
decreases in facial expressions, vocalisations and other forms of social communication, 
decreases in infant affiliation (and usually increased aggression towards infants), 
increased grooming and increased sniffing/smelling objects. The majority of these deficits 
can be explained by problems associated with dysfunction of visual processing, such as
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not recognising facial expressions appropriately, not recognising individuals (such as 
alpha male, infant, mother, etc.) or general loss of an object recognition ability.
Raleigh and Steklis (1981) also lesioned the anterior temporal lobe (including 
some of the temporal pole and the inferior temporal gyms) in vervet monkeys. They 
discovered that the amount of grooming initiated by operated animals decreased with 
increased ablation of the temporal pole, in the overall lesion. They found no other effects 
of this lesion in the categories they studied.
The final step in the social processing pathway proposed by Kling and Steldis 
(1976) is the orbitofrontal cortex (part of the prefrontal cortex). This particular area of 
the brain has received large amounts of attention in the areas of executive functioning, 
such as memory (Goldman-Rakic 1987), decision-making (Damasio, Damasio and 
Christen 1996) and motor planning (Passingham 1993). Many investigators have 
attempted to determine what role the prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex play in coding 
social behaviour (or the outputs from anterior temporal cortex and amygdala in the Kling 
and Steklis 1976 circuit).
Brody and Rosvold (1952) performed the first study to evaluate the effect of 
prefrontal lesions on social behaviour and social status in monkeys. They found that, as in 
amygdala lesioned animals, the pre-operative dominance positions of the operated 
animals were important in determining dominance and social behaviour after the lesion. 
Three rhesus macaques received prefrontal lobectomies; the most dominant (Back) and 
two least dominant animals (Alfred and Wizen). Motor activity increased in all three 
subjects. Back remained dominant after the lesion, as did his social responses. Alfred and 
Wizen, however, seemed to have reduced fear responses (as seen in their increased 
attempts to steal food) and did not respond to other’s threats. Later observations noted 
constant fluctuations in the dominance hierarchy of the group, due mainly to increased 
aggression from the lower subordinate animals towards the previously more dominant 
animals. Eventually, the levels of aggression returned to normal levels (including 
downward aggression towards subordinate animals).
Investigations of the prefrontal cortex have looked either at the orbitofrontal 
cortex or the dorsolateral cortex. Mass and Kling (1975) removed the dorsolateral
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prefrontal cortex of stumptailed macaques. They found early effects on social behaviour 
in the lesioned animals were an increase in aggression and stereotyped pacing. Later 
effects were increased displacing, threatening, aggression, joining and mounting. The 
aggression seen post-operatively was inappropriately directed (i.e. from low to high 
ranking individuals). Singh (1976) also lesioned the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex of 
rhesus macaques and found an increase in huddling, aggression, self-grooming, 
exploration of others, stereotypical activity and self-abuse and a decrease in withdrawal, 
proximity, contact, social grooming, threatening behaviour and vocalisations. (These 
same behaviours were also seen after orbitofrontal lesions.) A further experiment to test 
the effects of dorsolateral lesions on social behaviour was performed by Suomi, Harlow 
and Lewis (1970). Suomi et al tested rhesus monkeys in a social preference paradigm. 
Here the subjects were placed into the centre of a test apparatus and allowed free time to 
approach other monkeys (either with or without frontal lobectomies, and of either sex). 
Subjects with frontal lobectomies (consisting of lesions of the dorsolateral and 
orbitofrontal cortex) preferred to approach opposite sex monkeys with frontal lesions, 
but had no preferences for monkeys of the same sex (control or lesion).
The orbitofrontal cortex has been strongly placed in the social processing circuit. 
Basic emotional reactions (towards human observers in a non-social setting) are 
compromised after orbitofrontal lesions. Human obseivers provided the emotional 
stimuli, by looking directly into the eyes of the subjects. Individually caged rhesus 
monkeys with these ablations become unaggressive towards human observers and 
frequently attempt avoidance (by averting the head and eyes, and by lipsmacking; Butter, 
Mishkin and Mirsky 1968). This is opposite to the laboratory rhesus macaque’s usual 
behavioural reactions towards humans which are aggressive (consisting of threats and 
occasionally attacks).
These appear to be typical responses when monkeys with orbitofrontal lesions 
are placed into social situations with conspecifics. Stumptailed macaques reduce the 
number of threats or aggressive behaviour after orbitofrontal ablation (Miller and Levine 
1977). Their activity levels are also reduced, as is grooming. Dominance hierarchy 
changes because of this. All operates have an overall reduction in activity and an increase
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in solitary behaviours (such as self-grooming and reduction in proximity to conspecifics). 
As with amygdala lesions there is an increase in stereotypical activity (pacing) and 
mothers with new-born infants ignore them (Myers, Swett and Miller (1973).
Grooming is affected in vervet monkeys after orbitofrontal lesions, possible again 
due to a increase in solitary behaviour and a reduction in huddling (Raleigh and Steklis 
1981). Aggression increases towards human observers in vervets (opposite to rhesus 
macaques, maybe because of initial differences in aggressive behaviour between the two 
species). This is substantiated by the finding that there is decreased aggression towards 
the social group, but also a reduction in the formation of coalitions in females (Raleigh et 
al 1979).
Aside from lesions of the anterior temporal cortex, Franzen and Myers (1973) 
also lesioned the orbitofrontal cortex of rhesus monkeys. As with the temporal lesioned 
animals, there was an initial absence of a fear response directed to the human 
experimenters. The only activity performed by these animals was stereotypical pacing, 
and there was also a decrease in food intake. As with the temporal operates, there was a 
decrease in facial expressions, vocalisations, postures and gestures and a decrease in 
aggressive behaviour. The decrease in grooming others may again be due to a decrease in 
general proximity to other group members. The precise similarity of these functional 
deficits between the orbitofrontal and anterior temporal lesioned animals is convincing 
evidence for a link in function between these two regions of the monkey cortex.
Peters and Ploog (1976) studied the effects of orbitofrontal lesions on squirrel 
monkey dominance hierarchies and found that these lesions caused a number of profound 
deficits in the social behaviour of this New World monkey species. Dominance in this 
species was determined by the number of head grasps performed by one individual to 
another (dominant animals perform more head grasps than subordinate animals). After 
frontal cortex ablation, the number of head grasps was greatly reduced in the most 
dominant animal, therefore, reducing his position in the hierarchy. Overall, there was a 
50% reduction in total social interactions, with reduced fear, competition for food 
(usually seen as a criteria for dominance) and general reduction in activity levels (with an 
increase in stereotyped locomotion).
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Three other areas of the monkey brain have been studied for possible effects on 
social interaction. These are the hippocampus, cingulate cortex and superior temporal 
gyrus (Mirsky 1960, Kawai 1966). Removing the cingulate gyms of rhesus monkeys 
appears to have little effect on social behaviour, however, the most dominant animal in 
the group of lesioned monkey fell after the initial lesion, but recovered after a length of 
time (Mirsky, Rosvold and Pribram 1957). No other effects on social behaviour were 
reported by these authors. The hippocampus was originally removed in the Kluver and 
Bucy (1938, 1939) studies and may make a small contribution to social functioning. 
Beauregard et al (1995) lesioned the hippocampus (including all subfields and the 
parahippocampal gyrus) of new-born rhesus macaques, removed from their mothers. The 
new-borns were tested at 2 months, 6 months and 5-8 years after the lesion for a number 
o f motor and social behaviours. At 2 months, the operates reduced their approach to 
normal new-borns and were rejected when they did approach. All social interactions 
between operates and normals were initiated by the controls. After 6 months there were 
no social abnormalities apparent to the researchers, but at 5-8 years there was an increase 
in locomotor stereotypies seen after lesions in juveniles and adult monkeys with 
prefrontal and amygdala lesions.
Other investigators have looked at the time course of brain lesions and the effect 
on social behaviour. Although brain lesions during the first week of life may have little 
effect on social processing later in development (as there are assumed to be high levels of 
functional recoveiy at this stage of ontogeny), this may not be the case if lesions are 
performed later in development (Kling 1966, Kling and Green 1967). Harlow (1958) 
showed that social isolation in rhesus monkeys at this early stage was sufficient to cause 
pronounced deficits in social behaviour. This effect may be paralleled by lesions to brain 
structures crucial for this early stage of social development, such as the amygdala. The 
amygdaloid complex is one of the earliest stmctures to develop within the temporal lobe 
(Kordower, Piecinski and Rakic 1992). The two sub-divisions of the amygdala (see 
chapter III), do not differentiate until later in gestation. This suggests, that although 
neurons of the amygdala develop early in gestation (embiyonic day (E}30 - E50), the
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functional organisation may be acquired later in development (allowing for a certain 
degree of plasticity).
Kling (1966, 1968) has experimented with the idea that there are differences in 
social behaviour between those adult monkeys who received amygdalectomies as infants 
and those who received lesions in adulthood. In adult lesioned monkeys the symptoms of 
the KB-syndrome could be verified as in other studies mentioned above. In infants who 
received amygdala lesions, however, these behaviours were not seen or were of lesser 
severity than those seen in adults. These effects have been replicated for rhesus, 
stumptailed and bonnet macaques (Kling and Green 1967). Some behaviours are spared 
when damage to the functional systems involved are damaged in early life (Thompson 
and Towfighi 1976; Thompson, Bergland and Towfighi 1977; Thompson 1981). The 
separate emotion of fear was found to be prevalent in infant monkeys after 
amygdalectomy, even though the presence of fear in adult lesioned animals was either 
reduced or non-existent (Thompson, Schwartzbaum and Harlow 1969).
In summaiy, it appears that many different lesions localised in the medial and 
anterior temporal lobe and prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex cause profound changes in 
some forms of social and emotional behaviour in monkeys. In the KB-syndrome, the 
whole of the temporal lobe was lesioned by Kluver and Bucy (1938, 1939), but a number 
of workers have shown that lesions of the amygdala alone will suffice to produce the 
same range of deficits in emotion and social processing. Zola-Morgan et al (1991) have 
also substantiated this view by lesioning either separately or in conjunction, the amygdala 
and the hippocampus. They found that the hippocampus (which was also lesioned in the 
initial KB-syndrome studies) appeared to be uninvolved in emotion processing (i.e. did 
not effect fearful reactions to noxious stimuli) and was only involved in memory 
processes. The results of Beauregard et al (1995) suggest that emotion may not be 
processed in the hippocampus, but subtle coding of social behaviour may be performed 
by this structure. Lesions of the amygdala (Zola-Morgan et al 1991), however, caused 
disruptions to fear processing (the evidence for difficulties in fear processing in humans is 
discussed below).
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2.2.3 Neurophysiology of the Social Brain
The visual system of primates is an extremely complicated ftmctional network, 
with an estimated 32 visual areas (Fellman and Van Essen 1991, Young 1992). Basically, 
the visual system has a hierarchical nature, with two processing streams, dorsal and 
ventral (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982, Young 1992). The visual image is processed in 
increasingly more complex visual areas from the ganglion cells in the retina, lateral 
geniculate nucleus and the primaiy visual cortex (area 17, or VI). In the primary visual 
cortex, the pioneering experiments of Hubei and Wiesel revealed cells which were 
responsive only to the sight of contours presented at a particular orientation (Hubei and 
Wiesel 1962). The image is then processed further in extrastriate areas of the brain (for 
example, V2, V3, V4, MT, FST, parietal cortex). The information of the visual image 
reaches two areas of interest for this thesis; the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the 
amygdala. The physiology and anatomy of the early stages of the primate visual system 
will not be discussed further. The only information concerning the visual system that is 
important here, is that visual information reaches the anterior temporal cortex by a 
particular pathway (see Chapter III) and that the forms of stimuli processed by earlier 
stages in the pathway are not complex or biological in nature (Perrett and Oram 1993).
The superior temporal sulcus (STS) is a long sulcus running from the parietal 
cortex, down past V4, to run along side of the inferior temporal cortex to the temporal 
pole (Seltzer and Tandy a 1978). Neurophysiological studies of the STS have found that 
this cortical area has a primarily visual function, although one of the parcellation areas, 
called the anterior Superior Temporal Polysensoiy area (STPa), has been found to have 
polymodal functions (visual, auditoiy and tactile, Bruce et al 1981). Cells that have a 
primary visual function were reported by Gross et al (1972), who recorded in the inferior 
temporal cortex, specifically finding visually responsive cells in areas TEO and TE (von 
Bonin and Bailey 1947, see Chapter III for anatomical location). Gross et al were the 
first to describe, particular cell responses to a complex biological object; a hand. It was 
not until the late 1970’s (Perrett et al 1979) and early 1980's (Bmce et al 1981, Perrett et 
al 1982) that a systematic study of these types of cell was undertaken. Cells that coded
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for a number of biologically important visual stimuli, primarily faces were found by Bruce 
et al (1981). Bruce et al recorded in the STPa and found that the greatest number of cells 
were responsive to visual stimuli. They also reported cells responsive to faces (monkey 
and human), whose firing rate was significantly greater than their response to other 
objects (such as bars, gratings and non-biological complex objects). These cells were not 
identity specific as they responded to a wide variety of individual and species’ faces and 
the cells diminished their response when the particular parts of the face were "jumbled", 
or when the eyes were covered.
Cells in this area were also found to be responsive to other modalities, e.g. 
auditory and somesthetic stimuli; some required two modalities to be presented together 
and a small number required three, hence the name "superior temporal polysensory area" 
(Bruce et al 1981, Hikosaka et al 1988). Polysensory cells may be important in normal 
social behaviour, as the cells may be crucial to link a facial expression to a vocalisation, 
or a slap with a particular gesture, for example.
The description of face-responsive neurons was a significant discovery, as the 
neurological disorder of prosopagnosia has been known for some time. Briefly, this 
disorder causes the patient to be deficient in recognising previously familiar faces 
(Damasio 1985, Milders and Perrett 1993).
Continuing work started by Gross et al (1972) and Bmce et al (1981), Perrett et 
al (1982) reported a systematic analysis of the face-selective cells in the flindus of the 
STS. These cell responses were 2-10 times as large as the responses to other simple or 
complex visual stimuli, and other modal forms of stimuli (e.g. auditory). The latency of 
these cells were between 80 and 160 ms, which was compatible with the notion that the 
STPa is the next stage of visual processing after the inferotemporal cortex (Oram and 
Perrett 1992). The response of these cells to faces was found to be constant despite 
different transformations, including colour, size, distance and orientation (inverted or 
upright). The cell responses were reduced when the face stimuli was presented in profile 
and some of the cells were found to be responsive only to particular parts of the face, 
mainly the eyes.
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Perrett and colleagues have continued work on cells in the STS that are 
responsive to faces, whole and part body motion (Perrett et al 1985b, Oram and Perrett 
1994, 1996), static bodies (Wachsmuth et al 1994) and eye gaze (Perrett et al 1985a, 
Perrett et al 1992). The cells selective to one body, head or eye view have been 
interpreted as coding "social attention" or the direction in which another’s attention lies 
(Perrett et al 1992). These cells are described in more detail, in Chapters V ll and Vlll.
Cells responsive to specific identities have also been found in the STS (Perrett et 
al 1984, Perrett, Mistlin and Chitty 1987) and in the inferior temporal gyrus (Hasselmo, 
Rolls and Baylis 1989), although the occurrence of these apparently specific "gnostic 
(grandmother)" cells (Barlow 1972) are rare. The responses of the cells may be tuned to 
particular facial configurations and not identities per se (Yamane, Kaji and Kawano 
1988), or for multiple features in several different horizontal views of the head (Perrett et 
al 1984, perrett, Mistlin and Chitty 1987). These cells are also discussed more 
thoroughly, in Chapter VIII.
Cells responsive to different facial expressions are coded in similar regions to the 
face responsive neurons discussed above; STS (Hasselmo, Rolls and Baylis 1989, Perrett 
et al 1984, Perrett and Mistlin 1990, Perrett, Oram and Wachsmuth 1993), amygdala 
(Brothers and Ring 1993), temporal pole (Nakamura et al 1994) and orbitofrontal cortex 
(Thorpe, Rolls and Maddison 1983). Of all facial expressions, threat faces are 
represented most frequently at the neuronal level. Cells primarily responsive to threats 
have been found in the STS (Perrett et al 1984, Hasselmo, Rolls and Baylis 1989, Perrett 
and Mistlin 1990), accessory basal and medial basal nuclei of the amygdala (Leonard et al 
1985, Brothers and Ring 1993), ventral anterior temporal pole (Nakamura et al 1994) 
and orbitofrontal cortex (Thorpe, Rolls and Maddison 1983). Other facial expressions 
coded in these regions were grimace (Perrett and Mistlin 1990), yawn (Brothers, Ring 
and Kling 1990, Perrett and Mistlin 1990). One surprising result was the response of a 
single neuron to a human smiling face. This response was probably related to the 
reinforcing nature of the stimulus (human smiling equals more food?), rather than a 
innate neural response to smiling faces. A behavioural study by Kanazawa (1996) is
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suggestive that Japanese macaques may recognise human facial expressions, such as 
smiling faces.
The preponderance of threat neurons responsive to threat is of evolutionary 
significance. As discussed previously, being able to respond correctly and swiftly to a 
threat is extremely beneficial to the animal being threatened. Work performed in human 
patients with brain lesions, and studies of normal humans with neuroimaging, have 
complimented the neuronal studies described above (and the lesion studies performed on 
monkey described above, see also Kling and Brothers 1992).
Populations of cells in the STPa also respond to human bodies as a class of 
object; with different levels of coding for separate parts of the body (such as the head, 
torso and legs). These cells tend to respond to either the head presented separate from 
the rest of the body, the body presented alone or to the whole body (Wachsmuth et al 
1994). Ninety-percent of these cells are dependent on perspective view. The majority 
respond when the head and body are in compatible directions.
All cells within the anterior STS do not just respond to the presentation of faces 
(i.e the STS is not exclusively an area devoted to processing information about faces). 
Other investigators have recorded from single units in the STS and found that cells in this 
area respond to a number of different modalities, as previously described by Bruce et al 
(1981). Other cells respond to different types of complex visual stimuli (Mikami et al 
1994) and others respond to different colours, shapes and patterns (Komatsu and Ideura 
1993, Kobatake and Tanaka 1994).
A separate issue raised in a previous section was the development of social 
responsiveness. Mendelson, Haith and Goldman-Rakic (1981) found that infant rhesus 
monkeys can discriminate faces by the first week of life, and can discriminate whether a 
face is directed towards or away from the viewer, by the third week of life. By the third 
week, infant monkeys also appear to appreciate the emotional significance of the direct 
gaze (i.e. as a threat); it is learnt that turning away from direct gaze removes an 
unpleasant experience. Orienting towards faces may be an adaptive mechanism which 
allows infants to come into contact with the one individual which provides opportunities 
for survival; the mother. The time course of face discrimination described for rhesus
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monkey newborns is different for human newborns. A number of studies suggest that 
human infants do not tend to orient towards faces until two months of age (see Jolinson 
and Morton 1991 for review). Monkeys also begin to walk around the first day of life, 
whereas humans tend to begin walking around 9 months old. The development of rhesus 
monkey behaviour appears to mirror the development of other mammals, i.e. non-human 
animal infants are less reliant on their mothers than human infants. This has important 
implications for animals with natural predators, where a highly developed motor system 
enables greater ease of escape. Processing faces, as distinct visual objects within the first 
weeks of life, must have been of adaptive value for rhesus monkeys.
Rodman et al (1993) recorded from neurons in the IT and anterior STP of 
anaesthetised and awake infant rhesus monkeys and found that any visual responses were 
absent in STPa before 4 months of age, but after this the visual responses were the same 
as adults (including responses to face stimuli, such as facial expressions and different 
head views). During this first 4 month period, the infants may have been relying on 
simpler visual processes which were not coding the details of the face or early face 
processing occurs in other regions of the brain. It is also possible that Rodman et al 
missed a number of neurons which were face selective at an earlier age.
The information that reaches the STS and amygdala is already highly processed in 
terms of form, shape and colour (Perrett and Oram 1993). Neurophysiological studies of 
the primate amygdala have also elucidated the probable role for parts of or the whole of 
the amygdala in the recognition, interpretation and production of social behaviour. Rolls 
and colleagues have recorded in various amygdala nuclei and have reported cells 
preferentially responsive to the human and monkey face, and other visual forms (Rolls 
1981, Rolls 1984, Leonard et al 1985, Rolls 1992). The first set o f stimuli shown to 
monkeys, were visual stimuli which were associated with food reward (Sanghera et al 
1979). The cells found to respond to visual stimuli were located in the basolateral 
amygdala (lateral, medial basal, accessoi^ basal and lateral basal nuclei). Cell latencies for 
these cells were between 100-190ms which is higher than those visual cells in the 
temporal cortex (100-150ms, Oram and Perrett 1992). This suggests that cells within the 
basolateral nuclei in the amygdala are activated after visual processing in the anterior
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temporal cortex. This is compatible with the anatomical data (Chapter III) and the lesion 
data presented above (Kluver and Bucy 1938, 1939, Downer 1961).
The cells responsive to faces found in the amygdala were similar to those found in 
the anterior STS and inferotemporal cortex (Bmce et al 1981, Perrett et al 1982, 
Desimone et al 1984). The face selective neurons in the amygdala (12% of the visually 
responsive neurons) were resposive for monkey or human faces, certain facial 
expressions and occasionally to more complex stimuli such as pairs of infant monkeys 
(not responding or a small response to single monkeys). The response of these “complex” 
neurons was either twice as high as to faces, as to other visual stimuli, with some of the 
responses five to ten times higher (Leonard et al 1985).
Preliminaiy studies have already attempted to unravel the neurophysiological 
basis of processing and interpreting complex visual social signals (Brothers, Ring and 
Kling 1990, Brothers and Ring 1993). Brothers recorded in the amygdala whilst 
presenting videofilm of stumptailed macaques performing various visual social signals.
The results reported are interesting in the level of complexity with which the cells 
respond. Unfortunately, the number of cells reported is small, due to special difficulties in 
recording in the amygdala (Brothers, personal communication). The cells that Brothers 
and colleagues did report were as selective as neurons within the STS, such as responsive 
to solicitation for grooming, upward and downward climbing, eye contact, open rather 
than closed mouths, different identities of humans and monkeys (species differences) and 
a cell responsive to quadaipedal walking (Brothers, Ring and Kling 1990, Brothers and 
Ring 1993). The method of testing which Brothers attempted is clearly the way forward 
in determining what signals evoke responses from single-units in the amygdaloid 
complex.
Kling has used neurophysiological methods to evaluate the processing of social 
signals in the amygdala. Kling, however, used free-ranging monkeys performing naturally 
occurring forms of social interaction; an issue of importance raised from his studies of 
free-ranging amygdalectomised monkeys (Kling et al 1970). Kling used the method of 
radiotelemetry. In this technique, the electrodes are permanently embedded in the brain of 
the monkey and the cell responses were recorded and transmitted as radio waves, for
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analysis elsewhere. The monkey was free to move around their environment whilst being 
continuously recorded from (Kling, Steklis and Deutsch 1979, Kling 1981, Kling, Lloyd 
and Perryman 1987, Lloyd and Kling 1991). Kling et al (1979) looked at the change in 
power of delta, omega, alpha and beta EEG waves recorded by radiotelemetiy during 
very particular social interactions. The electrodes were implanted in the basolateral 
amygdala nuclei. Kling et al found that the highest delta power was seen during passive 
states of approach, approach with yawn, genital inspection and grooming. The highest 
power in the omega range was present during passive approach, passive genital 
inspection, mnning and chasing, and passive threats. The lowest omega power was seen 
during other behaviours, such as grooming, sitting together and sleeping.
More recent studies by Kling and colleagues (Kling Lloyd and Penyman 1987, 
Lloyd and Kling 1991) found a dramatic increase in delta activity when the subject 
monkey was in the presence of other monkeys, or in particular social interactions, rather 
than being alone. When the inferotemporal cortex (IT) was lesioned and electrical activity 
was recorded from the amygdala, Kling et al found that usual high levels of activity to 
visual stimuli (e.g. human and monkey faces) were decreased when the animal was in 
isolation. When in the presence of other group members there were no discernible 
changes.
Penyman, Kling and Lloyd (1987) used visual evoked potentials (VEPs) to test 
the effect of IT lesions on electrical activity in the amygdala to visual social stimuli. They 
found that VEPs in the medial basal nucleus of the amygdala were abolished after IT 
removal, but VEPs were intact in other nuclei. This may be one of the regions which 
codes the behavioural significance of visual social signals, probably due to it's extensive 
connectivity to anterior temporal cortex.
Pineda et al (1994) also used event-related potentials to study primate social 
behaviour. They studied the dominance hierarchy of a group of squirrel monkeys and the 
effect on ERPs, by presenting certain visual stimuli. Subjects were shown individual 
monkeys of differing social status, and Pineda et al reported larger N2 amplitudes when 
the subjects were shown higher-ranking animals. The perception of other’s rank in the
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social hierarchy can be detected at the neural level, for example in the STS (Young and 
Yamane 1992).
Amygdala neurons may function in the visual discrimination of complex forms 
(Nakamura et al 1992). Nakamura presented various types of visual stimuli (including 
faces) and came to the conclusion that the amygdala is involved in the recognition and 
evaluation of complex stimuli, and in the short-term storage of these same stimuli. This is 
probably correct, but the memory functions of the amygdala are likely to include 
emotional and social information (LeDoux 1987, 1996). Much work has studied the 
amygdala’s role in memory and visual association, but this work will not be discussed 
here due to lack of space. The following experimental studies discuss the role that the 
amygdala may play in memoiy (Mishkin 1978, Gaffan, Murray and Fabre-Thorpe 1993, 
Wilson and Rolls 1993, Gaffan 1994, Murray and Gaffan 1994). Gaffan, however, has 
recently suggested that his previous assumptions about the amygdala’s role in memory 
may have been over-interpretative (Gaffan 1995).
It should be mentioned that certain types of social behaviour can be elicited by 
electrical stimulation of various parts of the amygdaloid complex. Jurgens (1982) caused 
various types of vocalisations from monkeys by stimulating different areas in the 
amygdaloid complex. Stimulating the medial basal, lateral basal or accessory basal nuclei 
elicited purring. Stimulation of the lateral basal, accessoiy basal and medial nuclei evoked 
alarm peeps. Stimulation of the medial nucleus was required to cause chattering and 
groaning vocalisations (see also Robinson 1967).
2.2.4 Psychopharmacology and the Social Brain
The evidence presented above suggests that a number of areas of the brain 
function in recognising social signals, interpreting the signals and providing a response. 
The three main areas involved in this process are the anterior temporal cortex, amygdala 
and orbitofrontal cortex. Further evidence of these areas’ involvement comes from 
studies o f sociopharmacology (McGuire, Raleigh and Brammer 1982).
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Sociopharmacology is the study of the effects of pharmacological agents (drugs, 
neurotransmitters, hormones) on social behaviour. It follows that drugs that can pass 
through the blood-brain-barrier can have an effect on the brain. Effects on particular 
brain systems can effect particular behaviours. It is safe to presume that, a number of 
pharmacological agents can effect social behaviour if targeted in the correct brain areas 
(such as those described above).
Sociopharmacology is an important sub-area of psychiatry, as drug treatments for 
psychiatric disorders, such as schizophrenia, depression and psychosis have dramatic 
effects on social behaviour. Social behaviour maybe dysfunctional in these disorders due 
to a neurotransmitter imbalance. Experiments on monkeys that have revealed precise 
effects on their social behaviour and status due to drug treatments, will be described here.
Serotonin (5-HT) is an indoleamine (monoamine) neurotransmitter which has a 
wide range of functions in sleep, depression, eating, sexual arousal, locomotion, pain and 
aggression (McGuire, Raleigh and Brammer 1982, Carlson 1986). The administration of 
serotonin precursors or re-uptake blockers, such as ti-yptophan, 5-hydroxytiyptophan (5- 
HP) and the monoamine oxidase inhibitor, chlorgyline, either produce more serotonin or 
prevent it being metabolised. Raleigh et al (1980) studied the effects of administration of 
these drugs and parachlorophenylalanine (PCP A), an inhibitor of serotonin synthesis, on 
vervet monkey social behaviour. The experiment was split into three stages, baseline (to 
determine normal levels of social interaction), treatment (where the monkeys were 
injected with a dmg (either tiyptophan, PCP A, 5-HTP then PCP A, 5-HTP alone, 
chlorgyline or saline control) and post-treatment assessment. Tryptophan caused an 
increase in resting, eating, grooming and approach, a decrease in locomotion, vigilance, 
solitariness and avoiding others. There appeared to be no change in sexual behaviour, 
aggression or huddling. PCP A treatment produced some opposites to this scenario 
(increased locomotion, vigilance, solitariness, avoiding and aggression, but a decrease in 
resting, eating, huddling, grooming and approach behaviour). Again there was no change 
in sexual behaviour, suggesting that sexual behaviour is not a simple process dependent 
on one neural system or neurotransmitter. 5-HTP and chlorgyline treatment increased 
grooming, vigilance and approach and a reduction in solitaiy behaviour. Increased
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serotonin levels, therefore appear to “promote quiescent and tranquil behaviour” (Raleigh 
et al 1980), in a social context.
Raleigh then suggested that serotonin may effect social status and dominance 
through its calming effects (i.e. reduce the most dominant animals’ aggressive 
tendencies). Raleigh et al (1985) administered tiyptophan, fluoxetine (a serotonin re- 
uptake inhibitor; i.e. increase serotonin concentration) and quipazine (a serotonin 
receptor agonist) to vei*vet monkeys. Dominance was assessed as a males’ success in 
“dyadic inter-male agonistic encounters” (Raleigh et al 1985). Fluoxetine increased the 
occurrence of approach, grooming, resting, eating, and huddling, but decreased 
locomotion, avoidance behaviour, vigilance, solitaiy behaviour and sexual behaviour. 
Similar patterns were obseiwed for quipazine (except no increase in huddling, a decrease 
in submission and no change in sexual behaviour) and tryptophan (no change in sexual 
behaviour). The behavioural effects were also dependent on social status. Increasing 
approach (due to fluoxetine) was observed more in dominant, than subordinate animals, 
whereas decreased vigilance (due to fluoxetine) was observed more in subordinate than 
dominant animals.
Raleigh et al (1991) also studied the contrasting effects on social behaviour and 
dominance between tiyptophan and fluoxetine, and fenfluramine (an ampetamine 
derivative which disrupts serotonin storage vesicles and therefore decreases serotonin 
concentration) and cyproheptadine (a serotonin receptor blocker). Dominance was 
assessed using the same method as Raleigh et al (1985), but no fluctuations in dominance 
hierarchy occured throughout the course of the experiment. There were differential 
effects, however, in the actions of the different drugs. Tryptophan and fluoxetine both 
increased approach, grooming and proximity, and decreased aggression and locomotion. 
Fenfluramine and cyproheptadine both produced opposite effects. Fluoxetine and 
tiyptophan also increased male-to-female affiliative behaviours, female coalitions and 
success in intermale aggression. Again, fenfluramine and cyproheptadine had the opposite 
effect on these behaviours. Initiation of aggression (by males) and aggression towards 
females was performed at greater levels by those monkeys who had been treated with 
fenfluramine and cyproheptadine.
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The effects on social behaviour reported here are similar to those seen after 
orbitofrontal lesions (reduced aggression) in vervets. There are a number of noticeable 
differences. Grooming behaviour (of others) is decreased by orbitofrontal lesions 
(Raleigh and Steklis 1981), but is increased after serotonin precursor administration. 
Grooming behaviour requires an intact orbitofrontal cortex. Increases seen after 
serotonin treatment suggest that serotonin is acting at the orbitofrontal cortex during tliis 
behaviour. This hypothesis also follows for other social behaviours. A different story 
needs to be written for the effect on aggression. Serotonin treatment causes a decrease in 
aggression, so does orbitofrontal lesion. Amygdala lesions in free-ranging vervets, 
however, cause a decrease in aggression (Kling et al 1970), but also a decrease in 
affiliative behaviours (opposite to the effects of tiyptophan and fluoxetine; Raleigh et al 
1991).
Brammer, McGuire and Raleigh (1987) attempted to determine where serotonin 
acts in the vervet brain, using ligand biding of 5-HT2to localise concentrations of these 
receptors. They found high concentrations of receptors in the orbitofrontal cortex (all 
regions) and the temporal pole, but low concentrations in the amygdala. There were no 
differences in number of receptors between dominant and subordinate animals. The 
density of 5-HTz receptors can, however, be used to predict effects on social behaviour 
(see Table 2.2 for a summaiy).
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Table 2.2. Mean number (and SD) of 5-HT2 receptor density in different regions of the 
vervet monkey brain (n=16). The numbers in the Aggress, Prosocial and Cooperation 
columns refer to Pearson’s correlations betv/enn receptor density and acts of social 
behaviour. Aggress refers to acts of injurious behaviour, Prosocial refers to acts of 
positive social behaviour and Cooperation refers to acts of cooperative social actions. 
Data is taken from Raleigh et al (1996). Only those brain areas displaying significant 
correlations are reported
Brain Area M ean (SD) Aggress Prosocial Cooperation
Posterior Orbitofrontal Cortex 132 (42) -0.74* 0.86* 0.65*
Medial Frontal Cortex 128 (31) -0.63» 0.14 -0.23
Temporal Pole 114 (39) -0.41 0.70* 0.64*
Amygdala 54 (32) -0.61* &63* 0.30
Hippocampvs 45(18) -0.34 &63* -0.23
2.3 Social Behaviour: Human Neurology & Psychopathology
Final evidence that particular brain structures selectively processes social 
information is derived from studies of human organic brain disorders and 
psychopathology. One psychopathological disorder which displays prevalent dismptions 
to social behaviour and communication is autism. Infantile autism was first described by 
Kanner (1943), as a collection of impairments in social interaction and verbal and non­
verbal communication, emotion processing, restricted activities and interests, fear and 
anxiety and a failure to interpret the actions of others. Autism is not necessarily an 
impairment of intelligence, as some autistics, known as “idiot savants”, have 
extraordinaiy talents, such as painting or music. Others have excellent memory and can
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remember long lists and tables of numbers, however, an intellectual impairment is 
common. The social impairments include failure to form attachments with others, failure 
to take part in pretend play, or inappropriate behaviours such as spontaneous laughter 
(Mitchell 1996).
Deficits in social forms of communication are good indicators of autism. Face 
processing is impaired (Hobson 1986, Hobson et al 1988), with autistics having 
difficulties in recognising emotion in faces where the mouth and forehead have been 
blanked off. No such difficulty is seen when face identity is processed (although there is a 
minor impairment in recognising the sex of an individual, Hobson 1986). Davies et al 
(1994) also studied face perception in autistic and Asberger’s syndrome (a mild variant of 
autism) afflicted children. They found that in contrast to Hobson’s results, there were 
deficits in processing emotion and identity in the high ability autistics, but that this deficit 
was not face-specific.
Autistic individuals have difficulties in other forms of visual communication. Gaze 
processing is impaired (see Chapter IX), but only at the level of understanding gaze at a 
mentalistic level (Baron-Cohen et al 1995, Leekam et al 1997). A major indicator of 
autism is a lack of joint attention behaviour, such as gaze following, protodeclarative 
pointing (informative pointing), showing or other forms of “referential communication”. 
Autistic individuals do not direct others attention to objects and events in the 
environment (Mundy et al 1986) and they do not use pointing gestures (Baron-Cohen 
1991), Normal infants, however, readily follow other’s gaze (Scaife and Bruner 1975, 
Butterworth and Cochran 1980, Butterworth and Grover 1989, Butterworth and Jarrett 
1991) and pointing gestures (Leung and Rheingold 1981, Blake, O’Rouke and Borzellino
1994) and other forms of joint attention (Morissette, Ricard and Descarie 1995).
An analysis of joint attention skills (protodeclarative pointing and gaze 
monitoring) and pretend play has been used recently as part of a study of 16,000 18 
month old normal infants, in an attempt to evaluate the presence of some of the 
symptoms of autism (Baron-Cohen et al 1996). The infants were determined to be at risk 
o f being diagnosed as autistic if the infants failed all three tests. Twelve infants failed all
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three tests and subsequently ten infants were diagnosed as having autism. After a 3.5 year 
follow up, all the diagnosed children still had autism.
The deficits in joint attention have been suggested to lead to deficits in theoiy of 
mind processing in autism (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985, Baron-Cohen 1994,
1995). The theory of mind deficit was said initially to be derived from poor or absent 
functioning of the attribution of false belief. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) 
adapted Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) false-belief task into a special paradigm (the Sally- 
Anne stoiy) to test for the attribution of false belief in autistics. False belief is the idea 
that an individual holds a certain belief (i.e. that X is in the box), but that another 
individual in a different situation may hold a different or incorrect belief. In the Sally- 
Anne paradigm, the subject is shown a doll (Sally) who places a marble into a basket. 
Sally then leaves the room and Anne enters the room. Anne moves the marble and hides 
it in a box. Anne leaves and Sally re-enters the room. The subject is then asked “where 
will Sally look for the marble?”. Normal children (4 1/2 years old) responded by saying 
that Sally would say that the marble was in the basket (where Sally placed it). Autistic 
individuals do not appear to appreciate the concept of false belief, as autistics say that 
Sally would say that the marble was in the box (where Anne hid it). Other tests for 
deficits in theoiy of mind tasks in autistic individuals, have looked at the link between 
seeing, knowing and believing (Leslie and Frith 1988), pretend play, imitation (Whiten 
1996b) and language processing (Baron-Cohen 1995, Mitchell 1996). All the above 
studies found that autistic individuals had deficits in processing.
A number of authors have recently proposed that the temporal and frontal lobes 
are involved in processing social information, and may be dysfunctional in autism 
(Heltzer and Griffin 1981, Baron-Cohen and Ring 1992, Brothers and Ring 1992, Bishop 
1993, Bachevalier 1991, 1994). Lesions of these brain regions (see previous sections in 
this Chapter) have similar effects as some of the deficits prevalent in autism. Bachevalier 
(1991) has compared the effects of neonatal medial temporal lobe lesions in infant rhesus 
monkeys, with the socioemotional and memoiy deficits seen in autism. Bachevalier 
reported strildng similarities between the two groups and has suggested that the 
amygdala, in particular, may be the primary brain area to dysfunction in the autism
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disorder (Bachevalier 1994). Others have also suggested a similar scenario (Damasio and 
Maurer 1978, Heltzer and GrifFin 1981, Bishop 1993). Heltzer and Griffin (1981) 
summarised the similarities between the Kluver-Bucy syndrome and autism thus;
‘'Deficits ill adaptive social behavior along with the lack o f recognition o f the 
significance ofpersons, objects, or events are the very features that are essential to the 
diagnosis o f autism. The profound, failure to develop social relationships has been found 
in nearly all autistic children.,. The children also show a lack o f responsiveness with 
poor eye contact, and their social development shows a lack o f attachment and a failure 
o f bonding,,.In addition, autistic children demonstrate a preoccupation with and/or 
stereotyped use o f objects without regardfor function and have also been widely 
reported to prefer the use o f near receptors such as touch, taste and smell,,.The children 
often engage in repetitive sniffing, scratching o f surf aces,,, and scrutiny o f visual detail 
and often explore by putting every new object in their mouth...Hypersexuality is not 
commonly reported in autism. However, it is interesting to note in this regard that when 
Akert et al (1961) replicated the Kluver-Bucy syndrome in juvenile monkeys, they found 
all the main symptoms o f the syndrome except the sexual aberrations'’ (pp. 319-320).
Anatomical, histological and neurochemical differences between the brains of 
normal subjects and autistic individuals brains, particularly in the temporal cortex and 
amygdala have been reported (Damasio and Maurer 1978; Bauman and Kemper 1985). 
The finding that autistic children have been found to have dysfunctions in processing 
facial emotion and identity (Hobson et al 1988, Davies et al 1994) relate to the findings 
of cells responsive to emotional expressions and identity within the macaque temporal 
cortex (Perrett et al 1984; Hasselmo, Rolls and Baylis 1989) in the STS. Autistic children 
also have a deficit in processing and responding to different communicative gestures, 
including protodeclarative pointing (Camaioni et al 1994). Cells within the lower bank of 
the STS (TEa, see next chapter) have been reported to be sensitive to the sight of 
another individual reaching towards an object (Perrett et al 1989, 1990a, b), which would 
be comparable to protodeclarative pointing .
Finally, individuals with autism have problems in shifting the focus of their 
attention, between auditoiy and visual stimuli (Courchesne et al 1994) and this deficit 
may be due to a dysfunction of the cerebellar cortex (Courchesne 1997). Cerebellar 
patients have the same difficulties in shifting attention, but is not known whether such
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patients would have the same difficulties as autistics in spontaneously following gaze 
(Baron-Cohen 1991, 1995).
Recent investigations have began to attempt to map theory of mind ftmctions 
onto specific areas of the cortex using functional neuroimaging in normal subjects. 
Baron-Cohen et al (1995) first tested autistic, mentally handicapped and normal children 
with a list of “mental state” terms, and asked them whether the term had anything to do 
with thinking. For example, “want, know, pretend” are normal mental state terms, 
whereas “letter, car, horse” are not. There were significant differences between the three 
groups, with the autistic group failing to attribute meaning to the majority of mental 
terms. Second, normal subjects were tested with a larger number of words containing a 
number of mental state terms. The subjects were asked to raise a finger if the heard a 
mental state term. In a control condition, the subjects were asked to raise a finger if they 
heard a word associated with the body, such as the word “brain” . During trials, the 
subject’s neural activity was measured using SPECT. The brain region which showed 
increased blood flow (relative to the frontal polar cortex) during the mental state terms, 
was the orbito-ffontal cortex.
In a related study, Fletcher et al (1995) recorded brain activity using PET while 
normal subjects peiTormed stoiy comprehension tasks. The tasks either required an 
attribution of mental states or “theory of mind” in the stories or were “physical” stories 
or were unconnected sentences. The temporal pole, superior temporal gyms, posterior 
cingulate cortex and medial frontal gyrus were active during both types of stoiy, but not 
during reading of the unconnected sentences. These areas may therefore be connected 
with the imageiy required to understand these stories. When the activation during the 
“theory of mind” stories were compared with the activation during the “physical” stories, 
only the left medial frontal gyms, principally Brodmann’s Area 8 was active. The authors 
therefore suggest, that this area codes for the “mental attribution” part of the story 
comprehension.
A similar result was obtained by Go el et al (1995) using PET in normal subjects. 
In their control task, subjects were asked to visualise objects and name them. In the 
“theory of mind” task, the subjects had to visualise objects, and imagine how others
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would use them. This condition could be said to require an understanding of another’s 
perspective (a constituent of theoiy of mind). In the “theoiy of mind” task, significantly 
greater activation was seen in the left medial frontal lobe (Brodmann’s Ai’ea 9) and the 
left temporal pole (Brodmann’s Aieas 21,39 and 38).
Social behaviour can also be disrupted by organic damage to the structure of the 
brain, through disease, injury or surgeiy. The rationale for performing prefrontal 
lobotomies was derived from the effects of frontal lobe damage on human patients, such 
as the historical case ofPhileas Gage (Damasio 1994, Damasio et al 1994) and monkeys 
with frontal damage which showed dramatic reductions in aggressive behaviour (see 
earlier). There are many examples of deficits in social functioning that effect humans after 
frontal cortex lesions. As stated previously, prefrontal damage in monkeys causes a major 
disruption of social behaviour. This is also true for human patients who have sustained 
various forms of damage to the frontal cortex. A patient described by Damasio and 
colleagues (Eslinger and Damasio 1985; Damasio, Tranel and Damasio 1990; Saver and 
Damasio 1991), EVR, had sustained bilateral damage to the ventromedial frontal cortex 
and displayed abnormalities in decision-making in the area of social conduct (or how to 
behave appropriately in social situations). Damasio found that EVR, when tested on 
hypothetical social situations was at the same level as normal subjects and control 
subjects with lesions in different brain areas. If the social situations were "real-life", 
however, EVR had a large functional deficit, leading to various conclusions that he was 
sociopathic. The sociopathy was acquired due to the lesion, as previous to his damage 
EVR had no sociopathic tendencies and behaved normally. Damasio therefore stated 
three hypotheses concerning EVR’s disorder and the function of the ventromedial frontal 
cortex in social behaviour. First, EVR may not possess knowledge of the appropriate 
method of social conduct (not substantiated by them as he could perform well in 
hypothetical situations). Second, and the idea put foi'ward most strongly, is that EVR has 
lost the ability to analyse and integrate information for use in social behaviour, i.e. EVR 
has access to the correct social information, but his attribution is impaired. Finally, EVR 
may not access knowledge of social appropriateness, but could analyse and integrate 
information successfully.
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A collection of human patients have been shown to develop the KB-syndrome 
(Marlowe et al. 1975, Ghika-Schmid et al 1995). One patient, ES sustained bilateral 
damage to his temporal lobes and the underlying subcortical stmctures (including the 
amygdala) and was found to have symptoms similar to those seen in monkeys with the 
same damage (Marlowe et al 1975). The patient was unable to recognise a wide variety 
o f common-place objects, which were examined thoroughly when given to him. He could 
imitate other’s use of objects (not seen in monkeys), but failed to recognise familiar 
individuals (prosopagnosia), his visual orientation was defective and he was unable to 
determine which were relevant and irrelevant objects. He was remarkably placid and 
indifferent, and as seen in monkeys, would explore orally all objects within his grasp 
(including plastic wrapping paper, dog food, ink and faeces). He also had a "reversal of 
sexual polarity", as he was heterosexual before the temporal damage, but had acutely 
homosexual tendencies after. The patient described in Ghika-Schmid et al (1995) 
possessed unilateral damage of the anterior temporal lobe (including the lateral half of the 
amygdala, but sparing the hippocampus). All symptoms of the KB-syndrome were 
present in this patient (psychic blindness, hypermetamorphosis, visual agnosia and 
hypersexuality) suggesting that damage to only one lobe is required to produce the 
symptoms in humans.
There are also many examples of patients who have sustained amygdala damage 
who have many of the social processing deficits associated with amygdala damage in 
monkeys. Patient GR described by Jacobson (1986), received a bilateral amygdalotomy 
and subcaudate tractotomy to treat her persistent self-mutilation and aggressive 
behaviour. GR showed disorders in facial recognition (she did not recognise new faces, 
but did recognise family members and recognised people depending on non-facial 
characteristics, such as hair style, clothing or glasses), recognising facial expressions, 
social bonding and affective expression. In all social situations, GR was indifferent and 
placid, with no anger and therefore failed to create new friendships and emotional 
attachments. She also experienced difficulties in describing her own emotional state and 
apart from fear and depression, she didn't know how to "pigeon hole affects into familiar 
categories" (Jacobson 1986). Finally, she had feelings of remoteness from people and
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objects, but was hyperattentive/hyperalert to objects around her, closely inspecting them. 
The symptoms of this patient are wide-ranging, actually causing profound deficits in 
normal social functioning, as displayed in monkeys.
The majority of patients are impaired in a small number of problems, not so 
grossly impaired in social functioning that they cannot function in the social world. A 
number of patients with amygdala damage have been tested for deficits in face processing 
(emotion and identity processing, gaze following, etc.). Young et al (1995) described a 
patient DR who received a bilateral amygdalotomy to treat epilepsy in her temporal 
lobes. Although, DR did not display any substantial deficits in normal social behaviour, 
she did perform poorly on a number of facial processing tasks; including recognising 
familiar and unfamiliar faces, matching unfamiliar faces, gaze direction, and facial 
expressions. She could recognise highly familiar faces, especially when the faces were 
known pre-operatively and reject unfamiliar faces. She, however, could not name the 
familiar faces, but could give their occupation. For example, she would say that the 
recent Prime Minister John Major was familiar and she could identify his recent job, but 
she could not name him. She was unimpaired in matching two pictures of unfamiliar 
people.
Patient DR was also impaired in discriminating between eyes averted and eye 
contact. A forced-choice paradigm was used where pairs of photographs of faces were 
presented to the subject. In one-third of the photographs, the head was directed to the 
viewer, in one-third the head was directed 20® to the left and one-third the head was 
directed 20® to the right. Photographs in which the eyes were directed towards the 
viewer were target faces. Non-target faces were faces in which the eyes were looking 
away 5®, 10® or 20° to the right or left. There were, therefore 6 directions of gaze (5®, 10® 
and 20® left and right) and 3 head views (0®, 20® left and 20® right), which produced 18 
possible trials. Patient DR was deficient in discriminating eye contact (13 out of 18 
correct). This was compared to a mean performance of 16.95 (out of 18 correct) for 
matched control subjects. DR did not make any errors when the faces were deviated by 
20® (6 out of 6 correct), but performed worse with smaller deviations; 10° (3 out of 6 
correct) and 5® (4 out of 6 correct).
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She was poorly impaired when asked to point at a facial expression which was the 
same as one of six target expressions (anger, sadness, happiness, disgust, surprise and 
fear) and she performed badly when asked to name particular expressions (Young et al
1996). The same patient has further difficulties in processing emotion from auditory and 
speech cues (Scott et al 1997).
A number of other studies in human patients with bilateral damage to the 
amygdala have found profound deficits in the recognition of facial and vocal emotion, 
especially anger and fear (Adolphs et al 1994, 1995, Hamann et al 1996). The deficits 
described were most pronounced when static or motion sequences of emotional 
expression were presented to the patients and they either had to match the presented 
picture with a previously presented picture, or they had to name the emotion on the face 
they were presented with. In none of the studies was facial identity compromised with an 
impairment of emotion. Morris et al (1996) determined that the recognition deficits for 
fear are processed by the amygdala in the intact human brain, they presented normal 
subjects with pictures of varying degrees of emotion from neutral to extreme (using a 
morphing technique, see also Calder et al 1996 with amygdalectomy patient). The 
subjects regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) was measured whilst the subjects made 
gender judgements of the faces. Fearful faces caused significant activation in the left 
amygdala and left periamygdaloid cortex. Happy faces, by contrast, caused significant 
activation in the right medial temporal gyrus, right putamen, left superior parietal lobe 
and left calcarine sulcus.
These last findings are interesting and surprising when compared to a study of 
Adolphs et al (1996). They tested a range of brain-damaged patients with emotion 
recognition tasks, and found that patients with damage to only the left hemisphere were 
unimpaired in recognising emotion. Damage to the right inferior parietal cortex and the 
right anterior infra-calcarine cortex caused severe impairments in recognising negative 
emotions, particularly fear and sadness. There were no deficits in recognising happiness. 
It may be that patients damaged to the left parietal lobe and left calcarine sulcus may 
have become impaired in recognising happiness.
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Hornak, Rolls and Wade (1996) found that a selection of patients with ventral 
frontal damage were severely impaired in tests of emotion recognition from faces and 
voices. The same impairments were not seen across all patients, probably due to 
differences in the extent of lesion. Again the negative emotions, fear and anger were the 
expressions most severely defective in recognition.
Patients with amygdala damage have other cognitive impairments, such as 
problems with memoiy and attention (Andersen 1978), sensory-somatic cross-modal 
associations (Nahm et al 1993) and in learning all types of factual knowledge, although, 
not covert learning (i.e. the link between coding the faces of new individuals and their 
affective value, Tranel and Damasio 1993).
2.4 Summary
This review has attempted to suggest that non-human primates are a 
sophisticated, highly social collection of species with a rich social structure. The methods 
by which Old World monkeys (in particular) communicate with conspecifics and the 
subtleties of these methods are useful for thinking about human social (non-verbal) 
communication. The review of the “social brain” literature hopefully shows that some of 
the subtleties of monkey’s social behaviour can be eliminated with discrete lesions of the 
amygdala, anterior temporal and prefrontal cortices. The effects of these brain lesions in 
non-human primates appear to parallel the deficits seen after brain damage and 
psychopathology (especially autism) in humans. The rest of this thesis will look at 
particular subtleties of monkey social behaviour (such as gaze following. Chapter III), 
how this is coded by single neurons (Chapters VII and VIII) and how this is represented 
at the neural systems (Chapter V) and evolutionaiy levels (Chapter VI).
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Chapter III
Architecture of the Primate Social Brain 
A. Basic Anatomy
3.0 Introduction
The previous chapter reviewed evidence that three areas of the primate brain may 
function in coding aspects of social behaviour. The anatomical connections (intra-, 
cortical, hippocampal and subcortical) of the superior temporal sulcus and amygdala will 
be reviewed below. The connections of the orbitofrontal cortex are not treated here as 
the function of this area of cortex in social behaviour is probably not for recognition of 
social signals which is the area covered by this thesis. The reader is directed to numerous 
reviews of the connections of the orbitofrontal cortex (Barbas 1988, 1993, Barbas and 
Pandya 1989, Carmichael and Price 1995, Passingham 1993, Pandya and Yeterian 1990). 
One of the criteria for an area to be part of the social brain (see Chapter II) was extensive 
connectivity with other socially-responsive areas. This review of anatomy will help 
substantiate the evidence provided in the previous chapter. Only anatomical data from 
macaque species is included in the following review, particularly Macaca nmlatta, M. 
fascicularis and M  fuscata.
3,1 Superior Temporal Sulcus
The primate temporal cortex lies at the ventral surface of the brain, anterior to the 
occipital cortex, ventral to the parietal cortex and posterior to the frontal cortex. It is
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separated from the parietal and frontal cortices by the Sylvian Fissure (Post-Rolandic 
cortex), and from the occipital cortex by the occipitotemporal sulcus. The temporal lobe 
also contains many subcortical stmctures including the hippocampal formation and 
amygdaloid complex (see section 3.2).
3.1.1 Architecture
There are four main cortical components of the temporal lobe. The temporal pole 
(area TG, von Bonin and Bailey 1947 and area Pro, Seltzer and Pandya 1978) lies at the 
anteriormost end of the temporal lobe. The temporal pole has a multitude of connections 
(Markowitsch et al 1985, Moran et al 1987), with cortical (visual, olfactory and auditory 
cortical areas and subcortical structures (e.g. amygdala, thalamus, hypothalamus, brain 
stem).
Dorsal to the superior temporal sulcus (STS) is the superior temporal gyms 
(STG), which is an auditoiy area (Pandya and Rosene 1993, Jones and Powell 1970). 
The superior temporal gyrus has been parcellated into various sectors; areas TSl, TS2, 
TS3, paAlt and Tpt (Seltzer and Pandya 1978, 1994), with each sector connecting to a 
number of cortical and subcortical areas. The STG is rostral to area PG in the parietal 
cortex and ventral to the insular cortical areas.
Ventral to the STS is the inferotemporal or inferior temporal cortex (IT). This 
area is predominantly visual in function (Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982, Mishkin et al 
1983, Tanaka et al 1990, Tanaka 1993) and stretches from the anterior temporal pole to 
area V4t and area V4 in the prestriate visual cortical areas. The cytoarchitectonie areas 
composing the inferotemporal cortex include areas TEl, TE2, TE3, and TEO (Seltzer 
and Pandya 1978) or PITd, PITv, CITd, CITv, AITd, AITv (Felleman and Van Essen 
1991).
The superior temporal sulcus (STS), runs from the temporal pole (area TG) all 
the way to the lunate sulcus (LS) and area PG in the occipitoparietal border (von Bonin 
and Bailey 1947). The STS comprises of lower and upper banks and fundus (depths) of 
the sulcus. The lower bank consists of areas TEm, TEa and IP a; the upper bank consists
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of areas TAa, TPO (1-4) and PGa, and the depth or fundus consists of areas FST, MST, 
MT and OAa. The anatomical configurations of these areas is shown in figure 3.1. Figure
3.1 also shows how the position of the STS relates to the location of other temporal 
neocortical areas (Seltzer and Pandya 1978, 1991, 1994).
The upper bank of the STS, comprises of three architectonic zones, area TAa, 
TPO (1-4) and PGa. Area TAa is located entirely within the upper bank of the STS. The 
location of TAa can be determined in Nissl stained sections by the predominance of 
supergranular layers and a single boundaiy between layers V and VI. Area TPO is medial 
to area TAa, at the crest of the secondaiy gyrus, mnning along the level of the anterior 
central sulcus, to the caudal lateral fissure. Layer IV is seen as a broad cortical layer in 
Nissl stained sections of area TPO. There are four compartments to area TPO (1-4), but 
recently TPO has been subdivided into three sectors (TPOr, TPOi and TPOc; Cuisick et 
al 1995). At the junction with the depth of the STS is a thin cortical zone called area 
PGa.. Area PGa is more myelinated than its neighbour area PG.
The lower bank of the STS is architectonically distinct from the rest of the STS. 
Area TEa is entirely within the lower bank of the STS and architectonically layer IV is 
thinner than layer IV of area TEm. Area TEm stems the whole of the lower edge of the 
lower bank of the STS. Layer IV is highly developed, the supragranular cortex is as 
extensive as the infragranular cortex, and there is a much more diffuse myelination of the 
inner cortical layers. Area IP a is anterior to area OAa, with a thin, condensed cortical 
region, which is veiy poorly myelinated (Seltzer and Pandya 1989).
The depth of the STS consists of the areas, MT, MST and FST. Seltzer and Pandya 
(1989) name areas MT and FST as OAa. Area OAa is architectonically different from 
area OA, with a thinner layer IV and a more predominant layer VI, than area OA. The 
caudal areas of the STS are not considered further here as they are predominantly visual 
function (processing visual motion) and are extensively connected to the striate and 
prestriate cortices of the occipital, parietal and temporal lobes (Desimone and 
Ungerleider 1986a, b, Ungerleider and Desimone 1986, Boussaoud, Ungerleider and 
Desimone 1990, Hikosaka et al 1990).
Figure 3.1. Upper. Configuration of cortical areas within the superior temporal sulcus 
(STS), adapted from Seltzer and Pandya (1994). Areas TPO-1, TPO-2, TPO-3, TPO-4, 
PG and TAa are located within the upper banlc of the STS. Areas TEa and TEm are 
located within the lower banlc of the STS. Areas IPa and OAa (MT and FST) are located 
in the depth (fundus) of the STS. Area Pro is located in the anterior temporal pole, areas 
TSl, TS2, TS3, paAlt and Tpt area located within the superior temporal gyrus and areas 
TEl, TE2, TE3 and TEO are located within the inferotemporal cortex. LF is the lateral 
(Sylvian) fissure and lOS is the inferior occipital sulcus. Area OA (V4) is located in the 
occipital cortex and area Opt is located within the posterior parietal cortex. Lower, 
Drawing of the lateral (left) side of the rhesus macaque brain showing the position of the 












The STS is separated into three modal regions; the TPO (polysensory cortex), TA 
(auditoiy cortex) and TE (visual cortex). The majority of STS connections described in 
this chapter are to and from the anterior STS. Connections to and from the posterior 
STS, including MT, FST and MST are not described in detail, and the reader is referred 
to a number of detailed references (Desimone and Ungerleider 1986, Ungerleider and 
Desimone 1986, Boussaoud, Ungerleider and Desimone 1990, Hikosaka et al 1990,
Morel and Bullier 1990). There is extensive inter-connectivity within the three regions of 
the STS (upper and lower banks and the depth).
Cells within the rostralmost area of the upper bank of the STS (areas Pro and 
TPO-1) project to layer I of TPO-1, TPO-2, TPO-3 and rostrally to all layers of IPa, PGa 
and TAa. Rostral TAa and TPO-1 project cells to all layers of TPO-1, IPa and TAa and 
layer I of TPO-2, TPO-3 and PGa. TPO-2, caudal TPO-1, PGa and TAa project cells to 
layer IV of TPO-1 and Pro and all layers of TPO-2 and TPO-3. TPO-4 projects cells to 
areas medial to TPO (such as the area at the junction between PGa and OAa), IPa and 
TAa. Cells within TAa, lateral and rostral TPO-3 project to TPO-3, layer I of caudal 
TPO-4, columnar layer IV of the rostral sub-sections of TPO-1 and TPO-2, PGa and 
TAa. Rostral and caudal TPO-4, caudal TPO-3, PG and PGa project neurons to areas 
TPO-2, TPO-3 and PGa. Cells within TAa project diffusely to TPO-4 and the columnar 
layer of TPO-2 and TPO-3 (Seltzer and Pandya 1989).
Neurons within the sulcal area Pro and the rostralmost TEa and TEm project to 
layer I of the depth of area IPa, TEa and area OAa. Areas TEa and TEm project afferents 
to all layers of area Pro, IPa and the rostral portion of areas TEa and TEm, layer I of area 
OAa. Area TEa projects neurons to columnar layer IV of TEa, paralaminar layers or IPa, 
layer I of OAa, and TEm. The area within the lower rostralmost segment of the 
intraparietal sulcus (OAa or MT) projects to TEa, TEm, OAa and IPa; to layer IV 
rostrally and to layer I caudally. Neurons within area IPa project to all layers of areas 
Pro, TPO-1 and TEa and layer I of IPa and OAa. (Seltzer and Pandya 1989).
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Areas TPO-1 and TEa project to the temporal pole (area Pro), TSl, TS2 and 
TEl. OAa receives efferents from the upper bank (TPO-1, TPO-2 and TPO-3), the 
junction of the upper bank and depth (PGa and IPa) and the lower bank (rostral TEa and 
caudal OAa), The projections to the caudal depth of OAa arise from the supra- and infra­
granular layers of TPO-1 and TEa and layer III (supra-granular) of TPO-2, TPO-3, 
caudal TEa and OAa. Cells within areas Pro, TPO-1, TPO-2, TPO-3, TAa, IPa and PGa 
project to infra-granular layers of rostral TPO-1 and TPO-2 and supra-granular layers of 
caudal TPO-1 and TPO-2. The infra- and supra-granular layers of areas TPO-3, TPO-2, 
TAa and PGa, the infra-granular layer of rostral TPO-1 and the supra-granular layer of 
caudal TPO-4 project afferents to TPO-2 and TPO-3. The supratemporal plane, TPO-2, 
TPO-3, TPO-4 and TAa all project neurons to TAa. Cells within the infra-granular layers 
of Pro, TPO-1 and TPO-2, the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-3 and rostral 
TPO-4 and the supra-granular layers of caudal TPO-4 and PGa project afferents to TPO- 
4 (Seltzer and Pandya 1989).
Rostral areas TEa and TEm receive efferent projections from the supra- and infra- 
granular layers of TEa, rostral IPa and rostral TPO-1, caudal PGa and the supra-granular 
layer of OAa. TEm receives proflise projections from caudal area TEa and OAa, and less 
dense connections from rostral TEa. The supra- and infra-granular layers of rostral and 
caudal TEa, the infra-granular layer of rostral TEa and TEm, the supra-granular layer of 
OAa, UlPa and caudal PGa all project afferents to caudal TEa and TEm on the lower lip 
of the STS. The infra- and supra-granular layers of TPO-1, TPO-2, TPO-3 and TEa, 
layer III of PGa and OAa and the infra- and supra-granular layers of IPa project to caudal 
TEa, IPa and the rostralmost section of OAa. Finally, cells within the infra-granular layer 




The STS is extensively connected with a large number of cortical regions. The 
connections of the different areas of the cortex which connect to the STS will be 
discussed separately.
a) Frontal lobe connections to STS
Ai*eas within the frontal cortex project to the regions of the STS. The dorsal wing 
of the prearcuate gyms and principal sulcus (A46 and A8a) projects afferents to layer IV 
of the upper bank and flindus of the STS (TPOc, layers I, IV and VI; TPOi, layer IV and 
TPOr, columnar laminar pattern in layer IV, Cusick et al 1995). Areas Pro, 13, 12, 14,
10, 11 of the orbitofrontal cortex, A24 of the medial cortex and areas 9, 10 and 12 of the 
lateral cortex project neurons to the temporal pole (area Pro), rostral TPO, PGa and IPa. 
The lower bank of the principal sulcus (ventral A46) and ventral A6 also project to the 
supra- and infra- granular layers of rostral TPO, PGa and IPa. The dorsal frontal cortex 
(AlO, frontal pole), rostrodorsal A46, A9, medial areas 10, 14 and 32 project neurons to 
the mid-portion of TPO, whereas lateral and ventral A46, A12, rostral A8 (the dorsal 
limb of the arcuate sulcus), medial areas AlO and A24 and the central portion of the 
orbitofrontal cortex (areas 11 and 12) project to caudal TPO. Dorsal A46 and A8 send 
connections to rostrocaudal TPO and TAa. The lateral surface of the frontal cortex 
(upper and lower banks of the principal sulcus, dorsal and ventral A46), dorsal area 6 and 
medial area 24, all project cells to caudal area TPO (upper bank of the STS), ventral area 
PG, PGa and the lower bank of the STS (OAa and MT). Cells within the lateral sector of 
area 12, the ventral portion of the rostral bank of the arcuate sulcus (A8) project to areas 
TEa and TEm (Seltzer and Pandya 1989).
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b) STS connections to frontal lobe
Ai'eas within the upper and lower banks and the depth of the STS project to 
sectors of the frontal lobe. The upper bank of the STS projects to the following frontal 
lobe regions. Areas Pro, TPO and TS-1 and TS-2 in the superior temporal sulcus project 
neurons to the orbitofrontal cortex, proisocortex (area Pro), isocortical areas 11, 12, 13 
and 14, areas 25, 32, 14, 10 and 24 on the medial surface and A12 on the lateral surface. 
Termination within these frontal areas is located within the deep layers of the cortex; 
lamina IV and the supragranular layers; layer I. Cells within rostral TPO and TAa project 
to the orbitofrontal cortex (areas 13, 12, 11, 14 and proisocortex), medial frontal cortex 
(areas 24, 32 and 14) and lateral frontal cortex (areas 12, 10, 9 and ventral A46). Area 
TPO projects neurons to rostral AlO, A46, dorsal A9, principal sulcus (lateral A12), and 
the supra-granular layer of dorsal AS and A6 (Seltzer and Pandya 1989).
The lower bank of the STS projects to the following areas of the frontal lobe. 
Cells within rostral area TEa, TEm, sulcal proisocortex (Pro) and TEl project cells to the 
orbitofrontal cortex (area Pro and areas 11, 12, 13 and 14), medial frontal cortex (A24) 
and lateral prefrontal cortex (principal sulcus, A46, A12 and ventral A8). The projections 
from the STS terminated within the supra-granular layer of the frontal cortex. Areas TEa, 
TEm and TE3 project a small cluster of neurons to ventral A12 (Seltzer and Pandya 
1989).
The depth of the STS projects to the following frontal cortex areas. Cells within 
the rostral STS, area IPa and area TEa (encroaching into the lower bank of the STS) 
project to area Pro, areas 13, 14 and rostral area 11, medial frontal cortex (A9) and 
lateral frontal cortex (i.e. the midportion of A12 and ventral A46), all terminations within 
the supra-granular layer (Seltzer and Pandya 1989). Neurons within areas IPa and TEa in 
the depth of the STS project to area ProM (frontal operculum. Seltzer and Pandya 1991).
c) Parietal lobe connections to STS
The inferior parietal lobule including A7a (caudal inferior parietal lobule and 
upper bank of the caudal most part of the STS) projects to layer IV of TPOi and TPOr
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and the columnar layer of TPOc in the STS (Cusick et al 1995). Layers III and V of 
caudal IPL (area Opt) and layer V of the cingulate gyms (areas 23, 29 and 30) project 
neurons to areas TPO-2 and TAa within the upper bank of the STS. Layers III and V of 
caudal IPL projects neurons to rostral TPO-3 and caudal TPO-2, The apex of the IPL 
(area Opt) and the lower bank of the IPL (area POa and LIP) project cells to caudal area 
TPO-3. The medial cortex (areas 31 and PGm) of the parietal lobe, caudal IPL (area 
Opt), areas PG, area PFG and the lower bank of the IPS (area POa) all project neurons 
to area TPO-4. The lower bank of the IPS (area POa) also projects neurons to caudal 
areas TEa and TEm (Seltzer and Pandya 1994). Cells in the rostral inferior parietal lobule 
project to medial TPO and rostral PGa. Neurons within the middle and caudal inferior 
parietal lobule and the lower bank of the intraparietal sulcus project to posterior PGa, IPa 
and the medial sector of TPO (Seltzer and Pandya 1978),
d) STS connections to parietal lobe
The STS projects to areas within the parietal cortex. There are dense projections 
from Layers V and VI and less dense projections in layer III of areas OAa, TPO-1, -2, -3, 
PGa and IPa to all layers (I-VI) of area Opt and caudal area PG (area 7a) in the inferior 
parietal lobule. Dense connections from the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-2, 
TPO-3 and TPO-4 and sparse connections from TPO-1, PGa and TAa to the dorsal area 
Opt, caudal area PG (A7a) of the inferior parietal lobule. There are dense projections 
from the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-3, PO-4 and PGa and veiy sparse 
connections from the infra-granular layers of TPO-2 to caudal and dorsal area PG (area 
7a) adjacent to the IPS. Cells within the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-4, 
caudal IPa and PGa project afferents to the mid-portion of the lower bank of the intra­
parietal sulcus (PGa, area 7a and LIP). There are dense projections from the supra­
granular layer of areas TPO-3 and TPO-4 and scattered projections from the supra- and 
infra-granular layers of PGa and caudal IPa to rostral and dorsal PGa (areas 7a and LIP). 
There are connections from the supra-granular layer of OAa and the infra-granular layer 
of PGa to IPd within the intra-parietal sulcus. Cells within the infra-granular layer of 
areas TPO-2, TPO-3 and TPO-4 project to the ventral portion of PGm (Barnes and
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Pandya 1992). The upper bank area TPO-2, caudal TPO-1, medial PGa and lateral TAa 
all project cells to the lateral surface of the parietal lobe (PFG, PG and Opt) and the 
medial surface (cingulate gums area 23 and 24). Area TP03 (and TAa) project cells to 
areas PG, POa of the IPS, areas 23, 31 and PGm. Area TPO-4 projects to area POa (the 
lower bank of the IPS), areas PGm and A23, and the retrosplenial cortex. Neurons within 
areas IPa and TEa in the depth of the STS project to area PG within the lower bank of 
the IPS and the parietal operculum (Seltzer and Pandya 1991).
e) Temporal lobe connections to STS
(i) Superior temporal g)>rus
Many areas within the temporal lobe (superior temporal gyms, inferior temporal 
cortex, Sylvian fissure, temporal pole and parahippocampal gyms) have afferent 
connections to the STS. The crown of the superior temporal gyms projects to layer IV of 
TAa, the columnar layer of TPOr and mixed layers of TPOi and TPOc (Cusick et al 
1995). Layers III and V of the lateral temporal cortex (areas Pro, TSl-3, pal) project 
neurons to areas TPO-1 and TPO-2 of the upper bank of the STS. Areas within the 
rostral superior temporal gyrus (areas Pro, TSl-3), caudal superior temporal gyms (TS2, 
TS3, paAlt and Tpt) and the rostral lateral fissure (areas Pro and pal) project to caudal 
TPO-2 and TAa. Areas within the superior temporal gyms (areas TSl-3, paAlt and Tpt) 
project to TPO-3 and TPO-4 (Seltzer and Pandya 1994). Areas Tpt and TAa project 
neurons to the lateral sector of TPO, TAa and PGa. Cells within areas TSl-3 project to 
area TAa and TPO. (Seltzer and Pandya 1978).
(it) Inferotemporal cortex
Supra-granular and infra-granular layers of the inferotemporal cortex (TE 1-3, 
TEm) project to the lower bank of the STS (TEa and TEm). The supra-granular layer of 
caudal IT (areas TE3 and TEO) projects neurons to caudal areas TEa and TEm. Areas 
TE 1-3, TEO within the inferotemporal cortex project cells to areas TEa, IPa and OAa 
(FST, Seltzer and Pandya 1994). Ai*eas TEm, TE3 and TEa (dorsomedial inferotemporal
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cortex) project cells to rostral STS (TEm, TEa and TE2), whereas cells within areas TE2 
and TE3 project to TEa and TEm (Seltzer and Pandya 1978)
(Hi) Parahippocampal gyrus
Aieas within the ventral temporal lobe (perirhinal A35, areas TF and TL) project 
neurons to rostral areas of the upper bank of the STS (TPO-1 and TPO-2). Ar eas 35, TF 
and TL also project neurons to caudal TPO-2 and TAa (Seltzer and Pandya 1994). Cells 
within layers III and V of the entorhinal cortex project to caudal TPO-2 and TAa (Seltzer 
and Pandya 1994, Good and Morrison 1995). Layers III and V of the entorhinal and 
perirhinal cortices, TF, TH and T1 project neurons to caudal TPO-2 and rostral TPO-3 
and layers III and IV of the parahippocampal areas, TH, TF and TL and the prostriate 
area, project cells to TPO-4. Infra-granular cells within the cortex of the depth of the 
occipitotemporal sulcus (area TF) project neurons to the lower bank of the STS (TEa 
and TEm). Parahippocampal areas TF, TH and TL and the prostriate area project 
neurons to TEa, IPa and OAa (Seltzer and Pandya 1994).
f) STS connections to temporal lobe
(i) Superior temporal gyrus and Sylvian fissure
There are many connections from the STS to the superior temporal gyrus. There 
are projections from the supra- and infra-granular laminae of TPO-1, supra-granular 
layers of TPO-2 and rostral TPO-3, TAa, IPa, rostral area PGa and the sulcal component 
of area Pro to the rostral superior temporal gyms (TSl and Pro). There are medium 
connections from the infra-granular layers of TAa and sparse connections from the infra- 
granular layers of TPO-4 to caudal superior temporal gyms including the dorsal and 
central area paAlt. There are projections from the supra- and infra-granular laminae of 
areas TPO-1, TPO-2, TPO-3, TAa, rostral PGa and IPa to rostral area TS2. There are 
dense connections from the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-1 and rostral TPO-2, 
less dense connections from the supra- and infra-granular layers of caudal TPO-2, TPO- 
3, TAa and less dense connections from sulcal Pro to the central portion of TSl. There
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are dense projections from the supra- and infra-granular layers of TAa, scattered 
projections from the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-2 and the infragranular layer 
of PGa to the rostral sector of area TS3. Cells within the supra- and infra-granular layers 
of TPO-3 and TAa and the infra-granular layers of TPO-2 and TPO-4 project to the 
caudal-most portion of the superior temporal gyrus, area Tpt. Cells within the supra- and 
infra-granular layers of TPO-1, TPO-2 and rostral TAa project to ventral TS2. Cells from 
the supra-granular TAa and TPO project to dorsal TS2. There are projections from the 
supra- and infra-granular layers of areas TAa, TPO (-2, -3 and -4) to caudal paAlt. The 
cells in the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO (-1, -2 and -3), TAa and PGa project 
to the ventral portion of TS2. (Barnes and Pandya 1992). Aiea TPO-1 projects cells to 
the temporal pole, areas TSl, TS2, the Sylvian fissure (circular sulcus, areas Pro and pal) 
and the ventral insula. The upper bank area TPO-2, caudal TPO-1, medial PGa and 
lateral TAa all project cells to the temporal pole, TS (1-3), proisocortex, insula 
(agranular and dysgranular), circular sulcus (area Pro, pal and ProA) and the 
supratemporal plane (area paAr), all terminating in layer I. Areas TPO-2 and TPO-3 
project neurons to TS (1-3) and the Sylvian fissure (pal, the circular sulcus and the 
dysgranular insula), whereas TPO-2 and TAa project to areas TS2 (layer IV), TS3 (layer 
IV), paAlt, Tpt (layer I), the Sylvian fissure (pal, pro A and the circular sulcus), KA, 
paAc and A23 of the cingulate gyms. Area TP03 (and TAa) project cells to areas TS2, 
TS3, paAlt, Tpt, granular insula, areas ProA, relt (circular sulcus), paAr, KA, paAc. 
Neurons within areas IPa and TEa in the depth of the STS project to the Sylvian fissure 
(agranular and dysgranular insula) and the secondary sensory area (SII, Seltzer and 
Pandya 1991).
(ii) Inferotemporal cortex
The STS projects neurons to areas within the inferior temporal cortex. There are 
projections from the supra-granular layer of IPa and the supra- and infra-granular layers 
o f TEa, TEm and Pro to area TEa in the lateral bank of the occipitotemporal sulcus. 
There are connections from the supra- and infra-granular layers of TEa, TEm, IPa and 
OAa (MT and FST). Cells within the supra- and infra-granular layers of the depths and
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lower banks of the STS (areas IPa, TEa, TEm and OAa) project to the boundary 
between areas TE2 and TE3 (Barnes and Pandya 1992). Rostral TEa and TEm project 
neurons to layer I of the temporal pole, TEl, TE2, ventral perirhinal cortex (A3 5b) and 
the dysgranular insula. Area TEa at the lower rim of the STS projects neurons to layer I 
of areas TEl-3. The neurons within caudal TEa project to layer I of TEl-3 and TEO. 
Neurons within areas IPa and TEa in the depth of the STS project to the temporal pole 
(area Pro) and areas TEl-3 (Seltzer and Pandya 1991).
(Hi) Parahippocampal g)^rus
Ai*eas within the STS project neurons to the parahippocampal gyrus (areas TH,
TF and TL). There are dense connections from the supra- and infra-granular layers of 
TPO-2, TPO-3 to area TF in the parahippocampal gyrus. Sparse connections from the 
supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-1 and TP0-4 to area TF and less dense 
connections from the supra- and infra-granular layers of PGa and TGa to area TF (Cusick 
et al 1995). Dense connections from the supra-granular layers of TPO-2, dense 
connections from the supra-granular and infra-granular laminae of TPO-3, sparse 
connections from the supra-granular layers of the rostral areas TEa and PGa to area TF. 
there are dense connections from the supra-granular and infra-granular layers of TPO-2, 
the infra-granular layer of TPO-3, less dense connections from the supra-granular layers 
of TPO-1 and TPO-4, sparse connections of the supra-granular layer of PGa, TAa and 
connections from the sulcal area Pro and IPa to the medial bank of the OTS including 
area TF. Cells within the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-2 and TPO-3, the 
supra-granular layer of TPO-4 and PGa project to the caudal area Opt (area 7a). There 
are projections from the infra-granular layer of TPO-2 and the supra-granular layer of 
PGa, IPa, TEa and OAa (FST) to the midportion of area TF on the medial bank of the 
parahippocampal gyms. There are connections from the infra-granular layer of TPO-1 
and sulcal Pro and the supra- and infra-granular layers of TPO-3, PGa, TAa and OAa 
(FST) to the mid-portion of area TF. The cells within the supra- and infra-granular layers
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of TPO-2 and TPO-4, PGa, TEa and OAa project to areas TL and TF. Areas Pro, TPO 
(-1, -2 and -3), IPa and PGa (supra- and infra-granular layers) project neurons to the 
rostral-most TF, and areas TPO (-1, -2, -3 and -4), PGa, TAa and caudal MT project 
cells to area TL (Barnes and Pandya 1992). Aiea TPO-1 projects neurons to areas TH 
and TL and the perirhinal and prorhinal cortices. The upper bank area TPO-2, caudal 
TPO-1, medial PGa and lateral TAa all project cells to areas TF, TH and caudal TL. Area 
TPO-4 projects neurons to areas TF and TH. Rostral TEa and TEm project cells to layer 
I of rostral TL. Aiea TEa at the lower rim of the STS projects neurons to the columnar 
layers of TL and TF. Neurons within areas IPa and TEa in the depth of the STS project 
to areas TF, TL and the perirhinal cortex (A35, Seltzer and Pandya 1991).
g) Occipital lobe connections to STS
There are some feedback connections from the visual processing areas of the 
occipital lobe to the sectors of the STS. Layer V of the calcarine retro splenial cortex 
projects cells to area TPO-3. The supra-granular layer of the ventral preoccipital gyrus 
(A19; V4) projects neurons to caudal areas TEa and TEm and the junction between areas 
TEa, IPa and OAa (Seltzer and Pandya 1994). Neurons within the lateral surface of the 
occipital lobe; striate cortex (VI) project to area OAa (FST), whereas some neurons 
within area OA (A 19) project to the depth and lower bank of the STS at OAa and to the 
upper bank at TPO and PGa. (Seltzer and Pandya 1978).
h) STS connections to occipital lobe
Areas within the cortex of the STS project to the occipital cortex. Rostral area 
TPO-4 projects cells to the upper lip and depth of the calcarhine sulcus (A18 and A 19), 
and layer I of the lateral extrastriate cortex (lunate sulcus, annectent gyms, dorsal 
prelunate gyms and areas V2, V3, V4 and PP). Areas TEa, TEm and rostral OAaproject 





The amygdala is a collection of subcortical nuclei located in the medial temporal 
lobe. It lies in close proximity to the superior temporal sulcus (STS), inferotemporal 
cortex (IT), parahippocampal areas (entorhinal and perirhinal cortex), insula, 
hypothalamus and hippocampus (Amaral et al 1992). The amygdala’s close proximity to 
the hippocampus and hypothalamus, and its possible involvement in similar functions, has 
led to its classification as part of the limbic system (MacLean 1952).
The delineation of subdivisions of the amygdala is a contentious issue. The 
nomenclature of Amaral et al (1992) will be used here. In an early paper, Johnson (1923) 
discussed the phylogenetically distinct compartments of the amygdala as the “basolateral” 
(BL) segment, and the older “corticomedial” (CM) segment. These parcellations are 
anatomically justified, due to the extensive connectivity of the CM nuclei (the cortical 
(Co), central (Ce) and medial (Me) nuclei) with subcortical areas such as the thalamus, 
basal ganglia, hypothalamus and brainstem. The BL nuclei (lateral (L), lateral basal (LB), 
medial basal (MB) and accessoiy basal (AB) nuclei), have prolific connections, with 
sensory and association cortical areas which control sensory and motor behaviour and 
complex cognitive processing (Amaral and Price 1984, Amaral et al 1992). Other 
“peripheral” amygdala nuclei include the anterior amygdaloid area (AAA), amygdalo- 
hippocampal area (AHA), periamygdaloid complex (PAC) and the lateral nucleus of the 
olfactory tract (LTD).
The two main groups of nuclei in the amygdaloid complex, according to Johnson 
(1923) are the 'centromedial' (consisting of the cortical, medial and central nuclei, and 
the nucleus of the olfactoiy tract) and the 'basolateral' (consisting of the lateral, 
accessoiy basal, lateral basal and medial basal nuclei) groups.
The basolateral (BL) group lies laterally in the brain in close proximity to the 
temporal association cortex (STS) and claiistrum, with the larger number of cortical
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connections; with the centromedial (CM) group lying in a more medial position at the 
inner limits of the brain, and having the majority of subcortical connections. This is seen 
more easily in Figure 3.2a, a coronal section through the medial temporal cortex of the 
macaque monkey, showing the various configurations of the specific nuclei. Figure 3.2b 
shows the relative position of the amygdala nuclei in a photograph of a coronal section 
through the monkey brain.
The amygdaloid complex also has a wide ranging internal connectivity, leading to 
the assumption that the different nuclei function differently, but together are functionally 
integrated (meaning one nuclei affects the outcome of another).
3.2.2 Intra-amygdala nuclei connections
(a) Lateral Nucleus, L  -the lateral nucleus of the amygdala is a large nucleic group on 
the most lateral edge of the amygdala. Its main connections are with the cortical sensory 
areas, such as the inferior temporal cortex, and the superior temporal gyms.
Afferents to:- the accessory basal, lateral basal, medial basal, cortical, medial, 
central, paralaminar nuclei, and the amygdalo-hippocampal area, cortical transition area, 
anterior amygdaloid area, periamygdaloid cortex, nucleus of the lateral olfactory tract, 
and the lateral nucleus itself (Nauta 1961; Van Hoesen 1981; Aggleton 1985; Pitkanen 
and Amaral 1991).
Efferents from:- the accessoiy basal and central nuclei (Aggleton 1985).
(b) Accessory Basal Nucleus, AB  -the accessoiy basal nucleus is one of the basal nuclei 
found in the centre of the amygdaloid complex. It is parcelled into two compartments, 
the magnocellular (me) and the parvocellular (pc).
Afferents to:- the medial basal, cortical, central, lateral basal, lateral nuclei and the 
amygdalo-hippocampal area (Nauta 1961; Price and Amaral 1981; Van Hoesen 1981; 
Aggleton 1985).
Figure 3.2 (b) Photograph of a coronal section through the rhesus monkey brain 
displaying the amygdaloid complex and the constituent nuclei (lateral nucleus, L; lateral 
basal nucleus (basal nucleus, magnocellular), Bmg; medial basal nucleus (basal nucleus, 
parvocellular), Bpc; basal paralaminar nucleus, Bpl; accessory basal nucleus 
(magnocellular, ABmg and parvocellular, ABpc), A3; cortical nucleus, CO; central 
nucleus, lateralis. Cl; central nucleus, medialis. Cm; medial nucleus, M; periamygdaloid 
complex, PAC; entorhinal cortex, EC; rhinal sulcus, rs. Photograph taken from Amaral 
(1987).
m l'
Figure 3.2 (a) Series of coronal sections through the rhesus macaque brain showing the 
position of the amygdala to cortical and sub-cortical areas. The amygdala is within the 
hatched area.
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Efferents from:- the lateral, central, medial, lateral basal nuclei and the 
periamygdaloid cortex, and amygdalo-hippocampal area (Aggleton, Burton and 
Passingham 1980; Price and Amaral 1981; Van Hoesen 1981; Aggleton 1985).
(c) Lateral Basal Nucleus, LB  -the lateral basal nucleus is also a component of the basal 
nucleic group in the centre of the amygdala, next to the lateral nucleus, it is also known 
as the basal nucleus, magnocellular and intermediate divisions.
Afferents to:- the cortical, medial, central, accessory basal, medial basal nuclei, 
and the periamygdaloid cortex, amygdalo-hippocampal area and the cortical transition 
area (Aggleton 1985)
Efferents:- the lateral, medial basal, accessory basal, central, medial nuclei and the 
amygdalo-hippocampal area (Nauta 1961; Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980; 
Aggleton 1985; Pitkanen and Amaral 1991).
(d) Medial Basal Nucleus, MB  -the medial basal nucleus is the final large component of 
the basal nucleus. It is also known as the basal nucleus, parvicellular division, and is 
found at the ventral most portion of the amygdala, above the paralaminar nucleus (see 
below).
Afferents to:- the lateral basal, central, medial basal, cortical, accessory basal, 
medial nuclei, and the periamygdaloid cortex, cortical transition area and the amygdalo- 
hippocampal area (Aggleton 1985).
Efferents from:- the lateral nucleus and the amygdalo-hippocamapal area and the 
periamygdaloid cortex (Aggleton 1985).
(e) Medial Nucleus, Me -the medial nucleus is a component of the corticomedial 
complex (Johnson 1923), found in the medial part of the brain, close to the lateral 
nucleus of the olfactoiy tract.
Afferents to:- the cortical, accessoiy basal, lateral basal and central nuclei, and the 
cortical transition area, periamygdaloid cortex and the amygdalo-hippocampal area 
(Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980; Van Hoesen 1981; Aggleton 1985).
Efferents from:- the lateral, lateral basal, medial basal and central nuclei 
(Aggleton 1985; Pitkanen and Amaral 1991).
(f) Central Nucleus, Ce -the central nucleus is also part of the corticomedial complex, in 
the medial forebrain. In more anterior portions of the brain, it develops from the anterior 
amygdaloid area. It has a high connectivity with the deeper subcortical areas, such as the 
medulla and pons.
Afferents to:- the cortical, lateral, accessory basal, medial basal, lateral basal, 
central nuclei and the cortical transition area, periamygdaloid cortex and the amygdalo- 
hippocampal area (Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980; Price and Amaral 1981; 
Aggleton 1985).
Efferents from:- the lateral basal, accessoiy basal, lateral and medial nuclei and 
the periamygdaloid cortex (Price and Amaral 1981; Van Hoesen 1981; Aggleton 1985; 
Pitkanen and Amaral 1991).
(g) Cortical Nucleus, Co -the cortical nucleus is the final main nucleus comprising the 
corticomedial nucleic group. The cortical nucleus blends with the periamygdaloid 
nucleus, and some investigators deem the cortical nucleus and the periamygdaloid 
nucleus to be one and the same. It is separated into anterior and posterior parcels.
Afferents to:- the medial and periamygdaloid cortex (Amaral et al 1992). 
Efferents from:- the central, lateral, lateral basal, accessoiy basal, medial basal 
and medial nuclei and the periamygdaloid cortex (Price and Amaral 1981; Van Hoesen 
1981; Aggleton 1985; Pitkanen and Amaral 1991).
(h) Periamygdaloid Cortex, FAC -the periamygdaloid cortex is the area of cortex lying 
on the most medial portion of the amygdala, ventral to the cortical nucleus, and dorsal to 
the cortical transition area. The periamygdaloid cortex is therefore neither cortex, or 
amygdala (in the true sense).
Afferents to:- the periamygdaloid cortex projects to the medial basal, accessory 
basal, medial, central and cortical nuclei (Van Hoesen 1981; Price and Amaral 1981).
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Efferents from:- the periamygdaloid cortex receives connections from the lateral, 
medial basal, lateral basal, accessoiy basal, medial and central nuclei (Price and Amaral 
1981; Aggleton 1985; Pitkanen and Amaral 1991).
(i) Cortical Transition Area, CTA -the cortical transition area lies underneath the 
periamygdaloid cortex, at the transition point with the entorhinal cortex and other 
hippocampal stmctures.
Afferents to:- the afferent connections of the cortical transition area are unknown 
at this time (if they do indeed exist).
Efferents from:- the lateral, lateral basal, medial basal, central and medial nuclei 
(Aggleton 1985).
(j) Paralaminar Nucleus, PL -the paralaminar nucleus is a long, thin nucleus mnning 
along the ventral edge of the basal nucleic groups. It is sometimes thought to be a 
superficial part of the medial basal nucleus, but has a vastly reduced connectivity.
Afferents to:- the afferents of the paralaminar nucleus are also unknown at the 
present time.
Efferents from:- the lateral nucleus (Aggleton 1985; Pitkanen and Amaral 1991).
(k) Amygdalo-Hippocampal Area, AHA -this area as the name implies, is the transition 
area between the hippocampus and the amygdala . It is therefore only found at more 
posterior portions of the amygdala, on the dorsoventral side.
Afferents to:- the lateral basal, accessoiy basal and the medial basal nuclei 
(Aggleton 1985).
Efferents from:- the lateral, lateral basal, accessory basal, medial basal, central 
and medial nuclei (Price and Amaral 1981; Aggleton 1985).
(I) Anterior Amygdala Area, AAA -the anterior amygdaloid area as the name states, is 
situated at the more anterior portions of the amygdala, and is sometimes confused with 
the central nucleus.
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Afferents to:- the afferent projections of the anterior amygdaloid area haven't 
been discovered at this present time.
Efferents from:- the lateral and central nuclei (Aggleton 1985; Pitkanen and 
Amaral 1991).
(m) Nucleus o f the Olfactory Tract, NOT  -there is some debate as to whether the 
nucleus of the olfactory tract is part of the amygdala. It is included here for 
completeness, due to it's location close to the rest of the amygdaloid groups. It is thought 
to be part of the amygdala, as the amygdala was once thought to have an primary 
olfactoiy function.
Afferents to:- the afferents of the NOT are also not known at the current state of 
knowledge.
Efferents from:- the lateral nucleus (Aggleton 1985; Pitkanen and Amaral 1991).
The many different nuclei of the primate amygdala have a large variety of cortical, 
subcortical, hippocampal and internal connections. This suggests that the amygdala 
should not be analysed as a whole stmcture when the connectional data for each 
particular nuclei is so radically different, and the connections of individual nuclei to many 
functionally distinct areas of the monkey brain (see below).
3.2.3 Cortical connections
The amygdaloid complex has been shown to have many varied and extensive 
connections with the temporal cortex and temporal pole. Efferent projections from the 
amygdala to the temporal pole originate in the corticomedial and basolateral amygdaloid 
groups. The following nucleic groups project to the temporal pole (Area TG); accessory 
basal, lateral basal, medial basal, lateral, periamygdaloid complex, central, cortical, medial 
nuclei and the cortical transition area and the anterior amygdaloid area . Area TG also 
sends many afferents back to the amygdala; to the lateral, accessory basal, lateral basal,
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medial basal, periamygdaloid complex, cortical, medial and central nuclei (Herzog and 
Van Hoesen 1976; Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980; Turner, Mishkin and Knapp 
1980; Amaral and Price 1984; Markowitsch et al 1985; Iwai and Yukie 1987; Moran, 
Mufson and Mesulam 1987). Therefore, the basal nuclei and a few other nuclei have a 
reciprocal connectivity with the temporal pole. The temporal pole may have such a large 
connectivity with the amygdaloid complex due to the close proximity, and similar 
functions, such as vision (Nakamura et al 1994), to other heavily amygdala-connected 
temporal cortical stmctures, such as the STS.
More posterior areas of the temporal cortex also have connections with the 
amygdaloid complex. The inferior temporal cortex (Area TE of von Bonin and Bailey 
1947) has a wide plethora of connections with the amygdaloid complex, which has been 
demonstrated by a large number of anatomical investigators. The inferior temporal cortex 
projects heavily to the lateral, lateral basal, accessory basal, medial basal, and central 
nuclei (Whitlock and Nauta 1956; Herzog and Van Hoesen 1976; Aggleton, Burton and 
Passingham 1980; Iwai et al 1987). This is a diffuse, general projection, which is also 
reciprocated from the amygdala to the inferior temporal cortex; from the lateral basal, 
lateral, accessoiy basal, cortical, and medial basal nuclei, and periamygdaloid cortex 
(Nauta 1961; Amaral and Price 1984; Iwai et al 1987; Baizer, Desimone and Ungerleider 
1993).
There are also connections between specific areas of the inferior temporal cortex 
and the amygdala. Anterior temporal cortex (Area TEa) projects to the lateral, central, 
lateral basal, medial basal, accessoiy basal nuclei and the anterior amygdaloid area 
(Turner, Mishkin and Knapp 1980; Iwai and Yukie 1987). The amygdala (lateral basal, 
accessoiy basal, medial basal, lateral and periamygdaloid cortex) also projects to Area 
TEa (Iwai and Yukie 1987; Yukie et al 1990). Posterior temporal cortex (Aiea TEp) 
also has connectivity with the amygdaloid complex; projecting to the lateral and lateral 
basal nuclei (Turner, Mishkin and Knapp 1980; Iwai and Yukie 1987). This is 
reciprocated from the lateral basal, medial basal, lateral and accessoiy basal nuclei (Iwai 
and Yukie 1987; Yukie et al 1990).
The areas of the temporal association cortex which have been deemed primarily 
visual or polysensoiy in function, for example the superior temporal sulcus, and the areas 
situated within the STS, such as MT\MST\FST and STPa, also have a rich connectivity 
with the amygdala. The lateral and lateral basal nuclei project to the ventral bank of the 
STS (Amaral and Price 1984), and the STS (rostral, and both banks) projects to lateral 
basal, lateral, medial, central and medial nuclei (Herzog and Van Hoesen 1976; Aggleton, 
Burton and Passingham 1980). Aieas MT\MST do not project to the amygdala, but there 
is an efferent connection from the amygdala; from the lateral and lateral basal nuclei (Iwai 
and Yukie 1987)
Ai eas of the temporal cortex which are primarily auditory in neurophysiological 
function are also connected to the amygdala. The superior temporal gyrus (Area TA) 
sends afferents to the lateral basal, lateral, accessoiy basal, and central nuclei (Herzog 
and Van Hoesen 1976; Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980; Turner, Mishkin and 
Knapp 1980; Mizuno et al 1981, Iwai and Yukie 1987). Efferent connections from the 
amygdala to Ai ea TA arise from the lateral basal, lateral, accessoiy basal, and cortical 
nuclei (Nauta 1961; Amaral and Price 1984). Therefore, there is also a reciprocal 
arrangement between the superior temporal gyrus and the lateral, lateral basal and 
accessory basal nuclei.
Finally there are connections between parahippocampal temporal areas, TH and 
TF and the amygdala. There is a fairly strong afferent connection to the lateral nucleus 
from Areas TF and TH (Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980).
Although there is a substantial connectivity between the temporal association 
cortex and the amygdala, there is also a smaller projection from the amygdala to the 
occipital cortex, and more importantly the primaiy visual areas. The only nuclei in the 
amygdaloid complex which has a direct connection with the visual areas of the occipital 
lobe and the occipitotemporal border is the lateral basal nucleus. The lateral basal nucleus 
afferent travels to the striate cortex (Primaiy Visual Cortex, Area 17, Area VI) (Mizuno 
et al 1981; Amaral and Price 1984; Iwai and Yukie 1987); Area V2 (Area 18) (Iwai and 
Yukie 1987); and Area V4 (Iwai and Yukie 1987).
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The parietal cortex also has a small association with the amygdala, with the 
accessoiy basal, lateral basal and medial basal nuclei sending afferents to Area 7 of the 
parietal cortex (ventral bank of the rostral intraparietal sulcus) (Amaral and Price 1984), 
and the lateral nucleus receiving an efferent connection from Area 7 (Aggleton, Burton 
and Passingham 1980). There is also a connection from the lateral basal nucleus to the 
premotor area (Ai ea 6) (dorsomedial to the superior limb of the arcuate sulcus), but no 
connection from Area 6 to the amygdala (Avendano, Price and Amaral 1983, Amaral and 
Price 1984). There has also been noted to be a pathway from the lateral basal and medial 
basal nuclei to posterior parietal cortex (Baizer, Desimone and Ungerleider 1993).
Many of the areas which are constituents of the macaque frontal cortex are 
interconnected with the amygdaloid complex. The frontal eye field. Area 8, receives 
efferents from the lateral basal nucleus (Jacobson and Trojanowski 1975; Barbas and 
DeOlmos 1990). Ai ea 9 projects to the central, lateral, medial basal, lateral basal and 
accessory basal nuclei of the amygdala (Leichnetz and Astruc 1977) and the medial 
nucleus (Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980). The lateral basal nucleus projects to 
Area 9, therefore there is a reciprocal connection between the lateral basal nucleus and 
Area 9.
The frontal pole (area 10) also has a major projection to the amygdala from the 
basal (accessoiy basal, lateral basal and medial basal) nuclei (Jacobson and Trojanowski 
1975; Porrino, Crane and Goldaman-Rakic 1981; Amaral and Price 1984), and pathways 
from Area 10 to the central, lateral, medial basal, lateral basal, accessory basal and medial 
nuclei (Leichnetz and Astaic 1977; Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980), The frontal 
cortical areas 11 and 12, on the ventral surface of the prefrontal cortex, also have a 
degree of connectivity with the amygdala, with the lateral basal, medial basal, accessory 
basal projecting to Area 11, and the basal, lateral and cortical nuclei projecting to Area 
12. Area 11 sends an afferent projection to the medial nucleus (Aggleton, Burton and 
Passingham 1980), but Area 12 has no afferent connections to the amygdala.
The orbitofrontal cortex (Area 13) sends and receives neural connections with the 
amygdala; the accessory basal, lateral basal, medial basal, lateral and cortical nuclei 
project to Area 13 (Nauta 1961; Barbas and DeOlmos 1990); and Area 13 projects to
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lateral and medial nuclei (Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980). Other frontal cortical 
areas have an association with the amygdala. Area 14 projects to the lateral and 
accessory basal nuclei (Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980), and the accessoiy basal, 
lateral basal and medial basal nuclei all project afferent nerve fibres to Area 14 (Amaral 
and Price 1984; Barbas and DeOlmos 1990).
The cingulate gyrus (Area 24) located in the medial part of the brain, also has 
extensive connections with the basolateral groups of the amygdala. The lateral basal, 
medial basal and accessory basal nuclei all project afferents to the cingulate gyrus 
(Porrino, Crane and Goldman-Ralcic 1981; Amaral and Price 1984); and the cingulate 
gyrus projects back to lateral (Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980) and lateral basal 
(Pandya, Van Hoesen and Domesicj 1973; Pandya, Van Hoesen and Mesulam 1981).
Other frontal areas that have connections with the amygdaloid nuclei are Area 25 
(where the lateral, lateral basal, medial basal, accessory basal and cortical nuclei project 
to, and the medial nucleus from, Area 25); Area 32 (where the lateral basal, accessory 
basal, medial basal, cortical nuclei and anterior amygdaloid area project to Area 32- 
Amaral and Price 1984; Barbas and DeOlmos 1990); Area 45 (which receives input from 
the basal nuclei (Amaral and Price 1984) and Area 46 (which receives efferent 
connections from the accessoiy basal, lateral basal and medial basal nuclei-Barbas and 
DeOlmos 1990).
The principal sulcus also distributes inputs and outputs to and from the amygdala; 
the lateral basal nucleus projects to it (Jacobson and Trojanowski 1975); and the 
principal sulcus projects back to the lateral basal and medial nuclei (Aggleton, Burton 
and Passingham 1980). There are further connections between the amygdala and the 
frontal cortex, with a connection between the frontal granular cortex and its efferent from 
the lateral basal nucleus (Jacobson and Trojanowski 1975). Also the superior prefrontal 
dimple sends afferents to the lateral basal and medial nuclei (Aggleton, Burton and 
Passingham 1980), and the subcallosal gyms sends afferents to the lateral basal, medial 
and accessory basal nuclei (Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 1980).
The final area of the macaque cortex which has extensive connectivity with the 
amygdaloid complex is the insular cortex. The insular cortex has three components; the
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agranular, granular and granular cortices. The accessoiy basal, medial basal, cortical and 
lateral basal nuclei project to the agranular cortex (Mufson, Mesulam and Pandya 1981; 
Mufson and Mesulam 1982; Friedman et al 1986), and the agranular cortex projects to 
the anterior amygdaloid area, medial, cortical, medial basal, accessory basal, lateral and 
lateral basal nuclei (Mufson, Mesulam and Pandya 1981).
The granular insular cortex has an efferent connection from the medial basal, 
accessory basal, lateral basal and cortical nuclei (Mufson, Mesulam and Pandya 1981; 
Mufson and Mesulam 1982); and sends an afferent to the lateral nucleus (Friedman et al 
1986).
The final part of the insular cortex, the dysgranular cortex, sends a connection to 
the anterior amygdaloid area, medial, cortical, central, medial basal, accessory basal, 
lateral basal and lateral nuclei (Mufson, Mesulam and Pandya 1981, Friedman et al 
1986). The accessoiy basal, medial basal, lateral basal, lateral and cortical nuclei project 
afferents to the dysgranular cortex (Mufson, Mesulam and Pandya 1981; Mufson and 
Mesulam 1982; Friedman et al 1986).
More general connectivity with the insular cortex can also be seen in the macaque 
monkey. The lateral, lateral basal, accessoiy basal, medial basal nuclei, and the amygdalo- 
hippocampal area, and the periamygdaloid cortex all project diffusely to the insular 
cortex; and the insula also projects diffusely to the anterior amygdaloid area, lateral basal, 
accessoiy basal, medial basal, cortical, lateral and central nuclei (Turner, Mishkin and 
Knapp 1980; Mufson, Mesulam, and Pandya 1981; Mesulam and Mufson 1982b; Mufson 
and Mesulam 1982; Friedman et al 1986).
A substantial amount of the projections that leave and enter the amygdala, arise 
and terminate in the hippocampal formation. In this report, the hippocampal formation is 
taken to include the hippocampus (including the stratum moleculare and subfields CAl, 
CA2, and CA3), entorhinal cortex (A28), prorhinal cortex (Prl), perirhinal cortex (A35), 
subiculum (A3 6), parasubiculum (A49), presubiculum (A27), prosubiculum (Pro) and the 
rhinal sulcus. This nomenclature follows that designated by Van Hoesen and Pandya 
(1975).
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The entorhinal cortex (Ai ea 28) receives efferents from the amygdala, and 
projects afferents to the amygdala. It projects to the lateral, accessoiy basal, paralaminar 
nucleus, anterior amygdaloid area, periamygdaloid cortex, medial basal, central, medial 
and cortical nuclei (Insausti, Amaral and Cowan 1987; Aggleton, Burton and Passingham 
1980); and receives from the lateral, lateral basal, accessoiy basal, medial, central nuclei 
and the periamygdaloid cortex (Saunders and Rosene 1988a; Aggleton 1985; Aggleton, 
Burton and Passingham 1980).
The prorhinal cortex (Prl) receives many connections from the amygdala; lateral 
basal, accessoiy basal, medial and central nuclei, and the prorhinal cortex projects to 
medial basal and lateral basal nuclei (Aggleton 1986). The perirhinal cortex (A35) also 
connects to the amygdaloid complex; with the lateral basal, medial basal, cortical, lateral, 
and accessory basal nuclei (Saunders and Rosene 1988a; Amaral and Price 1984; 
Aggleton 1986) projecting to it, and Area 35 projects to the medial basal, and lateral 
basal nuclei (Herzog and Van Hoesen 1976; Aggleton 1986).
Other non-hippocampus areas of the hippocampal formation include the 
subiculum, prosubiculum, presubiculum, parasubiculum and the rhinal sulcus. The 
accessoiy basal, medial basal, cortical nuclei and the cortical transition area project to the 
prosubiculum (Saunders and Rosene 1988a; Aggleton 1986); and the prosubiculum 
projects to the medial basal, accessory basal, lateral, lateral basal nuclei and the cortical 
transition area and the periamygdaloid cortex (Aggleton 1986; Saunders and Rosene 
1988a). The subiculum receives efferents from the accessoiy basal, lateral basal, medial 
basal, lateral, central nuclei and the cortical transition area (Saunders and Rosene 1988a; 
Aggleton 1986; Amaral and Price 1984), and sends afferents to the medial basal, lateral, 
lateral basal, paralaminar nuclei and the cortical transition area (Aggleton 1986; Rosene 
and Van Hoesen 1977). The parasubiculum (A49) and the presubiculum (A27) both 
receive inputs from the lateral basal nucleus (Aggleton 1986), and the rhinal sulcus sends 




Aside from the connections with the cortex and the hippocampal formation, the 
amygdala has a wide and extensive connectivity with many subcortical structures. The 
amygdala was originally thought as being an olfactoiy stmcture and the links with the 
olfactory areas are quite pronounced. The olfactoiy bulb sends an afferent to the Co 
(Turner, Gupta and Mishkin 1978) and the olfactoiy tubercle sends afferents to the AB, 
LB, MB and L nuclei (Nauta 1961; Aggleton, Friedman and Mishkin 1987). The LB, 
MB, AB, L, Ce, Me and Co nuclei and the AAA and AHA project to the olfactory 
tubercle areas; Toi 1, 2, and 3 (Nauta 1961; Price and Amaral 1984; Russchen, Amaral 
and Price 1985; Russchen et al 1985; Aggleton, Friedman and Mishkin 1987).
The subcortical (afferent and efferent) connections of the individual amygdala 
nuclei are summarised in Table 4.1. The references describing each connection are also 
displayed in the table.
Subcortical Nucleus Afferent (input) Efferent (output) References
Hypothalamus
Ventromedial nucleus Ce, LB AAA, AB, Ce, Co, MB, 
Me,LTO,PAC
1, 4, 6, 8, 10
Dorsomedial nucleus AB. Ce, L.LB Ce, Co, Me 1, 6, 10
Mamillary nuclei AB, L, LB Ce 4, 6, 10
Lateral hypothalamic area AB, Ce, L, LB AAA, AB, Ce, Co, L, 
LB, Me
1. 4. 6. 8, 10




Lateral tubercle nucleus LB N/A 10
Basal Ganglia
Caudate nucleus (head, 
body & tail)
AB.LB, MB, PAC Whole amygdala 1,9, 11
Caudate nucleus (body) AAA, AB, Co, L, MB N/A 9,11
Caudate nucleus (tail) AAA, AB, Co, L, LB, 
MB, Me
N/A 9, 11
Putamen AB, Ce, Co, L, LB, 
MB, Me, PAC
AB, Co, L, LB, MB 7, 9, 11, 12
Globus pallidus AAA, AB, Co, MB AB, AHA, Ce, Co, LB, 
L, MB, Me, PAC, PLN
11, 12
Ventral pallidum AB, LB, MB AB, AHA, Ce, Co, CTA, 
L, LB, MB, Me, PAC, 
PLN
11
Claustrum AB, L, LB, MB AB, Co. L, LB, MB 7
Nucleus accumbens AB, AHA, Co, L,LB, 
MB
AB, Ce, L, MB 7, 11, 12
Basal Forebrain
Substantia innominata AB, L, LB, MB AB, Co, L, LB, MB 1,2, 7, 11
Nucleus basalis of Meynert AB, AHA, Ce, Co, L, 
LB, MB, Me, PAC, 
PLN
AB, AHA, Ce, Co, CTA, 
L, LB, MB, Me, PAC, 
PLN
10, 11
Nucleus of the diagonal 
band ofBroca
Ce AAA, AB, Ce, Co, L, 
LB, MB, Me
1,7
Anterior commissure AB, LB, MB AB, LB, MB 7, 11
Table 3,1, Macaque amygdala connections with subcortical areas (thalamus, 
hypothalamus, basal ganglia, basal forebrain, midbrain, pons and medulla). 
Abbreviations and references are at the bottom of the table.
Subcortîcal Nucleus Afferent (input) Efferent (output) References
Thalamus
Midline nuclei, nucleus 
centralis, nucleus medialis 
dorsalis, midline nucleus 




nucleus anterior medialis, 
nucleus alaris, nucleus 
rotundus, nucleus limitans, 
lateral dorsalis nuclei, nucleus 
parataenialis, nucleus reuniens 
ventralis, nucleus nterventralis, 
nucleus subparafascicularis 




LB, MB, Me, PAC
3, 6, 10
Nucleus anterior medialis, 
nucleus centralis, nucleus 
alaris, nucleus rotundus, 
nucleus parafascicularis, 
nucleus paraventricularis, 
nucleus reuniens, ventral 
anterior nucleus, nucleus 
paracentralis, nucleus 
subfascicularis, nucleus 
centrum medianum, nucleus 
medianum, habenula, medial 
pulvinar nucleus, midline 
nuclei, medial geniculate 




AB, Ce, Co, LB, Me 1, 3,8
Subcortîcal Nucleus Afferent (input) Efferent (output) References
Midbrain, Pons & Brainstem
Substantia nigra AB, L, LB, Ce AAA, Ce, dorsal 
amygdala, L, LB
1,4, 6, 8, 11
Ventral tegmental area AB, Ce, L, LB Ce, whole amygdala 4, 6. 8, 10
Peripeduncular nucleus of the midbrain AB, L, LB, MB 1,5
Nucleus of posterior commissure Ce 10
Nucleus cuneiformis Ce 10
Central gray Ce AB, whole amygdala I, 10
Periamygdaloid gray Whole amygdala 1
Raphe nuclei Ce Ce, Co, L, LB, Me 8, 10
Nucleus medialis annuli aqueductus Whole amygdala 1
Mesencephalic trigeminal nucleus Whole amygdala 1
Parabrachial nuclei Ce Ce, Co, Me, PAC 8, 10
Mesencephalic nucleus of the fifth nerve Ce 6, 10
Nucleus of the tractus solitarius AB, Ce, L, LB 6, 10
Spinomedullary border Ce 6, 10
Area postrema, area subpostrema AB, L,LB 6
Dorsal motor nucleus of the vagus AB, L, LB 6
Reticular formation Ce 10
Pontine nuclei Ce 10
Locus coeruleus Ce Ce, Co, L, LB, Me 8, 10
Abbreviations:
AAA, anterior amygdaloid area; AB, accessory basal nucleus; AHA, amygdalo-hippocampal 
area; Ce, central nucleus; Co, cortical nucleus; CTA, cortical transition area; L, lateral nucleus; 
LB, lateral basal nucleus; Me, medial nucleus; MB, medial basal nucleus; PAC, periamygdaloid 
complex; PLN, paralaminar nucleus; N/A, not available.
References:
1. Aggleton, Burton & Passingham ‘80, 2. Aggleton, Friedman & Mishkin ‘87, 3. Aggleton & Mishkin 1984, 
4. Amaral, Veazey & Cowan ‘82, S. Jones et al ‘75, 6. Mehler ‘80, 7. Nauta ‘61, 8. Norita & Kawamura ‘80 
9. Parent, Mackey & DeBelluille ‘8 3 ,10. Price & Amaral ‘8 1 ,11. Russchen, Amaral & Price ‘85 
12. Russchen et al ‘85
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Chapter IV
Architecture of the Primate Social Brain 
B. Connectional Analysis
4,1 Introduction
The brain is a metabolically expensive organ, on par with the gastro-intestinal 
tract in levels of energy consumption (Aiello and Wheeler 1995). It would be false 
economy for the brain to contain redundant connections between areas which are not 
directly functionally associated. For example, the primaiy visual cortex (VI) is not 
directly connected to the primaiy motor cortex (A4), as there is no functional 
requirement for this connection to exist. It would therefore seem reasonable to suggest, 
that the brain is designed to enhance the product of its activity; behaviour. For example, 
to enhance function, the lowest possible number of synapses required to transmit 
information from A to E would be used. The simplest route for information to be 
communicated A to E (including all areas in between), is via A to B to C to D to E. 
Information would not get passed from A to G to F to G to H to B to C to D to E, as an 
example; unless there is a precise, functional reason for this to occur (as may be required 
by parallel distributed processing; Rumelhart and McClelland 1986).
The brain is often described as a complex processing organ. Is the complexity of 
the brain’s anatomy (and connectivity) reflected in the complexity of the brain’s function? 
Sambrook and Whiten (1997) have recently discussed what complexity is in cognitive 
and behavioural science and suggested that complexity lies between orderedness and 
randomness. For example, a checkerboard is ordered, a random-dot stereogram is 
randomised (in one eye), but a fractal pattern is complex. Can the brain be thought of
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being complex, random or ordered (see Figure 4.1)? As stated earlier, it is unlikely that 
the brain is random as this would be wasteful from a metabolic sense and impossible from 
the standpoint of evolution. The primate brain has evolved to solve specific social and 
environmental problems; there would be no requirement for random connections 
(without a functional purpose). Is the connectivity of the brain ordered? If this was the 
case, eveiy brain area would be connected to eveiy other brain area. The brain could not 
function at this level, as integral processing stages may be missed by passing information 
by the fastest route from A to B. As A and B would be directly connected, the 
information would not have passed through the required processing stages.
Behaviourally, this could be fatal to the animal housing the “ordered brain”. It would 
therefore follow, that the connectivity of the brain is complex. Primate behaviour would 
also suggest this, due to the complexity of some of its manifestations (Sambrook and 
Whiten 1997, Sambrook 1995).
As reviewed in Chapter II, a large number of investigations have studied social 
complexity and the possible areas of the primate brain which may be involved in 
controlling this level of complexity. One area which was highlighted in these studies was 
the amygdala. From Chapter III, we know that the amygdala is a collection of subcortical 
nuclei located in the medial temporal lobe. It lies in close proximity to the superior 
temporal sulcus (STS), inferotemporal cortex (IT), parahippocampal areas (entorhinal 
and perirhinal cortex), insula, hypothalamus and hippocampus (Amaral et al 1992). The 
amygdala’s close proximity to the hippocampus and hypothalamus, and its possible 
involvement in similar functions, has led to its classification as part of the so-called limbic 
system (MacLean 1952, although see arguments against the limbic-system concept in 
LeDoux 1996).
The delineation of subdivisions of the amygdala is a contentious issue. The 
nomenclature of Amaral et al (1992) will be used here. A number of early papers, 
Johnson (1923) and Crosby and Humphrey (1941, 1944) discussed the phylogenetically 
distinct compartments of the amygdala as the “basolateral” (BL) segment, and the older 
“corticomedial” (CM) segment. These parcellations appear anatomically justified, due to 
the extensive connectivity of the CM nuclei (the cortical (Co), central (Ce) and medial
Figure 4.1; Diagrams of a hypothetical brain system (areas A-G) with connections 
between areas, (a) Ordered pattern o f connections, i.e. every area is connected to every 
other area. If information needs to travels from area A to area G, there are an infinite 
number of pathways by which the information can travel, depending on the levels of 
processing required. The simplest route is directly from area A to area G. (h) Random 
pattern o f connections, i.e. some areas are connected, whilst some are not. Information, 
again is required to travel from area A to area G, but there are a finite number of routes 
through which the information can travel. The simplest route is area A to area D to area 
G. The reduction in the number o f routes required may also reduce the levels at which 
information can be processed, (c) Complex pattern o f connections, i.e. each area 
connects to a small number o f other areas (in tliis example, a maximum o f two), which 
allow information to be processed through many stages. There is a precise, finite number 
o f processing steps to pass information from area A to area G (area A to area B to area C 
to area D to area E to area F to area G).
(a) ORDERED (infinité) 
0
Possible pathways: A-G or A-B-C-D-G or A-E-F-B-G etc. 
(to) RANDOM (finite; imprecise)
Possible pathways: A-B-D-G or A-D-G or A-B-E-C-G
(c) COMPLEX (finite; precise)
Possible pathways: A-B-C-D-E-F-G
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(Me) nuclei) with subcortical areas such as the thalamus, basal ganglia, hypothalamus and 
brainstem. The BL nuclei (lateral (L), lateral basal (LB), medial basal (MB) and 
accessory basal (AB) nuclei), have prolific connections, with sensory and association 
cortical areas which control sensory and motor behaviour and complex cognitive 
processing (Amaral and Price 1984, Amaral et al 1992). Other “peripheral” amygdala 
nuclei include the anterior amygdaloid area (AAA), amygdalo-hippocampal area (AHA), 
periamygdaloid complex (PAC) and the lateral nucleus of the olfactoiy tract (LTD). 
Comparative and evolutionary issues concerning the functions of these two parts of the 
amygdala are discussed and analysed in the next chapter.
Do the individual connection patterns of the primate amygdala nuclei relate to the 
functions of the amygdala in social cognition, and can this information be investigated by 
analysing the connections of the amygdala with separate neocortical areas? The statistical 
technique of non-metric multidimensional scaling (NMDS) has recently been adapted to 
determine the connectional similarities of particular brain regions (Young 1992, 1993, 
Young, Scannell et al 1995). NMDS allows visualisation of the global organisation of 
sets of interconnected objects. The similarities between these sets of data are then 
displayed as 2D or 3D geometric figures, showing relative distances between data points 
as computed in multidimensional space (Young and Harris 1993). Most brain areas are 
not inter-connected. A recent addition to the application of the NMDS method in this 
area is data transformation and conditioning, which reduces the impact of large numbers 
of non-connections between brain areas in the database matrix (Young, Scannell et al 
1995).
The NMDS method was employed by Young (1992) to analyse the cortico- 
cortical connections of the monkey visual system, and the results substantiated the 
findings of neuroanatomy, animal lesion studies and human neuropsychology 
(Ungerleider and Mishkin 1982, Felleman and Van Essen 1991, Goodale and Milner 
1992), that the cortical visual system was separated into two distict processing streams 
(dorsal and ventral-Young, Scannell et al 1995). NMDS also indicated that information 
from the streams has the opportunity to re-converge in the rostral region of the temporal 
lobe; area STP and in the frontal cortex; area 46. NMDS provides an objective method of
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analysis of brain connection data, which can be used in formulating subjective opinions 
about the relationships between brain anatomy and behavioural function.
Previous NMDS analysis of the amygdala’s cortical connections (Young and 
Scannell 1993) treated the amygdala as a single cohesive structure (see Figure 4.2).
Given the large number of separate amygdala nuclei, it is likely that the particular nuclei 
have different functions. It is also likely that, individual amygdala nuclei have distinct 
connectivity patterns, which can be analysed using NMDS. This study treats the 
amygdala as a collection of separate nuclei, and analyses the connections of each nucleus 
separately. Early anatomical and cytoarchitectural studies suggested that the amygdala 
was also separated into two larger sub-areas, the BL and CM complexes (Johnson 1923). 
This study used NMDS to attempt to evaluate objectively whether the definition of two 
nuclear groups was justified using connectivity data. The study also attempted to define 
the relationships between amygdala nuclei and cortical systems (particularly the temporal 
and frontal cortex), thought to be involved in social processes.
4.2 Methods
4.2.1 Anatomical nomenclature
The cortical area nomenclature was taken from Felleman and Van Essen (1991), 
with the exception of the auditoiy cortical nomenclature which was taken from 
Galaburda and Pandya (1983), and Pandya and Yeterian (1985).
The amygdala nuclei nomenclature and parcellation was taken from Amaral et al 
(1992). The lateral nucleus of the olfactoiy tract and the paralaminar nucleus were not 
included here due to their veiy sparse cortical and intrinsic amygdala connections, and 
their marked reduction in size and probably function in Old and New World monkeys and 
apes (Stephan et al 1987). The parcellation of cortical areas in an idealised monkey brain, 
was developed from Pandya and Yeterian 1985, Felleman and Van Essen (1991), and 
Preuss and Goldman-Rakic (1991), and is displayed in Figure 4.3a, b, and the 
configuration of the amygdala nuclei is displayed in Figure 4.3 c.
Figure 4.2: Output plot for macaque amygdalo-cortical connections analysed using 
NMDS, without the use of data transformation methods or separating the amydala into 
constituent parts. Taken from Young and Scannell (1993).
.3: (a) Lateral view of the rhesus macaque brain, showing parcellation of 
cortical areas with abbreviations from Young (1993). (b) Medial view of the macaque 
brain, with labels as in (a), (c) Ventral view of the macaque brain, with labels as in (a),
(d) Coronal section of the amygdala in relation to the STS, and idealised positions of the 
individual amygdala nuclei, with abbreviations from Amaral et al (1992).






























An anatomical database was compiled from 42 published papers (1945-1993) of 
amygdalo-cortical and cortico-cortical connections in the macaque monkey brain and is 
reproduced in Appendix 1. A connection was included in the database if it was reported 
in more than one paper (not if the technique used in both papers were neurodegenerative 
lesions), and the connection was relatively strong, particularly with ten or more 
(stained/degenerated) cells reported. The database itself contained the directional nature 
of the connection (unidirectional, or reciprocal), the species of macaque investigated, the 
number of animals used, the location of the injection site, and final destination of the 
connection, the anatomical method employed and (if applicable) the density of the 
connection. These anatomical data were derived from studies of various macaque species 
{Macaca miilatta, M. fasciculavis, M  fuscata andM. Nemestrhia), Anatomical data 
from other primate species were not considered here.
The cortico-cortical connections were taken primarily from Young (1993), but 
also from the following papers (Barnes and Pandya 1992, Cavada and Goldman-Rakic 
1989a, b, Felleman and Van Essen 1991, Friedman et al 1986, Galaburda and Pandya 
1983, Iwai and Yukie 1988, Markowitsch et al 1985, Morel and Bullier 1990, Pandya 
and Yeterian 1985, Seltzer and Pandya 1978, 1989b, 1994).
The data used in the database was found from studies using different 
neuroanatomical research techniques. For example, the neuronal degeneration method 
used in the 1950’s could have reported connections which appeared due to the imprecise 
nature of the lesion technique, e.g. the lesion damaging an area next to the target lesion 
area. The majority of the cases reported here are of connections which have been 
reported in more than one journal article by different authors, and use modern 
neuroanatomical research techniques, such as horseradish peroxidase (HRP). Earlier 
studies relied on the degeneration technique, but the results of these studies were added 
when they had been replicated using more modern techniques.
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4.2.3 Coiiiiectional matrix
Following methods of Young (1992, 1993), the connection data from the 
anatomical database were then formulated in a connection matrix. The connections 
between two stmctures were assigned a number depending on the presence or absence of 
a connection between two areas. If a connection did not exist or was not reported in the 
literature it was given a 0 value in the matrix. If a connection was reported but was 
apparently unidirectional, it was given a 1 value in the matrix. If the connection was 
reciprocal between two areas, it was given a 2 value. No information of the cortical 
laminar destination, strength of connection or direction of projection was attributed to 
this connection data. This basic data does not contain information on whether the two 
areas that are connected are proximal or distant from one another in physical distance in 
the brain.
The ordering of the brain areas along the side of the matrix was determined, for 
convenience, by grouping sensoiy, motor, association and amygdala areas together. The 
ordering of the brain regions in the matrix was randomised, to determine that this did not 
affect the outcome of the NMDS analysis, and this was found to be the case when the 
matrix was analysed (see below). The lower triangular half of the matrix is displayed in 
Figure 4.4, and shows all the connections between the amygdalar nuclei and all the 
cortical areas (sensory, motor, hippocampal, cingulate and prefrontal). A list of 
abbreviations is also displayed in Figure 4.4.
4,2.4 Non-metric multidimensional scaling analysis
(a) Untransformed data
Non-metric multidimensional scaling (Young 1970) was performed on the data, 
using the ALSCAL command language in SPSS for Windows (Young and Harris 1993). 
NMDS is a data analytic technique which displays a representation of the relative 
proximities between points. The data utilised here are the presence or absence of a 











Figure 4,4: Matrix of the cortical and inter-nuclear connections of the macaque 
amygdala. The absence or presence of a connection is represented numerically in the 
matrix. An absence of connection is designated by a ‘0’ in the matrix, a unidirectional 
connection by a T  in the matrix, and a reciprocal connection by a ‘2’ in the matrix.
Abbreviations: Anterior amygdaloid area (AAA), Accessory basal nucleus (AB), 
Amygdalo-hippocampal area (AHA), Dorsal anterior inferotemporal cortex (AITd), 
Ventral anterior inferotemporal cortex (AITv), Sensorimotor area 1 (Al), Sensorimotor 
area 2 (A2), Sensorimotor area 3a (A3a). Sensorimotor area 3b (A3b), Primary motor 
cortex (A4), Somatosensory area 5 (A5), Premotor cortex (A6), Posterior parietal area 
(A7a), Parietal area 7b (A7b), Dorsal prefrontal cortex (A9), Frontal pole (AlO), Rostral 
orbital frontal cortex (Al 1), Lateral orbital frontal cortex (A12), Central orbital frontal 
cortex (A13), Medial orbital frontal cortex (A14), Cingulate gyrus, posterior (A23), 
Cingulate gyrus, anterior (A24), Medial prefrontal cortex (A25), Prefrontal motor area 
(A30), Cingulate gyrus, rostral (infralimbic cortex-A32), Perirhinal cortex (A3 5), 
Prefrontal cortex, area 45 (A45), Frontal cortex, principal sulcus (A46), Central nucleus 
(Ce), Dorsal caudal inferotemporal cortex (CITd), Ventral caudal inferotemporal cortex 
(CITv), Cortical nucleus (Co), Cortical Transition Area (CTA), Dorsal prelunate (DP), 
Entorhinal Cortex, A28 (ER), Frontal Eye Field, A8 (FEF), Floor of the superior 
temporal cortex (FST), Gustatory Cortex (G), Hippocampal formation (including the 
hippocampus and subicular cortices-Hipp), Insular cortex, dysgranular layer (Id), Insular 
cortex, granular layer (Ig), Primary auditory cortex (KA), Lateral nucleus (L), Lateral 
basal nucleus (LB), Lateral intraparietal area (LIP), Medial basal nucleus (MB), Medial 
nucleus (Me), Dorsal medial superior temporal cortex (MSTd), Lateral medial superior 
temporal cortex (MSTl), Middle temporal area (MT), Caudal parakaniocortical auditory 
area (paAc), Lateral parakaniocortical auditory area (paAl), Rostral parakaniocortical 
auditory area (paAr), Periamygdaloid cortex (PAC), Parainsula cortex (Pal), Posterior 
intraparietal area (PIP), Dorsal posterior inferotemporal cortex (PITd), Ventral posterior 
inferotemporal cortex (PITv), Prokaniocortical auditory area (proA), Parieto-occipital 
area (PO), Circular sulcus, area relt (reit), Retroinsular area (RI), Somatosensory area 2 
(S2), Supplementary motor area (SMA), Anterior superior temporal polysensory area 
(STPa), Posterior superior temporal polysensory area (STPp), Parahippocampal gyrus 
(TF), Dorsal temporal pole (TGd), Ventral temporal pole (Tgv), ParaWppocampal gyrus 
(TH), Auditory area Tpt (Tpt), Auditory area in rostral portion of superior temporal 
gyrus (TSl), Auditory area in mid-portion of STG and adjacent cortex in superior 
temporal sulcus (TS2), Auditory area within caudal part of STG and adjacent cortex in 
STS (TS3), Primary visual cortex, A17 (VI), Secondary visual cortex, A18 (V2), 
Tertiary visual cortex, A19 (V3), Tertiary visual cortex, a (V3a), Visual area 4 (V4), 
Visual area 4, transitional (V4t), Ventral intraparietal area (VIP), Ventral 
occipitotemporal visual area (VOT).
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regions by using the similarity of connection patterns between these two brain regions. 
This is analogous to the possible connections between airports (see Figure 4.5). New 
York JFK and London Heathrow are physically far apart, but the number of connections 
(flights) between them are many. The physical distance between London and Aberdeen is 
much less than the distance between London and New York, but the number of flights 
between London and Aberdeen is far fewer than between London and New York. In a 
NMDS analysis of flight connections, London and New York would be close together in 
the topological plot, and London and Aberdeen would be far apart. Places physically 
close together can also be topologically close. London and Paris are relatively close and 
also have a large number of connections between them. The brain also contains regions 
which are physically close, but poorly connected, and regions which are physically 
distant, but well connected. The brain also has regions similar to London and Paris in this 
above analogy, which are physically and well connected.
Distance data is not included in this analysis of brain regions. Two regions are 
deemed to be proximal to one another if their connectivity patterns are similar, e.g. area 
X connects to areas Y, Z, A, B, C & D and area Z connects to areas X, Y, A, B, C & E. 
Areas X and Z have five connections in common. Areas X and Z, therefore, have very 
similar connection patterns and so would be placed close together in the NMDS output 
configuration. By contrast, area W connects to areas C, D, G, H, I, & I and therefore 
does not have a similar connection pattern to areas X and Z. Area W would be placed 
further away from area X and Z in the output NMDS configuration.
To visualise the output configuration, the NMDS analysis needs to be performed 
in two or three dimensions, to aid interpretation. The configuration of results is displayed 
in two dimensions here. Calculating distance in a low number of dimensions mean that 
not all the important aspects of the matrix data staicture may be visualised.
The details of the NMDS procedure are discussed fully in Young, Scannell et al 
(1995). The model used in the analysis here was similarity distance and the output 
configuration was plotted in Euclidean square space to aid visualisation (Shepard 1962). 
NMDS is used to reduce the number of dimensions of the output configuration. 
Convergence was set to zero, so that SSTRESS was minimised as well as possible. RSQ
\ \
Densely connected, positionally close 
Loosely connected, positionally close 
Densely connected, positionally far 
Loosely connected, positionally far
Figure 4.5: Diagrammatic representation of connectional problems solved by NMDS. 
New York JFK and London Heathrow airports are distant from one another, but the 
connections between them are many (large number of flights). In similar ways in the 
brain, two areas may be densely connected, but anatomically distant. London Heathrow 
and Aberdeen on the other hand, are loosely connected, but positionally close. Paris and 
London Heathrow are positionally close with a large number of flights between them. 
Finally, Aberdeen and New York JFK are positionally far and connectionally unrelated.
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(simple squared correlation coefficient) and stress values were also computed to 
determine the level of goodness-of-fit between the computed data and the output 
configuration. A high RSQ (towards 1.0) indicates the fit is very good and that 100% of 
the variance between the computed data and the resultant topological plot is explained. A 
low RSQ (towards 0) indicates that the fit of the data is bad, and that a low amount of 
the possible variance is explained. A bad fit signifies that the data is not well visualised in 
a low number of dimensions (2 or 3), or is otherwise a poor representation of the data.
The output topological configuration plots were created by the ALSCAL 
programme, and lines representing connections between two areas were drawn using 
custom drawing software.
(b) WDSMI data transformation method.
In an untransformed matrix, all values are treated with equal weighting, e.g. a 
zero entry is considered as important as a non-zero entry. To offset the influence of this, 
the wdsml transform (weighted dissimilarity transform-Young, Scannell et al 1995), 
maximises the importance of the known amygdalo-cortical and cortico-cortical 
connections (1 or 2 data points) and reduces the importance of the large number of non­
reported connections (0 data points). This is achieved by using a formula to convert the 
0, 1, 2 data to a meaningful set of values in the matrix. The wdsml transform method and 
formula is described in extensive detail in Young, Scannell et al (1995). The wdsml 
transform treats each connection in the matrix in terms of its own and its nearest 
neighbour’s connectivity patterns. For example. Area X and Aiea Y have the following 
hypothetical connectivity patterns, as shown in Figure 4.6.
Area X and Area Y therefore have very similar connectivity patterns and so 
would be located in similar positions in a basic (non-transformed) NMDS analysis. The 
wdsml transform attempts to reduce the possible influence of the high number of zero 
entities in the connection pattern of Area Y, by transforming the data in the following 
way. A l element is described as a connection in the matrix (i.e. 0, 1, 2). There is a 
unidirectional connection (1) between A ea  X and A ea  Y. This element in the new 





V 1 1 1 2 0 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 0 1 2  
w o o l  1 2 0 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0  
0 0 1  
2 2 0  
27  7 
0 0 0  
27 7 
0 7 2
Figure 4.6: Hypothetical connection matrix between brain areas V, W, X, Y, Z, Q. The 
numbers (0,1, 2) correspond to those used in the amygdalo-cortical matrix used in this 
analysis. The numbers in bold italics are the connections of Area X and A ea Y, and the 
number in bold is the connection (matrix element) between A ea X and A ea Y.
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of all the non-zero elements in A ea  Y. This value is then divided by the sum of all the 
non-zero elements in the A ea  X row plus all the non-zero elements in the A ea  Y row 
(using the formula below).
Weighting of new element = [Z|(Area X me - Area Y me )|] / 
[Z |(Area X me + Area Y me )|]
where me = matrix element
Transformed matrix element X/Y would therefore be calculated so. The non-zero 
numbers in Row X are added together (=15). The non-zero numbers are summed in Row 
Y (=11). These numbers are then placed into the equation above.
Weighting of new Me = X | (15 - 11) | / Z  i (15 + 11) | = 4/26 = 0.1538
Each new element is computed by taking the weighting of the new matrix element 
from the existing matrix element. In the above example, the old matrix element X/Y was 
1. The new matrix element would be 1 - 0.1538 = 0.8462. (NB. the new elements are all 
“real” numbers). The transformed matrix is then analysed using NMDS in the same way.
4.2.5 Cluster analysis (CA)
Hierarchical cluster analysis (CA) was also performed on the data matrix using 
the PROXIMITIES language of SPSS for Windows (Nomsia 1993). Cluster analysis is a 
second statistical procedure which groups data points together which have similar 
properties. Where NMDS groups areas together in a plot (of a multiple possible number 
of dimensions), CA also groups areas together but determines the relationships between 
those areas by producing an output dendrogram. The dendrogram visualises the
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relationships by representing them as connections on a tree stmcture (as is commonly 
used in phylogenetic studies). For example, bonobos and common chimpanzees are 
closely related. Both species are closely related to gorillas, and bonobos, chimpanzees 
and gorillas are related to orangutans (see Figure 4.7 below). CA can also be used to 
determine the precise relationships between areas using their connection patterns. CA 





Figure 4.7: Dendrogram displaying the genetic (evolutionaiy) relationship between 
species of great apes. Bonobos and chimpanzees are most closely related, so are 
connected together; gorillas are related to both these species, and orangutans are related 
to all of them.
4,2.6 Connectional Density Index (CDI)
Each area in the matrix can connect (unidirectionally or reciprocally) with a 
possible 83 other areas (including intra-areal connections). A Coimecüoml Density Index 
(CDI) was computed for each brain area. CDFs were computed as indicators of the 
density of connections of each area out of the total possible number of connections for 
that area. For example, area X may have 72 out of a possible 83 connections, whereas 
area Y may only have 34 out of a possible 83 connections. A ea  X would have a
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relatively high CDI and area Y would have a relatively low CDI. CDI was calculated as 
follows:
CDI = Area X, total no. connections (unidirectional or reciprocal) / 83
where 83 is the total possible number of connections in the matrix.
4.3 Results
The anatomical database, contained 951 reported connections, with 503 
reciprocal connections (52.9%) and 448 unidirectional connections (47.1%). There were 
83 structures in the database, so there were 3445 possible connections between all areas, 
(including intra-areal connections), so the 951 reported connections were 27.6% of the 
total possible connections. The matrix therefore contained a large number of non­
reported connections. The 83 areas reported were classified into categories; visual, 
auditory, somatosensoiy, motor, cingulate cortex, hippocampal areas (hippocampus, 
entorhinal and perirhinal cortices) and prefrontal cortex. The parcellation of each 
sensory/motor/association cortical area or amygdala nucleus is described in the legend to 
Table 4.1. The number of areas in each cat ego l'y (based on the physiological properties of 
single neurons in these areas, and/or their architectonic boundaries), is shown in Table 
4.1. Table 4.1 also displays the number of connections that each group (sensory, motor, 
association or amygdala) has reported in the matrix and an index of connectivity for each 
group dependent on the number of brain areas within a group. There are many visual 
areas and these areas have many connections. The amygdala has many connections from 
a relatively small number of areas, whereas the hippocampal areas have many connections 
from a few areas.
Table 4.1 shows that the hiipocampal formation has a large number of 
connections relative to the number of brain areas (13.7). The amygdala (10.4) and the 
prefrontal cortex (5.5) also have relatively large numbers of connections relative to 
number of brain areas. The primaiy sensoi*y and motor groups (visual, auditoiy.
TabSe 4.1: The number of brain areas that contribute to a particular modality or 
functional group, and the percentage number of total areas in the amygdala connections 
database. The number of connections with each group (matrix entries) and the 
percentage number of total connections are also displayed. Each score is ranked (1-8, 
l=highest number of areas/connections, 8=lowest number of areas/connections). The 
number of connections, dependent on the number of areas (i.e. number of 
connections/number of areas) are also displayed, with ranlc. Groupings; visual (VI, V2, 
V3, V3a, V4, V4t, VOT, VIP, LIP, PIP, DP, PO, AITd, AITv, CITd, CITv, PITd, PITv, 
FEF, FST, MT, MSTl, MSTd, STPa, STPp, TF, TH, TGv, A7a, A46), auditory (KA, Pal, 
paAl, paAc, paAr, proA, reit, TGd, Tpt, TSl, TS2, TS3), somatosensory (Id, Ig, S2, Al, 
A2, A3 a, A3b, A5, A7b, RI), motor (A4, A6, SMA, A30), cingulate (A23, A24, A32), 
hippocampal (Hipp, A35, ER), prefrontal (A9, AlO, Al l ,  A12, A13, A14, A45, A25, G), 
amygdala (L, LB, AB, MB, Co, Ce, AAA, AHA, CTA, Me, PAC).


















Visual 30 36.2 1 109 26.5 2 3.6 5
Auditoiy 12 14.5 2 32 7.8 6 2.7 7
Somatosensory 10 12 4 45 10.9 4 4.5 4
Motor 4 4.8 6 4 1.0 8 1 8
Cingulate 3 3.6 7 11 2.7 7 3.6 5
Hippocampal 3 3.6 7 41 10.0 5 13.7 1
Prefrontal 10 12 4 55 13.4 3 5.5 3
Amyp^dala 11 13.3 3 114 27.7 1 10.4 2
Total 83 100 411 100
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somatosensoiy and motor) have few connections relative to the number of areas within 
each group.
The number of connections (efferent and afferent) of the individual amygdala 
nuclei are displayed in Table 4.2. The LB nucleus has the largest number of total 
connections, with the greatest number being efferent and afferent connections with visual 
areas (particularly with the temporal cortical areas). The L nucleus has multiple 
connections with the ventral visual cortical areas of the temporal lobe. Other areas which 
are prolifically connected to parts of the amygdala are the prefrontal cortical areas with 
the LB, MB and AB nuclei, and the somatosensoiy and auditory areas with the AB 
nucleus.
The largest number of input and output connections of the various cortical areas 
is with the BL group of amygdala nuclei. The number of input or afferent connections are 
far outnumbered by the number of output or efferent connections for the majority of the 
amygdala nuclei. This differs for the L nucleus, which receives the largest number of its 
connections, but outputs relatively few to the cortex (with the exception of the ventral 
visual areas). The L nucleus does project to every other amygdala nucleus, but receives 
very sparse return connections from these nuclei.
4.3.1 Noii-nietric multidimensional scaling analysis.
(a) Intra-amygdala connections
The intrinsic connections of the primate amygdala were analysed with NMDS 
using a basic matrix (0, 1, 2) without transformation of the data, and the resulting 2D 
configuration of data points is displayed in Figure 4.8. The RSQ value of the output 
configuration plot was 0.645, so 65% of the relations in 83 dimensional space were 
accounted for. (NMDS computed the relations between brain areas in 83 dimensions, but 
the resulting configuration could not be visualised in 83 dimensions, so some 
relationships would be lost by visualising in 2D. There would be less loss of relations in 
3D, etc.)
Table 4.2: Number of efferent and afferent connections of each amygdala nucleus with 
each sensory/motor/associative group. Cortical grouping the same as Table 4.1. Eff= 
efferent connections, Aff = afferent connection. The amygdala abbreviations are the same 
as in Figure 4.4.
g S § g § g g S g 1
L 1! 12 2 4 2 2 1 0 3 1 3 4 0 1 22 24 13 2 35 26 61LB 24 10 2 1 3 2 2 0 3 0 10 5 2 1 46 19 8 6 54 25 79MB 10 4 I 0 3 2 I 0 3 3 9 2 2 0 29 11 8 4 37 15 52AB 11 5 8 1 9 2 0 0 3 2 7 2 3 0 41 12 6 6 47 18 65Ce 1 5 1 2 2 2 0 0 3 3 0 2 0 0 7 14 9 5 16 19 35Co 3 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 3 2 4 0 1 0 14 5 2 7 16 12 28Me 1 4 1 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 5 0 1 5 13 7 4 12 17 29PAC 4 1 3 1 8 0 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 17 4 5 6 22 10 32AAA 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 I 0 0 0 4 3 0 2 4 5 9AHA 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 3 6 9CTA 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 5 3 6 9Total 67 42 21 11 31 14 4 0 22 16 35 20 8 3 188 106 61 53 249 159 408
Figure 4,8 ; The topological organisation of the internal connections of the primate 
amygdala, as visualised using NMDS, basic transformation. From a total of 42 
connections, 28 are unidirectional (line) and 14 are reciprocal (broken line). 
Abbreviations as in legend to Figure 4.4.
<
106
The L nucleus lies at the centre of the plot, the LB, MB, Me and Ce nuclei are 
grouped together, and the remaining nuclei (Co, PAC, AAA, AHA) are collected on the 
outside edges of the topological plot, distant from the other nuclei. It is interesting to 
note here that the Co nucleus and PAC are grouped together. The connections of these 
two areas are probably similar due to their close physical proximity.
(b) Amygdalo-cortical connections
The amygdalo-cortical connections of the monkey cortex were analysed using 
NMDS (using the ALSCAL command language in SPSS). In this analysis, a total of 951 
connections, 503 (52.9%) were reciprocal, and 448 (47.1%) were unidirectional. The 
resulting analysis had a RSQ value of 0.76, therefore the topological relations expressed 
in the 2D solution, accounted for 76% of the relations covered in the original 83 
dimensional space.
The NMDS analysis plot is displayed in Figure 4.9. The veiy distinct separation 
of the BL and CM amygdaloid complexes is of primaiy interest here. The CM complex is 
placed with the prefrontal cortical areas in Figure 4.9 and is completely separate from the 
BL amygdala nuclei. As the CM nuclei are grouped with the prefrontal cortical areas and 
there is a strong interconnectivity between the nuclei within the BL and CM complexes 
(as seen in the intra-amygdala analysis); a possible flow of information between the BL 
complex and the prefrontal cortex may be via the CM nuclei of the amygdala. The LB 
nucleus is proximal to both visual processing streams, but is pulled away from the BL 
complex towards the dorsal visual areas. The MB and L nuclei are close to the ventral 
visual processing areas of the inferotemporal cortex (PIT, CIT and AIT). The 
hippocampal formation, perirhinal and entorhinal cortices are located between the CM 
and BL groups. The periamygdaloid complex (PAC) is located close to the CM group 
and may warrant its inclusion in the CM group. The peripheral amygdala nuclei (AHA, 
AAA and CTA) remain clearly separate from the other amygdala nuclei, which may be 
due principally to their low number of cortical connections.
From the figure, it can be seen that the auditory system areas within the superior 
temporal gyms are grouped in similar locations on the plot, with connections between
Figure 4.9: The topological organisation of the amygdalo-cortical system, as visualised 
by NMDS, and transforming the data matrix using the wdsml transform formula. From a 
total of 951 connections, 448 are unidirectional (green) and 503 are reciprocal (red). 
Abbreviations as in legend to Figure 4.4.
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primaty auditoiy cortex (KA) and secondaiy (association) auditoiy cortical areas. The 
auditory areas connect with the AB nucleus of the amygdala and the AB nucleus lies 
close to the auditory areas in the plot. Figure 4.9 also shows the grouping of 
somatosensoiy areas; primaiy somatosensoiy areas (Al and A2), the insula areas (Ig and 
Id), A3 a and A3b, A5 and S2. The motor areas are also located in similar spatial 
locations, positioned closely to the dorsal visual areas, particularly the FEF (which has 
oculomotor functions as well as visual functions-Leichnetz and Goldberg 1988).
The visual areas are also collected together in Figure 4.9, with the “dorsal visual 
areas” of the dorsal occipital and parietal lobes grouped together, and the “ventral visual 
areas” of the ventral occipital and inferior temporal lobes grouped together. No 
information about direction of flow is present in Figure 4.9, but the results seem 
compatible with the idea of two visual processing streams (Ungerleider and Mishkin 
1982, Goodale and Milner 1992, Young 1992, 1993). Adding the amygdala as 
constituent parts into the analysis does not appear to alter the positions of the two visual 
processing streams.
Evident in Figure 4.9 is the pulling in of “higher order” sensoiy and motor areas 
(such as STPa, A46, paAl, paAc, paAr, Ig and Id) towards the central position of the 
topological plot, with the BL and CM amygdala groups, and the prefrontal cortex. This is 
not the case for all sensoiy and motor association areas, but a trend is displayed.
4.3,2 Cluster analysis
The output dendrogram from the cluster analysis is displayed in Figure 4.10. As 
with the NMDS analysis, the amygdala is split into three parts; the BL complex (LB, L, 
MB and AB), the CM complex (Ce, Co, Me and PAC) and the peripheral nuclei (CTA, 
AAA, AHA). In the BL complex, the MB and AB are closely related, with the L nucleus 
related to both the AB and MB nuclei and the LB linked to all three. This suggests that 
the connection patterns of the AB and MB nuclei are similar, with the L nucleus close 
connectionally but distinct, and the LB nucleus strongly associated with the L, MB and 
AB nuclei, but its large number of connections with other brain regions force its position 
away slightly from the other nuclei in the BL complex.
Figïire 4.10; Dendrogram displaying results of cluster analysis of amygdalo-cortical 
connections. The abbreviations of cortical and amygdala areas are the same as in the 
legend to Figure 4.4. The BL group of nuclei is grouped together, as is the CM group 
and the peripheral nuclei.














Figure 4.11; Diagrammatic representation of the Connectional Density Index (CDI) 
values for each area in the matrix (out of a total of 83). The y-axis shows the brain areas 
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A similar position exists for the CM complex. The Ce and Me nuclei are closely 
associated; the PAC is closely related to both the Ce and Me nuclei, and the Co nucleus 
is related to all three, but is also related to areas of cortex (and the BL complex), so is 
separated slightly from the other components of the CM complex.
4.3.3 Connectional Density Index
A visual representation of the CDI scores for the 83 brain areas is displayed in 
Figure 4.11. The nuclei of the BL complex of the amygdala have the largest percentage 
of connections; LB (69%), AB (61%), L (52%) and MB (43%). The nuclei of the CM 
complex have a relatively lower percentage of connections compared to the nuclei of the 
BL complex; Ce (33%), PAC (30%), Me (28%) and Co (25%). The only regions of 
cortex which are as well connected as the CM complex, are the ER (38%), LIP (38%), 
A46 (38%), A7b (37%), TGv (35%), A7a (33%) and TF (33%). None of the primary 
sensory/motor areas are well connected with the rest of cortex.
5.4 Discussion
To summarise, the internal connections of the amygdala reveal a strong 
association between the LB, AB and MB nuclei (or “BL” group) and the Co, Me, and Ce 
nuclei and the PAC (or “CM” group). The L nucleus lies at the centre of the NMDS plot 
as it connects to eveiy other amygdala nuclei, and the poorly connected peripheral nuclei 
(AAA, AHA and CTA) are placed separately on the outside edge of the plot. There is no 
apparent separation of the BL and CM groups when analysing the internal connections 
only, as their are reciprocal heavy connections between these two groups. This supports 
the view that the BL complex receives sensoiy information, which is then passed onto the 
CM complex, with high levels of communication between the two groups. The gross 
structure of the NMDS plot is presented schematically in Figure 4.12.
In the amygdalo-cortical analysis, the sensoiy and motor areas group together, as 
do the areas of the hippocampal formation. The amygdala splits into three parts. The BL















Figure 412; Schematic representation of the NMDS output displayed in Figure 4.7. The 
diagram shows the proximity of the main brain regions to one another. The general 
collections of areas are based on a large number of areas in a group being aggregated 
together. The cortical areas of the dorsal and ventral visual processing streams are 
grouped together, as are the auditory, somatosensory and motor cortical areas. The LB 
nucleus is distinct from the other BL complex nuclei, and the CM complex nuclei are 
grouped together with the nuclei of the prefrontal cortex. The peripheral nuclei of the 
amygdala (AAA, AHA, CTA) are grouped on the periphery of the plot. The 
hippocampal formation and cingulate cortical areas are also grouped with the anterior 
temporal area (od the ventral visual stream) and the BL complex.
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group is closely associated with the anterior temporal visual processing areas, and to a 
lesser extent the auditoiy and somatosensoiy association areas. The CM group is closely 
related to the prefrontal cortex, and the peripheral amygdala nuclei lie at the edge of the 
NMDS plot.
The monkey cerebral cortex is largely parcelled into areas that have similar 
connectivity patterns (Young 1993) and this was apparent in this analysis. These 
similarities are striking when the functional aspects of the areas are taken into 
consideration. It appears that all areas of a cortical sensoiy processing group (e.g. 
somatosensoiy) group together in the NMDS due to their anatomical connections.
NMDS may be a useful tool in ascribing similar functions to areas with similar patterns of 
connectivity. This is displayed distinctively when the whole cortex and amygdala is 
subjected to NMDS analysis. As stated earlier, physical distances between brain regions 
were not taken into consideration in this analysis. If two brain regions are close in the 
topological plot, they are connectionally similar, and visa versa. Physical distance does 
not constrain topological distance, that is, two brain regions that are physically close 
together do not necessarily have similar connectivity. For example, the amygdala nuclei 
AAA and LB, are physically close in the amygdala, but in the topological plot they are 
distant, and therefore, connectionally dissimilar.
Young (1992), using a matrix of cortico-cortical connections of the visual system, 
argued that the concept of two “functional processing streams” of the visual system 
(Goodale and Milner 1992, Ungeiieider and Mishkin 1982), was apparent also because of 
their individual connectivity patterns. The “dorsal” stream travelling from VI through 
MT, MST, posterior parietal cortex, through A7a to FEF and A46 in the frontal lobe was 
present in the plots of the NIVIDS analysis (Young 1992). The “ventral” stream from VI 
through V4, to inferotemporal (IT) areas and STPa to A46 was also present in the same 
analysis. Young (1992) also argued that the two processing streams could converge in 
A46 and STPa. This information is present in this analysis, but is not as clear as in 
Young’s (1992) study. The ventral stream could be seen as a route by which visual 
information (objects such as faces) can be processed further to attribute an emotional or 
social significance to the observed object. Visual form information increases in
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complexity from VI to V4, IT and TGv. Complex, but emotionally/socially 
“insignificant” objects, such as fractal patterns and complex geometrical shapes, are 
processed in inferotemporal cortex and ventral temporal pole (Tanaka 1993, Tanaka et al 
1990, Miyashita et al 1993, Nakamura et al 1994). Although such complex patterns and 
shapes are not in themselves socially/emotionally significant, they could constitute parts 
of such biologically important visual stimuli. Biologically important objects, such as 
faces, bodies and hands, are processed in IT and STPa (Bruce et al 1981, Perrett et al 
1982, Desimone et al 1984, Wachsmuth et al 1994), which have prolific connections with 
TGv, TF and TH. Inferotemporal cortex and STPa have many connections between them 
(see Chapter III) and are closely associated with the “BL” nuclei of the amygdala in this 
analysis. These connections could allow such complex information to be attached an 
emotional or social significance. Such visual information could be used by primates to 
help infer the intentions and predict the behaviours of conspecifics in normal social 
interactions (Perrett and Emei-y 1994, see also Chapter VII).
The hierarchical organisation of the primate auditoiy system has also been 
tentatively suggested (Felleman and Van Essen 1991, Young 1993). This proposition is 
not substantiated or refuted by the present study. There is a loose grouping of auditory 
areas, with the primaiy auditoiy areas (KA), grouped next to secondary and tertiary 
auditory areas (such as paAc and paAr) in the anterior superior temporal gyrus, with the 
AB nucleus of the amygdala pulled away from the BL group towards the “higher” 
auditoiy processing areas. If there is a hierarchical nature to the connectivity of the 
auditory system, as displayed in the cat cerebral cortex (Scannell and Young 1993), this 
“pathway” may either be involved in auditoiy learning and memoiy, or may be involved 
in the processing of the social/emotional significance of monkey vocalisations. The 
amygdala contains cells which respond to different monkey calls, and when the amygdala 
is stimulated, similar vocalisation patterns are produced (Jurgens 1982). Such cells are 
found in the BL and CM groups. Areas of the frontal cortex which connect to the 
amygdala may ftinction in determining the meaning of the various vocalisations or send 
back information to the amygdala concerning the production of a correct response to the 
heard vocalisation (Ploog 1981). The AB nucleus connects directly with many auditory
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areas, such as TGd (dorsal temporal pole), Tpt, paAc, paAr, TSl (anterior superior 
temporal gyrus auditoiy area) and KA (primaiy auditory cortex). Auditoiy information 
may thus reach the amygdala via primary auditoiy cortex, secondary/tertiary auditory 
cortex or higher association auditory cortex routes. Cells in the lateral areas of the 
macaque auditory cortex (such as paAc and paAi*) which connect to the amygdala, also 
respond preferentially to complex sounds, also differentiating between different monkey 
calls (Rauschecker et al 1995). It is known that monkeys use different calls to report 
social information such as the location of a food source, or the presence of a particular 
type of predator (Seyfarth et al 1980a, b), and such social information may be processed 
by this system.
Connections between the amygdala and the somatosensory areas maybe routes by 
which tactile information can be linked to experience with a social or emotional 
significance. This information could then be passed from the amygdala on to the 
ventromedial frontal cortex, and premotor/motor cortex and translated into a 
behavioural/motor action (Fuster 1996). Information of this type would then be passed 
back to the body/viscera via the actions of the motor system, neuroendocrine system (via 
the hypothalamus), or via basic motivational or regulatoiy mechanisms (via the midbrain 
and brainstem). The information from the motor areas may pass back through the 
amygdaloid complex, which has extensive connectivity with these subcortical regions, 
particularly with the CM nuclei.
Friedman et al (1986) have suggested that there is a tactile processing pathway 
from the primary somatosensory area S2, through the insula (Ig and Id) and on to the 
amygdala, and that this pathway might seiwe a function in tactile learning and memory. 
The topological proximity between the amygdala and somatosensoiy areas is only evident 
between the AB nucleus and the somatosesnsoiy areas Al, A2 and RI, and between the 
proximity of the CM complex and the insula areas (Ig and Id). The high level of 
connectivity between the amygdala and the somatosensory cortical areas may arise due to 
the importance that Old World monkeys and great apes put on grooming in a social 
context. The amygdala may associate social/emotional significance to a certain 
somatosensoiy event. For example, a monkey may be able to recognise the difference
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between a playful siap and a slap as an attacking gesture, or the difference between 
grooming for cleaning and grooming as a form of alliance formation (Byrne and Whiten 
1988). Grooming is also said to aid in the maintenance of group cohesion in certain 
species of non-human primates (Dunbar 1991). The amygdala, as stated previously, also 
has connections with the multi-modal cortex of the STPa, where collections of cells 
respond to various social somatosensory stimuli, such as stroking, and grooming (Mistlin 
and Perrett 1990), particularly allogrooming (unexpected touch), since the cells did not 
respond to self-grooming (expected touch). This region also contains cells which are 
responsive to multiple modalities, such as touch and vision, and only respond when both 
sensations are presented simultaneously. Such cells responding to touch and sight, may 
code for not only the act of grooming (touch), but also the identity of the grooming 
animal (sight). Such information is important when forming alliances, and computing the 
structure of dominance hierarchies (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990c).
Historically, the amygdala has been studied as a component part of the limbic 
system, a group of cortical and subcortical areas which have basic functions, such as 
emotion, spatial memory and species-specific behaviours (MacLean 1952). The idea of 
the limbic system has recently been questioned (LeDoux 1991), but the cortical and 
amygdala areas of the limbic system analysed here are all groupd quite close together in 
the topological plot. The BL and CM nucleic groups are associated with the 
prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortical areas, the “higher” sensoiy areas (those association areas 
which code for complex sensoiy stimuli), the anterior cingulate cortex, and the 
hippocampal formation. This conclusion parallels that of Young and Scannell (Young 
1993, Young and Scannell 1993) who stressed that there is a Fronto-Limbic Complex, 
connecting the amygdala, hippocampus, entorhinal, perirhinal, cingulate and prefrontal 
cortices in monkeys. The analyses of Young and Scannell were similar to the analyses 
performed here, but the amygdala was treated as a unitary structure. Separating the 
constituent parts of the amygdala did not disturb the view of a Fronto-Limbic Complex. 
The “higher” sensoiy areas are topologically closer to each other or the amygdala in the 
plot, than primary and secondaiy sensoiy areas.
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There is a high level of connectivity between the amygdala and the neocortex, 
with similar connection strengths between all sensoiy/association areas and the amygdala, 
so the amygdala was placed in the centre of the topological staicture in Young and 
Scannell (1993, see Figure 4.2). Differences in the results of the two analyses are 
apparent because the amygdala was analysed with separate nuclei with different weights 
of connections (i.e. the BL group has more cortical connections than the CM group). 
This resulted in the different nuclei of the amygdala remaining near the centre of the plot, 
but with clear divisions between the nuclei.
The BL and CM groups appear as two separate entities, as distinctly shown in 
Figure 4.9. The LB nucleus is associated with the ventral visual cortical areas which are 
said to play a role in object recognition. The anterior cingulate cortex is also close to the 
LB nucleus and the hippocampal formation, entorhinal and perirhinal cortices are placed 
in between the two amygdala groups.
The above discussion is an attempt to formulate a basic theoretical framework of 
the architecture of those areas of the brain which have functions in some aspects of 
monkey social cognition and perception. Such theoretical frameworks may be useful, 
particularly when discussing global theories of brain function. It is easy to be misled by 
the results of such analyses, especially when considering distinct brain regions as one 
unit, when they are actually comprised of millions of cells. Single cells have very specific 
and complex response properties, and extremely diverse and complicated connectivity 
patterns of their own (Martin 1988). Generalising a ftinction to an area may be a gross 
over-simplification. The role that other important subcortical areas such as the basal 
ganglia, hypothalamus, superior colliculus and thalamus may play in social and cognitive 
processing was not considered in this analysis, and the subcortical connections of the 
monkey amygdala would need to be analysed to begin to achieve this. Such studies 
would be important when discussing the role of the CM nuclei, due to their extensive 
connections with subcortical areas (Amaral et al 1992).
NMDS analysis, while having certain limitations (such as a necessarily simplified 
view of brain connectivity), does allow development of ideas about how particular 
regions might be viewed in the brain, not only as single entities, but also as parts of
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functionally integrated systems, NMDS also has another possible function, apart from 
being a statistical tool. As structure is often related to function, NMDS could be used as 
a tool to direct neurophysiological and lesion studies. Scannell et al (1996) is an example 
of the use NMDS analysis of the connections of the cat cerebral cortex to guide 
successful physiological studies. NMDS in this study suggests possible targets for 
neurophysiological studies of visual social perception, determined due to the similarity of 
the connectivity patterns of the ventral and medial temporal areas, which are said to code 
for complex biologically significant objects and actions (Perrett and Emery 1994, Chapter 
VII). Similar avenues of research may stem from comparable statistical analyses using 
neuroanatomical data as a starting point for beginning more functional lines of research.
The NMDS and CA analyses suggest that the amygdala can be split into two 
functional groups; the BL and CM complexes. The BL complex has more numerous 
connections with cortical areas, including high order sensoiy processing areas which may 
be involved in social cognition. The parcellation of the amygdala into two divisions 
provides a basis for analysis of comparative volumetric data of the two divisions (and 
constituent parts of the amygdala) in the next chapter (V).
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Chapter V
Architecture of the Primate Social Brain
C. Comparative Analysis
'‘Oiir Imowledge o f the evoluiîonœy transformation o f hominid social systems is 
primarily based on comparative studies ofprimates....If these approaches are to he o f 
value for tinderstanding the behavior and evolution o f nonhuman primates or 
humans...then it must be demonstrated that the bases for complex behaviors are 
differentially inherited and have evolved”
Armstrong, Clarke and Hill (1987, p. 263)
5.0 Summary
In the previous chapter, the connections of the macaque neocortex and 
amygdaloid complex were analysed using a statistical method (NMDS) which groups 
brain areas together with similar connection patterns. It was found that three brain 
regions said to be the primaiy components of the so-called “social brain” (basolateral 
amygdala, anterior temporal and prefrontal cortices) were closely associated. The same 
analysis found that the amygdala separated into two parts (the basolateral complex; BL 
and the centromediaal complex; CM) which may have also functionally separated during 
the evolution of insectivores and prosimians. The hypothesis that the amygdala and the 
constituent parts of the amygdala (BL and CM complexes) are involved in coding social 
behaviour in the primate order was tested using brain volumetric and socio-ecological 
data (e.g. mean group size, % time grooming and diet composition), and compared using 
correlation and regression analyses. It is proposed that the basolateral amygdala functions
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in anthropoid social behaviour, but probably not in prosimians. Finally, it is proposed that 
the connectional separation displayed for the two amygdala complexes (as revealed by 
NMDS analysis) will also be present when comparing amygdala component size with 
social variables, such as mean group size.
5.1 Introduction
The causes and consequences of the evolution of the primate (and therefore 
human) brain are one of the mysteries of modern science. Recent hypotheses have 
created debate in all disciplines concerned with evolutionary biology; anthropology, 
psychology, primatology, neuroscience and behavioural ecology. Work in this area is 
naturally made difficult by the fact that no one knows or will ever know exactly what did 
cause our (and our nearest relatives) brains to increase in complexity and size.
Evolutionaiy theoiy suggests that one or more “states” (ecological, social, 
technical, etc.) caused the brain to adapt for its increased complexity in primates and 
proto-hominids, or that the Environment of Evolutionaiy Adaptation (EE A) created 
selection pressures on primates which required them to evolve a more complex brain 
(Tooby and Cosmides 1992). Primates could not have evolved without a more complex 
brain. Many theories have been proposed as to what these “states” or EEA’s were and at 
what point in time they were active.
One field which has failed to contribute considerably to this debate has been 
neurobiology. This is certainly not due to a scarcity of data, as Stephan’s group has 
measured the brain (and brain part) volumes of large numbers of chiroptera, insectivores, 
prosimians and anthropoids (Stephan and Pirlot 1970, Stephan, Frahm and Baron 1981). 
Unfortunately, the only volumetric data has been provided by this one research group, 
and only on one representative from a species and in some cases from only one species in 
a genus. This does not take individual differences and variation into consideration. This is 
something that has been discussed by Stephan’s group (Stephan et al 1981), but not by 
other primatologists using the data. No further data has been collected for obvious
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reasons. Measuring the volumes of individuals is painstaking research, requiring patience 
for little rewards. Fortunately, new anatomical data from a few monkey and ape species 
is being collected using neuroimaging techniques such as MRI (Semendeferi et al 1997). 
These studies should provide results ultimately preferable to previous studies as they can 
be used to measure brains in living animals, thereby providing volumetric data untainted 
by histological methods which may substantially shrink brain tissue.
Theories of brain evolution have not taken into consideration neurobiological data 
concerning localisation of brain function. It is the purpose of this chapter to discuss 
relationships between the relative size of the amygdala and its component parts with 
socio-ecological measures. The cortico-basolateral division and lateral basal nucleus have 
a large number of anterior temporal and orbitofrontal cortical connections. The anterior 
temporal and orbitofrontal cortices contain cells which may function in social cognition 
and recognition, and lesions of cortex cause deficits in social, affiliative, emotional and 
aggressive behaviour (see Chapter II). The centromedial division by comparison has few 
cortical, but many subcortical connections, particularly with effector structures 
(hypothalamus, thalamus, brainstem and basal ganglia (Amaral et al 1992). The cortico- 
basolateral division therefore, is connected with areas involved in complex social 
behaviour, whereas the centromedial division is not.
Evohiion o f brain & inlelligence: allernative hypotheses
Two schools of thought concern the driving forces behind the evolution of the 
primate brain. Both relate to adaptations to changes in the environment and the 
consequent effects on social behaviour, food abundance, etc. Ultimately, absolute brain 
size is constrained by the volume of space in the skull or cranial capacity and various 
anatomical features (such as vertebral column, muscles, ligaments, etc.) for keeping a 
large brain supported. A related factor is cranial blood flow. Bipedal posture necessarily 
moves the head higher relative to the ground, than a quadrupedal posture. Increased 
blood flow is required to produce the necessary supply of blood to this greater height and 
is also a requisite for an enlarged brain. Robust australopithecines and other extinct
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hominids are said to have moved from the forests to the savannah (an environment with 
little protection from the sun). This environmental change and whatever behavioural 
consequences caused the brain to increase in size, would necessitate what Falk has called 
a “radiator” (Falk 1990) or an appropriate venous system which can allow increased 
blood flow and cool the brain. The venous system probably used by australopithecines 
and other hominids (hypothesised from venous patterns on brain endocasts and 
physiological studies of modern humans) is different from those used by apes (Falk 
1992). There appears to be an evolutionaiy grade shift in the use of different venous 
systems from the jugular vein to the vertebral plexus (mastoid and parietal emissary 
veins). This shift in emphasis is commensurate with Falk’s “radiator” argument.
This explanation may helps us understand the physiological and anatomical 
constraints imposed by brain enlargement. Evolution, however, does not predict what 
faculties will be of use in the future. A larger brain must have been an adaptation to an 
environmental or behavioural requirement. Change in posture required a better adapted 
venous system and this may have had the knock-on effect of permitting an enlarged brain.
There are other examples of physiological mechanisms which would allow for an 
increase in brain size. Martin (1996) suggests that brain development in the womb may 
be important in brain evolution. The ‘maternal energy hypothesis’ suggests that there is a 
strong relationship between the basal metabolic rate (BMR) of the mother and the size of 
her offspring’s brain. The greater the energy transferred from mother to infant, the 
greater the brain size. The mother would therefore either be required to have a greater 
BMR (fuelled by highly digestible foods, such as fruit and meat), or increase the length of 
gestation. The mother would also require an enlarged pelvis for birth of a large brained 
infant.
A further argument for the effects of BMR has been proposed in the “expensive 
tissue hypothesis” (Aiello and Wheeler 1995). They suggest that as the enlarged brain is a 
metabolically expensive organ (20% of all energy resources in humans) other energy 
expensive organs such as the gastro-intestinal (GI) tract should reduce in size, thereby 
providing extra energy for the brain. This idea comes from data suggesting that there is 
no significant correlation between BMR and brain size in humans (Aiello and Wheeler
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1995). The brain increases in size and requires extra energy but gross levels of energy 
required by the body are not necessaiy. It appears that the energy is found elsewhere in 
the body. Aiello and Wheeler state that a reduction in mass of one of the other energy 
expensive tissues would be sufficient to provide this extra energy. The evidence for the 
GI tract as the mass reducing organ is enticing. As brain mass increases there is a 
matched decrease in the mass of the GI tract and the resultant energy provided by this 
mass reduction is the same as that required by the increased brain mass. Other energy 
expensive organs have been ruled out of the equation. The liver replaces glucose levels 
which are required by an enlarged brain; the heart could not reduce the efficiency with 
which it pumps blood around the body (especially to a larger heart, see previous 
arguments) and the kidneys could not reduce in size as they are required in a savannah 
environment where water is scarce (also see earlier). Finally, a smaller gut requires a 
better diet of highly digestible foods (meat and faiit) and in smaller quantities to function 
in the same way as a larger gut.
Both the maternal energy and expensive tissue hypotheses suggest that better 
sources of food contribute to the brain’s efficient functioning. This presupposes an 
environmental pressure to increase brain size throughout primate evolution. Such 
ecological pressures may have led to a primate specialisation for remembering, locating 
and extracting certain types of food (Byrne 1995a, b, 1997). Predominantly leaf-eating 
primates (such as howler monkeys or gorillas) are relatively unspecialized feeders. The 
preferred foods are widely available and do not appear to require any special cognitive 
skills to locate them (however see Byrne 1995a, Byrne and Russon 1997, who suggest 
that large primates can eat copious amounts of difficult to process foods). Gorillas in 
comparison to howler monkeys are substantially larger and require plentiful amounts of 
foliage to fuel their massive bulk.
Fmgivorous or omnivorous primates (such as baboons, rhesus macaques and 
chimpanzees) are specialised feeders. Their diets rely on gaining higher quality food, such 
as fruit and meat which are patchily distributed. Unfortunately, high quality foods are 
spread over wide areas in clumped patches, and are not available all year (fmits are 
usually available for 2-3 month stretches, Milton 1988). Milton (1988) studied the
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feeding ecology of two species of neotropical monkeys; spider and howler monkeys. 
Spider monkeys are different from howler monkeys as their diet is predominantly fruit 
based (60-72%). The spider monkey’s home range size is 25 times that of howler 
monkeys (suggesting dispersed resources). The monkeys also differ in social structure; 
howler monkeys live in relatively large social groups who learn about the location of 
favourite trees from other group members, whereas spider monkeys live in small foraging 
units of a mother and infant. Information about feeding in spider monkeys could be 
transferred from mother to infant. As spider monkeys are primarily fmit-eaters their 
chosen food cannot sustain members of a larger social group (Milton 1988). Spider 
monkeys have to rely on their own skills to remember the location of good fruiting trees, 
when the trees produce optimal levels of finit and whether newly encountered fruits are 
sufficient sources of nutrition. Milton (1988) has suggested that, in these two species at 
least, diet is correlated with mental ability, which would have required increased 
processing power. This increased power would itself require more and better sources of 
energy (see earlier).
At a basic level, this is seen in these two species. The spider monkey brain (107g) 
is twice the weight of the howler monkey brain (50.3g). Brain size is constrained by 
energy input; and this correlates well with diet. Gorillas, for example, have to eat large 
amounts of plant matter to gain the same nutritional value as eating a smaller amount of 
fruit. To do this, gorillas remain sedentaiy, thereby not expending energy, or utilise 
nutritious, but difficult to extract foods. (It is interesting to note that gorillas are not very 
sociable animals; sociality expends large amounts of energy).
Gibson (1986) and King (1986) both suggested that the extraction of difficult to 
procure foods has had an effect on primate brain and intelligence (although this is hard to 
reconcile with the data for gorillas who have relatively small brain and neocortex 
(Stephan et al 1981), but complex methods for extracting foods, Byrne and Byrne 1993, 
see also Russon 1997 for orangutan complex feeding skills). Difficult to extract, catch or 
well hidden foods such as fruits with tough skins, nuts, shellfish, eggs, snails insects and 
small animals are part of the diets of a large number of primates (other mammals, birds 
and reptiles). Procurement of these foods require special skills and heightened perceptual
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and motor abilities (visual, auditoiy, olfactory and fine motor manipulation). What may 
differentiate some simian primates from other animals who eat these foods is fine motor 
control including use of tools. Thmshes may use stones to crack open snail shells, but the 
ability is not precisely controlled. Gibson (1986) tested the hypothesis that omnivorous 
extractive foragers had larger relative brain sizes (RBS, relative to body size) than other 
types of foragers. The smaller brained primates did not use extractive foraging and 
usually ate whole foods, such as fruit, leaves, grass or insects. It seems reasonable to 
suggest that extractive foragers are better adapted to changing environments than non­
extractive foragers, by utilising unusual foods in times of scarcity.
Acquisition of various types of food suggest a need for enhanced sensory abilities. 
Barton et al (1995) studied correlations between certain sensoiy brain regions (visual 
brain; striate visual cortex, lateral geniculate nucleus, optic tract, and olfactory brain; 
olfactoiy bulb, piriform cortex and accessoiy olfactoiy bulb) in primates. They found that 
there appeared to be a trade-off between olfaction and vision, nocturnal species (not 
surprisingly) had larger olfactory bulbs and smaller striate cortices than diurnal primates. 
The reverse was true for the diurnal primates. Vision and olfaction are important for 
frugivores, who need to evaluate the location, toxicity, colour and smell of fruit). 
Surprisingly, there was no correlation between percentage fruit in the diet of diurnal 
haplorhines and the volume of visual and olfactoiy structures. There was a correlation 
between percentage fruit in diet and volume of olfactory staictures but not visual 
structures in nocturnal strepsirhines. Vision and olfaction appear unimportant for 
folivores.
It remains to be seen which ecological and behavioural pressures caused an 
expansion in brain complexity. The complexity of social life has been proposed as one 
answer. Chapter II discussed some of the reasons why living in large groups would be 
beneficial. Territoriality, intrasexual competition, predator pressure, food density and 
food distribution are some of the suggested factors effecting group size (van Schaik and 
van Hoof 1983). Ecological variables are at the forefront of the list of pressures 
warranting larger groups (but not necessarily complexity of relationships within a group).
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Several authors (Dunbar 1992, Sawaguchi 1992, Barton 1996, Barton and 
Dunbar 1997) have suggested that increasing the size of a group requires more 
computational power (reflected as an increase in the number of neurons and the 
connections between them) to keep track of the fluctuating state of relationships. 
Humphrey (1976) and Jolly (1966) were the first tp discuss issues of intelligence in terms 
of social behaviour. The “social” or “Machiavellian” intelligence hypothesis stated that an 
increase in intelligence (and therefore brain processing capacity) was required to process 
the complex relationships inherent in living a social existence. For discussions of the 
merits of the social intelligence hypothesis, see Chapter II.
Comparative neuroanatomical and socio-ecological analyses appear to be ideal for 
testing this hypothesis; short of detailed experiments and obseiwations on a large number 
o f primate species. The behavioural ecology of a large number of primates is known and 
a large set of anatomical data is present for the majority of brain structures in each of 
these species. The rationale behind the tests described in the final part of this chapter are 
discussed. The next section reviews the analyses performed so-far and the limitations of 
these particular analyses for answering questions of how particular brain structures solve 
social problems. Following this, the final section of the chapter provides the development 
of the tests.
Armstrong et al (1987) were the first to find an evolutionaiy relationship between 
brain size and social system. They compared the mean values of anthropoid thalamic 
nuclei depending with male social system (monogamous, harem, dominance hierarchy or 
fission-ftision). Although, they had the insight to look at the size of brain components 
rather than whole brain size, the choice of brain area was related to functional or 
anatomical data (as no evidence as to the contribution of the thalamic nuclei to social 
behaviour has been reported). Ai mstrong et al found that multi-male groups had larger 
anterior thalamic nuclei (and more neurons in these structures) than single-male groups.
Sawaguchi (1990, 1992, Sawaguchi and Kudo 1990) also attempted to correlate 
measures of social behaviour and ecology with measures of brain anatomy using the 
comparative method. Sawaguchi and Kudo (1990) studied sociality at a basic level; 
whether a species was solitaiy, monogamous and polyandrous (multi-male) or
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polygynous (multi-female). The data from the different species were grouped at the level 
of genus so that species with similar ecological and social parameters were grouped 
together. The neuroanatomical data used was neocortex volume, or brain weight 
(removing the effect of body weight). Sawaguchi found no difference between groups 
due to activity timing, but there was a positive significant correlation between neocortex 
size and troop size (in prosimians). In anthropoids, polygynous groups had larger 
neocortices than monogynous groups. The effect of diet and social structure on relative 
brain size (RBS) was studied more extensively by Sawaguchi (1990). Four categories of 
diet (fmgivorous, faigivorous/omnivorous, folivorous or “seed-grass” eating) and five 
categories of social structure (solitaiy, monogynous, single-male polygynous, multi-male 
polygynous or variable male polygynous) were analysed with 42 generic groups. 
Fmgivorous Ceboidea RBS correlated with troop size and folivorous CercopHhcoidea 
RBS correlated with home range size.
Sawaguchi (1992) used measurements of relative neocortex size (RSN), “the 
difference between actual neocortical volume and the volume expected for an allometric 
relationship between neocortex volume and volume of the rest of the brain” (pp. 131). 
The possibility of ancestral affinity was compensated for by analysing ecological and 
social measures at the subfamily and genus levels. Ecology was studied at a gross level by 
grouping folivores and frugivores separately, time of activity (nocturnal or diurnal) and 
stratification (arboreal or terrestrial) separately. Sociality was compared across 
monogynous and polygynous groups. There was no difference in RSN between 
polygynous and monogynous groups at the subfamily level, however differences did 
occur when the influence of ecological measures were removed. Fmgivorous species had 
a higher RSN than folivorous species, polygynous/frugivorus genera had a higher RSN 
than monogynous/frugivorous genera and polygynous/frugivorous/arboreal subfamilies 
had a higher RSN than monogynous/ffugivorous/arboreal subfamilies. There was no 
difference between arboreal and terrestrial primates on any other measures. When RSN 
was compared with home range size (as an indicator of mental complexity associated 
with diet) and troop size (as an indicator of mental complexity associated with social
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behaviour) there was a significant correlation for all anthropoids and Ceboidea (for troop 
size only).
This last result has been replicated on a number of occasions (Dunbar 1992, 
Barton and Puiwis 1994, Barton 1996). There appears to be no significant association 
between the size of the neocortex and ecological variables (such as diet or home range 
size). This data suggests that the neocortex did not evolve to process information about 
processing food (although this cannot be ruled out from a small amount of studies). It is 
probable that the processing power required to locate and extract food is small in 
comparison to the power required to furnish social relationships.
Dunbar (1992) attempted to determine what precisely was the driving force 
behind primate brain evolution. Dunbar used volumes of the primate neocortex, 
suggesting that “intelligence” requires increased processing and that a larger computer 
can store the largest amount of information. This is not completely true as the processing 
power of modern computers is not constrained by physical size. A laptop computer may 
have a larger processing power compared to a desktop computer, if the number of 
components have increased complexity or the number of components are increased; e.g. 
Pentium > 486 > 386. Connectional complexity is the key (as size may remain the same, 
but the network of connections increases, Holloway (1966). Dunbar (1992) used 
neocortex ratio (NR; against the volume of the rest of the brain) as an anatomical 
variable, because the neocortex may be the seat of cognition, and lesions of different 
parts of the neocortex effect social behaviour (see Chapter II for a review). Comparing 
NR with mean group size (after removing the effects of body size) produced a significant 
correlation (7-^= 0.764, p<0.001), whereas comparing NR with ecological variables 
produced the following results, % fruit in the diet (no correlation), home range area {r^  = 
0.593) and day journey (/'^= 0.295). The effects of body size and group size were 
removed and produced positive correlations between NR and % fmit in diet (Pairwise r ~ 
0.503, p  < 0.05) and range area (Pairwise /• = 0.793, p < 0.05) but not day journey 
(Paii*wise r — 0.294, p > 0.05). The differences of NR were also tested at the group level 
between extractive versus non-extractive foragers (see also Gibson 1986), Extractive 
foragers (as a group) had a significantly larger NR than non-extractive foragers.
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The regression equation for predicting the NR (neocortex ratio) developed from 
this study was developed further by Aiello and Dunbar (1993), who used it to predict the 
group size (and percentage grooming time) of extinct hominids. Fossil endocasts of 
extinct hominids can be used to evaluate and determine cranial capacity. From these 
values, Aiello and Dunbar produced further regression equations to predict NR for 
extinct species. Using these measurements they suggested that increased group size and 
amount of grooming required to furnish social relationships required a communication 
system such as language. The arguments are a little circular as large groups require a 
better communication system (i.e. language). Language requires a more complex brain 
system to operate it and a more complex brain enables formation of larger groups, etc.
The NR regression equation (Aiello and Dunbar 1993) may have been overly 
interpreted, and has been used extensively by Dunbar and colleagues (Dunbar 1995, 
Dunbar and Joffe 1997, Pawlowski et al 1997 and Dunbar and Bever 1997). Uses have 
included predicting the neocoitex ratio for species which were not included in the 
original Stephan et al (1981) anatomical data set. Strangely, the equation has been used 
sometimes to the exclusion of real data. From this new data, Dunbar (1995) has 
suggested that there are differences in NR between four categories of foragers (skilled, 
unskilled, specialised and non-extractive), that prosimian NR is related to mean group 
size (Dunbar and Joffe 1997, /'^= 0.278,p  < 0.05), that the mating and social skills of 
group males (Pawlowski et al 1997) is related to NR (groups with 2-4 males, b = -0.075, 
p  = 0.697; groups with 5-8 males, b ~ -1.289,/? < 0.01; groups with 9-20 males, b ~ -  
0.629,/) < 0.05) and that NR of insectivores and carnivores (Dunbar and Bever 1997) is 
significantly correlated with mean group size (insectivores, 0.295,/) < 0.05 and 
carnivores, i^= 0.288,/) < 0.05). The problem with using this neocoitex equation is that 
it is based on a correlation of a regression.
A new comparative method for analysing data from closely related species has 
been used to determine an association between sociality and brain size. The method is 
discussed fully in the methods section. Briefly, the method treats individual data points 
from separate species as possibly being evolutionarily related. It is highly probable that a 
certain trait (morphological or behavioural) is mutual to two related species with a
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common ancestor. The comparative method uses phylogenetic data on the similarity (and 
dissimilarity) of species (using branch lengths of time since splitting from the common 
ancestor). This information is then used to compute contrasts of anatomical and/or 
behavioural data, which can then be analysed using normal statistical methods. Barton 
and Purvis (1994) used this method to test relationships between brain volume data and 
socio-ecological data (group size and home range size). They found that absolute 
volumes of the cerebellum, medulla, mesencephalon, diencephalon, telencephalon and 
whole brain correlated well (/• > 0.67) with body weight, group size and home range size. 
They therefore suggested that there were no selection pressures on large specific brain 
systems. They then looked at smaller systems; neocortex and hippocampus. Neocortex as 
a system for processing large amounts of information and hippocampus for memory 
functions. They found that correlating contrasts of the relative size of these two 
structures (against the rest of the brain) produced significant correlations between 
neo cortex and group size (/• = 0.96, p < 0.001), but not home range size, and between 
hippocampus and home range size {r = 0.97, p  < 0.05), but not group size. This suggests 
that the neocortex is used in remembering social relationships and the hippocampus is 
used in remembering the location of food.
Finally, Barton (1996) used the comparative method to determine whether there 
was a difference in the correlation with neocortex ration between diurnal and nocturnal 
primate groups. Barton found that contrasts in neocortex ratio correlated with contrasts 
in group size for diurnal primates and that the correlations were significant only for 
haplorhines, not for strepsirhines (this is not surprising as the majority of strepsirhines are 
nocturnal).
Measures o f social complexity
Social complexity is an almost impossible variable to measure particularly when 
comparing between a large number of primate species. Whiten and Byrne (1988b) 
suggest that every animal in a troop has to know not only its own relationships, but the 
relationships between dyads, and even triads (third party relationships). They suggest that
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this would be a power function of group size. Byrne (1995b) suggested an equation for 
the possible number of dyadic relationships in a group, TN  from 0 to (N-\) where #  is 
the group size.
Maximum group size may be a good indicator as to the upper limits of social 
complexity. The maximum number of individuals in a group present the highest levels of 
relationship processing. It is extremely unlikely, however, that any primates know all 
members of their troop and certainly not the precise details of all triadic (or even dyadic) 
relationships. Most primates remain in small group units (or cliques) within a troop 
(Dunbar 1996b) and these units may be better indicators of social complexity (Kudo et al 
1997). It is also difficult to determine clique sizes for all species of primates, and such 
data is not available in the published literature except for a few representative species.
Aims and predictions
The method used in Chapter IV analysed simple brain connection data to 
determine whether the regions of the macaque brain that were said to function in coding 
social behaviour were anatomically associated and whether connections between areas 
determined functionality. The amygdala, anterior temporal cortex, prefrontal cortex, 
cingulate cortex and schizocortex all grouped together suggesting similarity between 
their connection patterns. This also suggested similarity in flinction. One striking result 
was the parcellation of the amygdala into two distinct nuclear groups, the basolateral 
(BL) and the centromedial (CM). This separation had been proposed earlier by Johnson 
(1923) on anatomical and cytoarchitectural bases. The subsequent analysis provides 
evidence for the following hypotheses based on the connectional analysis in Chapter IV 
and the neurobiological data described in detail in the literature review of Chapter II. 
First, the two divisions of the amygdala will correlate with social group complexity. 
Second, the correlations will differ between the two complexes, which may reveal 





Volumetric brain measurements were taken from published sources; Stephan et al 
(1981) for volume of the whole brain and Stephan et al (1987) for volume of the 
amygdala and component parts of the amygdala. The components of the amygdala 
analysed were cortico-basolateral complex (lateral basal, medial basal, accessory basal, 
lateral and cortical nuclei, for abbreviations see Chapter III, IV), centromedial complex 
(central and medial nuclei and periamygdaloid complex) and the lateral basal nucleus 
(magnocellular basal nucleus of the amygdala, Stephan et al 1987). The cortico- 
basolateral complex (BL) is slightly different from the basolateral complex described in 
the previous chapter, because of the addition of the cortical nucleus, which traditionally is 
associated with the centromedial complex (CM). The volume of the cortical nucleus was 
not presented in the original Stephan et al data set, so the cortical nucleus is included 
with the rest of the BL complex through necessity.
Data is presented for 18 representative species of prosimians (strepsirhines), and 
26 species of simian primates (haplorhines; New and Old World monkeys, lesser and 
greater apes). These species were chosen because of the original volumetric data of 
Stephan et al (1981, 1987). Data from Homo sapiens was not included, as no reliable 
socio-ecological data was present for humans. Pygathrix nemaeus (Douc langur) was 
removed from the socio-cognitive analyses as no data could be found about this species’ 
social system or behaviour in the primatological literature.
The effect of body size (mass) was removed from subsequent analyses using two 
methods. First, the effect of mass was regressed against the volume of the amygdala/brain 
component. The residuals from the regression line were then used in the analysis with 
socio-ecological variables. A second method indirectly removed the effects of body 
weight, by regressing the rest of the amygdala/brain against a corresponding component 
part. For example, the amygdala has two divisions; the BL and CM complexes. When 
testing the relationship between the BL complex and a socio-ecological variable, the 
possible effects of the CM complex (due to the inter-connectivity between the two
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divisions) were removed by regressing the volume of the CM complex against the volume 
of the BL complex. Again, the residuals from the regression line were then used in an 
analysis of the relationship between BL and socio-ecological variables. For other 
analyses, the CM complex was regressed against the BL complex, the LB nucleus against 
the rest of the amygdala (amygdala minus LB nucleus, RoA), the amygdala against the 
rest of the brain (brain minus amygdala, RoB) and the rest of the brain against the 
amygdala.
5.2.2 Socio-cogiiUive data
Socio-cognitive variables were taken from published sources. Four measures of 
social complexity were analysed. First, mean group size is a conseiwative measure of the 
number of possible relationships with which an individual may have to keep track of. 
Second, the mean number of females in a group is a good indicator (certainly for 
anthropoids) of the breeding capabilities of a group. (Female oriented groups are the 
hallmark of “fission-fusion” societies such as chimpanzees, where the males stay in the 
group until young adulthood and then leave to tiy their reproductive skills elsewhere.) 
Mean group size measures were taken from Smuts et al (1987) and Dunbar (1992). The 
number of females in a group were taken from Dunbar (1992).
A third more general measure of social behaviour used was social system 
depending on the number of males (single or multi-male) in a group. These measures 
were whether the single-male groups were monogamous or harem and the multi-male 
groups were dominance-stratified or fission-fusion. These relationships were taken from 
Armstrong et al (1987).
The final measurement of group cohesion may be percentage time spent grooming 
(either grooming another or being groomed). Grooming has been suggested to not only 
be used for cleansing purposes, but is also a main channel for diffusing aggressive 




A series of data concerning ecological factors were also derived from published 
sources. Five measures were used to test the ecological hypothesis of primate 
intelligence, the percentage of fmit in the diet, mean home range size, stratification or 
ecological niche (arboreal, A; semi-terrestrial, ST; or terrestrial, T); diet type (folivorous, 
Fol; frugivorous, Frg; or insectivorous, Ins) and activity timing (nocturnal, Noc or 
diurnal, Dl). These data were taken from Clutton-Brock and Harvey (1977), Smuts et al 
(1987), Dunbar (1992) and Barton et al (1995).
5.2.4 Data analysis
The brain and socio-ecological data sets were analysed using three methods. First, 
relationships between brain volume (removing the effects of body size) and socio- 
ecological variables were analysed using linear regression (and ANOVA).
Second, the data was analysed by socio-ecological variable using ANOVA and 
post-hoc tests (Protected Least Significant Difference, PLSD). The variables compared 
were social grouping, (small, medium or large groups), male group composition and diet 
type (by averaging data for all species in each group). Finally, categorical data (activity 
type, average of all species in each group (nocturnal or diurnal)and stratification, 
average of all species in each group (arboreal or terrestrial}) was analysed using student 
t-tests (unequal variance).
All raw data is displayed in Table 5.1 (a-c). Table 5.1 (a) displays the raw 
volumetric data for LB, BL, CM, RoA, amygdala, RoB and whole brain (in mm3). The 
socio-cognitive data is displayed in Table 5.1 (b); mean group size, number of females, 
male social structure and percentage grooming time. The body mass and ecological data 
is displayed in Table 5.1 (c); activity timing, diet type, percentage fmit in diet, 
stratification and home range size.
The possible effects of ecological variables on socio-cognitive data and the effects 
of socio-cognitive variables on ecological data, were eliminated by regressing the effects 
of percentage fmit and home range size respectively against the three socio-cognitive
Table 5,1 (a): Volumetric data o f amygdala, basolateral complex (BL), centromedial 
complex (CM), lateral basal nucleus (LB), whole brain, rest of amygdala (amygdala 
minus LB nucleus) and rest of brain (brain minus amygdala), in mm2 for Strepserhine and 
Haloprhine primates.
Genus species Amyg BL LB CM Brain RoB RoA
Microcehtis murintfs 36.6 24.5 2.1 12 1680 1643.4 34.5
Cheirogaleus major 102.3 68.8 8.8 33.6 4667 4564.7 93.5
Cheirogaleus medius 64.9 40.8 3.9 24.1 4667 4602.1 61
Petterus fuhms 260.7 185.5 20 75.2 25910 25649.3 240.7
Varecia variegata 368.2 253.5 22.9 114.7 25910 25541.8 345.3
Lepilemiir rujjcaudatus 133.9 91.4 7.8 42.5 7175 7041.1 126.1
Avahi laniger 113.2 73.8 5.4 39.5 9461 9347.8 105.4
Propithecus verreauxi 302.2 206.4 22.5 95.8 25194 L 24891.8 279.7
Indri indri 398.5 277.7 26 120.8 36285 35886.5 372.5
Daubentonia madasgascariensis 481.7 357.1 25.3 124.6 42611 42129.3 456.4
Loris tardigradus 104.1 72.5 6 31.6 6269 6164.9 98.1
Nycticebns coucang 189.2 121.4 11.4 67.8 11755 11565.8 177.8
Perodictus potto 202.2 138.8 14.1 63.5 13212 13009.8 188.1
Galago senegalensis 73.2 51.5 4.2 21.7 5794 5720.8 69
Otolemur crassicatidatns 148.8 103.3 8.5 45.5 140.3
Galagoides deidojf 57.9 40.4 3.2 17.6 5794 5736.1 54.7
Tarsius bancamis 53.4 39.7 3.3 13.7 3393 3339.6 50.1
Callithrix jacchus 106.1 75.6 7.7 30.5 7241 7134.9 98.4
Cebuella pygmae 75.4 57.9 7.1 17.5 4302 4226.6 68.3
Sagidnus midas 144.9 106.1 8.8 38.8 9537 9392.1 136.1
Saguinus oedipus 141.8 110.2 11.4 31.6 9537 9395.2 130.4
Callimico goeldii 146.9 111.2 11.6 35.6 10510 10363.1 135.3
Cebus albijrons 458.2 337.8 36 120.4 66939 66480.8 422.2
Aotus trivirgatiis 193.6 136.9 14.6 56.6 16195 16001.4 179
Callicebus moloch 254.1 179.5 16.3 74.6 17944 17689.9 237.8
Saimiri sciureus 242.4 188.3 15.5 54.1 22572 22329.6 226.9
Pithecia monacha 365.3 273.7 31.7 91.6 32867 32501.7 333.6
Alouatta seniculus 426 324.3 31.4 101.7 49009 48583 394.6
Ateles geoffroyi 868.8 644.5 74.7 224.3 101034 100165.2 794.1
Lagothrix lagothricha 753.2 565.2 74.6 188 95503 94749.8 678.6
Macaca midatta 678.4 493.2 69.7 185.2 87896 87217.6 608.7
Cercocebus albigena 781.3 515.9 83.5 265.4 97603 96821.7 697.8
Papio anubis 953.5 740.2 104.7 213.3 190957 190003.5 848.8
Cercopithecus ascanins 572.5 433.2 45.6 139.3 67035 66462.5 526.9
Cercopitheciis mitis 704 493.1 66.4 210.9 67035 66331 637.6
Miopithecns talapoin 413.1 311.3 52.9 101.9 37776 37362.9 360.2
Erythrocehus patas 688.4 489 63.7 199.4 103167 102478.6 624.7
Colohus badius 500.9 377.3 47.7 123.6 73818 73317.1 453.2
Pygathrix nemaeus 489.2 337.5 51.2 151.6 72530 72040.8 438
Nasalis larvatus 718.9 499.1 55.8 219.8 92797 92078.1 663.1
Hylobates lar 666.2 510.2 84.6 156 97505 96838.8 581.6
Pan ti'oglodytes 1421.8 1046.5 136 375.3 382103 380681.2 1285.8
Gorilla gorilla 2752.6 1998.1 227.5 754.5 470359 467606.4 2525.1
Table 5.1 (b): Raw socio-cognitive data for Strepserhine and Hapolorhine primates 
(Data taken from Clutton-Brock and Harvey (1977, 1980), Smuts et al (1987) and 
Dunbar (1992). Male group structure, SM-M, single-male monogamous; SM-H, single­
male harem; MM-DS, multi-male dominance stratified; MM-FF, multi-male fission- 
fusion. Male group structure was taken from Armstrong et al (1987).








Microcebns murinus 1 1
Cheirogaleus major 1 1
Cheirogaleus medius 1 1
Petterus fulvus 9.5 5
Varecia variegata 2 1
Lepilemur mficaudatus 1 1
Avahi laniger 2 1 2
Propithecus verreauxi 5 1 4.7
Indri indri 4.3 1 1
Daubentonia madagascatiensis 1 1
Loris tardigradus 1 1
Nycticebus coucang 1 1
Perodictus potto 1 1
Galago senegalensis 1 1
Otolemur crassicaudatus
Galagoides demidqff 1 1
Tarsius bancamis 1 1
Callithrix jacchus 8.5 2.5 SM-M
Cebuella pygmae 6 1
Saguinus midas tamarin 5.2 2.4 SM-M
Saguinus oedipus 5.2 2.4
Callimico goeldii 7.3 1
Cebus albifrons 18.1 5.7 0
Aotus trivirgatus 3.8 1 SM-M
Callicebus moloch 3.3 1 0.1
Saimiri sciureus 32.5 7.9 1.5 MM-DS
Pithecia monacha 3.6 1
Alouatta seniculus 8.2 3.6 0.4 MM-DS
Ateles geoffroyi 17 9.8 7 MM-FF
Lagothrix lagothricha 23.4 7.5 MM-FF
Macaca mulatta 39.6 14.3 15 MM-DS
Cercocebus albigena 15.4 7 5.8 MM-DS
Papio anubis 52.1 11.4 12.2 MM-DS
Cercopithecus ascanins 23.9 8.2 SM-H
Cercopithecus mitis 23.9 8.2
Miopithecus taîapoin 65.5 15.4 MM-DS
Eiythrocebus patas 28.1 7.9
Colobus badius 50 33.3 3.8 SM-H
Pygathrix nemaeus
Nasalis larvatus 14.4 6.3
Hylobates lar 3.4 1 2.1 SM-M
Pan troglodytes 53.5 13 6.2 MM-FF
Gorilla gorilla 7 3 1 MM-DS
Table 5.1 (c); Raw ecological data for Strepserhine and Haplorhine primates. Diet types, 
FR = frugivorous, FO = folivorous, IN = insectivorous. Stratification, A ^arboreal, T 
^terrestrial. Activity, N  ~ nocturnal, D =diurnal. Home Range = km2. Body Mass = g
S p e c i e s D i e t %  F i n i t S t r a t i f i c a t i o n A c t i v i t y H o m e  R a n g e B o d y  M a s s
M icrocebus m winus F R A 1 .0 3 5 0 .0 0 5
Cheirogaleus major F R A N 4 0 .0 3 1
Cheirogaleus medius F R A N 4 0 .0 3 1
Petterus fulvus F R A D 1 1 .8 7 5 2 . 2
Varecia variegata F R A D 2 .2
Lepilemur mficaudatus F R 5 A N 0 .2 0 . 9 2
Avahi laniger F R 0 A N 1 .0 7
Propithecus verreauxi F O 4 0 A D 5 .2 5 3 . 4 8
Indri indri F O A D 1 7 .8 5 6 .2 5
Daubentonia
madagasariensis
I N A N 2 . 8
Loris tardigradus I N 1 5 A N 0 . 3 2 2
Nycticebus coucang I N 6 0 A N 0 . 8
Perodictus potto F R 7 5 A N 2 3 1 .1 5
Galago senegalensis F R A N 1 3 .6 5 0 . 3 7 2
Otolemur crassicaudatus F R 1 6 A N
G alagoides dem idoff I N 1 9 A N 1 .6 0 . 3 7 2
Tarsius bancanus I N 0 A 1 .5 0 .1 2 5
Callithrix jacchus F R 1 4 A D 0 .3 0 . 2 8
Ceb uella pygm ae F R A D 0 . 1 4
Saguinus midas tamarin F R A D 2 5 . 4 0 . 3 8
Saguinus oedipus F R A D 0 . 3 8
Callimico goeldii F R A D 1 3 2 .5 0 . 4 8
Cebus albifrons F R 1 7 A D 1 0 3 .1
Aotus trivirgatus F R 4 6 A D 4 .2 5 0 .8 3
Callicebus moloch F R 5 3 A D 1 4 1 .5 0 . 9
Saimiri sciureus F R A D 7 0 . 6 6
Pithecia monacha F R 8 2 A D 1 4 .5 1 .5
Alouatta seniculus F O 3 1 A D 1 0 7 .5 6 . 4
Ateles geoffroyi F R 7 7 A D 4 0 0 8
Lagothrix lagothricha F R 7 9 A D 5 .2
M acaca mulatta F R 6 3 T D 1 6 0 .5 7 .8
Cercocebus albigena F R 6 4 A D 1 3 5 7 .5 7 . 9
Papio anubis F R 3 2 T D 2 9 2 5
Cercopithecus ascanins F R 5 0 A D 4 . 8 5
Cercopithecus mitis F R 5 4 A D 4 . 8 5
Miopithecus talapoin F R 5 4 A D 4 2 0 0 1 .2
Erythrocebus patas F R 7 6 T D 1 0 0 7 .8
Colobus badius F O 2 2 A D 7
Pygathrix nemaeus F O A D 7 .5
Nasalis larvatus F O 3 9 A D 4 9 1 4
Hylobates lar F R 6 0 A D 2 0 0 5 .7
Pan troglodytes F R 6 6 T D 2 0 4 6
Gorilla gorilla F O 3 T D 1 0 5
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variables. The residuals were then regressed against the residuals of brain area 
(controlling for effects of body mass).
5.2.5 Independent contrasts (CAIC)
Recently, some authors have suggested that comparing data sets as independent 
variables is incorrect for analyses of evolutionaiy data (Harvey and Pagel 1991, Purvis 
and Rumbaut 1995, Barton 1996). The argument follows that a trait in one species may 
be shared by closely related species. For example, a lemur and a human are distantly 
related, but have a similar number of traits (four limbs, hands, two forward facing eyes, 
etc.). Chimpanzees and humans are more closely related (with a common ancestor at 6-8 
million years ago). Chimpanzees and humans also share a large number of these same 
traits, but the probability that they were derived from the same common ancestor is 
greater than the traits shared between lemurs and humans. Comparison of independent 
contrasts removes the possibility of relatedness between species (and therefore traits) 
being overlooked in gross analyses of multiple related species. This method uses 
phylogenetic reconstructions of genera in analysis (and branch lengths or lengths of time 
since a common ancestor). The cladistic (and phylogenetic) reconstmction for the 
primate order has recently been developed by Puiwis (1995).
A particular method used to compare independent contrasts (Harvey and Pagel 
1991, as based on Felsenstein 1985), is a computer package called Comparative Analysis 
o f Indepejident Contrasts (CAIC, Purvis and Rumbaut 1995). This package computes 
contrasts of any set of data for a species depending on the relationship with other closely 
related species. This method is used mainly in analyses of closely related species (such as 
within the primate order), but it may not be particularly useful when comparing across 
orders or sub-families. The output contrasts are analysed using normal statistical methods 
such as correlation and regression.
The main results of this chapter will not be analysed using the CAIC program.
For the majority of primate genera in the sample, data from only one species is 
represented. Only three geni {Cheirogaleus, Saguinus and Cercopithecus) have more
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than one species (i.e. 2) represented. For example, of the large number of macaque 
species, only Macaca nmlatta is represented. The independence of species is, therefore 
likely to be high, especially between distantly related species, for example, Gorilla gorilla 
and Indri indri. The relationship between the BL complex and group size, and between 
the CM complex and group size have been analysed using CAIC. No differences were 
found when compared with results from analyses not using CAIC (see Results section for 
CAIC results). ^
5.3 Results
Correlations were performed between the raw anatomical data (amygdala, BL, 
CM, LB, BL (-LB), RoA and whole brain, to determine the relationships between brain 
regions. The correlation coefficients are displayed below in Table 5.2. All areas were 
highly significantly correlated. These results suggest that any significant correlations 
between area X and a socio-ecological variable may be due to the relationship between 
the two variables, not because of a general increase in brain size (Findlay and Darlington 
1995) or the level of connectivity between two areas (including area X). For example, the 
volume of area X is highly correlated with the volume of area Y ( i^ -  0.81). The 
relationship between area X and number of copulations/hour reveals a significant 
correlation. There is no correlation between area Y and number of copulations/hour. The 
relationship between area X and copulations/hour is independent of the effects of area Y. 
This is justified by regressing area Y on area X and correlating the resulting residuals 
against copulations/hour.
T  w i s h  t o  t h a n k  R o b e r t  B a r t o n  f o r  a n a l y s i s  u s i n g  C A I C . T h e  C A I C  m e t h o d  w a s  r e c e n t ly  b r o u g h t  t o  m y  
a t t e n t i o n  a f t e r  t h e  m a i n  r e s u l t s  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  w e r e  w r i t t e n  u p . A t t e m p t s  t o  u s e  C A I C  h a v e  f a i l e d ,  d u e  to  
s o f t w a r e  p r o b le m s .
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Table 5.2. Correlation statistics (coefficients, r^) for relationships between brain area 
volumes, amygdala, whole brain (brain), brain - amygdala (rest of brain, RoB), amygdala 
- LB nucleus (rest of amygdala, RoA), LB nucleus, BL complex and CM complex. All R 
square values were significant, p < 0.00001.
Brain RoB Amygdala RoA BL CM LB
Brain LOO 0.7:5 0.77 0.70 0.72 0.07 0.75
RoB LOO 0.91 0.91 0.P2 0.88 0.90
Amygdala LOO LOO 1.00 0.99 0.96
RoA 1.00 LOO O.PP 0.95




The LB nucleus was larger in groups with sizes greater than 11, F(2,41) = 10,/? < 
0.001; PLSD,/? < 0.05. There was no difference between large and medium groups 
(PLSD,/? = 0.32). There was an overall effect of the BL complex on group size, 7^(2,40) 
= 3.63,/? < 0.05 and an almost significant effect between large and medium sized groups, 
PLSD, /? = 0.06. There was an overall effect of the CM complex on group size, F(2,40) = 
3.52,/? < 0.05, but no significant differences between sizes of groups. There was a 
significant overall effect of group size on the size of the amygdala, F(2, 38) = 13 .1,/? < 
0.001, with groups of 1-10 having relatively larger amygdalae than larger groups; 
medium group, PLSD,/? < 0.001 and large group, PLSD,/? <0.01. All significant results 
are displayed as line graphs in Figure 5.1.
The second test for social complexity placed anthropoid (only) species data into 
categories dependent on male social structure (single-male versus multi-male groups). 
These two categories were further divided depending on the specific stmcture (see Table 
5.3 for means and SEM’s of each brain structure in each category). There was no overall 
effect of male group composition for the LB nucleus, F(3,13) = 0.25, /? = 0.86, the BL
Fîgiare 5.1. (a) Graph depicting differences between the mean percentage size (+/- SEM) of the 
lateral basal nucleus, LB (as a percentage of the amygdala) for 44 primate species (strepsirhines 
and haplorhines), where each species has been grouped dependent on group size. Using addition 
of percentages removes the effects of body mass. Small groups have been designated as groups 
containing 1-10 individuals, medium groups as containing 11-20 individuals and large groups as 
containing greater than 20 individuals. The size of the groups were arbitrary measures, (b) Graph 
depicting differences between the mean percentage size (+/- SEM) of the whole amygdala (as a 
percentage of the brain) using the same criteria as in (a), (c) Graph depicting differences between 
the mean percentage size (+/- SEM) of the basolateral complex, BL (as a percentage of the 
amygdala) using the same criteria as in (a), (d) Graph depicting differences between the mean 
percentage size (+/-SEM) of the centromedial complex, CM (as a percentage of the amygdala) 
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complex, F(3,12) = 0.3, p  = 0.83, the CM complex, F(3,12) = 0.29,/? = 0.83 or the 
amygdala, F(3,12) = 0.83,/? = 0.5.
Table 5.3, Means and SEM’s for LB nucleus, BL complex, CM complex and amygdala 
grouped according to male social staicture in anthropoid primates (Armstrong et al 
1987).
S I N G L E - M A L E
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Harem Dominance-stratified Fission-Fusion
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The relationships between brain components and social behaviour were tested 
further by correlating with more stringent socio-cognitive variables. The results 
(correlation coefficients, probabilities and ANOVA’s) are presented in detail in a number 
of the tables below.
First, the results produced by regressing body mass against brain region are 
presented. Second, the results of regressing against the opposite brain region are 
presented (e.g. removing the effects of the CM complex from the BL complex). After 
removing the effects of body mass, all brain areas were significantly correlated
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(positively) with mean group size (see Table 5.4 below). Scatter-plots demonstrating the 
relationships between group size and brain region are displayed in Figure 5.2).
Table 5,4. Regression statistics for relationships between mean group size and volume of 
brain area (controlling for the effects of body mass on volume of brain area).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R  Square F  value df P
BL complex 0.50 0.25 12.94 1,39 <0.001
C M  complex 0.33 0.11 4.9 1,39 <0.05
LB nucleus 0.59 0.35 20.66 1,39 <0.0001
R est o f  Am ygdala 0.44 0.19 9.41 1,39 <0.01
Am ygdala 0.46 0.21 10.6 1,39 <0.01
R est o f  Brain 0.52 0.27 14.37 1,39 <0.001
The effects of the volume of a corresponding brain area (for example, the rest of 
the amygdala for the LB nucleus, the CM complex for the BL complex, the BL complex 
for the CM and the rest of the brain for the amygdala) were partialled out and all brain 
areas (except for the amygdala) were significantly correlated with mean group size (see 
Table 5.5 and Figure 5.3 for scatter plots of significant results).
Mgwiire 5.2. Scatterplots displaying the relationship between (a) the residuals of the volume of the 
LB nucleus (removing the effects of body mass), and mean group size, for strepsirhine and 
haplorliine primates, (b) the residuals of the volume of the rest of the amygdala (RoA, removing 
the effects of body mass), and mean group size, (c) the residuals of the volume of the BL complex 
(removing the effects of body mass), and mean group size, (d) the residuals of the volume of the 
CM complex (removing the effects of body mass), and mean group size, (e) the residuals of the 
volume of the amygdala (removing the effects of body mass), and mean group size and (f) the 
residuals of the volume of the rest of the brain (RoB, removing the effects of body mass) and 
mean group size. The dots represent individual primate species and the line on each scatter-plot is 
a best-fit regiession line.
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Figure 5.3. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the 
volume of the LB nucleus (removing the effects of the RoA), and mean group size for 
strepsirhine and haplorhine primates, (b) the residuals of the volume of the RoA 
(removing the effects of the LB nucleus), and mean group size, (c) the residuals of the 
volume of the BL complex (removing the effects of the CM complex), and mean group 
size, (d) the residuals of the volume of the CM complex (removing the effects of the BL 
complex), and mean group size. The dots represent individual primate species and the 
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Table 5.5. Regression statistics for relationships between mean group size and volume of 
brain area (partialling out the influence of volume of the corresponding brain area).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R  Square F  Value df P
BL complex (vs. CM complex) 0.4 0.16 7.28 1, 39 <0.01
CM complex (vs. BL complex) 0.34 0.12 5.04 1, 39 <0.05
LB nucleus (vs. Rest o f Amygdala) 0.54' 0.29 15.82 1, 39 <0.001
Rest o f  Amygdala (vs. LB nucleus) 0.45 0.2 9.75 1, 39 <0.01
Amygdala (vs. Rest o f Brain) 0.10 0.01 0.42 1,39 0.52
Rest o f  Brain (vs. Amygdala) 0 0 0 1,39 1.0
Mean group size may be affected by ecological variables, such as diet and size of 
home range. The percentage of fruit in the diet may effect social relationships as fruit is a 
scattered resource which cannot sustain large numbers of individuals (Milton 1988). 
Primates which eat a high amount of fmit would therefore be more solitaiy animals. 
Primate which eat a mainly folivorous diet can eat together, as foliage is plentiful and not 
clumped. The correlation between mean group size and percentage fruit was not 
significant (;*^= 0.06, F(l,26) = 1.62,p  = 0.21), but this may have been affected by the 
low levels of fruit eaten by prosimians. When the possible effects of fmit were removed 
from mean group size, the residuals significantly correlated with the residuals of LB (vs. 
mass), i^= 0.19, F(l,26) = 5.9, p < 0.05 and the residuals of the rest of the brain (vs. 
mass), 7'^= 0.16, F(l,26) = 5.11, p  < 0.05. There were non-significant correlations 
between residuals of group size (vs. fruit) and residuals of the following brain areas (vs. 
mass); BL complex, 0.11, p  = 0.08; CM complex, /'^= 0.02, p  = 0.45; rest of 
amygdala, 7*^ = 0.07,p  = 0.17 and the amygdala, /'^= 0.08,p  = 0.13. Figure 5.4 displays 
scatter plots of the significant results.
Mean group size may also be affected by home range size. A larger home range 
may be required by fmit eaters and to sustain larger groups. There is a significant 
correlation between home range size and mean group size {i^= 0.3, 7^(1,28) = 11.93,p <
Figure 5.4. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the volume of 
the LB nucleus (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of mean group size 
(removing the effects of percentage fruit in the diet) for strepsirhine and haplorhine primates, (b 
the residuals of the volume of the rest of the brain (removing the effects of body mass) and the 
residuals of mean group size (removing the effects of percentage fruit in the diet). The dots 
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0.01), but not between home range size and percentage fruit (7*^ = 0.04, p  — 0.4). When 
the effect of home range size was removed from mean group size, the residuals were 
significantly correlated with the residuals ofBL complex (vs. mass), 7'^= 0.15, F(l,28) = 
4.93, p  < 0.05; residuals of the LB nucleus (vs. mass), 1^ = 0.15, F(l,28) = 4.78, p  < 0.05 
and residuals of the rest of the brain (vs. mass), 1^ = 0.25, F(l,28) = 9.35, p  < 0.01. The 
residuals were not significantly correlated with the residuals of the following brain areas 
(vs. mass); CM, 7'^= 0.02, p  = 0.39; rest of amygdala, -  0.06, ^  = 0.19 and amygdala, 
0.09, p  = 0.09. Figure 5.5 displays scatter plots of the significant results.
Number of females in a group may provide an indication of male competition and 
mating opportunities. Linear regressions were performed between the brain areas and 
number of females in a group. All brain areas were positively correlated with number of 
females, when controlling for body mass. See Table 5.6 for regression statistics and 
Figure 5.6 for scatter plots of significant results.
Table 5.6. Regression statistics for relationships between number of females in a group 
and volume of brain area (partialling out the effects of body mass on the volume of the 
brain area).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R Square F Value df P
BL Complex 0.48 0.23 11.35 1,38 <0.01
CM Complex 0.36 0.13 5.73 1,38 <0.05
LB Nucleus 0.52 0.27 13.88 1,38 <0.001
Rest o f Amygdala 0.44 0.20 9.25 1,38 <0.01
Amygdala 0.46 0.21 9.9 1,38 <0.01
Rest o f Brain 0.42 0.17 7.90 1,38 <0.01
When number of females were regressed against brain area (removing the effects 
of the corresponding brain area), only the LB nucleus and the rest of the amygdala were
Figure 5.5. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the volume of 
the LB nucleus (removing the effects o f body mass) and the residuals of mean group size 
(removing the effects of mean home range size), for strepsirhine and haplorhine primates, (h) the 
residuals o f the volume o f the BL complex (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals 
of mean group size (removing the effects o f mean home range size), and (c) the residuals of the 
volume o f the RoB (removing the effects o f body mass) and the residuals of mean group size 
(removing the effects o f mean home range size). The dots represent individual primate species and 
the line on each scatter-plot is a best-fit regression line.
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Figure 5.6. Scatterplots displaying the relationship between (a) the residuals of the volume of the 
LB nucleus (removing the effects of body mass), and number of females in a group, for 
strepsirhine and haplorhine primates, (b) the residuals of the volume of the rest of the amygdala 
(RoA, removing the effects of body mass), and number o f females in a group, (c) the residuals of 
the volume o f the BL complex (removing the effects of body mass), and number of females in a 
group, (d) the residuals of the volume o f the CM complex (removing the effects of body mass), 
and number of females in a group, (e) the residuals o f the volume of the amygdala (removing the 
effects o f body mass), and number of females in a group and (I) the residuals of the volume of the 
rest o f the brain (RoB, removing the effects o f body mass) and number o f females in a group. The 
dots represent individual primate species and the line on each scatter-plot is a best-fit regression 
line.
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significantly correlated (see Table 5.7 for regression statistics). Scatter plots displaying 
the significant results are in Figures 5.7.
Table 5.7. Regression statistics for relationships between number of females in a group 
and volume of brain area (controlling for effects of volume of the corresponding brain 
area).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R  Square F  Value df P
BL Com plex (vs. C M  Complex) 0.28 0.08 3.23 1,38 0.08
C M  Complex (vs. BL Complex) 0.23 0.05 2.14 1,38 0.15
LB Nucleus (vs. Rest o f  Am ygdala) 0.39 0.15 6.62 1,38 <0.01
R est o f  Am ygdala (vs. LB Nucleus) 0.31 0.10 4.07 1,38 <0.05
A m ygdala (vs. R est o f  Brain) 0.03 0.001 0.04 1,38 0.85
R est o f  Brain (vs. Am ygdala) 0.06 0.003 0.15 1,38 0.7
Percentage fmit in the diet may effect the number of females in the group in 
similar ways to the effect on group size, although the relationship is not significant {r^~ 
0.02, p  = 0.5). The effects of percentage fruit in diet were removed from number of 
females and the residuals were significantly correlated only with the residuals of the LB 
nucleus (vs. mass), r^= 0.15, F(l,26) = 4.55, p < 0.05. The residuals were not 
significantly correlated with the residuals (vs. mass) of the following brain areas; BL 
complex, 0.13,;; = 0.06; CM complex, r^= 0.06, p = 0.23; rest of amygdala, =
0.11, ;? = 0.09, amygdala, /’^  = 0.11, ;? = 0.08 and rest of the brain (vs. mass), = 0,32, 
F(l,26) = 3.02, p  = 0.09. The significant results are displayed as scatter plots in Figure 
5.8.
The effects of home range size were also removed from number of females, as 
there is a significant relationship between range and number of females {r^= 0.26,
F(l,27) = 9.56, p < 0.01). The residuals were significantly correlated with the residuals 
ofBL complex (vs. mass), 0.18,7^(1,27) = 5.76,p  < 0.05; LB nucleus (vs. mass),
= 0.15, jF(l,27) = 4.87,/; < 0.05; rest of amygdala (vs. mass), 7'^= 0.14, F{\,21) = 4.29,/;
Figure 5.7. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the volume of 
the LB nucleus (removing the effects of the RoA), and number of females in a group, for 
strepsirhine and haplorhine primates and (fo) the residuals of the volume of the RoA (removing the 
effects of the LB nucleus), and number of females in a group. The dots represent individual 
primate species and the line on each scatter-plot is a best-fit regression line.
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Figure 5.8. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between the residuals of the volume 
of the LB nucleus (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of number of 
females in a group (removing the effects of percentage fruit in the diet) for strepsirhine 
and haplorhine primates. The dots represent individual primate species and the line on 
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< 0.05, amygdala (vs. mass), i^= 0.15, F(l,27) = 4,58, p < 0.05 and the rest of the brain 
(vs. mass), i^= 0.23,7^(1,27) = 8.14, p  < 0.01. The residuals of CM (vs. mass) were not 
significantly correlated with the residuals of number of females (vs. home range), r^~ 
0.06, p  = 0.21. Scatter plots of the significant results are displayed in Figure 5.9.
A final measure of social complexity was proposed; percentage time spent 
grooming. When percentage time grooming was regressed against brain area (removing 
the effects of body mass), only the residuals of the LB nucleus were significantly 
correlated (see Table 5.8 and Figure 5.10).
Table 5.8. Regression statistics for relationships between percentage time spent 
grooming and volume of brain area (controlling for effect of body mass on brain area 
volume).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R Square F Value df P
BL Complex 0.46 0.21 3J^ 1, 14 0.07
CM Complex 0,31 0.10 1.47 1,14 0.25
LB Nucleus 0.56 0.31 6J7 1, 14 <0.05
Rest o f Amygdala 0.41 0,17 2.77 L 14 0.12
Amygdala 0.43 0.19 3.25 1, 14 0.09
Rest of Brain 0.43 0.18 3.13 1, 14 0.09
When percentage grooming time was regressed against the residuals of brain area 
(vs. corresponding brain area), there were significant correlations with the LB nucleus 
and the rest of the amygdala (see Table 5.9 and scatter plots of significant results 
displayed in Figure 5.11).
Figure 5.9. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the 
volume of the LB nucleus (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of the 
number of females in a group (removing the effects of mean home range size) for 
strepsirhine and haplorhine primates, ( b )  the residuals of the volume of the RoA 
(removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of the number of females in a group 
(removing the effects of mean home range size), (c) the residuals of the volume of the BL 
complex (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of the number of females 
in a group (removing the effects of mean home range size), (d) the residuals of the 
volume of the RoB (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of the number 
of females in a group (removing the effects of mean home range size) and (e) the 
residuals o f the volume of the amygdala (removing the effects of body mass) and the 
residuals of the number of females in a group (removing the effects of mean home range 
size). The dots represent individual primate species and the line on each scatter-plot is a 
best-fit regression line.
3 0 0 0 0  n
2 5 0 0 0  -
20000 -%«  1 5 0 0 0  - 
ÿ 10000 - 
g  5 0 0 0  - o°
•o -5 0 0 0  -
10000 *
-1 5 0 0 0  -
20000
10 150 55
Residuals Females (vs. Home Range)
1 5 0 0 0  1
10000  -
5 0 0 0  -
-5 0 0 0  -
2  -10000 -
- 1 5 0 0 0  -
-20000
10 IS0 5•5
Residuals Females (vs. Home Range)
20000
15000 -













3  -5000 -




Residuals Females (vs. Home Range)
15000 1




1 -10000  -
-15000
105 15•5 0
Residuals Females (vs. Range)
Figure 5.10. Scatterplot displaying the relationships between the residuals of the LB nucleus 
(removing the effects of body mass) and percentage time spent grooming, for strepsirhine and 
haplorhine primates. The dots represent individual primate species and the line on the scatter-plot 











Figure S ,ll . Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the volume of 
the LB nucleus (removing the effects of the RoA) and percentage time spent grooming, for 
strepsirhine and haplorhine primates and (b) the residuals of the volume of the RoA (removing the 
effects o f the LB nucleus) and percentage time spent grooming. The dots represent individual 
primate species and the line on each scatter-plot is a best-fit regression line.
















Table 5.9. Regression statistics for relationships between percentage time spent 
grooming and volume of brain area (controlling for effects of volume of corresponding 
brain area).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R  Square F  Value df P
BL Complex (vs. CM Complex) 0.19 0.04 0.55 1, 14 0.47
CM Complex (vs. BL Complex) 0.18 0.03 0.46 1, 14 0.51
LB Nucleus (vs. Rest of Amygdala) 0.57 0.32 6.60 1, 14 <0.05
Rest o f Amygdala (vs. LB Nucleus) 0.53 0.28 5.54 1,14 <0.05
Amygdala (vs. Rest o f Brain) 0.09 0.01 0.12 1, 14 0.73
Rest o f Brain (vs. Amygdala) 0.13 OTG 0.24 1, 14 0.63
Percentage fruit in the diet may affect percentage time grooming, as finding and 
eating fruit is time consuming, reducing the possible time which can be spent on 
grooming. The relationship between finit and grooming, however is non-significant, P' = 
0.44,^ = 0.13. None of the residuals of brain area (vs. mass) were significantly correlated 
with the residuals of grooming (vs. percentage fruit in diet); BL complex, 0.03,/? = 
0.6; CM complex, 7'^= 0,/? = 0.99, LB nucleus, 0.07, p  = 0.37; rest of amygdala, t^ = 
0.008, p = 0.77; amygdala, 7*^ = 0.01, p = 0.7 and rest of brain, 0.02,/? = 0.61.
Grooming may also be affected by home range size, as a widely dispersed food 
source requires longer to find and process food. The relationship between grooming and 
range, however, was non-significant; 7*^ = 0.02,/? = 0.61. When the affects of home range 
size are removed from percentage time grooming, the residuals do not correlate with any 
of the residuals of brain area (vs. mass); BL complex, 0.12,/? = 0.22; CM complex, 
0.009,/? = 0.73, LB nucleus, 7'^= 0,17,/? = 0.15; rest of amygdala, 0.09,/? = 
0.31; amygdala, r^= 0.08,/? = 0.32 and rest of brain, 0.13,/? = 0.2.
5.3.2 Ecology
There was an overall effect of diet on the size of the LB nucleus, F(2,41) = 3.28, 
p  < 0.05. Frugivores (PLSD, p < 0.05) and folivores (PLSD, p  < 0.05) have a larger LB
141
nucleus than insectivores (see Figure 5.12). There was no difference between the two 
groups of plant-eating primates (PLSD, p  = 0.79). There was no overall effect of diet on 
the BL complex, F(2,41) = 0.34,/? = 0.71, on the CM complex, F(2,41) = 0.34,/? = 0.68 
or on the amygdala, 7^(2,40) = 2.36, /? = 0.11.
Relationships between the ecological variables and the seven brain regions were 
also analysed further. Two measures of ecological complexity were analysed; home range 
size and percentage fruit in the diet. When home range size was regressed against volume 
of brain area (removing the effects of body mass), the residuals of all areas (except the 
rest of the brain) were significantly correlated (see Table 5.10 and scatter plots displayed 
in Figure 5.13) with home range size.
Table 5.10. Regression statistics for relationships between home range size (km2) and 
volume of brain area (controlling for the effects of body mass on brain area volume).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R  Square F  Value df P
BL Complex 0.51 0.26 10.09 1,28 <0.01
CM Complex 0.7 0.49 26.76 1,28 <0.00001
LB Nucleus 0.54 OJ^ 11.47 1,28 <0.01
Rest of Amygdala 0.58 0B3 14.08 1,28 <0.001
Amygdala 0.58 0J4 14.14 1,28 <0.001
Rest o f Brain Oj^ 0.08 2.47 1,28 0.13
When home range size was regressed against the residuals of volume of brain area 
(vs. corresponding brain area), significant correlations were found with the BL complex 
and the CM complex (see Table 5.11 and scatter plots displayed in Figure 5.14).
Figure 5,12. (a) Graph depicting the differences between the mean percentage size (+/- SEM) of 
the LB nucleus (as a percentage of the amygdala) for 44 primate species (strepsirhines and 
haplorhines), where each species has been grouped dependent on diet (folivorous, fhigivorous or 
insectivorous), (b) Graph depicting the differences between the mean percentage size (+/- SEM) 





















Figure 5.13. Scatterplot of (a) the residuals of the volume of the LB nucleus (removing 
the effects of body mass) and mean home range size, for strepsirhine and haplorhine 
primates, (b) the residuals of the volume of the rest of the amygdala (removing the 
effects of body mass) and mean home range size, (c) the residuals of the volume of the 
BL complex (removing the effects of body mass) and mean home range size, (d) the 
residuals of the volume of the CM complex (removing the effects of body mass) and 
mean,home range size and (e) the residuals of the volume of the amygdala (removing the 
effects of body mass) and mean home range size. The dots represent individual primate 
species and the line on each scatter-plot is a best-fit regression line.
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Figure 5.14. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the 
volume of the BL compex (removing the effects of the CM complex) and mean home 
range size, for strepserhine and haplorhine species, (b) the residuals of the volume of the 
CM compex (removing the effects of the BL complex) and mean home range size. The 
dots represent individual primate species and the line on each scatter-plot is a best-fit 
regression line.
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Table 5.11. Regression statistics for relationships between home range size and volume 
of brain area (controlling for the effects of the volume of the corresponding brain area).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R  Square F  Value df P
BL Complex (vs. CM Complex) 0.45 0.2 7.13 1, 28 <0.01
CM Complex (vs., BL Complex) 0.47 0.22 8.09 1,28 <0.01
LB Nucleus (vs. Rest of Amygdala) 0.09 2.64 1, 28 0.11
Rest o f Amygdala (vs. LB Nucleus) 0.26 0.07 2.05 1, 28 0.16
Amygdala (vs. Rest of Brain) 0.32 0.10 3^3 1, 28 0.08
Rest of Brain (v5. Amygdala) 0U2 0.10 333 1, 28 0.08
Percentage fruit in the diet may have an effect on home range size (and visa 
versa), as finit is usually widely dispersed. The effects may be hidden, however as there is 
a non-significant correlation between percentage fruit and home range size {i^= 0.04,/? = 
0.4). The effects of percentage fruit were removed from home range size and the 
residuals correlated with the residuals of brain area (vs. mass). All residuals of brain areas 
were significantly correlated with the residuals of home range size (vs. fruit), rest of 
brain, r^= 0.25, F(l,19) = 6.49,/» < 0.05; BL complex, r^= 0.27, F(l,19) = 6.95,/? < 
0.05; LB nucleus, 0.23, F(l,19) = 5.71,/» < 0.05; rest of amygdala, 0.24,
F(l,19) = 6.03,/» < 0.05 and amygdala, 0.37, F(l,19) = 11.28,p  < 0.01, except the 
CM complex, 0.16, p  = 0.07. Scatter plots of significant results are displayed in 
Figure 5.15.
A second measure of ecology used was percentage fruit in the diet. As stated 
previously, finit is a scarce resource that requires knowledge of the location of the best 
fruiting trees, when they are ripe and whether novel fruits are edible in times of need. The 
higher the percentage of finit in a diet, the greater the reliance on complex cognitive 
processes (Milton 1988). When percentage fruit was regressed against volume of brain 
area (removing the effects of body mass), all areas, except the rest of the brain, were 
significantly correlated with percentage fruit (see Table 5.12 and scatter plots displayed 
in Figure 5.16).
Figure 5.15. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the volume of 
the LB nucleus (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of mean home range size 
(removing the effects of percentage fruit in the diet) for strepsirhine and haplorhine primates, (fo) 
the residuals of the volume of the RoA (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of 
mean home range size (removing the effects of percentage fruit in the diet), (c) the residuals of the 
volume of the BL complex (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of mean home 
range size (removing the effects of percentage fruit in the diet), ( d )  the residuals of the volume of 
the CM complex (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of mean home range size 
(removing the effects of percentage fruit in the diet) and (e) the residuals of the volume of the 
amygdala (removing the effects of body mass) and the residuals of mean home range size 
(removing the effects of percentage fruit in the diet). The dots represent individual primate species 
and the line on each scatter-plot is a best-fit regression line.
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Figure 5.16. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the volume of 
the LB nucleus (removing the effects o f body mass) and percentage fruit in the diet, for 
strepsirhine and haplorhine primates, (b) the residuals o f the volume of the rest of the amygdala 
(RoA, removing the effects of body mass), and percentage fruit in the diet, (c) the residuals of the 
volume of the BL complex (removing the effects o f body mass), and number of females in a 
group, (d) the residuals of the volume o f the CM complex (removing the effects of body mass), 
and percentage fruit in the diet and (e) the residuals o f the volume o f the amygdala (removing the 
effects o f body mass), and percentage fruit in the diet. The dots represent individual primate 
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Table 5.12, Regression statistics for relationships between percentage fruit in diet and 
volume of brain area (controlling for the effects of body mass on volume of brain area).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R  Square F Value df P
BL Complex 0.66 0.44 20.42 1,26 <0.0001
CM Complex 0.65 0A2 18.80 1, 26 <0.001
LB Nucleus 0.64 0.41 18.11 1,26 <0.001
Rest o f Amygdala 0.67 0.45 2L48 1,26 <0.00001
Amygdala 0.67 0.45 21.69 1,26 <0.00001
Rest o f Brain 0.57 0,32 12.37 1,26 <0.01
When percentage fruit in diet was regressed against volume of brain area 
(removing the effects of corresponding brain area), only the residuals of LB nucleus and 
the rest of the amygdala were significantly correlated (see table 5.13 and scatter plots 
displayed in Figure 5.17).
Table 5.13, Regression statistics for relationships between percentage fruit in diet and 
volume of brain area (controlling for the effects of volume of corresponding brain area).
Correlation ANOVA
Brain Area Multiple R R  Square F Value df P
BL Complex (vs. CM Complex) 0.008 0.00007 0.002 1, 27 0.97
CM Complex (vs, BL Complex) 0.008 0.00007 0.002 1,27 0.97
LB Nucleus (vs. Rest of Amygdala) 0J9 0.15 4 j# 1, 27 <0.05
Rest o f Amygdala (vs. LB Nucleus) 0J6 0.13 4.10 1, 27 <0.05
Amygdala (vs. Rest of Brain) 0T6 0.03 Oj# 1, 27 0.41
Rest o f Brain (vs. Amygdala) 0.14 0.02 0.55 1,27 0.46
The effects of home range size on percentage fruit are the same as percentage 
fruit on home range size (see above).
Fignfi’e 5.17. Scatterplots displaying the relationships between (a) the residuals of the volume of 
the LB nucleus (removing the effects of the RoA) and percentage fruit in the diet, for strepsirhine 
and haplorhine primates and (b) the residuals of the volume of the RoA (removing the effects of 
the LB nucleus) and percentage fruit in the diet. The dots represent individual primate species and 
the line on each scatter-plot is a best-fit regression line.
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Two final measures of ecology were analysed for each anatomical data set. First, 
activity timing (diurnal v nocturnal) was compared between species. The means and 
variances for activity timing are displayed in Table 5.14 and the overall results are 
summarised as histograms in Figure 5.18. The BL complex was found to be larger in 
diurnal species, /(IB) = 4.35, p < 0.001, as was the LB nucleus, /(31) = 5.89,/? < 0.0001. 
The other anatomical regions were larger in nocturnal species; amygdala, /(16) = -0.44,/? 
< 0.001 and the CM complex, /(IB) = -0.42,/? < 0.001.
Table 5.14. Means and variances for anatomical measures (BL, CM, LB, and amygdala) 
vaiying by Activity Timing (Nocturnal v Diurnal).
Nocturnal Diurnal
Basolateral Complex
M e a n 6 8 . 1 6 7 3 . 0 2
V a r i a n c e 9 .9 7 1 0 .2 4
Ceiilromeclial Complex
M e a n 3 1 . 7 0 2 6 . 9 8
V a r i a n c e 1 0 .4 7 1 0 .2 1
Lateral Basal Ahicleiis
M e a n 6 D 2 8 .6 3
V a r i a n c e 1 .0 2 3 .1 2
Amygdala
M e a n 1 .5 4 0 .9 4
V a r i a n c e 0 .1 2 0 .1 7
Stratification was also measured for each anatomical variable,. The means and 
variances are displayed in Table 5.15 and the overall results are summarised as 
histograms in Figure 5.19. The LB complex was larger in terrestrial species, /(9) = -0.38,
Figure 5.18. Histograms depicting the differences between the percentage size of the LB nucleus 
(as a percentage of the amygdala), the percentage size of the BL complex (as a percentage of the 
amygdala, the percentage size of the CM complex (as a percentage of the amygdala) and the 
percentage size o f the amygdala (as a percentage o f the brain) for 44 primate species 
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Figure 5.19. Histograms depicting the differences between the percentage size of the LB nucleus 
(as a percentage of the amygdala), the percentage size of the BL complex (as a percentage of the 
amygdal^ the percentage size of the CM complex (as a percentage of the amygdala) and the 
percentage size of the amygdala (as a percentage of the brain) for 44 primate species 





p  < 0.01. Ai'boreal species had a larger amygdala, /(18) = 5.86,/? < 0.0001. There was no 
difference in stratification for the BL complex, /(7) = -1.63, /? -  0.15 or the CM complex, 
til)  ~ 1.59,/? = 0.59.
Table 5.15. Means and variances for anatomical measures (BL, CM, LB, and amygdala) 
varying by Stratification (Aiboreal v Terrestrial).
A r b o r e a l T e r r e s t r i a l
Basolateral Complex
M e a n 7 1 . 4 2 7 3 . 5 0
V a r i a n c e 1 5 .4 4 6 .1 3
Centromeelial Complex
M e a n 2 8 . 5 3 2 6 . 5 0
V a r i a n c e 1 5 .2 7 6 .1 3
Lateral Basal Nucleus
M e a n 7 .6 9 .6 4
V a r i a n c e 0 .9 7
Amygdala
M e a n 1 .1 9 0 .5 8
V a r i a n c e 0 .2 2 0 .0 2
5.3.3 CAIC analysis
CAIC analysis (Pum s and Rumbaut 1995) was used to determine the 
relationships between mean group size and residuals of volume of brain area (removing 
the effects of the corresponding brain region) for the LB nucleus, the BL complex and 
the CM complex. Residuals of the volume of the BL complex (vs. CM complex) were 
significantly correlated with mean group size, r = 0.41, r^= 0.15, A(l,39) = 7.88,/? < 
0.01. Residuals of the CM complex (vs. BL complex) were significantly correlated with 
mean group size, /' = 0.39, r^= 0.15, A( 1,39) = 7.03,/? < 0.01. Finally, residuals of the
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LB nucleus (vs. CM complex) were significantly correlated with mean group size, r = 
0.38, 0.15, F(l,39) = 6.75,/? < 0.01.
5.4 Discussion
The results are summarised as follows. Group size appeared to be a relatively 
stable measure of social complexity. When grouping brain parts according to subjective 
measurements of group size (small, medium or large), a larger LB nucleus was related to 
medium and large groups (11+ individuals). A larger amygdala is found in small groups 
(1-10). The amygdala as a whole would, therefore not appear to be required for 
processing social information about large groups. This is may not strictly be true as the 
amygdala has increased in size allometrically with body weight. The amygdala has not 
increased as a percentage of the whole brain. This leaves the possibility that function has 
been transmitted to an area of the brain which is larger than would be expected for body 
weight, such as the neocortex. The BL complex was larger in large groups (+ 20 
individuals), where as the corresponding CM complex was smaller in large groups.
Male group composition was also tested against brain part size. No relationships 
were found in the data. There was, however, an appreciable difference in the size of the 
LB nucleus according to male social stmcture, suggesting that the LB nucleus may be 
involved in general social behaviour/?g/- se, but not in processing behaviours specifically 
relevant to male sociality.
The relationships between brain area volume and mean group size were 
dependent on the measures used and partialling out the effects of a) body mass and b) a 
corresponding brain area, with which the area was heavily connected. When body mass 
was controlled (partialled out), all brain areas correlated with group size. When the 
effects of a corresponding brain area were removed all areas, except the amygdala 
correlated with group size. The most stringent correlations between group size and brain 
area were seen with the LB nucleus and the rest of the brain (RoB). Both areas 
correlated with group size when controlling for the effects of mass and either fruit or 
home range size. The rest of the brain includes the neocortex, which has been previously
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shown to correlate well with mean group size (Dunbar 1992, Barton 1996). The LB 
nucleus is extensively connected with the neocortex (see Chapters III and IV), therefore 
it may have been predicted that the relationships between group size and the volume of 
the LB nucleus would be stable.
Similar relationships were seen with brain size and number of females in a group. 
All areas correlated with number of females (when body mass was controlled), but only 
the LB nucleus and the RoA when controlling for the reciprocal part. Again the LB 
nucleus and the RoB correlated with number females when controlling for mass and 
percentage fruit in the diet. When removing the effects of home range size, the LB 
nucleus, RoA, BL complex, CM complex and the amygdala correlated with number of 
females. The relationship with the LB nucleus again proved to be the most reliable.
Percentage time spent grooming was a good measure of social complexity, but 
the data available for this socio-cognitive variable were limited. Only the volume of the 
LB nucleus (partialling out the effects of body mass) correlated significantly with 
percentage grooming, as would be suggested by the LB nucleus’ involvement in social 
behaviour (but mean group size did not correlate with % grooming). The LB nucleus and 
the RoA also correlated with percentage grooming when removing the effects of the 
corresponding brain area. This result is interesting as it is possible that grooming may 
require attaching emotional significance to incoming tactile information (from grooming), 
which may be processed in the amygdala. The likely candidate for processing in the 
amygdala would be the AB nucleus (part of the BL complex), which has many 
somatosensoiy connections. The LB nucleus also connects extensively to the 
somatosensoiy areas (see Chapters III, IV).
Volume of amygdala components also vaiy according to ecology. The LB 
nucleus (as a percentage of the amygdala) is smaller in insectivorous species and 
approximately the same size in folivores and frugivores, and the amygdala (as a 
percentage of the brain) is larger in insectivorous species and approximately the same size 
in frugivores and folivores. Insectivorous primate species are in the main prosimians, 
which are also nocturnal. The LB nucleus connects proflisely with the visual system 
(ventral and dorsal processing streams), but not with the olfactoiy system (the olfactoiy
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system is less well developed in simian primates according to the size of the nucleus of 
the olfactoiy tract, Stephan et al 1987, and the paleocortex or olfactory brain, Baron, 
Stephan and Frahm 1987). Catching insects may rely on lower levels of visual processing 
(such as processing motion, without form) than locating and eating fruit (although this 
seems unlikely).
Other ecological variables correlate with brain volume. The LB nucleus, BL 
complex, CM complex, amygdala and RoA all correlate with home range size (after 
removing the effects of body mass). When controlling for the corresponding brain area, 
the LB nucleus, RoA, amygdala and RoB all correlate with home range size. When 
controlling for mass and fruit, the BL complex and CM complex both correlate with 
home range size. The hippocampus correlates well with home range size, but the 
neocortex does not (Barton and Purvis 1994). The nuclei of the BL complex connect 
with the hippocampus (see earlier chapters), but what role the nuclei of the BL complex 
may play in remembering the location of foods (for example) is not known. The BL 
complex may be a part of a functional system coding emotional memory, e.g. location X 
= nutritious, tasty food = good feeling.
Percentage fruit in the diet also correlates with volume of brain area. After 
controlling for the effects of body mass; the LB nucleus, RoA, BL complex, CM complex 
and the amygdala all correlated with percentage fruit in the diet. Only the LB nucleus and 
the RoA correlated with percentage fruit in the diet, after controlling for the volume of 
the corresponding brain area. As suggested earlier, locating and processing fruit may 
require higher levels of visual processing, but choice may also be related to the hedonic 
appreciation of food (fruit A tastes nicer than fruit B, so more will be added to the diet if 
fruit levels can supply demand). Scott et al (1993) have suggested that the responses of 
amygdala neurons in the monkey, in particular the LB nucleus, are coding for the hedonic 
appreciation of food. This idea is congruent with the results of lesions of the monkey 
amygdala and temporal cortex (Kluver and Bucy 1939), where feeding behaviour 
becomes grossly disrupted. Recognition of objects as food was compromised, but the 
pleasurable aspects of feeding may also have been obliterated after lesions of the
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temporal lobe. (Amygdala neurons also respond to the sight of certain foods; Ono et al 
1983, 1989, Nishijo, Ono and Nishino 1988).
The LB nucleus and BL complex (as a percentage of the amygdala) are larger in 
diurnal species than nocturnal species, whereas the amygdala and CM complex are larger 
in nocturnal species. Information entering the LB nucleus (and BL complex) is 
predominately visual in origin, therefore, the LB nucleus and BL complex may be 
processing highly processed visual information (as appears to be the case, see earlier 
chapters). Auditoiy and tactile information also reaches these areas. Nocturnal primates 
predominately use olfactoi-y means of social communication, which may be processed by 
the CM complex. The functional relationships described in this chapter would therefore 
be expected from known anatomical relationships.
The LB nucleus (as a percentage of the amygdala) is larger in terrestrial species, 
whereas the amygdala (as a percentage of the brain) is larger in arboreal species. 
Following the previous arguments, these relationships are to be expected from anatomy, 
as arboreal species have to rely on olfactoiy information where there is little light in the 
canopy, and terrestrial species can use visual methods of social communication due to 
increased light levels. Strangely, there is no evidence of size differences between 
stratification for the BL complex or the CM complex, which may be explained by other 
forms of modal information being processed by these areas, which is not contingent on 
visual processing. For example, the other nuclei of the BL complex may process auditory 
information which can be used as a form of communication in the canopy or on the 
ground. The main results are summarised in Table 5.16 (brain area removing effects of 
body mass) and Table 5.17 (brain area removing effects of corresponding brain area).
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Table 5.16: Summaiy table of main results of relationships between brain area (removing 
the effects of body mass) and socio-ecological variables. V indicates significant 
correlation, and X indicates no relationship.
Brain Area Group Size No. Females % Grooming Range Size % Fruit
LB Nucleus V V V < <
Rest o f Amygdala V < X < V
BL Complex < V X < V
CM Complex < < X V V
Amygdala < V X V <
Rest o f Brain V V X X V
Table 5,17: Summary table of the main results of relationships between brain area 
(removing the effects of corresponding brain area) and socio-ecological variables. V 
indicates significant correlation, and X indicates no relationship.
Brain Area Group Size No. Females Vo Grooming Range Size Vo Fruit
LB Nucleus (vs. RoA) V V V X V
RoA (vs. LB Nucleus) V V V X V
BL Complex (vs. CM Complex) < X X V X
CM Complex (vs. BL Complex) < X X V X
Amygdala (vs. RoB) X X X X X
RoB (vs. Amygdala) X X X X X
5.4.1 Amygdala and the evolution of social behaviour
Some of the predictions made in the introduction were found to be substantiated 
by the results presented above, whilst others were not. Neocortex ratio (volume of 
neocortex against the volume of the rest of the brain) has been used to predict the mean 
group size of primates (Dunbar 1992, 1995). The neocortex contains regions which when 
lesioned cause deficits in social behaviour and contain cells which may function in social 
recognition, interaction and action. It is important to note that lesions of and cellular 
responses in other regions of the primate brain also contribute to processing social 
stimuli. The amygdala is one of the regions (see Chapter II).
Anatomical connectivity, neuropsychological and neurophysiological studies in 
macaques, described in Chapter II, have revealed a divergence of function for the 
macaque amygdala’s two component parts. This anatomical and flinctional separation of 
the macaque amygdala would seem to be present throughout the primate order (or at
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least in simian primates). There appears to be a trade-off between the BL and CM 
complexes which is concerned with processing information about social group behaviour. 
This was predictable from the connectional analysis of Chapter V. It is therefore possible 
that the BL complex ‘took-over’ the role of the CM complex in social behaviour. This 
may be explained by the shift in method of social communication from pro simian to 
simian primates. Prosimians are nocturnal, arboreal and use vocal or primarily olfactory 
communication in social interactions. This is due to necessity (vision is difficult in the 
dark forest). Simians, by contrast, are not only vocal, but also highly visual (being diurnal 
and terrestrial, see Chapters II and III). The LTO nucleus (not analysed here, but 
minuscule or non-existent in simian primates) is connected with other olfactory structures 
and processes solely olfactoiy information. The CM complex has few cortical, but many 
subcortical connections, especially with the hypothalamus which may be involved in 
olfactory recognition and communication by sex pheromones (Karadi et al 1989), and the 
olfactoiy bulb (Carmichael et al 1994). The BL complex (and LB nucleus) by contrast 
have many cortical connections (see Chapters IV and V), particularly with ‘higher’ visual 
centres which contain neurons coding for the recognition of biologically and socially 
important stimuli, such as faces (Bruce et al 1981, Perrett et al 1982, Desimone et al 
1984, Perrett and Emeiy 1994), whole bodies (Wachsmuth et al 1994), eye gaze (Perrett 
et al 1985b, 1992) and moving bodies (Oram and Perrett 1996). The BL complex itself 
contains similar types of neurons (Leonard et al 1985, Rolls 1984, Brothers et al 1990, 
Brothers and Ring 1993).
The shift in function from CM complex to BL complex, would also accompany a 
change from predominantly sexual behaviour in non-primate mammals and prosimians 
(controlled by the hypothalamus, see Lipp 1978, Lipp and Hunsperger 1978, Lloyd and 
Dixson 1988) to more complex forms of social cognition, highlighted by the 
Machiavellian Intelligence hypothesis (see papers in Byrne and Whiten 1988, Whiten and 
Byrne 1997) in simians. This hypothesis would also fit with the anatomical data.
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5.4.3 Conclusions
Previous studies of the connection between brain size and socio-ecological 
variables have ignored the role which the amygdala and the amygdala’s component parts 
may have played in the evolution of primate social behaviour. The results of this chapter 
have highlighted significant relationships between the volume of the BL complex, and in 
particular, the LB nucleus and various predictors of complex social functioning. The 
possible prominence of the LB nucleus in primate social evolution was suggested by the 
connectional data discussed in Chapter IV. The LB nucleus appears to perform the same 
or similar social functions in a large number of primates, not just macaques. 
Neuropsychological tests of social information processing in human patients with 
amygdala lesions suggest that the amygdala also functions in aspects of human social 
behaviour (Adolphs et al 1994, 1995, Young et al 1995, Breiter et al 1996, Calder et al 
1996, Young et al 1996, Scott et al 1997, )
The volume of the LB nucleus and the other nuclei of the BL complex are also 
related to aspects of ecological processing, which may be related to emotional and social 
behaviour. There is no previous evidence that the amygdala is involved in processing 
information about the location and extraction of foods or in specialising in eating 
different types of food, although amygdala neurons do respond to the sight of certain 
food, such as water melons (Ono et al 1983, 1989). Two possible functions may be social 
learning of complex food processing skills (Byrne and Byrne 1993, Russon, 1997, see 
also Chapter VII) or as suggested earlier attaching hedonic value to different food types 





Subjects were two juvenile rhesus macaque monkeys, one male (S; weight, 5-7 
kg) and one female (E; weight, 8.0 kg). The subjects were born and reared in an 
established, registered UK breeding colony. Throughout recording and training periods 
(over two and a half years), the monkeys were housed separately from the colony, but 
still remaining in visual and auditoiy social contact with the other monkeys. One monkey 
(S) was used in the gaze following study (Chapter IX) and had been previously used in 
another behavioural test, involving the use of human eye gaze to determine the presence 
of a peanut reward (Pettigrew, Forsyth and Perrett 1993, unpublished observations).
6.1 Pre-surgical training
Before light-discrimination training, the subjects were trained to enter a primate 
chair voluntarily, and sit comfortably for up to 4 hours. The subject was trained to enter a 
travelling cage, which was moved into the laboratoiy. Further training, enabled the 
subjects to safely and spontaneously enter the primate chair and place his/her head 
through the neck plates for further head restraint (under Home Office Licence).
The subject’s food and water was restricted once training had begun. Food in the 
subject’s home cage was restricted to diy pellets (with faiit and vegetables at weekends) 
and fruit and nuts were given during training and recording sessions. Water was 
withdrawn for up to 24 hours (usually overnight) between training and recording sessions 
and was available during training and ad lib after training. This regime allowed the
154
subjects to control their own water intake and also maintained the subjects’ performance 
on the light-discrimination tasks.
The first stage of training required the monkey to lick juice from a pair of 
licktubes, which were attached to the primate chair in front of the monkey. The licktubes 
were connected first to a solenoid driven pump system (subject E). The liquid-reward 
system was later converted to a two-syringe, two-valve pipette (Microlab 941; Hamilton, 
Dundee, UK). The tubes dispensed liquid when the circuit between the tubes and the 
primate chair was closed (by the subject licking). Reward, such as sweet blackcurrent 
juice (Ribena) or sugared water was dispensed as an incentive to lick during training.
The subjects were trained on an LED colour discrimination task. LED displays 
were imbedded in the white projection screen facing the monkey (4 m from the primate 
chair). Five LEDs were positioned in the screen (centre; +/- 10 ° above and below the 
central LED or +/- 15 ®to the left or right of the central LED). The monkey was trained 
to discriminate the colour changes of the LED in the centre of the screen (red or green) 
and an LED attached to the primate chair close to the subject. The LED first changed 
colour at the discretion of the experimenter. Later in training, the presentation was 
controlled by the computer in a pseudo-random order. When a juice reward was 
dispensed, the LED changed to green (after a 0.5 sec tone). When a mildly aversive, 
weak saline solution was dispensed, the LED changed to red (also after a 0.5 sec tone). 
The monkey learned to lick when a green light was displayed and withheld licking when a 
red light was displayed. This task required that the subject maintained fixation on the 
central LED (for approximately 1 sec).
6.2 Implant construction
Once the monkey was successftil on the visual discrimination task, the monkey 
was prepared for surgical implantation of the stainless steel recording wells. First, the 
stereotaxic implant was made. This consisted of two stainless steel David Kopf wells and 
two restraining head bar holders, made from PTFE or Tuffnal. The stereotaxic co­
ordinates for each well were determined for each monkey from previous subject co­
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ordinates. The co-ordinates which enabled ease of entry to the STS were 15 anterior/14 
lateral in the left hemisphere and 11 anterior/14 lateral in the right hemisphere (see Figure 
6.1). A scale diagram of the implant (1:1) was made using graph paper, showing the 
positions of the wells and the position of the head bars relative to the wells. A sheet of 
glass was then placed over the diagram and the various components of the implant placed 
in the appropriate positions on the glass on the graph paper diagram (using Blutack). 
Dental acrylate (Autenal Dental Products Ltd., Harrow, UK) was then poured sparingly 
onto the parts of the implant, loosely joining them together. Excess dental acrylic was 
removed using a dental drill. The implant was removed from the glass by “floating-off’ 
with water.
6.3 Surgery
Twenty-four hours prior to surgeiy, the monkey’s access to food was restricted 
(including forage). Twelve hours before surgery, the monkey was water restricted. In 
preparation for surgery, the monkey entered a travelling cage and was given an injection 
of ketamine (0.5 to 1.0 ml depending on weight of monkey; 10 mg/kg Vetalar, Park 
Davis & Co., Gwent, UK). This sedated the monkey, so that the legs (for anaesthetic 
injection) and head could be shaved. Liquid paraffin oil was placed into the monkey’s 
eyes for protection and to stop the eyes from drying up. The shaved head was swabbed 
with alcohol and tincture of Iodine. To reduce secr etions, particularly saliva, during the 
operation, Atropine (1 ml of 600 pg/ml) was injected. A wide acting anti-biotic was also 
injected (1 ml duplocillin; Propen) to prevent infection. Before being taken into theatre, 
an intr avenous cannula (as part of a Butter fly vein set, JERUM, Surflo IV catheter) was 
inserted into a large vein in the leg, which allowed the administration of a barbiturate 
anaesthetic (Sagatal; 60 mg/ml; May & Bar ker Ltd., Dagenham, UK). This cannula was 
connected to an inflision set (Bioset) and Hartmann’s solution drip (Baxter) in theatre via 
a three-way valve. This pr'ovided a continuous flow of saline to enter the vein and the 
option to administer Sagatal.
Figure 6,1. Diagram of the implant co-ordinates for subjects Esther and Steve. Top of 
the diagram is anterior and the bottom is posterior. The implant consists of two Teflon, 
ceramic or plastic tubes through which the restraining head bars can be fitted and two 








Full sterile procedures were obseiwed in theatre. The surgeons were clothed in 
sterile gowns, hats, masks and gloves and equipment was prepared by autoclaving or 
bathing in alcohol or Cetavalon. Other assistants and observers were clothed in gowns, 
hats, masks and gloves and remained clear of the sterile area. The monkey’s head was 
placed into the stereotaxic frame, held in position by the ear-bars into the external 
auditory meatus, teeth-bars and orbital ridge grips. The monkey was positioned onto a 
diathermy base plate and wrapped in a fleece blanket and diathermy cover. Body 
temperature was kept at approximately 37 ® C, thermostatically controlled with a rectal 
thermometer probe. To maintain a watch on breathing rate (30-40 breaths per min), the 
monkey was also covered by an inflatable breathing monitor blanket linked to a counter.
One incision was made from just above the eyebrow ridges to the back of the 
crown of the skull. The skin was then reflected and held in position with the use of 
haemostats. Connective tissue was scrapped away using bone scrappers and localised 
bleeding was quaterised using a diathermy needle. Before drilling, the implant was 
lowered onto the skull surface and the position of the two recording wells was drawn 
onto the skull using a china-graph pencil. The areas marked were then drilled out, using a 
dentist’s drill, being careful not to damage the dura, underneath the skull. This procedure 
was performed under constant saline irrigation to stop the temperature of the skull rising 
above 50 ° C, which would cause bone necrosis. Once the two well holes were cut and 
removed, the implant was lowered on the skull to verify the position of the required 
stainless steel T-pieces (1 cm length, 0.3 cm width), screws (1 cm length) and the holes. 
6-8 small holes (1 cm length) were then drilled into the skull and the T-pieces and screws 
were placed into position. The implant was then re-lowered and dental acrylic placed 
around the implant to secure it in place. Dental aciylic was built up around the wells to 
make an effective seal and around the head bars so that they could withstand pressure 
once the animal was restrained in the primate chair.
Throughout the operation the sedation of the animal was checked using various 
pain reflexes (foot pressure twitch reflex) and if deemed necessary, further doses of 
anaesthetic were administered. A cumulative dose of 3 ml (Esther) and 5 ml (Steve)
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Sagatal (initial dose X ml, with additions of between 0.25 and 0.5 ml, every 20 minutes at 
the start of the operation, with longer gaps between administration later in the operation).
The monkey was then returned to the home cage and wrapped in a fleece 
blanket. The monkey was given a minimum of 4-7 days to properly recover fully. The 
monkey was then retrained on the visual discrimination task until satisfactory 
performance was achieved. The dura in the wells was kept clean every 1-2 days after the 
operation with saline swabs and an anti-bacterial agent (PEP, 3% powder).
6.4 Electrophysiological R ecording M ethods
For each recording session the wells were cleaned using diluted antiseptic 
disinfectant. Before inserting the metal guide-tube (length 60 mm) and the electrode, 
0.1ml of topical local anaesthetic (lignocaine hydrochloride, Xylocaine, 40mg/ml; 
ASTRA Pharmaceuticals Ltd.) was applied to the surface of the dura. A David Kopf 
micro-positioner was then attached to the appropriate recording well and a transdural 
guide-tube (internal diameter 0.6 mm) was inserted 3-5 mm into the brain at the correct 
co-ordinates determined before recording. The co-ordinates were chosen from previous 
experimental animals, previous tracks and on the number of penetrations made into a 
particular position. A tungsten in glass microelectrode of measured length and tip size 
(outer diameter 0.5 mm, Merrill and Ainsworth 1972), was inserted through the guide- 
tube and advanced into the target recording area using a hydraulic micro-drive (David 
Kopf 607W). The depth of every cell tested was noted from the micro-drive. The target 
area was the STPa in the anterior part of the upper bank of the superior temporal sulcus 
(areas TPO and PGa of Seltzer and Pandya 1978; see Chapter III).
The electrical signals were amplified using a Neurolog (NL104) amplifier, filtered 
with a 50 Hz notch filter together with low pass (300 Hz) and high pass (20 Hz) filters 
(Neurolog N L125) and displayed on a fast time base oscilloscope and audiomonitor. 
These signals were then converted to TTL pulses by a spike processor (Modified 
Digitimer DM130; threshold voltage window for discriminating individual action 
potentials). The TTL pulses were used to form peri-stimulus time histograms (PSTHs)
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which were displayed as 250 bins of approximately 5 ms duration. During data collection, 
there was a pre-stimulus sample period of either 200-300 ms and a post stimulus time 
period of 1 second (these were set by the experimenters). Data was collected on an AT 
compatible PC microcomputer (Dell 386), and CED 1401 (Cambridge Electronic Design) 
using custom software (Dick program, Oram 1996). A schematic representation of the 
physiological laboratoiy, including data collection methods and visual presentation 
methods is displayed in Figure 6.2.
6.5 Data analysis
Before testing for specificity, cell responses were tested clinically, without 
quantitative testing methods. These tests were used to determine the modality of the cell 
being tested and whether cell responded to motion or static images. Once a particular cell 
type was determined, the cell was tested more formally with the appropriate test stimuli. 
Cell responses were measured from the tiue stimulus onset time, or the time when a 20 
cm^ transparent computer controlled shutter (Screen Print Technology Ltd.) was opened.
Eye movements were monitored using an in-built infra-red camera [Compact 
medium-high resolution camera (JVC), RS Components; resolution: 500 horizontal by 
582 vertical pixel, and a wide angled lens (16 mm), light sensitivity 0.5 lux (at F 1.4)]. 
Cell responses were recorded 100 ms after stimulus presentation, for 250 ms (a time 
period of 500 ms was sometimes recorded). Visual stimuli were tested with 5 trials in a 
computer-controlled pseudo-random order, with the data collected and on-line analysis 
performed by the microcomputer. On-line analysis enabled the experimenters to 
determine what properties the cell had, so that ftirther appropriate tests could be 
performed. Cell depths were recorded from the David Kopf micropositoner, but were 
also recorded by taking X-radiographs after each recording session.
Figure 6.2. Schematic representation of the physiology laboratory set-up. The subject 
sits in the primate chair facing a white projection screen onto which visual stimuli are 
presented. Cell responses are detected by the electrode, which are amplified and filtered 
by the Neurolog system, the data is then collected by the computer, which also controls 
the pseudo-random order presentation of the visual stimuli, via the video-disk player, 
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After a sufficient number of recording sessions had been completed, the animal 
was killed and perfused for anatomical and histological studies. Thirty minutes before 
peidusion, the monkey was given an anti-coagulant (Heparin 5000 units/1.5 kg body 
weight). The monkey then received an injection of Ketamine (1.0 ml Vetalar) and finally 
a lethal intravenous injection of Sagatal. This placed the animal into a deep coma, which 
was verified by the absence of a gabella reflex (eye-lid closure after the cornea is gently 
touched).
The monkey was perfused transcardially (via the heart). First, the thorax was 
opened to expose the heart and a large bore cannula (internal diameter 2mm) was 
inserted into the left ventricle. A puncture was also placed into the right atrium so that 
blood and the pre-fixative solution would flow from this exit point. 5 litres of pre­
warmed (37 C) pre-fixative (0.1 M phosphate buffered saline + 0.2% NaNOs) was 
passed through the heart by the use of a centrifugal pump (C16-C, Charles Ansten Pumps 
Ltd.) positioned approximately 1 m above the body. After the pre-fixative had passed 
through the articulatory system, the fixative solution (phosphate buffered 4% 
paraformaldehyde and 0.5% glutaldehyde) was passed through a perfusing cannula into 
the left ventricle and into the ascending branch of the aorta. The descending aorta was 
clamped shut.
6,6.2 Sectioning, mounting and staining of sections
Once the brain was thoroughly fixed, the brain was removed from the skull using 
bone cutters. The brain was blocked (i.e. cut at a vertical angle, 90  ^from the horizontal) 
at anterior 25. The cerebellum, posterior to the corpus callosum (approximately posterior 
10), was left on the brain and used to form a base for sectioning. The brain was also 
marked on one side (with a scalpel) to discriminate left from right when mounting
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sections. The brain was then sunk in successively higher concentrations of sucrose (10,
20 and 30 %) and left in the refrigerator at 4  ^C.
One litre of isopentane was placed into a metal container and cooled to 
approximately minus 45 ° C. The liquid was cooled by adding dry ice. The stage (chuck) 
of the ciyostat (Bright Instruments Co., Huntington, UK) was then placed into the 
cryostat to check whether the blade would pass over the whole of the stage and entire 
brain. Before the chuck was attached to the ciyostat, a smaller loose block was attached 
to the chuck at the bottom and back of the chuck. The chuck was then removed from the 
cryostat. Embedding compound (OCT) was trickled down the brain from top to bottom, 
so that it entered all the sulci. The posterior end of the brain was then placed onto the 
chuck platform. The chuck was placed into a holder and lowered into the freezing 
isopentane. The temperature of the isopentane was kept below minus 36 ® C by adding 
more diy ice. After 20 minutes, the brain was removed from the isopentane and put into 
the cryostat, upside down (i.e. the ventral surface was dorsal).
The brain was left to equilibrate for 1 hour at minus 24 C in the cryostat. Brain 
sections of 25pm thickness were taken eveiy 1/4 mm and collected in bays filled with
O.IM phosphate buffer and 0.9% NaCl (half-filled). A photograph of the brain block was 
taken eveiy 1 mm using a still camera (Nikon) at a fixed position, on a fixed tripod. A 
label with the section number and animal name was fixed underneath the brain block after 
each photograph.
Sections were removed from the blade with a small paint bmsh on either side of 
the section and lifting the section away from the blade and placing into the appropriate 
collection bay (marked with section number). Sections were free-floated in phosphate 
buffer and were transferred to dishes containing tap water, for mounting with a small 
brush. The pre-coated microscope slides were marked with the appropriate section 
number (using a glass pencil) and lowered into the water. The sections were guided onto 
the slides making sure that the sections were the correct orientation. When the sections 
were reasonably fiat on the slide, the slide was dragged up from the water while gently 
pulling the section straight. The sections were then left to diy in the air and placed onto 
slide trays.
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The sections were stained for Nissl substance (cell bodies) using cresyl violet 
stain. First, the sections were placed in Xylene for 2 minutes, transferred to absolute 
alcohol for 3 minutes and then 50% alcohol for a 3-4 rinses. After rinsing in tap water, 
the sections were placed into cresyl violet stain for l ^ ^ - 2  minutes. The sections were 
left in water for 2-3 minutes or until the excess stain had been rinsed off. Again, the 
sections were rinsed in 50% alcohol, then unadulterated absolute alcohol, absolute 
alcohol and finally Xylene (length of time depending on the time left in the alcohol; long 
alcohol = short Xylene). The sections were then cover-slipped and excess xylene and 
bubbles removed. The sections were stored in section boxes until microscopic 
investigation.
6.7 Reconstruction of electrode tracks
Before the brain was sectioned, anatomical stereotaxic marker probes (cannula) 
were placed into the brain at various stereotaxic positions, for example in the STS and 
the centre of the amygdala. The position of the probes was determined from the previous 
electrode tracks and stereotaxic co-ordinates using the David Kopf micro-positioner, 
Indian ink (Windsor & Newton) was injected (5pl at 5-10mm intervals) using a glass 
micro-syringe (Scientific Glass Engineering PTY, Ltd.) attached to plastic tubing and 
cannula containing dye.
Vertical probes were inserted stereotaxically at positions -10mm, 0mm, 10mm 
and 20mm anterior, 15mm lateral; into the brain to reconstaict Anterior/Posterior (AP) 
position of tracks. Horizontal probes were inserted bilaterally at -10mm, 0mm, 10mm and 
20mm depth relative to the auditory meatus. The probes were inserted, so that when 
slides and tracings of brain sections were viewed, they could be aligned properly so that 
electrode tracks could be reconstructed relative to one another. These probes were also 
recorded with X-radiographs.
After each recording session, frontal and lateral X-radiographs were taken of the 
monkeys head using a Portable X-ray machine (Type MX-2). The microdrive was 
detached from the David Kopf, with the electrode remaining in the brain. X-rays were
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taken with exposure times of 5-6 seconds at 16 kV. X-rays were taken at the same 
distance from the skull for each session (10cm) and were taken whether cells were found 
or not. An initial clear set of x-ray photographs were used as templates for subsequent x- 
ray measurements.
The depth, A/P position and laterality of the electrode tip were measured in 
frontal and lateral X-radiographs. The depth was defined relative to a horizontal line 
through the auditory meatus (zero plane, height 0mm) and a horizontal line drawn 25mm 
above the zero plane. The A/P position was defined relative to a perpendicular line 
through the auditoiy meatus and horizontal line drawn through the auditory meatus and 
under the orbital ridge. Laterality was defined relative to the perpendicular mid-line, 
equidistant between the eye sockets (see Figure 6,3).
From the X-radiograph co-ordinates, the 3-D trajectoiy of the stereotaxic probes 
could be determined. The electrode coordinates taken from the X-radiographs were 
matched to tracings of the photographic slides taken after eveiy brain section. The slides 
were projected onto a white wall covered with clean white tracing paper. Each section 
was aligned so that the ciyostat chuck was in a constant position. For each projected 
slide, the position of the various Indian ink probes were recorded with anatomical 
landmarks, such as the external boundaiy of the cortex and the grey-white matter 
boundary within the gyri and sulci.
The tracings were then stored onto a personal computer using specially developed 
software (Oram 1996) by tracing the sections into a computer programme (using a 
mouse). The brain maps were then used in the reconstruction of electrode track and cell 
positions, which had been stereotaxically verified.
Fagure 6.3. Reconstruction of electrode track position from X-ray photographs, (a) 
Drawing of frontal X-radiograph displaying macaque skull with auditory meatus (AM) 
and orbital ridges (OR). The horizontal (0mm) line passing through the AM and under 
the ORs is a reference for the depth measurements for the tip of the elctrode. A line is 
drawn 25 mm above the zero line so that two coordinates for the depth can be entered 
into the computer. The perpendicular line positioned equally between the two eye sockets 
and the nasal cavities is a reference for the laterality measurements, (b) Drawing of 
lateral X-radiograph displaying macaque skull with AM and OR. The horizontal line 
passing through the AM and under the OR is a reference for the depth measurements for 
the tip of the electrode. Again a line is drawn 25mm above the zero line. The line 




Neurophysioîogy of Perceiving Purposive Behaviour
Attention & Intention
“Only species that also possess Ihe abilHy for highly differentiated movements o f the 
appendages and individual body parts, and a reliable use o f such movements in their 
own anticipatory dealing with objects not within their grasp, will provide group 
members with any reliable potential cues. ”
Menzei (1974b, p. 132)
“Walking is certainly purposive...,It is also informative; for example, the rate o f speed 
with which someone is walking suggests to us how interested he is in his goal. ”
Chomsky (1967, p. 73)
“Purposive movement is defined...as motion that cannot adequately be described 
without referring to some object external to the animal. “
Menzei (1974b, p. 133)
7.0 Summary
The ability to discriminate where others are attending (Chapter IX), where they 
are moving to and what they are interacting with, is of primaiy importance for 
understanding others’ behaviour (Brothers 1990, 1994). Visual representations of 
another’s attention, motion and action are derived in various regions of the brain (Perrett 
and Emeiy 1994). These neural systems specialising in the analysis of others’ social 
behaviour may be precursors used in the sensory analysis of the contents of the minds of 
conspecifics (Brothers 1992, Brothers and Ring 1993). It is the purpose of this chapter to 
1) review studies of primate purposive behaviour, in particular social learning, imitation 
and social attention and 2) to discuss the behavioural abilities of primates as providing a
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functional context for interpreting the results of the neurophysiological study described 
within this chapter.
7.1 Introduction
7.1.1 Perceiving Purposive Behaviour & Theoiy of Mind
Before discussing some of the possible evidence pertaining to reading purposive 
or intentional behaviour in others, it is important to clarify what is meant by these 
mentalistic terms. The concept of a “theory of mind” or “mindreading” or 
“metarepresentation” or “intentionality” (Baron-Cohen 1994, Whiten 1994, 1997) has 
been discussed recently by a number of authors who are either against the idea that 
animals and in particular non-human primates have a concept of other’s minds (Heyes 
1997) or for the idea that, at least some primates (namely the great apes and humans) 
have such concepts (Povinelli 1996, Whiten 1996, 1997). It is not the purpose of this 
chapter or this thesis to discuss the pros and cons of such arguments (these have be made 
on multiple occasions elsewhere, see previous references). This chapter will, however, 
discuss the evidence for purposive “behaviour reading” in monkeys, apes and to a lesser 
extent humans, how these abilities may be dependent on interpreting basic visual signals 
and how these signals may be coded in the brain.
Theoiy of mind was a term coined by Premack and Woodruff (1978), attempting 
to describe the complex behavioural reactions of a language-trained chimpanzee called 
Sarah, in response to a video sequence. In the task, Sarah watched video films of a 
human actor attempting to solve a problem, such as reaching for an out-of-reach banana. 
Sarah was then presented with a collection of photographs, one containing the solution to 
the problem, such as a stick to reach the bananas. Sarah consistently chose the 
photograph with the solution, suggesting to Premack and Woodmff that she knew that a 
problem had to be solved, that the actor was the one attempting to solve the problem and 
that only one course of action could solve the problem. This suggested to them that
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Sarah could infer intentions, desires and beliefs from basic perceptual signals provided by 
the actor.
Many attempts have been made to determine whether monkeys, apes and humans 
can attribute mental states to others. Those efforts will be detailed in the three sections 
below which focus on social attention, intention and imitation. The most convincing 
evidence for possession of a theory of mind has been shown for human infants (however, 
adults have not been tested implicitly). It has also been suggested that children with the 
developmental disorder of autism have deficits in theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, Leslie 
and Frith 1985).
(aj Mental significance o f attention
The behavioural evidence for monkeys’ and apes’ awareness of other’s attention 
cues and the ability to use attention cues to locate objects in the environment or to 
determine their emotional state of mind is discussed in the gaze following and joint 
attention study of Chapter IX.
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the role that analysing another’s gaze 
(eye position, head view or pointing) may play in determining what the intentions of 
others are. Non-human primates may not infer intentions from the presence or direction 
of the eyes. The eyes may only be used to communicate another’s emotional state (such 
as anger displayed as a threat), or to communicate the presence of objects within the 
immediate environment (see Chapter IX).
There are many instances in the primate literature which suggest that some 
primates may use their own gaze to convey information not just of an emotional or 
referential nature. Gaze following may be utilised by primates when soliciting for help 
from conspecifics when challenged by or challenging other group members. Soliciting 
help or an invitation to co-operate against a third party has been described for baboons 
(Kummer 1967, Packer 1977, Walters and Seyfarth 1987) and vei*vets (Cheney and 
Seyfarth 1990b). Vei-vet monkeys use quick, furtive glances between an aggressor and a 
potential helper, to gain support from the potential helper. The aggressive monkey needs 
to be attended to, both by the monkey soliciting help, and the potential helper. The
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intentions of the soliciting monkey may then be determined by the helper. The object of 
attention needs to be known to a high degree of accuracy in possibly volatile situations. 
Soliciting has been described ïox Papio amtbis (olive baboons) as:
“a triadic interaction in which one individual, the enlisting animal, repeatedly and 
rapidly turns his head from a second individual, the solicited animal, towards a third 
individual (opponent), while continuously threatening the third”
(Packer, 1977, p. 441)
Knowledge that other monkeys and apes automatically follow gaze may be 
utilised by some clever individuals in the species, during complex behavioural situations. 
In a database of primate tactical deception, Whiten and Byrne (1988a) describe an 
anecdote where they obseiwed a young baboon apparently using gaze direction cues in a 
possibly deceptive communicative role. Baboons and vei*vets usually stare and make calls 
at predators in the distance (Whiten and Byrne 1988a, Cheney and Seyfarth 1990b). In 
the following anecdote, the subadult ME appeared to use this information to his 
advantage.
“subadult male ME attacks one o f the young juveniles who screams. Adult male 
HL and several other adults run over the hill into view, giving aggi'essive pantgrunt 
calls; ME seeing them coming, stands on hindlegs and stares into the distance across 
the valley. HL and the other newcomers stop and look in this direction; they do not 
threaten or attack M E”
(Whiten and Byrne 1988a, p. 237)
Whiten and Byrne suggested that subadult male ME learnt that his own attention 
was a salient cue which could be used to deter others from chasing him. In this example, 
a predator (or other interesting object) was not within the field of view (or the object of 
MB’s attention). Attention appeared to be an automatically interesting cue which was 
distinguishable enough to disrupt the actions of the pursuing animals. Whiten and Byrne 
(1988a, b) discuss many instances where an individual manipulates another’s use of 
attention cues, as a form of deception.
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How non-human primates use gaze in intentional communication, and understand 
the meaning behind this volitional use has only started to be tested experimentally. One 
recent study has highlighted one aspect of this use. Gorillas can successfully use their 
gaze to refer to objects and to direct humans’ attention to objects and the gorilla’s 
behaviour (Gomez 1990, Gomez 1991). Gomez tested an infant gorilla with a problem 
(similar to Kohler’s problem-solving experiment (1925) with chimpanzees). Gomez 
found that the gorilla not only used conventional objects to solve the problem, but also 
used the experimenters as social objects.
An infant gorilla was placed into a locked room with a latch to lock the door (out 
of reach of the gorilla), a box high enough to reach the latch and a human experimenter. 
The infant gorilla used four different strategies to attempt to reach the latch. First, the 
gorilla dragged the box under the latch and climbed onto the box. Second, the subject 
dragged the experimenter under the latch, to climb on the experimenter and reach the 
latch. Third, the gorilla gently lead the human experimenter to the door while looking 
between the experimenter’s eyes and the latch (the goal, or object of attention). Finally, 
the gorilla would look between the experimenter’s eyes and the latch without leading the 
experimenter (Gomez 1990). By looking at the eyes and face of the experimenter, the 
gorilla could be said to be directing the attention of the experimenter to the focus of the 
gorilla’s own attention, namely the latch. This may be similar to the baboons described 
earlier who solicited help by looking continuously between the goal of their attention (an 
opponent) and a solicited helper (Packer 1977). The gorilla may have been checking to 
see that the experimenter was still attending to the latch and to the gorilla’s actions. The 
gorilla also seemed to use eye contact to monitor if the human was attending to the 
gorilla’s request that the experimenter acted (Gomez 1990).
Distinguishing another’s visual perspective from one’s own is thought to be an 
important step to interpreting their intentions and thoughts about the world. Kummer et 
al. (1996) attempted to train long-tailed macaques {Macaca fasciadaris) to take a juice 
reward, only if a human experimenter was not in a position to observe them taking the 
reward. The experimenters threatened the monkeys if the monkeys took the reward 
whilst in the,experimenter’s view, however, the subjects behaved equivalently, drinking
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juice reward out of view of the experimenter (hidden behind an occluder), or in front of 
the experimenter. Kummer et al. interpreted this as a lack of perspective-taking or a lack 
of "experiencing" another's visual perception.
Povinelli and colleagues studied the ability of chimpanzees (Povinelli, Nelson and 
Boy sen 1990, 1992, Povinelli, Rulf and Bierschwale 1994) and rhesus monkeys 
(Povinelli, Parks and Novak 1991, 1992) to appreciate another’s visual perspective and 
assess levels of knowledge or absence of knowledge based on visual perception. Subjects 
were required to use their appreciation of another’s perspective to reverse roles. The 
same apparatus was used for chimpanzee and rhesus monkey subjects. The apparatus 
consisted of two (or eight) opaque shielded food trays attached to each other by a 
complicated series of spring joints which allowed the trays to be moved apart to both 
ends of the apparatus, when a handle was pulled at one end of the apparatus (see Figure 
7.1).
The subjects were trained to pull the handle, which delivered food to both ends of 
the apparatus within reach of the subjects and a human experimenter. The subject pulling 
the handle could not see the presence of the food on a tray and was called the operator. 
The experimenter who could see the food was named the informant. The subjects were 
initially trained to pull the handle corresponding to the tray which a human experimenter 
baited within the subject’s view. In the next phase, the subjects were paired with a human 
experimenter. The subjects were then split into two groups, operators and informants. 
The primate informants had to watch an unknown human experimenter bait one food 
tray, whilst the paired experimenter (operator) was not present. The subjects then had to 
gesture towards the baited tray. In the second group, primate operators, had to respond 
correctly to the cues provided by the human informant, by pulling the handle 
corresponding to the tray which the human informant pointed at. The last phase of the 
experiment required that the primate subjects reversed roles with human experimenters,
i.e. the primate informants became operators and visa versa.
Chimpanzee subjects responded correctly as informants and operators 
respectively and there was a clear transfer of roles in the last experimental phase 
(Povinelli, Nelson and Boysen 1992). It would appear that the chimpanzees understand
Figure 7.1. Diagrammatic representation of apparatus used to test role-reversal and 
attribution of knowledge in others, in experiments with rhesus macaques and 
chimpanzees (Povinelli, Nelson and Boysen 1990, 1992, Povinelli, Parks and Novalc 
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pointing as referential communication and could easily reverse role. Rhesus macaques 
responded differently to the chimpanzees (Povinelli, Parks and Novak 1992). The 
monkey operators were able to use pointing cues to receive food rewards, but could not 
transfer to unknown roles. This is evidence that rhesus monkeys can not appreciate 
another’s visual perspective. Monkey informants made reaching/pulling motions towards 
the food which the human obseiwers could interpret correctly. Povinelli has suggested 
that the monkeys were not responding to pointing gestures in a communicative way, but 
were actually trying to reach the food themselves. When the roles were reversed, the 
informants responded at chance level. The operators performed poorly at first, but then 
steadily improved. Operators can, therefore learn to become informants.
In guessing versus knowing experiments, the same apparatus was used as in the 
role reversal experiments. Again, the subjects learnt to point to the correctly baited tray 
and learned to respond to similar pointing cues from a human experimenter. In this 
experiment, however, the subjects had two choices of human informant (guesser and 
knower). The knower baited the food tray whilst the guesser was out of the room. When 
the guesser re-entered the room, both experimenters pointed at a tray; the knower 
towards the baited tray. The subject had to respond by pulling the handle indicated by 
the knower (and the baited tray). Cues to help with reinforcing the identity of the knower 
were added in later phases of the experiment, such as a red or blue hat. In the transfer 
phase, the guesser and knower both remained in the laboratory whilst a third 
experimenter baited the food trays. At this time, the guesser placed a bag over his own 
head, obstaicting his view of the baiting procedure. All chimpanzee subjects responded 
significantly more to the signals provided by the knower than the guesser in all phases, 
including the bag over head phase (Povinelli, Nelson and Boysen 1990).
The rhesus monkey subjects had an additional testing phase where the knower 
wore a pink glove when pointing to the baited tray. This additional cue did not seem to 
help the monkeys, as they did not seem to discriminate between the guesser and the 
knower in any phases of this experiment (Povinelli, Parks and Novak 1991).
The experiments described above suggest that great apes, but not other non­
human primates process other’s gaze within a purposive behaviourist framework. A
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behaviourist interpretation would suggest that non-human primates respond to attention 
cues in terms of reward and learning about stimulus-response relationships. For example, 
“X follows the gaze of Y as X has learnt that nutritious fimit attracts Y’s gaze”. X will be 
rewarded (i.e. will have access to fruit) if X responds appropriately after observing Y’s 
gaze. A purposive behaviour interpretation of the above experiments require that the 
monkeys and apes understand that other individuals of their own or other species perform 
acts for a specific purpose. A leopard hunts monkeys because it has to eat, a chimpanzee 
looks at a patch of fruit because he intends to eat the fruit, etc. Difficulties in 
interpretation arise, not just when suggesting that others have purpose in their behaviour, 
but also when suggesting that individuals can interpret and understand another’s purpose 
from behaviour patterns.
Anecdotes and obseiwational studies described above, for monkeys in their 
natural habitat, suggest that monkeys and great apes do understand the meaning behind 
the gaze and attention of others. Experimental studies performed in the laboratory, 
however, suggest a dichotomy between the abilities of monkeys and apes in utilising 
social attention information. Great apes, such as chimpanzees and gorillas do appear to 
use the direction of another’s attention to interpret another’s intentions (as related to 
objects in the world). There appears to be no evidence that monkeys utilise social 
attention cues in the same manner as the great apes, when tested in the laboratory. The 
dichotomy may arise between an apparent positive ability in feral-ranging monkeys and 
an apparent negative ability in laboratoiy monkeys, because the social attention cues 
presented in the monkey’s natural environment would have been provided 
by conspecifics. Social attention cues in the laboratoiy would have been provided by 
human experimenters. The great apes may have the ability to use non-ape social attention 
cues, whereas monkeys may only utilise conspecific cues (see Chapter IX for behavioural 
data which suggest that this may be the case for gaze following in monkeys).
(h) Intentional motion
The classic studies of primate’s perception of purposive (or intentional) motion 
were performed by Menzel (Menzel 1971, 1973, 1974, 1979, Menzel and Halpein 1975).
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A mixed group of juvenile chimpanzees was allowed to move freely around a semi­
natural environment (a one-acre “naturalistic” cage, with trees and shrubs) which could 
be easily manipulated by the experimenters. Before releasing the chimpanzees, the 
experimenters hid pieces of fruit and novel objects, such as toys with one chimpanzee 
present. (Usually the experimenters chose a subject who was unperturbed when being 
handled, and they would physically show the chimpanzee the position of the hidden 
object, or hide it in front of the chimpanzee.) The subject (named the “leader”) was then 
taken back to his/her home cage and released with the other members of the group into 
the enclosure.
The rationale of this experiment was to test whether other members of the 
chimpanzee group would be able to infer the location of the hidden objects from the 
leader’s behaviour (direction and movement cues) and whether such cues could be used 
to transmit other forms of information about the hidden objects, such as the objects’ 
presence, quality and amount (Menzel 1971).
When a large amount of food was hidden (six pieces of limit), the other subjects 
followed closely and occasionally attempted to move ahead of the leader. The followers 
appeared to be projecting a trajectoi-y from the orientation and motion direction of the 
leader to a point in space where the fruit may have been hidden.
When the experimenters changed the nature of the objects (the leaders were 
shown a plastic snake or alligator compared to fruit or a pile leaves) the followers 
approached the “frightening” objects with caution. The subjects were also cautious when 
approaching positions where they presumed frightening objects were present (the 
experimenters removed the frightening objects after showing the object’s position to the 
leader). Thus, the leader appears to have communicated the valence and location of 
objects.
A further experiment looked at the communication about the presence versus 
absence of objects. The experimenters hid large amounts of fruit as usual, but also 
provided some small amounts of visible food attached to a stake. The subjects tended to 
follow the leader to the hidden faiit, rather than the lesser amount of visible food. 
Communication about the quality of hidden food was also studied. Two leaders were
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each shown one pile of food (fruit or vegetables). In 80% of trials the subjects followed 
the leader making towards the fruit (higher quality food). What forms of signals were the 
leaders and followers using to communicate such a wide body of information? Menzel 
stated that no specialised vocalisations, hand or limb gestures or facial expressions were 
noted in any of the trials, but the leader would “get up, orient and move independently in 
a consistent direction, as if he knew exactly where he was going and why” (Menzel 1971, 
p. 228). It therefore appears that chimpanzees, at least, can use simple behavioural cues, 
such as direction of attention, and motion and speed as indicators of others intention (to 
get nice food).
The same experiment has been replicated for mangabeys (Coussi-Korbel 1994), 
and a similar pattern of results to those of Menzel were found. The majority of group 
members who had not seen the hiding of the food followed the informed individual on 
53% of trials. Differences in behaviour were attributed to social dominance and 
deception. A submissive “leader” who was shown the food would not go straight to the 
food when the dominant male was present, but would either wait or take an indirect food 
to take it when the dominant’s attention was elsewhere.
It is probable that other primates use similar attention or motion cues to learn 
about objects in the environment from conspecifics. One example, may be the daily march 
of hamadi*yas baboons. Kummer (1995) reported that the hamadiyas baboons of Ethiopia 
move from large groups on “sleeping rocks” (or cliff faces) in the morning and split, first 
into bands, then into smaller clans and finally into family groups (comprising one male, 
the male’s harem of females and infants). The bands tend to move away in different 
directions, but the clans stay relatively close to one another. An ability to know the 
identity of the individual members of a clan, an ability to interpret the actions of the alpha 
male and an ability to determine the direction of the alpha male’s movement, may all be 
important for successful and speedy clan movement. The members of a clan may use 
visual (direction of movement, attention direction, etc.) and vocal signals from the leader 
and the leader’s cohorts to influence the direction of the group move. It may also be 
important for the members of one clan to notice the direction in which another clan 
moves, to predict where they intend to travel and the final destination, therefore avoiding
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meeting them at a feeding place or drinking hole which may only be able to sustain one 
clan. Multiple clans form into bands again at a sleeping rock in the evening.
Other forms of primate motor behaviour have been described using 
communicative or mentalistic terminology. Bertrand (1969) discussed the “dominant 
walk” of stumptailed macaques; the slow, deliberate walk where the (usually dominant 
adult male) monkey looks directly ahead, with its tail raised. Bertrand (1969, p. 57) “had 
the impression that an alpha male purposefully maintained a slow walk, whereas other 
animals tended to mn”. This same form of motion was also noted in rhesus and Japanese 
macaques, by the same author (Bertrand 1969). Other such forms of dominant walk have 
been identified in a range of primates; the “swaggering walk” of Lemur catta, the 
“confident gait” of olive baboons, the “confident walk” of vervets, the “stmtting walk” of 
gorillas and the “powerful, measured gait” of langurs (Quotations from Bertrand 1969, p. 
57). These examples suggest that the manner of walking may be a good indicator of 
dominance status (i.e. a dominant animal walks confidently, but with an arched back, 
whereas a subordinate animal neiwously ams to avoid social interaction).
Bertrand also discussed two other forms of macaque motion, which may have a 
communicative function. First, submissive animals would often move slowly, whilst 
sitting down, usually towards a food source monopolised by a dominant animal. The 
submissive monkey would shift along the ground to the food and take some if tolerated 
by the dominant. The second was the so-called “follow-me walk”, similar to the dominant 
walk, as the monkey walks deliberately in one direction, but they also glance back at the 
individual they want to follow them. This behaviour was also noted for rhesus, Japanese, 
lion-tailed and barbaiy macaques (Bertrand 1969, personal obseiwations), hamadryas 
baboons (Kummer 1968) and gorillas (Schaller 1964). The first example could be an 
attempt by the subordinate monkey to suggest to the more dominant animal that it is not 
a threat. The second example may be an example of referential communication, directing 
another’s attention onto an interesting object. (This interpretation would require the 
monkey to understand gaze as a means of communication, with subjects using similar 
abilities to those used in the experiment described above with a gorilla, Gomez 1990, 
1991.)
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This section described experiments which suggest that a number of monkeys and 
apes may understand that others move (whole body or limbs) for a purpose. The purpose 
of the behaviour can be as simple as to get from A to B. Menzel’s experiments suggest 
that chimpanzees (at least) use direction of motion cues to locate hidden objects and the 
quality o f the objects (food, predator, etc.). Some non-human primates may therefore 
use gaze direction and direction of motion cues to learn about objects in the world and 
more specifically how others intend to interact with those objects. The next section 
discusses experiments of social learning and imitation (or learning about others 
interactions with objects), which may link the propositions made in the first two sections.
(d) Social learning, imitation and tool use.
Social learning may be defined as learning something about objects, events and 
actions in the world from social interaction with conspecifics (however, vervets appear to 
learn from others species, e.g. the specific alarm calls of starlings, Seyfarth and Cheney 
1990). There are many forms of behaviour that require learning from conspecifics which 
may be called social learning (Whiten and Ham 1992, Byrne and Russon 1997).
Stimulus enhancement (SE) is where individual X interacts with an object and the 
observing animal, Y’s attention is drawn to the object because of the interaction. Local 
enhancement (LE) is a related phenomenon. Individual X is located in a particular area. 
Y’s attention is drawn to the sama area, because o fX ’s location within that area. For 
example, individual X is standing next to a tree with abundant fruit. Individual Y 
becomes attracted to the tree because X is located next to the tree.
Observational conditioning is a form of social learning about objects and events. 
A previously neutral stimulus becomes aversive, frightening, pleasant, etc. due to the 
reactions and interactions of individual X with the previously neutral stimulus (object, 
event or action). Individual Y learns about the presence and location of objects, as with 
SE and LE, but also about the significance of the objects. Whiten and Ham (1992) also 
suggest that Y learns from X to what it should direct actions already within its repertoire. 
An example, is obseiwational conditioning of snake fear. Laboratory raised rhesus 
monkeys are not naturally fearful of snakes (Mineka et al 1980), but can be conditioned
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to become fearful of real, fake and toy snakes when in the presence of naturally fearful 
wild-born parents, directing fearflil expressions towards the snakes (Mineka et al 1984).
Imitation or “monkey-see-monkey-do” or “to ape” is a not the simple form of 
behaviour that is depicted in popular human culture. To some extent, imitation includes 
SE and LE, but individual Y must also learn some aspect of the intrinsic form of an 
action from individual X (Whiten and Ham 1992). A strict criteria for imitation, is 
copying a sequence of actions from a demonstrator which are novel (i.e. are not within 
the behavioural repertoire of the obseiwing animal), but available for inclusion in the 
behavioural repertoire, which are used to achieve the same goal as the demonstrator’s 
action (Byrne and Russon 1997). For example, a chimpanzee may have the physical 
capabilities to use a knife and fork (i.e. the correct grip and motor control). Using a knife 
and fork, however, would be a novel action for chimpanzees. A successful example of 
imitation, using the criteria above, would be as follows. A chimpanzee would watch a 
demonstrator picking up a knife and fork in either hand and cutting a piece of fmit in 
half. The chimpanzee would then be required to pick up the knife and fork in the correct 
hands and cut the finit in the same manner as was obseiwed.
Finally, goal-emulation (Tomasello 1990) is a form of social learning, where a 
goal-directed sequence of action is not copied precisely, but the final goal of the action is. 
Tomasello et al (1987) studied the responses of chimpanzees watching actors using a 
rake to collect out of reach food. The method demonstrated was to turn the rake over to 
the straight edged-side and pull in the food, rather than keep the rake serrated side down 
and hope that the food does not slip through the serations in the rake. The subjects did 
not copy the specific actions (flip over to serrated side and pull) but achieved the goal 
(reaching and pulling in the food) on a large number of occasions. Tomasello et al (1987) 
concluded that as the final goal was achieved, but the actions used to achieve the goal 
were not copied, the method of social learning which the chimpanzees used was 
emulation.
The ability to determine the focus or object of another’s attention is vitally 
important for social learning. Actions may be directed onto objects (which may be tools, 
food, conspecifics or parts of the body). The capacity to learn about objects by observing
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other’s interactions with objects requires that the observing individual’s attention is 
drawn to the correct object. Nothing can be learnt about one specific object, if attention 
is directed to another, unrelated object.
The presence of imitative ability in monkeys and apes is a highly contentious 
issue. All textbook examples of monkey imitative learning have now been reasonably 
explained by other forms of social learning. Japanese macaque potato washing has been 
presumed to be due to imitation, which is a relatively rapid form of social learning (the 
behaviour is modelled then replicated). Yet, potato washing was found to be acquired 
over long lengths of time (mean 2 years, Whiten and Ham 1992). Potato-washing, due to 
length of time to acquire the behaviour, has been suggested to be a part of Japanese 
macaque culture, other examples being wheat-washing, fish-eating and stone-handling 
(Huffman 1996). Culture has been defined by Imanishi in 1952 as “socially transmitted 
adjustable behavior” (Nishida 1987, p. 462). In the case of potato-washing, the initial 
ability may have been acquired through individual learning (trial and error). The 
behaviour would then have been obseiwed by other individuals, who would have had the 
opportunity to learn to perform the action of potato-washing over time. The term culture 
suggests that the potato-washing ability would be acquired over time and would be 
passed from generation to generation (i.e. the ability would still be displayed in animals 
present generations after the initial manifestation of the ability). Cultural learning, 
therefore is a form of social learning, dependent on long-term learning processes, not just 
learning independent actions (or sequences of actions) within a short time-scale 
(Tomasello, Kruger and Ratner 1993).
There may be simple reasons why monkeys fail on most studies of imitation, 
compared to studies of other forms of social learning (Hall 1963, Whiten and Ham 1992). 
First, monkeys do not appear to be efficient tool users (in natural and captive 
environments). Second, in experimental studies, humans provide the actions to be 
imitated. Visalberghi and Fragaszy (1990) described experiments where capuchin 
monkeys (the most proficient primate tool users after chimpanzees) were presented with 
shelled nuts and stones or blocks of wood which could be used to crack open the nuts. 
They tested the ability of capuchins to use the stones or blocks of wood as tools to crack
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open the nuts. One capuchin was proficient at this and would demonstrate the nut- 
cracking behaviour many times in front of obseiwers. The ability to crack open nuts did 
not transmit through to the observers. A second experiment also demonstrated a basic 
lack of imitative skills in tool use. Capuchin subjects were presented with a transparent 
tube, which was baited with food in the centre. The subjects were given sticks of 
sufficient length to poke the food through the tube. Three out of four subjects achieved 
this, but the fourth did not, even when given the opportunity to watch proficient 
modellers for a total of 3.5 hours. The fourth subject did not learn either by trial and 
error, or by other forms of social learning (including imitation).
One other study tested the ability of non-human primates to imitate the actions of 
a conspecific (Thmmble 1987, Thrumble and Perrett 1987). The results of the study 
provided evidence that some stumptailed macaques could use tools in similar ways to 
capuchins, but did not learn how to use tools from a proficient conspecific (i.e. the 
obseiwing subjects used individual learning rather than imitation). Non-proficient subjects 
did not learn from conspecifics, even though the subjects were presented with 300 hours 
of time to observe modellers (Perrett, personal communication).
The use of the popular term “monkey see, monkey do”, appears to be a little 
strained. There is little or no evidence of monkey imitation. A second popular term is “to 
ape”. Tomasello (amongst others, 1996) has asked the question “do apes ape?”. Only 
two veiy recent studies could be said to be indicative of some form of imitation. Whiten 
et al (1996) looked at whether chimpanzees and human children imitate novel actions on 
novel objects (which Whiten et al called artificial finit). The artificial finit were 
constincted so as to pose food-processing problems which chimpanzees would encounter 
during normal feeding behaviour. Two actions in sequence were required to open the 
artificial finit, requiring not only goal-emulation (the ultimate goal of opening the 
artificial fruit) but also imitation, using the correct obseiwed actions. The actions were 
complex and consisted of multiple parts (e.g. twist barrel whilst pulling out). The children 
were fairly proficient imitators of all obseiwed actions, whereas the chimpanzee subjects 
were only proficient in copying one of the two actions (there were individual differences 
in which action was copied).
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A second study may be indicative of imitation skills in chimpanzees. Custance et 
al (1995) replicated a study by Hayes and Hayes (1952). Language-trained chimpanzee 
subjects were taught to copy a series of gestures on command of "do this!” (the 
experimenter gained the subject’s attention, then performed the action). The ability to 
copy actions was then transferred to 48 novel actions. Two subjects correctly imitated 13 
and 17 out of the 48 novel actions respectively. Examples of such arbitraiy (non­
functional) actions were wiggle fingers, wobble lips, clap back of hand. It is contentious 
whether these actions test for copying or imitation; they do not test for goal directed 
actions on objects in the world.
Actions directed towards a goal object (meaning an object external to the body; 
such as a tool), may not be part of the dependent criteria for imitation. For example, 
imitating an individual playing with their hair, or an individual lifting one arm with the 
other arm would be examples of actions directed towards objects, not external to the 
body. Meltzoff and Moore (1977) tested the ability of human neonates to imitate facial 
and body gestures, such as tongue poking and hand waving.
Imitation requires the analysis of another’s viewpoint or visual perspective 
(Whiten 1996) and a visuomotor transformation from a visual representation (obseiwed 
action) to a motor representation (performed action). The next section discusses recent 
neurophysiological data which may provide evidence that single neurons in premotor 
cortex are capable of visuomotor transformations which would be required for imitation.
7.1.2 Neurophysiology of Perceiving Purposive Behaviour
The behavioural examples reported above suggest that learning about another’s 
behaviour and intentions can be computed from basic perceptual signals. The studies 
described in this section provide some evidence that particular neural sub-systems exist in 
the monkey brain for the analysis of other’s purposive behaviour.
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(a) Social attention
The brain of the rhesus monkey contains neurons which respond preferentially to 
the sight of human or monkey faces (Bmce et al. 1981, Perrett et al. 1982, Desimone et 
al. 1984). An important first step in social interaction is recognition of a second 
individual (see Chapter VIII). Cells with responses selective for faces over other objects 
have been found in the upper and lower banks and the ftindus of the superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), in an area named the superior temporal polysensoiy area (STPa). This 
region contains cells which respond to polymodal stimuli (visual, auditory and tactile, 
Bruce et al 1981). Perrett et al (1982) recorded from cells in the fundus of the STS and 
found that the responses of face selective neurons were not affected by transformations 
of the face (changing colour, size, vertical orientation). Scrambling the features of the 
face did reduce the cells’ responses. Separating the face into component parts (eyes, 
nose, mouth, etc.) and presenting the separate part without the other parts reduced the 
response of some cells from the initial strong response to the whole face. Some cells, 
however, responded equally well when the eyes or the mouth region were presented 
alone.
Importantly, rotating the face horizontally away from the front view also changed 
the response of a number of cells (21/32 cells). It therefore appeared from this study that 
the presence of the eyes and the head view were important for a number of cells. An 
increase in response was seen with one cell, when the face was presented in profile.
These findings were extended. Perrett et al (1985b) found that view had a dramatic effect 
on the responses of face responsive neurons. Some cells were tuned to the face, with a 
gradual decline in response with increasing horizontal rotation from the face. Other cells 
produced opposite responses, where the cell was preferentially responsive to a profile 
(e.g. left profile) with a decline in response as the head was rotated towards the face view 
(view 0^). Elevation of the head appeared to effect cell responses (some cells preferred 
heads that were level, other cells preferred heads that were facing upwards. A large 
number of cells were responsive to all views of the head (non-selective for view). Eye 
gaze was also important. Sixty-four percent of cells selective for the face and profile 
were also dependent on the position of the eyes. The majority of cells preferred that the
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head and eyes were in compatible directions with respect to the viewer, e.g. head left and 
eyes left. Some cells were selective for eye position independent of the head view. For 
example, the response to head left and eyes facing viewer would be the same as head and 
eyes facing the viewer, or head right and eyes facing the viewer. Eye gaze dependent 
cells often did not require the presence of the rest of the head to respond. Other cells 
were only responsive when the eyes were averted from the viewer. This is important 
behaviourally for macaques, as direct eye contact is a threat (see Chapter IX).
In a later study, Perrett et al (1991) classified the responses of head selective 
neurons into two forms of coding (object-centred and viewer-centred, see also Hasselmo 
et al 1989). Object-centred coding would seem an appropriate label for neurons which do 
not discriminate head view (i.e. all views of the head are equally responsive). Any view of 
the head is sufficient for object recognition, such as object X is a head. Cells responsive 
to multiple views of the head may be responsive to features common to all views, such as 
hair or an ear. Recognition may only require the analysis of four “characteristic” views of 
the head (face, left and right profiles and back of the head). Object-centred coding 
requires independent analysis of at least these four views. Object-centred cells may be 
combining the outputs of viewer-centred cells, The term “viewer-centred coding” is 
applied to neurons which are selective to one or more, but not all views. Usually, the 
sight of only one view causes the cell to be maximally responsive. Cells selective for view 
were either narrowly-tuned (only the presentation of one view was sufficient for maximal 
firing from the cell) or broadly-tuned (one view was sufficient for firing, but the cell 
response declined as the head was horizontally rotated further from the view providing 
the maximal cell response). Cells broadly-tuned to view would only require tuning within 
(+/-) 45® of the four characteristic views to code for all views (360®) of the head. Only 
four broadly-tuned viewer-centred cells, therefore, are required to code for all possible 
views in the horizontal plane.
Perrett et al found that object-centred neurons were rare (4/119 cells tested), 
whereas the majority of cells were responsive to one view (99/110 cells), A numbers of 
viewer-centred cells were responsive to views which were not one of the four 
characteristic views. This suggested to Perrett et al (1991) that the flmction of these
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neurons (and neurons with responses selective for one of the four characteristic views) 
may be to determine the direction of another’s attention, as these cells were superfluous 
to requirements for face recognition.
The breadth of tuning exhibited by some viewer-centred neurons would not 
explain cell responses to vertical head elevation. Perrett et al (1985b) found that a 
number of cells were unresponsive to changes in horizontal orientations of the head, but 
were affected by vertical elevation. For example, a cell may have responded to all frontal, 
horizontal views, but only when the head was directed upwards i.e. head 45®, up had the 
same response as head view 90®, up and head view 0®, up. Other cells were dependent on 
the view and elevation of the head, i.e. head view 0®, up compared with head view 0®, 
down.
Perrett et al (1992) reported the activity of a cell responsive to attention down. 
The cell was responsive when the head was directed down, the eyes were directed down 
or the head and body posture (quadmpedal) was directed downwards. Changing the 
elevation of the eyes in relation to the head (e.g. eyes directed towards the viewer, head 
downwards) and the head in relation to the body (e.g. head directed at the viewer, but 
body posture downwards) would change the direction of attention. Head elevation, 
therefore, is also an important indicator of attention direction. For example, attention to 
the left (horizontal, level head) is different to attention up and left or attention down and 
left.
A large number of cells sensitive to the horizontal head view were also sensitive 
to the position of the eyes. Perrett et al (1985b) found that a number of cells responsive 
to the face (directed towards the viewer) preferred that the eyes were also directed 
towards the viewer. Similarly, if a cell was responsive to the head view 45® (half profile), 
the cell preferred that the eyes were also averted to 45® from the viewer. Some cells 
responsive to the face were insensitive to the position of the eyes, i.e. there was no 
difference in response between eye contact and eyes averted.
Previous studies have suggest that the eyes are ultimately important for 
recognising another’s direction of attention (Perrett et al 1990d, Perrett et al 1992). It is 
possible that if the eyes become occluded from view (for example, under poor lighting
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conditions; Hietanen et al 1992), information from the head becomes important. In a 
similar manner, cells responsive to the information provided from the body will become 
important if the head is occluded from view, Perrett et al (1992) proposed that the 
information provided by eye/face/body sensitive neurons was part of a processing 
hierarchy (for attention direction or social attention).
Most cells within the STS were responsive to heads, but 42% (of 53 cells tested) 
were also responsive to information from the rest of the body (Wachsmuth et al 1994). 
Wachsmuth et al (1994) tested the response of cells to the presentation of the head only 
(with the body occluded), the body only (with head occluded) or the whole body (head 
and body). Ninety percent of cells responsive to the head and body were dependent on 
view (usually the head and body were presented in compatible directions). Body view 
may be an indicator of attention direction (when the head and eyes are not present or 
occluded). If the head is also present, however, then the information provided by the 
body will be superceded by information from the head. For example, the body may be 
oriented towards the viewer, but the head is directed to the right. Attention direction 
would be determined to be towards the right. The position of the eyes may be a more 
important indicator of attention direction than the head and body (see behavioural studies 
described in Chapter IX), so information from the eyes may inhibit information from the 
head. Perrett et al (1992) proposed this when discussing a cell responsive to attention 
down (see earlier). The cell was responsive to the eyes, head and body directed 
downwards. When the cell was presented with body down, but head up (profile), the 
response was reduced from the response to head down body down. A critical test would 
have been head down, eyes directed towards the viewer. If the response of the cell was to 
attention down, the predicted response would be a decrease, as attention would now be 
attention towards the viewer (if position of the eyes are more important then head 
direction). Unfortunately, this was not tested.
Physiological responses to eye gaze have been found in other brain regions. 
Brothers (Brothers et al. 1990, Brothers and Ring 1993) recorded from single cells in the 
amygdala (accessory basal, lateral basal, medial basal, cortical and central nuclei) and 
rhinal sulcus. Brothers found that two cells were responsive when a video-stimulus of a
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stump-tailed macaque looked directly into the camera (i.e. eyes directed towards the 
viewer), but not when the video-stimulus averted gaze away from the viewer.
Further evidence suggests that the STPa and probably amygdala and rhinal sulcus 
form part of a system coding the direction of another’s attention (eye gaze direction, not 
just gaze away or towards a viewer). Campbell et al (1990) and Heywood and Cowey 
(1992), lesioned the STS (including STPa) after testing the limits of eye gaze 
discrimination in rhesus monkeys. Pre-operatively, the monkeys had to perform a two- 
choice picture task and to choose the picture with the eyes averted. Differing degrees of 
eye gaze displacement (head view 0®), from eye gaze aversion to eye contact were 
presented (5®, 10® or 20® degrees deviation from view 0®). The eyes and head were varied 
independently (e.g. head view 20® from 0®, eyes 10® from 0®), to determine whether the 
monkeys were using eye gaze rather than head position as a discriminative cue. Before 
surgeiy, the monkeys were extremely good (75-90% correct) at discriminations of gaze 
directions, 10® and 20® from 0®, but poor (chance) at 5® from 0®. After removal of the 
STS, the monkeys performance at discriminations of gaze directions, 10® and 20® from 
0®, was reduced to 50-60% (approximately chance level). It would therefore appear that 
rhesus monkeys can discriminate gaze averted laterally from eye contact (10® and 20® 
from 0®) and that the STS is important for these discriminations.
Eacott et al (1993) also tested the ability of rhesus monkeys with lesions of the 
STS to discriminate gaze. Pairs of eyes (without the head) were presented towards the 
viewing monkeys (0®) or averted at deviations of 5®, 10®, 15® or 20® from the viewer. 
Although the head was occluded, the eyes were presented as part of a head either 
directed towards the viewer, or averted (20® to the left or right of the viewer). The 
subjects were presented with a two-choice discrimination, choosing between eyes 
directed towards the viewer (incorrect stimulus) versus eyes averted (correct stimulus), 
irrespective of the position of the head. The unoperated animals were better (overall) at 
discriminations of eye gaze (deviation > 5®) than the STS lesioned animals. Although, 
both groups of subjects were the same at discriminations of 5® from the viewer, the 
choices were significantly greater than from chance. The percentage number of correct 
choices increased with increasing deviation from the viewer. Lesioned animals were also
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impaired on a novel two-choice discrimination task (between different groups of ASCII 
characters). Eacott et al (1993) thus concluded that the deficits in processing differences 
in eye gaze were due to deficits in two-choice discrimination learning. There have been 
no suggestions that the STS is a region which solely processes information about gaze. 
Gaze directed towards the viewer may be an exemplar, which may be compared with 
other instances of gaze. This may be why there is no difference between operated and 
unoperated subjects in discriminating gaze deviations of 5® from the viewer. The eye 
position would not be sufficiently different from the exemplar to aid discrimination. 
Eacott et al (1993) failed to test the monkey subjects on eye gaze discrimination before 
STS surgeiy. It is not known how the operated subjects would have performed pre- 
operatively in the discrimination task.
(b) Intentional motion and imitation
Simple motion cues are processed in the extrastriate areas of the macaque 
temporal lobe. Areas MT (middle temporal cortex), MST (middle superior temporal 
cortex), FST (fundus of the superior temporal cortex), A7a (posterior parietal area)and 
VIP (ventral intraparietal area) are the areas of the extrastriate cortex which appear to be 
involved in the simple analysis of motion. Literature on the cellular processing of simple 
motion cues is extensive and largely irrelevant to the discussion here (see Hildreth and 
Koch 1987, Maunsell and Newsome 1987, Newsome et al 1990 for reviews).
Processing of the motion of complex objects occurs flirther away from primary 
visual cortex and prestriate areas (MT, FST, etc.) in the superior temporal polysensory 
area (STPa, Oram et al 1993). Some cells in this region code for the form of an object in 
motion, whereas other cells in this region are unselective for the form of the object, but 
are sensitive to the direction of motion. These cells may be derived from direction 
specific cells found in MT and MST, as there are distinct projections from the middle 
temporal areas in the STS (MT, MST and FST) to the more anterior part of the STS 
(STPa, Boussaoud et al 1990).
A large number of cells within STPa respond to the specific motion of complex 
objects, responding to motion in a particular direction, with a particular form (i.e. a
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walking human body) and a specific view (i.e. compatible with the motion direction (i.e. 
“following the nose”). Perrett et al (1985a) were the first to report the responses of cells 
to whole body motion (i.e. walking). Cells sensitive to motion stimuli had latencies 
equivalent to cells sensitive to static stimuli. The majority of cells were responsive to the 
motion of a body (translation) in one preferred direction (i.e. walk left to right) and some 
cells were responsive to translation in two directions (180® apart, i.e. walk towards and 
away from the monkey). The cells did not appear to discriminate between the velocity of 
motion (20-120 deg/sec), although changing the velocity during motion did effect the 
responses of some cells. A small number of cells were insensitive to the form of the 
object in motion (i.e. responded equally to walking bodies and control objects moving in 
the same direction). Some cells were only responsive when the translation of the body 
was out of or into view, but equally responsive when a screen was passed in front of a 
static body. Cells within this brain region were also sensitive to body rotation (i.e. facing 
the monkey to facing away from the monkey in one motion), limb and body part 
articulation.
Perrett et al (1985a) found that the response of neurons sensitive to body motion 
were dependent on the direction of motion (i.e. walk left to right, not right to left). The 
majority of cells required that the view of the body was compatible to the preferred 
direction of motion (i.e. walk left, facing left). A small number of cells which responded 
to one direction of motion, were broadly tuned to view, i.e. were responsive to two 
views, 180® apart, moving in one direction). For example, a cell may be responsive to 
walk towards the monkey, but responses to views 0® (facing the monkey) and 180® 
(facing away from the monkey) would be equal.
Johansson (1973) termed motion where a very small amount of form was present 
but no distinguishing features, as “biological motion”. Biological motion stimuli consist 
of lights attached to the body at joints and positions along the limbs and torso. Human 
subjects were clearly able to discriminate that these lights represented people walking. 
Oram and Perrett (1994) found that 25% of cells tested for whole body motion in the 
upper bank and flindus of the STS (Seltzer and Pandya 1978) were responsive to 
biological motion stimuli (human stimuli with lights on the limbs). The large majority of
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cells selective for body motion found in this highly complex processing area were 
selective for the form and motion of complex objects, such as walking bodies, with 
articulating limbs (Perrett et al 1985a, Oram and Perrett 1996).
The majority of form selective cells within this region were also sensitive for the 
direction of motion (i.e. walk left, Oram and Perrett 1996). Seventy-eight percent 
(125/161) of these cells also required that the body view was compatible to the direction 
of travel (e.g. walk left facing left). Oram and Perrett (1996) found that 5% of cells were 
broadly tuned for view (two views 180® apart, one direction of motion) and 2% were 
non-selective for direction of motion (i.e. responsive to any direction), but required that 
view was compatible with the direction of motion. A few cells were responsive to 
incompatible motion (i.e. walk left, facing right). Oram and Perrett (1996) found that the 
latency of cells selective for motion information, but not form were responding 20msec 
earlier than cells responsive to form information only. The latencies of cells responsive to 
form and motion information were the same as cells responsive to motion direction only 
and the latencies of cells responsive to direction were 35msec earlier than cells responsive 
to form information. Oram and Perrett suggested that cells with longer latencies showed 
more form sensitivity, so motion information is processed before form information.
A subpopulation of cells in STPa respond to the sight of movements of different 
parts of the body (Perrett et al 1985a, Oram et al, submitted), such as the limbs (arms and 
legs), smaller units of limbs (such as hands and fingers), shoulders, heads and torsos (as 
components of whole body motion). The responses of the majority of cells were not 
dependent that the limbs were attached to the body (i.e. independent movement was 
sufficient for responses).
Perrett et al (1989a, b, 1990a) studied the responses of neurons in the lower bank 
of the STS (TEa) to hand actions. All cells reported required that the hand actions were 
directed towards objects. Seven different actions were categorised (reach, retrieve, 
manipulate, pick, tear, present to monkey and hold). Although some cells were 
responsive only to the sight of one action, some cells did respond to two or more actions 
(although not all). The vast majority (92%) of cells were unselective for the view of the 
actions, i.e. the cells were equally responsive to the front and the profile views of the
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actions. The interaction between the hand and objects appeared to be important to the 
neural responses. Perrett et al (1989a) suggested that viewer- and object-centred coding 
was insufficient to describe the coding of these neurons. Perrett et al (1989a) termed the 
coding of actions performed onto objects (or specific locations) as goal-centred coding:
''we define goal-centred descriptions as descriptions in which the disposition or 
movements o f one animate object (the agent) are specified with respect to a second 
object or part o f the environment (the goal). ” (p. 101).
The responses of cells sensitive to hand actions were unselective for the object (or 
goal), however, some cells preferred deformable objects and some cells preferred foods 
over non-foods. The size of the object was also unimportant. The interaction between 
hand and object was ultimately important, as the motion of hands without an object, the 
object moving without the presence of hands or the hands and object moving but spatially 
separated did not cause the cell to respond (Perrett et al 1989a, b).
Reaching to objects in particular locations relative to the viewer were more 
important than reaching to different locations with no object as a goal. For example, a 
cell was responsive to the sight of reaching to an object to the left of the monkey. The 
cell did not respond to reaching to the right of the monkey, where there was no object 
present. Reaching per se was not important, but reaching to a particular object, only 
located to the left of the monkey was important. Moving the monkey, so that the object 
was positioned to the right of the monkey may not have reduced the response of the cell.
The interaction between animate and inanimate objects was highlighted with cells 
responsive to the sight of the experimenter bringing food to their mouth. The cell was 
responsive to the food moving towards the mouth or the mouth moving towards the 
food. There is an interaction, but the cell appears to be responsive to two different types 
of movement achieving the same goal.
Goal-centred coding was also apparent in the responses of some neurons sensitive 
to whole body motion. Perrett et al (1990a, b) reported a cell which was maximally 
responsive when an experimenter walked towards the laboratoiy door (to the right of the 
monkey). The monkey was positioned towards the facing wall. The response of the cell
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was not dependent on the initial starting position (i.e. left or right o f  the door or in front 
o f  the monkey), the cell only responded when the final destination o f  travel was the door. 
The response was not affected by positioning the monkey towards the door and again 
walking towards the door.
Studies in humans using neuroimaging techniques (PET) have confirmed the 
results seen with monkeys, that the rostral STS and amygdala are activated when human 
subjects watch biological motion displays o f  expressive motion, such as dancing (Bonda 
et al 1996). Bonda et al (1996) found activation in human caudal STS (and intraparietal 
sulcus) when subjects viewed light-point displays attached to reaching and grasping arms.
PET studies using human subjects indicate that similar regions o f  the human 
neocortex are responsive for coding the sight and motor responses o f  actions. Rizzolatti 
et al (1996b) found that the following regions showed significant levels o f  activation 
when subjects watched grasping actions (frontal gyrus; A8, A7, A45, middle occipital 
gyrus, A19/37). Object prehension (grasping objects by the subjects) caused significant 
activation in the following areas (precentral and mesial motor areas, putamen, 
cerebellum, superior parietal lobule, cuneus, cingulate gyms; A24, inferior parietal lobule; 
A40, A l, A2, A3, A4 and precuneus; A7). There appear to be similarities between the 
location o f coding the visual appearance and the motor component o f  actions (A8).
The motor cortex o f  normal human subjects was magnetically stimulated whilst 
the subjects watched an experimenter reaching for objects, the objects alone and the 
experimenter tracing figures in the air (Fadiga et al 1995). Motor evoked potentials 
(MEPs) were measured in four muscles from the hand during obsemation. Fadiga et al 
found that significant increases in MEPs were correlated with obseiwing the actions, with 
similar levels o f  activity seen in the muscles when the same actions were performed.
The importance o f  coding the specific direction o f another’s whole body and body 
part motion from the viewpoint o f  reading intentions is relatively clear. As described 
previously, monkeys and apes appear to infer purpose from complex motion (such as 
walking), view (attention direction) and direction o f  motion (e.g. move left) cues. A  
neural system which can process such details quickly is ultimately going to be o f  benefit 
to obseiwing animals. For example, knowing that a dominant individual is moving quickly
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towards an obseiwer rather than towards an individual next to the observer, may allow an 
appropriate response to be prepared. This has important implications if  the approaching 
animal is a predator. An animal approaching slowly is unlikely to be a predator or 
aggressive animal (unless hidden in undergrowth). A stimulus approaching quickly, 
however, is likely to be dangerous. Perrett et al 91989a) reported that neuronal responses 
did not discriminate between fast and slow motion, however changes in velocity did 
effect some responses. Information connected with a fast approaching stimulus may be 
processed using non-form selective cues, such as speed o f approach, rather than more 
complex processing o f  form such as “object X is a leopard”.
Neural coding o f  limb and extremity movements is important for imitation and 
social learning. O f greater importance, however, is the relationship between moving 
limbs, extremities, whole bodies, etc. and objects in the environment (such as reaching to 
a piece o f  fruit, see M enzel’s experiments detailed earlier).
Neural mechanisms responsive to other’s manipulation o f  objects therefore 
appear to be present in the macaque brain. This neural specialisation may have had an 
adaptive value for primates. This is clear when discussing social learning, in particular 
learning new methods o f  food acquisition and extraction as stated in the extractive 
foraging hypothesis for the evolution o f primate intelligence or for learning to use tools 
(Fragaszy and Visalberghi 1990, Tomasello et al 1987, Call and Tomasello 1994a, Byrne 
and Byrne 1993, Russon 1997). Byrne and Russon (1997) have suggested that social 
learning and imitation work by “priming...existing brain records” . The responses o f  
neurons to the sight o f individual hand actions would enter into memory and be used in 
later analyses to interpret sequences o f complex actions, such as used by gorillas when 
stripping and preparing nettles for feeding (Byrne and Byrne 1993), orangutans removing 
the nutrious pith from bark (Russon 1997), or vei'vet monkey’s many methods used for 
gathering and processing foods (Harrison 1996).
There is evidence that some cells in premotor cortex (cortical area F5, Jeannerod 
et al 1995) may function in the type o f  visuomotor transformations which form the basis 
o f  imitation. Cells in premotor cortex (F5) fire when a monkey makes a reaching or 
grasping movement, or manipulates an object (Rizzolatti et al 1990). Some o f  these cells
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with motor responses also respond to the sight o f  an experimenter performing the same 
actions which were performed by the monkey. For example, cells responded to the 
monkey picking up an object and the sight o f an experimenter picking up the same object 
(di Peliigrino et al 1992, Gallese et al 1996, Rizzolatti et al 1996a). The motor neurons 
were probably not responding to the sight o f the monkey’s own arm moving towards an 
object and performing the action, as the motor response was also present when the action 
was made in the dark. The motor responses were present in the light and the dark, 
therefore coding the motor rather than the visual component o f the action. The actions 
seen and performed by the monkey were usually highly specific, e.g. only responsive to 
precision grips. Moreover, most required the presence o f an object (similar to the 
neurons described by Perrett et al (1989a, b). The neurons also responded when a 
monkey actor performed the actions.
It seems reasonable to suggest that imitation in its simplest form is reliant on a 
visuomotor transformation. The visual program o f an action is encoded into memory 
(possibly in the parahippocampal gyms, hippocampus or amygdala) and the resultant 
representation o f the action is mapped onto neurons in premotor cortex for the action to 
be performed. Complex imitation as discussed earlier requires a number o f  visuomotor 
transformations to be linked together in a complex sequence. The cells studied by 
Rizzolatti, therefore, do not completely satisfy the requirements as a basis for imitation, 
but combinations (or ensembles) o f  similar neurons may be utilised in imitative behaviour.
The exact nature o f the action combinations would be dependent on the actual 
actions to be imitated, which may be sequential or parallel, and may also be dependent on 
the complexity o f the actions. Tanji and Shi ma (1994) trained macaques to perform 
sequences o f  three actions (push, pull or turn a handle) in a particular order. The 
monkeys were successful in combining separate actions into more complicated sequences 
o f  3 actions. Recording from neurons within the supplementary motor area (SMA) o f the 
frontal cortex, Tanji and Shima found neurons whose activity was related to the 
particular sequence o f  actions previously learnt by the monkeys. The cells were 
maximally active before a particular sequence o f  actions (e.g. push-turn-pull), but not 
other sequences o f actions (e.g. piill-push-turn). Tanji and Shima suggested that the
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neurons “seem to signal a specific order o f  forthcoming multiple movements to be 
performed on the basis o f memoi-y” (p. 413). Monkeys can, therefore learn to perform 
complex sequences o f  actions (as required for imitation), however, monkeys may not be 
able to copy the obsei*ved sequence o f  actions o f other monkeys. The SMA is connected 
to the amygdala (see Chapter III), so visual information (coding for the sight o f  actions) 
may pass from the STS via the amygdala to the SMA (direct projections from the 
anterior STS to the SMA have not been reported).
7.1.3 Aims and Predictions
It is the aim o f  this chapter to evaluate the responses o f  neurons within the 
macaque STS and to provide an interpretation o f the cells’ possible function in 
perception o f  social signals. Previous studies have found that cells within the STS 
respond to complex visual (static and motion) stimuli (see earlier). The stimuli used in the 
protocols (experiments) described in this chapter, used to elicit cell responses were o f  
human heads and bodies (static or in motion). The following sections describe the 
predictions/hypotheses for different cell types which may be responsive to some aspect o f  
another’s attention, (see also Perrett et al 1992).
1. Static stimuli
(a) Gaze direction
Perrett et al (1985b, 1991, 1992) reported that a large percentage o f  cells within 
the STS which were responsive to a specific view o f  the head were also selective for a 
particular direction o f eye gaze. Cells sensitive to eye direction were either responsive to 
gaze which was compatible with the head view (e.g. eyes left, head left) or gaze direction 
independent to the direction o f the head (e.g. eyes left, head facing or eyes left, head 
left). Chapter IX discusses behavioural evidence that the eyes are important predictors o f  
another’s attention. The first prediction for neurons responsive to gaze is that the 
maximal responses will be dependent on the direction o f gaze, but independent o f  head 
view. If head and gaze direction are incompatible, the cell response would be dependent
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on the direction o f  gaze alone. A second prediction would be that a second population of  
neurons may respond to either eye contact or gaze averted (as eye contact is part o f  a 
threat and eye aversion is a subordinate gesture when presented with a threat, in rhesus 
monkeys). Cell responses, therefore, would relate to behavioural responses (eye direction 
is a better predictor o f  attention direction than head direction and this is reflected in 
cellular responses).
(b) H ead  view
Perrett et al (1991) also found that cells selective for one head view were more 
copious than cells responsive to all or multiple views o f  the head. The majority o f  cells 
were responsive to the sight o f one “characteristic” head view (face, back o f head, left 
and right profiles). As discussed earlier, coding for recognition o f faces as a class o f  
object may only require pooling o f four types o f  neurons responsive to only one o f  the 
four characteristic views.
A selection o f  the cells responsive to one characteristic view are occasionally 
“broadly tuned” (i.e. they respond vigorously to one head view, but less so to other 
views; with response diminishing with increasing distance from the best view [+/- 60- 
90®]. Pooling o f four broadly tuned head view cells would be sufficient for face 
recognition. Cells in the STS do not just code for one o f the four characteristic views. 
Perrett et al (1991, 1992) have suggested that one function o f neurons responsive to 
intermediate views (e.g. half profiles) maybe coding the direction o f  other’s attention.
Just as it has been suggested that as gaze is a more important indicator o f  the 
direction o f  another’s attention than head view; head view may also be a better predictor 
o f  attention direction than body view (Perrett et al 1992). Wachsmuth et al (1994) 
reported that single neurons were either sensitive to the sight o f  heads presented alone 
(with the body occluded from sight), bodies alone (wih the head occluded from sight) or 
combinations o f heads and bodies (in the correct locations) as whole bodies. The 
selectivity o f the majority o f  these neurons was also dependent on view. In all cases, head 
and body view sensitivity were compatible with one another (e.g. view 90® head and 
body). Head direction may be a better indicator o f attention direction than body view. It
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is predicted that if the view o f  the head and body view are incompatible (e.g. head facing 
left, body facing forward), the cell would respond more to the head than the body. This 
prediction holds taie for cells with independent tuning o f  the head and body (i.e. the cell 
responds separately to both parts, when tested in isolation). If the head is obscured, the 
information from the head is lost, so information from the body would be required to 
provide cues to attention direction.
(c) OrientatioTi
There is no evidence o f  an inversion effect for monkeys viewing upside-down 
faces with normal configuration o f features (Bruce 1982). There is an inversion effect is 
the facial features are jumbled (Perrett et al 1988). Ethologically, an absence o f  this effect 
might aid in recognising others when suspended from the branches o f  trees (for example). 
Wachsmuth (1995) tested the effects o f  rotating pictures o f whole bodies (vertical 
orientation) on cell responses to upright bodies. (It is noted here that there are 
differences between orientation and view. Orientation is used here to refer to rotation in 
the picture plane; view refers to rotation in the horizontal plane.) The majority o f  cells 
responsive to whole bodies, had responses to a particular orientation (e.g. upright); some 
cells generalised across orientation in the picture plane and some were broadly tuned for 
orientation.
A  face horizontally oriented towards the viewer is probably looking at the 
observer. Rotating a fbiivard facing head would not change the direction o f attention. 
Rotating the whole body (view 0°) produces a slightly different result, as the position o f  
the head changes (top to bottom o f view). The head may therefore be attending to a 
different part o f  the obseiwer’s body. It is predicted that if a whole body is in profile (left 
or right), and possibly providing a cue to attention direction, then changing vertical 
orientation would have a dramatic effect on the cell’s response (and the direction o f  
attention. Upright orientations (0 ,^ 45^ and 315°) o f profile or half-profile views, provide 
information o f  attention direction (e.g. view 90°, attention to the left). Inverting the body 
would change the direction o f attention (rotating a left facing head, 180°, would cause 
the resultant head to be facing to the right).
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It is predicted that rotating the head (views 0° or 180°) will not have an effect on 
cell responses to an upright head. Rotating the whole body (views 0° or 180°) may have 
an effect on cell responses as the direction o f  attention o f a head/body may change with 
rotation. It is also predicted that the responses o f cells sensitive to profile bodies (coding 
attention direction) will be reduced if the body is rotated in the picture plane. I f  the cells 
are not coding attention direction, then rotaing the body may have no effect on the cell 
responses.
(d) Elevation o f  head posture
The majority o f previously tested STS neurons were found to be responsive to 
head views and/or orientations which were level on the horizontal plane (however, see 
Perrett et al 1985b, 1992, 1993). There are many instances in behaviour where 
determining the focus o f another’s attention on the ground or in the sky is important (for 
example, locating predators after hearing an alarm call, Cheney and Seyfarth 1990b). It is 
predicted that head elevation is important for determining another’s direction o f  
attention. Two hypotheses would substantiate this view (but requiring different levels o f  
processing). One, elevation alone may be more important than view. Cells responsive to 
multiple views with the same attention direction (i.e. up) should not show differences in 
their response (i.e. the response to left profile up would be the same as right profile up). 
Two, elevation and view are equally important (one specific view and one specific 
elevation). For example, head elevation up and view left may be the optimal stimulus for 
the cell; other views and elevations would reduce the cell’s response. Orientation tuning 
may also be a part o f tuning for elevation (i.e. view 90°, orientation 315° is the same as 
head view 90°, elevation up).
(e) Object (goal) o f  attention
It is also important to locate and identify the object o f  another’s attention 
(whether it is a predator, food source or potential mating partner). Human and non­
human animals look at interesting things in their environment. It has been suggested that 
following X ’s gaze onto the object o f X ’s gaze (joint attention) may be used to predict
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X ’s intentions in relation to the object. Cells responsive to motion stimuli (walking bodies 
and reaching hands) have been tested for the importance o f interactions with objects. 
Perrett et al (1989a, b) reported that a population o f STS neurons selective for hand 
actions were maximally active when the hands were in contact with objects (or were 
heading interactions with objects). A second type o f  cell was responsive when an 
experimenter walked towards a specific part o f  the laboratoiy (in relation to the 
observing monkey).
It is predicted that certain neurons responsive to specific views o f  static heads 
would require that the head was attending to an object (within view). There are two 
possible positive predictions for this type o f  cell. A goal-centred coding approach would 
suggest that the view o f  the head would be unimportant, only that an interaction occured 
between the head and an object. A further hypothesis would suggest the head view and  
head-object interaction was required for the cell to respond (e.g. view 90° towards 
object, but not view 270° towards object).
2. M otion
(a) View
Head view is vitally important for determining another’s direction o f  attention. 
M otion can also provide information about where another is attending (and what they are 
intending). As with static stimuli, view is also important when interpreting direction o f  
attention from motion stimuli. Perrett et al (1985a) and Oram and Perrett (1996) looked 
at the responses o f cells to the sight o f human bodies walking. Cells in the STS were 
selective for the direction o f  travel (e.g. to the obsei'vers left, towards the observer, etc.) 
and to the view o f the walking body (compatible or incompatible to the direction o f  
travel, e.g. walking backwards). It is predicted that for a number o f cells responsive to 
whole body motion, the greater responses would be found for a specific view o f the head 
and body, independent o f  the direction o f  motion (i.e. walk towards the monkey, view 0° 
or walk away from the monkey, view 0°; see Oram and Perrett 1996).
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(b) H ead  versus body view
Head view provides a better indicator o f  attention direction than body view (see 
earlier). This has been stressed for cells responsive to static head and body images, but 
would also be important for cells selective for the sight o f  bodies in motion. It is 
predicted that changing the view o f  the head whilst keeping the body compatible with the 
direction o f  motion, would change the cell responses. In section (a) above, a prediction 
was made that body view would be a better indicator o f attention direction than direction 
o f  motion. This may be tested further by testing multiple views o f  the head moving in one 
direction.
(c) O bject (goal) o f  attention.
The effect o f adding a goal (object) o f  attention to a specific head view, for cells 
responsive to static heads, was emphasised earlier. The response o f  a number o f  STS 
neurons was dependent on the addition o f  an object o f attention. The evidence presented 
for imitation and social learning would suggest that learning about objects in the world 
would be difficult without establishing what object an obseiwed individual was interacting 
with. One prediction would therefore be, that the response o f  cells selective to reaching 
or walking would increase when a goal object was added.
7.2 Methods
7.2.1 General methods
The general physiological methods were described in Chapter VI. Two subjects 
described in the general methods were recorded. Subject Esther was recorded for 6 
months from Januaiy 1994 to June 1994 and subject Steve was recorded for 23 months 
from Januaiy 1995 to December 1996 (with 9 months break to take part in the 
behavioural experiment (see Chapter IX). Esther had previously been tested in 
neurophysiological experiments (from March 1993) and Steve is currently being tested in
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neurophysiological and behavioural experiments. No anatomical data is presented for 
Steve because o f his continued participation in experiments.
7.2.2 Stimulus preparation
Static stimuli
Neurons were tested for their responses to static real 3D “junk” objects (such as 
toys, tools, foods, pieces o f  material, boxes, etc.), real 3D biological objects (heads and 
bodies o f  the experimenters) and 2D slide representations o f  the same biological objects. 
All cells were tested for responses to the static head and body and sometimes to the eyes 
if  found to be responsive to the head. Slide stimuli were photographed using 200 ASA  
ectochrome slide film. The head and body stimuli were photographed against a light grey 
background with the person wearing uniform dull coloured clothes. The attention to 
objects stimuli were also photographed onto slide film. Only the head and shoulders were 
photographed looking at a large object (collection o f finit in a hanging net). The head 
was lit so that the eyes were clearly visible, and that little or no shadows were present on 
the completed slides.
Static stimuli had also been previously filmed using a video camera (JVC BY- 
llO E ) which recorded onto U-matic videotape. These stimuli had been edited using a 
JVC editing suite (control unit RM-88U) and transferred onto a videodisk containing 
motion sequences, facial expressions and eye gaze. Each frame containing a static image 
was recorded so that the computer could control the presentation o f  the stimuli during a 
protocol (Perrett et al 1991). The videodisk was played on a Phillips VP406 LaserVision 
disc drive, with the images presented through a Sony colour video projector (VPH-1041 
QM) and projected onto a white projection screen (4 metres from the subject).
If  the 2D slide and videodisk stimuli did not cause the cell to fire, static stimuli 
were also presented “live”, i.e. an experimenter would follow the computer protocols.
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M otion stimuli
Motive stimuli were also created using the JVC videocamera, and transferred to 
videodisk similarly to the static stimuli (see Oram et al 1993, Oram and Perrett 1996). 
The presentation o f  the 2D stimuli was again controlled by the computer from the start 
and stop frame numbers o f  the motion sequences. The majority o f motion stimuli were 
presented live (3D) by the experimenters. A basic protocol testing body view and 
direction o f  motion comprised four basic views (facing the monkey, left and right profiles 
and away from the monkey)) and two directions (compatible and incompatible to the 
direction o f  motion). In later descriptions, facing the monkey is designated 0°, left o f  the 
monkey is designated 90°, right o f  the monkey is designated 270° and away from the 
monkey is designated 180°. 3D stimuli were also used when certain directions o f  motion 
were not present on the videodisk or when head direction was altered when relative to 
the body.
Reaching and walking to specific objects (goal-directed behaviour) were also 
tested for a number o f  cells; performed live following a protocol which was rehearsed to 
maintain compatibility between trials, experimenters and test sessions. A food tray and 
stand containing the subjects’ food rewards was used as the object or goal o f  the 
experimenter’s attention in these tests, due to its manoeuvrability, size and probable 
salience to the subjects (food reward = tray).
Testing methods
Eveiy cell with a clear continuous spontaneous activity (S/A), was tested with a 
variety o f  stimuli. The sensoiy modality preferred by the cell was tested using visual 
objects, changing light levels, auditoiy stimuli (such as hitting objects, jangling keys, 
stamping feet, etc.) and tactile stimuli (stroking or grooming the monkey). Those cells 
found to be visually responsive were further tested (clinically) with a number o f  objects 
including faces and bodies, and objects in motion. Protocols using static or motion stimuli 
were then used to further study the precise response characteristics o f  the visually- 
responsive cell being investigated (see below for details).
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1. Static
(a) H ead  and/or body view
A cell’s response to view was tested either using live 3D stimuli (the human 
experiementers) or 2D images o f whole bodies and heads from videodisk or slides (see 
earlier). For a minimum test for view; multiple views (> 2) o f  the same head and/or body 
were presented. Two views were tested for body parts (head only, body only, whole 
body). Four characteristic views (face, left and right profiles and back) were normally 
tested. For perspective view, view 0° corresponds to the face, view 90° to the left profile, 
view 180° to the back o f  the head/body and view 270° corresponds to the right profile 
(see Figure 7.2). Intermediate views were occasionally tested (view 45°, 135°, 225° and 
315°) with the four characteristic views. Cells which were narrowly-tuned to view had 
responses maximal to one view greater than other views, control objects or S/A. Cells 
which were broadly-tuned to view had responses to multiple views (but not all views), 
with responses greater than controls and S/A. Cells with object-centred coding were 
designated as having responses which were non-selective for view (i.e. equally responsive 
to all views, but greater than controls and S/A).
(b) Eye gaze
Cells selective for a specific view (only front facing and profile views) were tested 
for effects o f changing eye position. These cells were tested using 3D heads 
(experimenters) or 2D head images from the videodisk. Two tests were used to 
determine that eye direction was more important than head view. First, the specific head 
view was tested with the eyes in a 1) compatible direction to the head and 2) 
incompatible direction to the head (approximately +/- 45-60° from the head view). For 
example, the cell may respond to the head view 0°. The response to the eyes would be 
tested at view 0° (compatible to the head) or view 45-60° (incompatible to the head 
view). Second, the direction o f the head was changed to determine that the initial strong 
response to the head may have been due to the influence o f  the position o f  the eyes. For 
example, the cell may respond preferentially to head view 0°. The head view would then
Figure 7.2. Schematic representations of head view stimuli. The head was presented 
either on slide, videodisk or live (using one of the experimenters). Two protocols testing 
for the effects of head view were used, encorporating a total of either four views (0°, 90®, 





be changed (+/- 45-60® from preferential view), with either 1) the eyes changing to be 
compatible to the head (e.g. head 45® eyes 45®), or 2) the direction o f  the eyes would 
remain incompatible to the head view (e.g. head 45®, eyes 0®).
(c) Orientatiofi
A cell’s response to orientation (rotation in the picture plane) was tested only 
using 2D slides o f  whole bodies and heads or a life-size cardboard photograph o f  a head 
(view 0®). Eight total orientations were tested for whole bodies. Upright corresponds to 
0®, 45®, left horizontal to 90®, 135®, inverted to 180®, 225®, right horizontal to 270® and 
315®. Four total orientations were tested for heads (0®, 90®, 180® and 270®). Orientation 
was tested using heads and bodies with a particular view (0®, 90®, 180® or 270®). Cells 
were sensitive for a particular orientation if responses were greater than other 
orientations, control objects and S/A.
(d) H ead elevation
The effects o f head elevation on the response o f head selective cells were tested 
using 3D stimuli (the experimenters). Two tests were performed with the cells. First, the 
effects o f  head elevation, but not view on cell responses, i.e. head down, up or level 
(irrespective o f the view; i.e. responds to view 90® head up and view 0® head up).
Second, the effects o f elevation and view on the cells’ response, i.e. the response to head 
down and view 90® is greater than head up and view 90® or other view and elevation 
combinations, controls and S/A.
(e) Object o f  attention
Goal-centred coding suggests that the responses o f  a number o f  head view  
selective neurons are dependent on the interaction o f an object with the head. Two 
possible tests for the effect o f  adding an object as a focus o f  the head’s attention were 
presented to the subjects. The first protocol tested whether the response to a particular 
head view would be increased if  an object was presented in the same visual field as a head 
(i.e. the head is looking towards or away from the object). This was tested by presenting
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the subjects with slides o f one head view (as the importance o f  view would have already 
been previously established), the same view with the head oriented towards an object 
(fruit hanging in a net), the same view with the head looking away from the object and 
the object without the head (see Figure 7.3). This protocol therefore tested, 1) whether 
view was important and 2) whether interacting with an object was important. A  second 
protocol tested whether view was unimportant, but the interaction between the head and 
object would be important for the response o f  the cell (i.e. the cell always responds when 
the head is facing the object, independent o f the head view). A minimum test for this 
hypothesis would be to use two head views, with views 180® apart. In either case, for the 
cell to be selective for heads interacting with objects, the response to the head and object 
must be greater than to the head alone, object alone and S/A. It is also predicted that the 




View is an important indicator o f  another’s direction o f  attention during 
movement. Cells responsive to body motion (i.e. walking) were tested for view selectivity 
using videodisk (see Oram and Perrett 1996) or live by experimenters. A minimum test 
for view sensitivity was 1) the view was compatible to the direction o f  motion (e.g. walk 
towards the monkey whilst facing the monkey) and 2) the view was incompatible to the 
direction o f motion (e.g. walk away from the monkey whilst facing the monkey). In most 
circumstances, a minimum o f  four views were tested for compatibility with motion 
direction. When discussing view sensitive motion responsive cells, use o f 0®, 90®, 180® 
and 270® is comparable with the use for static view responsive neurons (see Figure 7.4).
A second protocol was used to test the effect o f head view and motion. The body 
view which caused the maximal response from the cell was tested with different head 
views (three in total). For example, a cell responsive to a body walking towards the 
monkey would be tested further with the head facing forwards, to the left or to the right. 
As with cells responsive to static head view, the information from the head should be
Figure 7.3. Photographic examples o f slide or live stimuli used to test the effects o f  
making an object the focus o f  attention o f a specific head view. For a minimum 
protocol, four stimuli were presented to the subjects; (a) head view alone, (b) object 





Figure 7.4. Schematic representations of motion stimuli (videodisk, videtape or live by 
the experimenters) used to test the effects of head and/or body view on whole body 
motion, and motion direction. A minimum of four views were tested (0®, 90®, 180® and 
270® degrees from the viewer). For example, view 0 is facing the observing monkey 
independent on the direction of motion. A minimum of four directions were tested (go 0®, 
go 90®, go 180® and go 270®). Go 0® was walk towards the subject, go 90® was walk to 
the left o f the subject, go 180® was walk away from the subject and go 270® was walk to 
the right of the subject.




















more important than the body for coding attention direction. The cell, therefore, should 
only respond to one head view, if coding for attention direction.
(b) Direction
Motion direction can potentially be used as a secondai-y indicator o f  attention 
direction when other cues are not available. For example, it may be difficult to analyse 
another’s attention direction when the other individual is moving at a high speed. An 
eagle moving quickly towards a monkey can be assumed to be attending to the monkey, 
without the need to process the bird’s direction o f  attention. The cell’s response to 
motion direction was tested live (3D) or on videodisk (see Oram and Perrett 1996) using 
either one or two views and four or eight directions (towards the monkey, away from the 
monkey, to the left o f  the monkey and to the right o f  the monkey and intermediate 
direction). In discussions o f  cells selective for motion direction, motion towards the 
subject is designated “go 0®”, motion away from the subject as “go 180®”, motion to the 
left o f  the subject as “go 90® ’’and motion to the left o f the subject as “go 270®” (see 
Figure 7.4).
(c) Object o f  attention
Objects or goals o f  attention may also increase the response o f  cells selective to 
body and/or hand motion (see Perrett et al 1989a, b, 1990b). Interactions between whole 
bodies in motion and objects were tested live by the experimenters. The direction o f  
motion and specific view were previously established (cells responsive to specific view  
and specific direction o f motion, and specific view but unspecific direction o f  motion 
were tested). A minimum protocol was similar to the minimum static protocol (walk 
towards the object whilst facing the object, walk away from the object whilst facing away 
from the object, walk towards the usual position o f  the object). A more complex protocol 
testing view and interaction with objects may include walk towards the object whilst 
looking away from the object, and walk away from the object whilst looking at the 
object. All responses to walking may be compared with responses to the object alone, the 
object moving away and towards a static standing body and S/A.
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D ata  analysis
Neuronal responses to the optimum test views, directions, etc. were compared 
with other views, directions, etc., control objects and S/A using I-, 2- and 3-way 
ANOVAs and protected least significant difference (PLSD, Snedecor and Cochran 1980, 
Oram 1996) post-hoc  tests. Cells were deemed to be selective if they responded to one or 
more o f  the stimuli presented with responses significantly different from S/A. Cells may 
have responded as well to controls in some cases where direction o f  motion was more 
important than form. The results o f  the analyses were plotted as histograms o f  mean 
neuronal response (spikes per second), with SEMs. .
7,3 Results & Discussion
A total o f  829 cells were recorded and isolated from three hemispheres o f  two 
monkeys. A total o f  283 cells (34.1%) were recorded in Esther and a total o f  546 cells 
(65.9%) were recorded in Steve. Cell data was collected from a total o f  111 electrode 
penetrations (45 (40.5% }in Esther and 66 (59.5% }in Steve). O f these 829 cells, 194 
cells (23.4%) were visual, 42 cells (5.1%) were auditoiy, 11 cells (1.3%) were tactile,
525 cells (63.3%) were unclassifiable, 16 were complex spiking cells (1.9%) and 41 were 
fibres (4.9%).
O f the 194 visually responsive cells, 58 (29.9%) cells were classified as visual 
general, or not responsive to any specific stimulus in the collection o f  test stimuli. O f the 
remaining visually responsive cells, 69 (35.6%) were classified as motion general, or 
responding to any stimulus moving in any direction (during clinical testing). These cells 
were not tested further with any o f the test stimuli. Two visually responsive cells (1%) 
were classified as habituating to the presence o f  visual stimuli. In these cells, the response 
was high to the first presentation o f  the stimulus, but this response was significantly 
lowered on subsequent presentations. The response was recovered by the presentation o f  
a new stimulus. Finally, 65 (33.5%) visually responsive cells were classified as having
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specific responses to at least one item in the test array; species or attention/intention 
(static or motion}). The cells tested for responses to animal species, monkey body parts 
and monkey eye gaze will be described below. The cells tested for responses to human 
head and body views, eye gaze, attention to objects, whole body motion and motion 
towards objects are described in Chapter VIII.
7.3.1 General cell response characteristics
The cells recorded in the superior temporal sulcus (anterior superior temporal 
polysensoiy area) have general response characteristics. Average response (excitatoiy 
cells) to the most effective stimulus in a test array was 33.63 spikes/sec (range 0.8-104 
spikes/sec, number o f cells = 95) compared to an average spontaneous activity (baseline) 
rate o f  6.8 spikes/sec (range 0-26.4 spikes/sec, number o f  cells = 95).
7.3.2 Specific Cell Responses
The cells types described in the following sections were extremely diverse. For 
this reason, and to aid in relating patterns o f responses with patterns o f  behaviour, the 
results and discussion for each categoiy o f  cells are combined.
1. Static stimuli
A total o f  31 (out o f 56 tested) cells (55.4%) were responsive to either static 
stimuli which may function in coding another’s attention direction (eye gaze, head view  
or body view) or static stimuli which may require an interaction with an object.
a) Cells generalising across view (object-centred cells)
N o cell which was tested for view was determined to generalise for all views 
presented. This finding corresponds to previous studies that only a low number o f  cells in 
the STS generalise response across all views (Perrett et al 1991, 1992). Hasselmo et al
205
(1989) suggested that object-centred head-selective cells were abundant in the STS, 
however these authors did not test all views (or at least a minimum o f  four views were 
tested). The cells reported in Perrett et al (1985b) and Hasselmo et al (1989) were not 
tested for responses to the rear view (180®). Moreover, cells were treated as object- 
centred, even when view was found to interact with identity. Perrett et al (1985b) also 
stated that many cells tested for view had object-centred properties, but in early studies 
only two views were tested.
b) Cells broadly tunedfor view
Twelve cells (38.7%) were not selective to one view o f  the head, but were 
sensitive to more than one view. These cells were broadly tuned to one view, whilst 
remaining responsive to a number o f  other views, or were responsive to three views, but 
not to a fourth view (e.g. the face and both profiles, but not the back o f  the head). An 
example o f  the response o f a neuron, broadly tuned to multiple views is displayed in 
Figure 7.5.
Cells broadly tuned to one or more views have been suggested to code for the 
recognition o f heads and bodies. Pooling the responses o f  four populations o f  cells, each 
broadly tuned to one view would be required to recognise an object from any view. 
Broadly tuned neurons which are responsive to multiple views (not responsive to one 
view) may also function in coding attention direction. For example, a cell may be 
responsive to head view 0®, 90® and 270®, but not head view 180®. This cell is therefore 
sensitive to all views o f the head except the back o f  the head. Features o f head views, 0®, 
90® and 270® are the presence o f  at least one ear, one eye, a nose and a certain amount o f  
hair. The responses o f these neurons may, therefore be coding for faces which are 
oriented towards the viewer (to a certain degree). An opposite example would be a cell 
which responds to head view 90®, 180® and 270°, but not to the face (head view 0®). This 
neuron may be responding to all views away from the viewer (to a certain degree).
Figure 7.S. Neuronal responses of a cel! broadly tuned to head view (sensitive for 
multiple views). Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to different views of the 
head (0®, 90®, 180® and 270®), controls and S/A, for one cell (S32_2531), There was a 
significant effect o f condition, ANOVA: F(5,24)=4.28,p<0,01. Three views (head view 
















c) Cells specialising fo r  one specific view (attention specific)
1. View.
Eighteen cells (58.1%) showed narrow tuning to view (i.e. a selective responsive 
to one specific view o f  the head and/or whole body). The responses to specific views 
displayed for these cells were significantly different from controls and S/A, and all other 
views tested. An example o f a cell selective for view (viewer-centred) is displayed in 
Figure 7.6.
Three cells were responsive to the specific view o f the head independent o f  the 
body view. For one cell (E99_4016), there was an effect o f testing condition 
(F(7,32)=7.9, p<0.0001). The response to the sight o f the head only (view 0®) was not 
different from the whole body (view 0®, PLSD, p=0.89). The responses to the head only 
and whole body were significantly different from the body only (view 0®, PLSD, 
p<0.0001). The cell was also tested for multiple views o f the whole body and there was a 
significant effect o f  condition (F(5,24)=10.8, p<0.0001). The response to view 0® was 
significantly greater than other views (PLSD, p<0.05, all comparisons). When the same 
cell was tested for different head views whilst keeping the body view constant (view 0®), 
there was an effect o f  condition (F(4,20)=9.4, p<0.0001) and a greater response to head 
view 0® body view 0®, than to head view 90® body view 0® and head view 270® body view  
0® (PLSD, p<0.05, all comparisons).
The response o f a second cell (E103_3995) was sensitive to the view o f  the head. 
A  third cell was responsive only when the head was attached to the body and the views 
o f  the head and body were incongruent (see Figure 7.7). Previous studies o f  cells 
responsive to bodies and body parts (Wachsmuth et al 1994, Wachsmuth 1995) 
concluded that if a cell was sensitive to the appearance o f both the head and the rest o f  
the body, then sensitivity to the view o f the head and body was compatible (i.e. head 
view 0®, body view 0®). The cell reported in this section was most responsive when the 
view o f  the head and body was incompatible. Behaviourally, this type o f  cell may be 
coding another’s direction o f attention, from head view, but while the observed animal 
was doing something else. (Note that the cell was only tested with static stimuli, but the 
response to a static stimulus may be part o f coding a ‘freeze-frame’ o f  an action or
Figure 7.6. Neuroual responses of a cell selective to one view of the head (viewer- 
centered). Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to different views of the head 
(0®, 90^ 180®, 270®), controls and S/A for one cell (E94_3790). There was a significant 
effect of condition, ANOVA: jp(5,24)=13.86), p<0.0001. The responses were narrowly 
tuned to view 180® and were significantly different fi*om all other views, controls and S/A 
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Figure 7.7. Neuronal responses of a cell selective for head and foody when the views 
were incompatible. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to different views of 
the head and body (separate and attached), controls and S/A for one cell (E104 3995). 
There was a significant effect of condition, ANOVA: F(9,40)=6.41,/><0.0001. The 
responses to head view 0®, body view 90® were significantly different from the responses 






motion sequence.) Vigilant animals perform actions, such as feeding, mating, etc. whilst 
maintaining attention elsewhere (Whiten and Byrne 1988a, Lazarus 1990). Interpreting 
the head view (attention direction) and body view (attention o f  action) may be important 
for social learning and predator avoidance. Another possible behavioural interpretation 
may be that the obseiwed individual was studied when the individual’s attention was 
distracted or looking over their shoulder. The body may have been directed towards one 
view, but a stimulus to the right o f the body caused the head to move towards the right. 
The cell response may also be interpreted as a “follow-me” signal (see earlier), where the 
body is oriented in one direction, but the head is directed towards a third party.
2. Orientation.
The majority o f  the view specific cells described above were responsive when the 
head/body was presented upright. Two view (not view O") specific cells (11.1%) were 
tested for their response to different vertical orientations (upright, left and right 
horizontal, inverted) o f the whole body (see Figure 7.8 for details o f  a cell responsive to 
view 90®, which failed to respond to inverted orientations).
Both cells tested for the effects o f vertical orientation were found to be 
responsive to upright orientations (0®, 45®, 315®) significantly more than inverted and 
horizontal orientations. It was predicted that changing the orientation o f  the head or body 
would effect the response o f  a cell selective to a specific view. The prediction stated that 
changing the orientation would also change the view. For example, the cell described 
above responded to view 90®. Inverting the body changed the view to 270®. The cell only 
responded to upright orientations which would have maintained the view (90®), and 
therefore the direction o f attention.
A cell responsive to the face (view 0®) was tested for the effects o f changing 
orientation. The responses o f this cell are described in Figure 7.9. It was predicted that 
orienting a face would not change the face’s attention direction (towards the viewer). 
There was no effect o f  changing the orientation o f  the face on the responses o f  this cell. 
The responses o f  the cell may be generalising across orientation. Orienting the whole 
body may have affected attention direction, as the head would be placed into a different
Figure 7.8. Neuronal responses of a cell selective to one view of the body (view 90®) 
in an upright vertical orientation. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to 
different orientations of the body (view 90®), controls and S/A for one cell (E86_3843). 
Previous testing determined that the cell was responsive to view 90®. There was a 
significant effect of condition, ANOVA: F(9,40)=5.27,/?<0.0001. The cell was tested for 
responses to 8 orientations of the body (0®, 45®, 90®, 135®, 180®, 225®, 270® and 315® 
fi'om upright) and there were no significant differences between the upright orientations 
(0®, 45® and 315®; PLSD,/?>0.05 all comparisons), but there were significant differences 
between the upright orientations and other orientations (90®, 135®, 180®, 225® and 270®), 
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Figure 7.9. Neuroual respouses of a cell generalising across multiple vertical 
orientations of the face (horizontal head view 0®). Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 
each category) to four vertical orientations (0°, 90®, 180®, 270®) of the face (view 0®), 
controls and S/A for one cell (S33_2615). The stimulus was a cardboard mounted 
photograph o f a face. There was a significant effect of condition, ANOVA: 
/^(5,24)=7.39,/?<0.0001. There were no significant differences between orientations 0®, 
90® and 270® (PLSD,/?>0.05), but there were significant differences between orientations 
0®, 90® and 270® and controls and S/A (PLSD,i?<0.05, all comparisons). The three 
upright orientations were not significantly different fi’om orientation 180® (PLSD, 
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location (top to bottom) and may be viewing a different pait o f  the observer’s body). The 
responses o f cells selective to the sight o f the whole body (Wachsmuth 1995), which 
were oriented, were affected by inversion (differences from upright). All previous studies 
o f  the effects o f  orientation on cell responses to heads and bodies used face or the back 
o f  bodies as stimuli (Perrett, Rolls and Caan 1982, Perrett et al 1988, Tanaka et al 1991, 
Wachsmuth 1995), not profile views which may signify attention direction.
3. Elevation
Another aspect o f attention which has been suggested for the importance to cell 
coding is elevation (this is related to orientation above). One cell (5.6%) was tested for 
the effects on cell response by differing the elevation o f the head (up, level and down). 
The responses o f  this cell are displayed in Figure 7.10.
The one cell tested above was selective to elevation (head level) and head view  
(view 0°). This follows from the second prediction, that cells which code for attention 
direction would be sensitive to elevation and view. For the one cell tested, the response 
to head level (view 0®) was significantly different from head elevation down or up (view  
0®), suggesting that the head was looking directly at the viewer’s face (not above the face 
or towards the viewers body, Perrett et al 1984).
4. Eye gaze.
The direction o f  the eyes are better indicators o f attention direction than head 
view (Perrett et al 1992). For one cell, the view o f the eyes and the head were required to 
be in compatible directions to one another (e.g. eyes left, head left, not eyes left, head 
facing viewer). The responses o f  this cell are displayed in Figure 7.11. Changing the head 
view, while the eyes were directed towards right (i.e. eye direction 270®, head view 0®) 
did not produce responses which were the same or higher than the response to the head 
and eyes with compatible views (i.e. eye direction 270®, head view 270®). The response 
to head view 0®, eye direction 270® was greater than the response to head view 0®, eye 
direction 0®. This result suggests that the cell was sensitive to gaze direction independent 
o f  the head view.
Figure 7.10. Neuronal responses of a cell selective to view and elevation of the head.
Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to 2 different views of the head (0® and 
180®) with different elevations (up, level and down) for one cell (833 2615). The cell 
was responsive to view 0® and the head level, compared to other views, elevations and 
S/A (PLSD,/K0.05 all comparisons). There was a significant effect of condition, 
ANOVAF(6,28)=12.64,/?<0.0001. There was also a significant main effect of head 
view, two-way ANOVA: F(l,8)=9.29,/K0.05; and a non-significant main effect of head 
elevation, F(2,2)=0.94,/7=0.517. There was a significant interaction between head 





Figure 7.11. Neuronal responses of a cell selective to head view and gaze direction. 
Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to two different views of the head (0® and 
270®) and two different eye directions (0® and 270®) for one cell (S43_2473). There was 
a significant effect of condition, ANOVA: F(4,20)=11.45, p<0.0001. The cell was more 
responsive to the head view 270® and eye direction 270® compared to other head and eye 
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The responses of a second cell did not require that the eyes were directed towards 
a particular view, only that the eyes were present (not closed). This cell was responsive 
to head view, independent of eye position (see Figure 7.12). This cell appears to code the 
presence of the eyes on a face. One cell which was dependent on the position of the eyes 
was also dependent on the species of animal with the eyes (monkey not human). The 
responses of this cell are described in Chapter VIII.
d) Cells tested for attention to objects
Determining the direction of another’s attention may be important for attributing 
purpose behind another’s behaviour, but gaze also provides an important cue for locating 
objects in the environment, such as food, mating partners and predators (see chapter IX). 
Single or populations of neurons may respond to the sight of a head directed towards an 
object, but not when the head was presented alone, when the object was presented alone 
or when the head was looking away from the object.
Four view selective cells (22.2%) were tested for the effect on responses when an 
object was made the object of a human head’s attention. None of the cells tested were 
found to responsive only to the head plus the object (looking towards or away from the 
object). An example of this type of response is displayed in Figure 7.13, where no 
differences are apperent between head alone, head towards object or head away from 
object.
Cells responsive to the interaction between bodies and objects were described in 
the introduction (Perrett et al 1989a, b, 1990b). Those cells required that the bodies were 
in motion and that a physical interaction (or prediction of physical interaction) occured 
between the body (e.g. hand) and the object. The absence of an effect of objects on static 
head view selective neurons may be due to the lack of a physical interaction between the 
heads and objects. The cells responsive to hand-object interactions described above 
(Perrett et al 1989a, b) required that the hands and objects were actually touching to 
produce a response. Only looking at an object may not be sufficient to drive the cell 
responses.
Mgure 7.12. NewronaS responses of a cell sensitive to head view, but independent of 
eye position. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to one view of the head 
(view 0®), with eye direction, 0®, 45^ , 315® or eyes occluded, for one cell (S33 2615). 
There was a significant efect of condition, ANOVA, 7^11,48)=5.5, /?<0.0001. The 
responses to head view 0® with different eye positions (0®, 45® and 315®) were 
significantly different fi'om head view 0® with the eyes occluded, controls and S/A 
(PLSD, ^ <0.05, all comparisons).
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Figure 7.13. Neuronal responses of a cell responsive to head view and interaction 
with an object. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to slides of two different 
views of the head (90° and 270°), with the head either looking towards and away from an 
object (hanging collection of fruit), the head without the presence of an object, or the 
object without the presence of the head, for one cell (S43_2498). There was a significant 
effect of condition, ANOVA: F(8,36)=3.12, p<0.01. All views (in all combinations) were 
significantly different from S/A (PLSD,/?<0.05). There was a significant main effect of 
view in a 2-way ANOVA, F(l,8)=9.73,/?<0.05, but no significant effect of object 
presence, F(2,2)==3.91,/?=0.2. There was also a non-significant interaction between view 













Behavioural evidence in chapter IX suggests that monkeys follow another’s gaze 
independent of the presence of an object of attention. The objects used in the slides in 
this study (e.g. collections of finit) would have been salient for the subjects. All the 
subjects’ food during a recording session was located on a stand to the right of the 
subject. Neurons appear to be responsive to the sight of hands reaching and bodies 
moving towards the usual position of the food tray (see section 7.3.2.2 e). Neurons 
responsive to another’s direction of attention may not require that an object of attention 
be processed within the same receptive field. This may be of importance for two reasons. 
One, the object of attention may not be within the receptive field of the responsive cell 
(and gaze may have to be followed to some distance outside the receptive field). Second, 
the precise object of another’s attention changes temporally, spatially and between 
individuals. One individual may be looking at a clump of fruit, a second may be looking 
at a predator, a third may be looking at a conspecific. The second individual may be 
looking at a predator, first by the trees, next by a pool, etc. The response profiles of 
neurons selective for other’s heads looking at precise objects would not be flexible to 
code a large number of objects, spatially and temporally. The responses of the majority of 
neurons sensitive to hands interacting with objects (Perrett et al 1989a, b) were not 
dependent on the form of the object. Only the goal of the interaction was important. 
Determining the goal of another’s behaviour may be more difficult when using 
information from static stimuli, such as a head looking at an object. More information 
concerning the intentions of the head towards the object are gained if the head moves 
towards the object. Static stimuli, however, appear to be sufficient stimuli for human 
children to interpret another’s gaze within an intentional framework (Baron-Cohen 1994, 
1995, Baron-Cohen et al 1995). Non-human primates may only be able to utilise motion 
cues to help understand another’s purposive behaviour.
It is possible that a number of neurons in the temporal lobe do code for the sight 
of other’s heads interacting with objects. The small sample of neurons described in this 
chapter provide evidence which is indicative, but not conclusive that such neurons are not 
to be found within the cortex of the STS.
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2. Motion stimuli
A total of 25 (44.6%) cells were responsive to motion stimuli (heads and bodies 
in motion) or motion stimuli where an interaction with objects (i.e. walk to an object) 
elicited cell responses. A number of these cells may represent the direction of another’s 
attention (view specificity during motion).
a) Cells sensitive to motion direction with compatible body view
All cells tested were selective for direction of motion and/or head and body view. 
Seven cells (28%) were non-selective for a particular view or direction of motion, but 
required that the view and direction of motion were compatible to one another. An 
example of a cell response is displayed in Figure 7.14. It is noted that this type of cell 
differs from motion general cells, in that these cells require coding of a specific form as 
well as motion to respond (such as walking bodies, not moving trolleys). All form- 
selective motion responsive cells described in the following sections respond 
preferentially to walking three-dimensional bodies or representations of 3-D bodies.
b) Cells sensitive to motion direction, but not body view
Six cells (24%) were selective for the direction of motion, but not for the view. 
Some of these cells were non-form selective, as they were responsive to control objects 
moving in the appropriate direction. An example cell is displayed in Figure 7.15. This cell 
appeared to be responsive to motion towards a particular location, but not specific for 
the form of the object moving towards that location. An ability to determine the motion 
of objects without discrimnating form can have a number of functions. Oram and Perrett 
(1996) stated that cells responsive for direction of motion only were responsive 35msec 
earlier than cells responsive to form and motion direction. Eveiyday survival of an animal 
may not require or allow complex form processing to occur. For example, a predator 
may be hidden in bushes, where only the motion of the leaves provides a cue for the 
direction of the predators motion.
Some of these cells were sensitive to form and responded to bodies moving in a 
specific motion direction, but were not selective for the view of the head on the walking
Figure 7.14. Neuronal responses of a cell sensitive to compatible motion direction 
and view. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each categoiy) to four directions of walking 
(go 0°, go 90°, go 180° and go 270°), two views (compatible and incompatible) and to 
control motion, for one cell (S48 2150). There was a significant effect of condition, 
ANOVA: F1(12,52)=6.03,/7<0.0001, A 2-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of motion direction: F(3,16)=5.13,/><0.01; and a significant main effect of view 
(compatible v incompatible), ANOVA: F’(2,6)=33.98,/?<0.001. There was a non­
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Figure 7.15. Neuronal responses of a cell sensitive to motion dli'ection, but not 
form. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category ) to four directions of walldng with 
compatible view (go 0°, go 90°, go 180° and go 270°) and to moving controls, for one 
cell (S53_2669). There was a significant effect of condition, ANOVA; F(12,52)=6.44, 
/7<0.0001. Responses to view 90° go 90° and controls moving 90° were significantly 
different fi'om all other directions (independent of view or control, PLSD, p<0.05 all 
comparisons). There was a significant main effect of motion direction, 2-way ANOVA, 
7 (^3,16)=12.2, p<0.001; and a non-significant main effect of form (compatible view or 
control), F(l,3)=0.553,p=0.6. There was a non-significant interaction between motion 
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body (such as the responses of the cell displayed in Figure 7.16). This cell may be 
responsive to motion information from the body only, independent of head view. The cell 
was not tested for responses to motion of the body only.
c) Cells sefisiiive to body view, not motion direction
One cell (4%) was selective for the view of the body, but not the direction of 
motion. This cell was maximally responsive to view 0°, than other views, controls and 
S/A, but did not differentiate between move towards the monkey (go 0°) or move away 
from the monkey (go 180°). The cell, therefore responded to facing the monkey, 
independent of the motion direction (move towards or away from the monkey). The 
response of this cell are shown in Figure 7.17.
This cell may be responding to attention direction cues, as the view of the head 
and body, not the direction of motion appear to be important. For example, responses to 
walking towards or away from the monkey whilst looking at the monkey, may signal 
interest in the monkey. Similarly, responses to attention left, independent of the direction 
of motion may signal interest in an object, location or event to the left.
d) Cells sensitive to motion direction and body view
Eleven cells (44%) required that walking bodies were moving in one direction 
with the head and body in a compatible view to the direction of motion (i.e. walking 
towards the monkey with the head and/or body view also directed towards the monkey). 
An example of this type of cell is displayed in Figure 7.18.
One cell (9.1%) was responsive to direction and view, required that the walking 
body went out of sight of the subject (exited) at the end of travel. The cell was maximally 
responsive when the body walked to the right, with the head and body pointed to the 
right and the body exited the monkey’s visual field (see Figure 7.19).
Cells with responses to one specific direction of motion and one specific view 
may signal the direction of attention of the obseived figure. Furthermore, the cell may 
also function in interpreting another’s intentions in relation to objects, events or 
locations, at the end point of the motion. For example, an individual walking to the right
Figure 7.16. Neuroual responses of a ceiî selective for motion direction (go 225°), 
not head view. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to one direction of 
walking (go 225), three head views (90°, 180°, 270°), controls and S/A, for one cell 
(E94 3818). No other directions of motion were tested. There was a significant effect of 
condition, ANOVA: F(4,20)=10.24,p<0.0001. Responses to all head views moving were 
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Figure 7.17. Meua'oiial responses of a cel! selective for head/body view (0®), not 
motion direction. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to four directions of 
walking (go 0°, go 90°, go 180°, go 270°), 2 views (compatible and incompatible) and to 
control motion, for one cell (E95 3805). There was a significant effect of condition, 
ANOVA: F(12,52)=6.62,/?<0.0001. Differences between head view 0° (go 0° and go 
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Figure 7.18. Neuronal responses of a cell selective for motion direction and 
liead/body view. Mean response (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to four directions of 
walking (go 0°, go 90°, go 180°, go 270°), two views (compatible with motion direction 
and incompatible with motion direction) and moving controls, for one cell (E80_3589), 
There was a significant effect of condition, ANOVA: F(12,52)=5.77,/K0.0001. The 
response to view 270° go 270° (compatible 270°) was significantly greater than the other 
views, directions, controls and S/A (PLSD,/?<0.05 all comparisons). This was confirmed 
in a 2-way ANOVA which revealed a non-significant main effect o f motion direction, 
F(3,16)=2.51, jp=0.1); a significant main effect of view, F(2,6)=6.32,/?<0.05 and a 
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Figiir© 7.19. Neuronal responses of a cell sensitive to motion direction, head/body 
view and type of motion (exit/stop). Mean response (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to 
two directions of motion (go 90° and go 270°), two views (90° and 270°; compatible and 
incompatible to the direction of motion) and type of motion (exit or stop), for one cell 
(S19 2166). There was a significant effect of condition, ANOVA; F(10,44)=7.68, 
p<0.0001. The response to view 270° go 270° exit was significantly greater than other 
views, exit/stop, controls and S/A (PLSD,/?<0.01, all comparisons). The response to 
control go 90° was 2.4 spikes/sec (+/- 2.4 SEM), the response to control go 270° was 0.8 
spikes/sec (+/- 0.8 SEM) and the S/A was 0 spikes/sec (+/- 0 SEM). The results o f a 3- 
way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect o f direction, F(l,32)=48.3,p < 0.0001; a 
significant main effect o f view, F(l,32)==7.7, p < 0.01 and a significant main effect of 
motion type, F(l,32)=42.9, p  < 0.0001. There was a significant 3-way interaction 
between motion type, direction and view, F(l,32)=10.1,/? < 0.01.
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with view to the right, starting at a location left of the monkey, may be interested in and 
intend to move towards an object, location or event to the right of the monkey. The cell 
with a response to a specific view and direction of motion while exiting, may also be 
responsive to attention direction and intention towards an occluded object or object not 
within the observing monkey’s receptive field. The cell was not as responsive when the 
motion remained in view. This may signify that the end point of the motion was not 
within view.
e) Cells sensitive to reaching and motion to objects
The final class of cells were responsive to motion towards objects or exact 
locations (reaching or walking), in a goal-directed manner. Three (out of 11 tested) view 
and direction specific cells (27.3%), one (out of 18 tested) view specific static cells 
(5.6%) and two (out of 7 tested) general view and direction motion cells (28.6%) were 
tested for responses when an object was made the object of attention, during motion 
towards that object. One cell, S20_2268 (out of 7 tested) responded to reaching towards 
or moving the whole body towards the usual position of the food tray (which held the 
subject’s finit and nut rewards). The cell’s response was not contingent on the 
appearance of the tray (or a goal object, see Figure 7.20).
A second cell (S30_2564) was responsive when the whole body walked towards 
the subject (go 0°) with compatible view (view 0°), but was also walking away from an 
object (a food tray on a stand), compared to walking to an object or walking without an 
object. A histogram displaying this cell’s response is displayed in Figure 7.21.
The first cell described above responded to reaching or walking towards a 
particular location, but responses were not contingent on the presence of an object. 
Perrett et al (1989a, b) stated that the responses of the majority of the cells sensitive to 
actions were dependent on the presence of an object. The cell reported here corresponds 
to the cell reported in Perrett et al (1990b), where the response was contingent on 
walking to a precise location (the laboratory door). The responses of the cell described 
above were independent of the presence of an object, but the motion had to be directed 
towards the particular location, not away from it.
Figure 7.20. Neuronal responses of a cell sensitive interaction with an object (or 
usual location of the object). Mean response (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to a hand 
reaching to or retracting from an object or whole body motion towards an object (tray 
present or not present), for one cell (S20 2268). There was a significant effect of 
condition, ANOVA: F(6,28)=2.68,/? < 0.05. The responses to reach towards or move 
towards tray position were significantly different from move body to tray, retract hand 
from tray and S/A (PLSD, p  < 0.05, all comparisons). All other comparisons were non­
significant (PLSD,/? > 0.05). A 2-way ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of 
presence of the tray, F(l,8)=5.33,/? < 0.05 and a non-significant effect of motion type 
(reach, retract, move body), F(2,2)=12.87, p  -  0.07. There was a non-significant 








Figure 7.21. Neuronal responses o f a ceiî sensitive to wlioie body motion away from 
an object. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to a whole body walking 
(view 0® go 0®, view 180® go 0® or view 0® go 180®) towards or away from an object (a 
food tray) or walking (all views and directions above) to the position o f  the tray (tray not 
present), for one cell (S30_2564), There was a significant effect o f  condition, ANOVA: 
F (9 ,40)= 2 .79 ,p  < 0.01. There were significant differences between view 0®go 0® away 
from the tray and all other stimuli and S/A (PLSD, p  < 0.05, all comparisons). A  2-way 
ANOVA revealed a significant main effect o f  view and motion direction, F(2,4)=12.63,/?  
< 0.05, a non-significant effect o f  motion type (walk to and away from tray and walk to 
tray position), ANOVA: F(2,12)=3.07,/? = 0.08 and a non-significant interaction 
between motion type and view/motion direction, 7^(4,24)=0.71, p  = 0.59.
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The responses of the second cell were dependent on the presence of the object. 
The whole body motion had to be directed away from the object. The object had to be in 
a particular location as the view and direction of motion were also important. For 
example, the cell responded to walk towards the monkey while attending to the monkey 
and walking away from the object. This may correspond to walk to the monkey with a 
fruit reward (as the food tray was the object). The cell did not respond to walk towards 
the monkey, but attend away, or walk away from the monkey, but attend to the monkey. 
The cell may not have responded to these motion types, as the end goal of the motion 
would be different, e.g. monkey receives a reward.
7.3.3 H istological reconstruction
Histological data is not available from subject Steve as this monkey is still being 
used in ongoing neurophysiological and behavioural experiments. The reconstruction of 
cell postions within subject Esther (see Chapter VI for methods), indicated that cells 
responsive to the stimuli discussed in this chapter were located in the upper and lower 
banks of the anterior STS (see Figure 7.22).
7.4 General Discussion
The responses of cells reported in this chapter confirm earlier studies (Perrett et al 
1985a, b, 1989a, b, 1990a, b, c, 1991, Oram and Perrett 1994, 1996, Wachsmuth et al 
1994) which suggested that the STS is one area of the monkey brain which may code for 
the visual analysis of other’s behaviour. Perrett and Emei*y (1994) also suggest that the 
responses of neurons selective to cues of another’s attention may be used to analyse 
another’s behaviour within a purposive framework. It is difficult to completely support or 
refute claims of this type when the sample of cells presented are small.
The responses of the cells described in this chapter may be explained in a number 
of ways, but a social interpretation makes the most sense. In order to survive, a monkey
Figure 7,22. H istological reconstruction; Attention and intention (static), (a) Series 
o f  frontal sections o f  the STS every 1mm (6.5 {bottom}to 5.5mm {top} anterior in the 
interaural plane) reconstructed from one monkey (E) showing the location o f cells 
responsive to static view (open circles), view and orientation (filled circles), head 
elevation (open triangles) and eye gaze (filled triangles).
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Figure 7.22. H istological reconstruction; Attention and intention (motion), (b)
Series o f  frontal sections o f  the STS every 1mm (6.5 {bottom} to 15.5mm {top} anterior 
in the interaural plane) reconstructed from one monkey (E) showing the location o f  cells 
responsive to view  specific, direction non-specific motion (filled circles), direction 
specific, view  non-specific motion (open circles), direction and view  specific motion 
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Figure 7.22. Histological reconstruction: Attention and intention (static and 
motion), (c) Series o f frontal sections o f  the STS taken every 1mm (6.0 to 17.0mm 
anterior in the interaural plane) reconstructed from one monkey (E) showing the 
location o f recording tracks. Thick black lines indicate the surface o f the cortex and the 
thin black lines indicate the boundary between white and grey matter.
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or ape must have intimate knowledge of their environment (such as good sources of food 
and water, where to get them in times of hardship, and the probable location of predators 
and how to avoid them), but also how to interact appropriately with conspecifics. Theory 
of mind has been proposed as a method which enables humans to function successfully in 
the social domain (Baron-Cohen 1994, 1995). Evidence suggests that this domain- 
specific system may not be available to non-human primates (particularly the Old and 
New World monkeys, lesser apes and prosimians). (There have been no studies of lesser 
ape theory of mind, but as the evidence for great ape theory of mind is controversial, the 
capacity of lesser apes is as likely to be controversial.) The same evidence indicates that 
non-human primates can read another’s behaviour, rather than another’s mental state 
(Cheney and Seyfarth 1990a, b, c, 1991, 1996). The form of behaviour-reading that non­
human primates may employ, may not require that mental states are read (as proposed by 
a theoiy of mind). Predicting what another individual animal will do next (within a 
sequence of actions) does not require that mental states need to be attributed to the 
observed animal. Experience forms a large part of interpreting another’s future behaviour 
(X always does Y, so X will do Y again in the same situation.). This form of analysis 
does not require higher-order levels of interpretation beyond complex behaviour reading. 
This level of analysis is, however, more complex than the methods with which the 
majority of animals may respond to the behaviour of conspecifics (i.e. within a 
behaviourist framework, see MacPhail 1987, 1996). For example, individual W performs 
behaviour X and this effects behaviour Y of individual Z. Individual Z does not attempt 
to change the outcome of individual W’s behaviour X, so thata different behaviour V 
occurs. Animals may always respond to a particular stimulus with a particular action.
Humans do not always successfully interpret what another’s attention, goals, 
beliefs, etc. are going to be. Attributions of mental states are not always correct, as 
humans (and may be other primates) are not mindless automatons reacting to changes in 
the environment, which may easily be predicted (e.g. X has occured, so Y will do Z; if Q 
occurs, Y will do R).
The introduction to this chapter discussed the possible ways with which monkeys 
and apes may analyse other’s behavioural patterns and interpret purpose behind their
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behaviour (in a non-mentalistic fashion). The cells reported in this chapter fit with this 
interpretation. Obsei'ving the goal of another’s use of a tool and how actions with tools 
interact with objects, requires not only an understanding of another’s actions, but also 
how those actions can be integrated into the obseiwer’s behavioural repertoire. For 
example, tools may not have been used prior to the obseiwation of a conspecific using a 
tool. The physical capability to use the tool may be present in the animal’s physical 
repertoire (e.g. the correct grip). Matching the observed action with an exact brain 
record of the precise physical ability required to perform the novel, observed actions 
using the tool in the approriate manner, would be required . For example, a chimpanzee 
infant obsei*ves his mother using a stripped twig to fish for termites (Goodhall 1971). The 
infant has the physical capability to perform the same action; hands and neuromotor 
system for producing the same actions as related to the twig and the termite mound. To 
perform the same action, the infant’s brain must match the existing visual neural records 
for this action (as obsei-ved from the mother’s actions) with the motor output required to 
perform the correct action (visuomotor transformation). Neurons coding the sight of 
actions onto objects (or simple interactions with objects) would be an important and 
integral step to forming mental representations of obsei*ved actions. These forms of 
representations may be formed in premotor cortex by ‘monlcey-see-monkey-do’ neurons 
(Carey 1996) which code for the appearance of actions on objects and the motor output 
of the same actions (Gallese et al 1996, Rizzolatti et al 1996), which are obviously of 
importance when discussing mechanisms of imitation.
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Chapter VIII
Neuronal Categorisation of Primate Species
'‘Individual recognition requires that animals form mental representations o f the 
properties o f conspecifics as well as o f the identity o f particular conspecifics. These 
representations should he neurally encoded, stored in plastic areas o f the brain, and 
reactivated when recognition occurs. ”
Zayan (1994, p. 233).
8,0 Summary
Earlier chapters have distinguished the anterior temporal cortex as an area which 
contributes to social behaviour (in particular the perception and recognition of facial 
stimuli and social signals). The goal of this chapter is to examine whether cells responsive 
to faces are sensitive to species differences. Different cells within this region were found 
to respond preferentially to human faces or preferentially to monkey faces. Other cells 
were unselective, responding to both monkey and human faces. The results are discussed 
in terms of species recognition at the behavioural level and the natural categorisation of 
primate species at the neural level. Some cells also responded preferentially to monkey 
body parts and other cells were sensitive to the eye positions of the observed monkey 
head (see also Chapter VII). The results of this chapter have important implications for 
the results of Chapter IX, where recognition of social signals may be enhanced or present 
only when cues are displayed by the same species (rather than cues from humans).
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8.1 Introduction
8.1.1 Ethology of Conspecific Recognition
Evidence exists for species (and individual) recognition in a large number of 
invertebrates and vertebrates (Fletcher and Michener 1987). Monkeys and apes appear to 
have the ability to distinguish between the subtle differences of similar species, at the 
behavioural level. As with other forms of social communication, diurnal anthropoid 
primates employ predominantly visual and vocal methods in conspecific recognition. This 
small review will discuss only the role of vision in recognition.
There are three possible levels of recognition which a particular individual can 
achieve. First, recognising that an individual is part of a larger category such as species 
(e.g. Macaca rmilatta ovMacaca fascicularis), genus (e.g. Macaca imdatta oï Papio 
anubis), subfamily (e.g. Cercopiihecinae or Hominoidea), order (e.g. Primate or 
Insectivora) or class (e.g. Mammalia or zlve^). Second, recognising that an individual is 
kin (e.g. mother, father, siblings). Finally, distinguishing the exact identity of the 
observed individual (e.g. mother, alpha male, best friend. Uncle Joe, etc.).
(a) Species recognition
Individuals must be able to recognise other members of their own species, or else 
they would not be able to mate or socially interact. This is beyond doubt. Do individuals, 
however, distinguish own species from closely related species, or from distantly related 
species using simple perceptual cues, such as face and body shape?
Fujita (1990, 1993 a) studied the preferences of infant Japanese and rhesus 
macaques when presented with pictures of different or same species. All subjects were 
separated from their mother 7 days after birth and then human reared. During rearing, the 
infants were either caged with an age-matched individual of the same species or an aged- 
matched individual of a different species. For testing, the infants were trained to press a 
lever when a bulb illuminated, which would cause a picture to appear on screen.
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Preference for the picture was scored as the length of time before the lever was pushed 
again to present a different picture. The subjects were tested at 3, 6, 9 12, 18 and 27 
months old. The stimuli were slides of rhesus and Japanese macaques, either including or 
not including infants. Rearing condition (same species versus different species) did not 
seem to effect the overall preference of the subjects. All subjects appeared to prefer slides 
of rhesus macaques. An older Japanese macaque trained in a similar way, preferred adult 
Japanese macaques over adult rhesus macaques. There may be an effect of rearing 
condition on species preferences in Japanese macaques.
In a third experiment, 14 month old rhesus and Japanese macaques were 
presented with slides of Japanese, rhesus, Taiwanese, crab-eating, pigtail, bonnet and 
stumptailed macaques, either with one, two or more than two animals of the same species 
in each picture. Rhesus macaques preferred their own species; rhesus and Japanese 
macaques showed a negative preference for crab-eating and stumptailed macaques and 
Japanese macaques showed a strong preference for pig-tailed and bonnet macaques. 
When rhesus and Japanese macaques were cross-fostered (Fujita 1990), the Japanese 
infant reared by a rhesus mother, preferred slides depicting scenes with rhesus monkeys, 
but there was no clear statistically significant preference of rhesus infants reared by 
Japanese mothers (although the tendency was a preference for rhesus). A preference for 
rhesus macaques in Japanese macaques may be innate. Delson (1980) has suggested that 
Japanese macaques were derived from rhesus macaques who immigrated from Asia to 
the Japanese islands in the Middle Pleistocene period.
The same species preference with adult rhesus and Japanese macaques was 
replicated in normally reared pig-tail macaques (Fujita 1993b). Adult monkeys were 
tested using a similar paradigm as previously and responses to pictures of Japanese and 
pigtail macaques (either with the whole body or with parts removed) were measured. The 
subjects clearly preferred their own species. The preference for the pig-tail pictures was 
reduced if the head and tail, or just head were removed from the pictures. There were no 
changes in preference when the tail only, body only or background were removed. Pig­
tail macaques preferences, therefore, appear to be based on a combination of body 
features (including the head), not just single features.
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Dittrich (1994) also studied which physical features monkeys appeared to be use 
in their discrimination of other species and found contrasting results. In tests, subjects 
(long-tailed macaques) were not examined for preferences, but subjects had to 
discriminate pictures of a previously learnt vervet monkey from pictures of a baboon, a 
patas monkey and a cebus monkey. All the stimuli were presented simultaneously and the 
subject had to press a button next to the picture of the vei*vet monkey. The pictures 
presented were either whole body, torso without head, head alone, extremities (legs and 
arms), head and extremities, and torso and extremities. Subjects were proficient in 
discriminating the vei*vet from the other species and appeared to be making 
discriminations based on the presence of the torso (with and without extremities). The 
head was not required for discrimnation, as in the Fujita (1993b) study. Monkeys may 
prefer the head (as the face provides large amounts of social information), but monkeys 
may make discriminations between species on the presence of other body parts.
The preference for same species seems to be present in the preferences of other 
species of macaque. Fujita and Wat a nab e (1995) studied the preferences of seven closely 
related species of Sulawesi macaques (M nigra, M  nigrescens, M  hecki, M. tonkeana, 
M. mannis, M. ochneata, A4, bninnescens). There is probably extensive interbreeding 
within these species and the differences between the species are vei'y subtle. All seven 
species, when tested using a similar preference paradigm to Fujita (1990, 1993a,b), 
clearly preferred pictures of their own species.
Monkeys also appear to be proficient in discriminating between species of non­
human primates and non-primate vertebrates (birds, ungulates, carnivores, etc.). 
Preference time was measured for stump-tailed macaques watching slides of different 
animals for 15 minute trial periods (Demaria and Thieri7  1988). The subjects preferred 
slides of stumptailed macaques and slides which included adults with infants (greater 
preference than slides with infants only or adults only). Duration of fixation was greater 
for mammals than for birds, with felids (cats) examined more than ungulates (cattle) and 
canids (dogs). Demaria and Thieriy suggested that felids' eyes were important and tested 
differences in preference between mammalian species with forward facing eyes or averted 
eyes. The eyes appeared to make no differences to the preference of felids over other
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mammals. It is possible that there is an innate interest response to felids, which are 
naturally predatoi-y to monkeys.
The majority of behavioural work conducted to test species (and between classes, 
orders, subfamilies, genus’s, etc.) discrimination has been performed by experimenters 
investigating primate’s categorical perception of objects. Monkeys have a natural interest 
in pictures of animal over pictures of counti*y scenes (Humphrey 1974). Schrier and 
Brady (1987) have suggested that the interest may be because monkeys categorise 
objects individually rather than as collections of objects as multiple parts of a whole 
scene. Animals, although collections of objects themselves (such as body parts), are 
different from scenes, which by nature, have thousands of small details which would be 
impossible to categorise at the individual level. Categorising pictures individually takes 
longer to process, by fitting percepts with specific exemplars within a categoiy (i.e. all 
monkeys have tails, faces, a body, four legs, etc., but stumptailed macaques have short 
tails, rhesus macaques have medium-sized tails, long-tailed macaques have long tails, 
etc.). Interest in a stimulus may be highly correlated with time spent inspecting the 
stimulus.
Yoshikubo (1985) tested the proposition that rhesus monkeys form concepts 
about other species, based on their common attributes. Subjects had to spontaneously 
discriminate between pictures with and without rhesus monkeys (of vaiying size, distance 
from the camera and horizontal view). Three lights were illuminated simultaneously with 
the presentation of pictures. When a key was pressed, a reward was delivered (S+). If a 
key was pressed when the lights were not illuminated (during simultaneous presentation 
of a picture), the subjects were not rewarded (S-). Pictures with rhesus monkeys were S+ 
and pictures without rhesus monkeys were S-. The subjects performed these 
discriminations after an average of 10 sessions (80 trials per session). Next, the subjects 
made discriminations between pictures of rhesus monkeys and other animals (humans, 
chimpanzees, dogs, pigeons, sheep, snakes, etc.). Finally, the subjects were able to 
discriminate between Japanese and rhesus monkeys.
Monkeys can also distinguish between slides which include humans and slides in 
which humans are not present. D ’Amato and Van Sant (1988) trained two capuchin
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subjects on a slide set of human exemplars (a collection of pictures of humans with 
similar shape, size and build). Choice of the human slides was reinforced by rewarding 
the subjects each time a slide with a human was chosen, above other slides of scenes 
without humans. This scenario was switched for the second subject; i.e. choice of humans 
was unrewarded. Both subjects were then asked to perform a transfer task on a novel set 
of human slides. Both subjects achieved a significant transfer in a relatively small number 
of trials. A second set of capuchin subjects were tested to determine whether the transfer 
effect remained if the skin-colour of the humans in the slides was changed. Skin-colour 
did not significantly effect discrimination of humans from other slides. Rhesus monkeys 
can also make these discriminations after a large number of trials (and training) and can 
distinguish humans from non-human primates (monkeys and apes), even when the human 
pictures are scrambled and inverted, but not when they are silhouetted (Schrier and 
Brady 1987).
Schrier et al (1984) previously found that rhesus monkeys could be trained to 
choose scenes including humans from those that did not and to transfer this ability to 
novel slides. The choices of the macaque subjects were not made by analysing individual 
slides. This is in contrast to Schrier et al’s later findings. Schrier et al (1984) also tested 
stumptail macaques in the same experiment (choice discrimination), but tested for 
categorisation of non-human primates from other animals. The stumptail subjects could 
distinguish between slides of different animals (primates versus non-primate animals), but 
transfer to novel pictures appeared to be difficult, unless the slides were of macaques. A 
single stumptailed macaque, however, made high percentage correct transfers for humans 
and monkeys when using a go/no-go procedure, rather than a choice discrimination 
procedure. The results, therefore, may be dependent on the method of testing, on 
individual performance, or on the amount of previous experience of the categories being 
tested.
When presented with pictures of a number of primate species (monkeys, apes and 
humans), outdoor scenes and other objects (flowers, trees, fruits), rhesus monkeys’ 
responses, on a same/different picture task, were similar for primate pictures and for 
other objects (in the majority of cases). Interestingly, one subject grouped an outdoor
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scene (blue sky), a blue flower and a mandrill (blue face) together, which all have some 
blue features. This subject may have been grouping using a simpler concept of the colour 
blue, rather than classes of object. Monkeys, may use a concept of primate, not just 
individual species (Sands, Lincoln and Wright 1982), but also lower levels of conceptual 
analysis (such as colour).
The results described above suggest that there are innate abilities to distinguish 
between same species and other closely related species. The ability to differentiate 
primates and humans from other objects was demonstrated only after extensive training. 
The use of different testing methods, reflecting subtle changes in recognition, may reveal 
spontaneous abilities of species discrimination. The results of the above studies do not 
tell us how monkeys categorise same and other species in their natural environment. 
Cheney and Seyfarth’s studies of vei*vet alarm calls provide evidence that monkeys do 
form concepts about different animals (see Chapter II). As stated in Chapter II, vervets 
use at least three different alarm calls in response to the sight of different types of 
predator (Seyfarth et al 1980a, b, Cheney and Seyfarth 1990c). Vervets probably have at 
least a general concept of predator (an aversive, dangerous, external, animate stimulus) 
and more likely, concepts of multiple types of predator (avian, large mammal, snake).
The use of specific alarm calls would be redundant without such concepts. Use of 
different alarm calls for different predators (eliciting different, appropriate responses from 
conspecifics) provides evidence for multiple concepts of predator in vei*vets (Seyfarth et 
al 1980a, b).
(b) Kin recognition
Kin are probably not recognised just by basic perceptual signals based on the 
physical features of an individual. Other perceptual cues may be utilised. For example, kin 
are often found within close proximity to one another (Gouzoules and Gouzoules 1987). 
This is particularly apparent for mothers and infants, and aunts/uncles and cousins to a 
lesser extent. Rates of grooming may also be higher between kin.
Some authors have recently suggested that kin recognition in monkeys may be 
attributed to familiarity only (Fredrickson and Sackett 1984). Fredrickson and Sackett
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(1984) attempted to replicate an earlier study (Wu et al 1980), where infant pigtailed 
macaques displayed a trend (non-significant, p=0.1) to select genetically related males 
over unrelated males. Frederickson and Sackett studied the preferences o f a larger sample 
o f  infant macaques o f  adult males o f vaiying familiarity and relatedness to the infants 
subjects. Fredrickson and Sackett did not find the trend shown in the previous study. 
There was no effect o f genetic related ness on social preference for individual males. 
Preferences may have been based on familiarity cues only. This may certainly be the case 
for related males, including fathers, as there is little or no form o f parental contribution to 
an infant’s welfare after conception. There is little benefit to the infant to maintain links 
with their father. The bond between mother and infant, however, is different and is due 
probably to aspects o f kin recognition which cannot be attributed just to familiarity. N o  
reasonable length o f  time would have passed between birth and preliminary contact with 
the mother to establish familiarity (this would not explain the initial attraction o f  the 
infant for the mother). Familiarity does not breed contempt for infants towards their 
mothers.
(c) Individual recognition
Individual recognition by primates has not be overly studied despite the 
importance o f  this every-day behaviour. For example, knowledge o f an individual’s 
position in a dominance hierarchy is vital for conflict avoidance. (Note: amygdala lesions 
may cause disruptions in responding appropriately to an individual’s threatening gesture, 
when that individual is more dominant. This may either have been due to a deficit in 
coding the significance o f the threat expression (the emotionality was removed from the 
basic perception o f  the threatening face} or a deficit in correlating the act o f  a threat with 
the dominance o f the individual providing the threat, i.e. not linking “X  is threatening me 
and X  is dominant to me, therefore I should respond with a submissive gesture”.)
A new-born infant must begin to recognise individuals as soon it is born. Whether 
this form o f  recognition is visual, auditoiy, tactile or olfactoiy is not known. The infant 
may attach itself to the first animate object in its immediate proximity, but it is more 
likely that the mother naturally nurses the infant until the infant reaches a point in
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development where it can discriminate objects visually. Rodman et al (1993) found that 
cells selectively responsive to faces could be successfully recorded in inferotemporal 
cortex (IT) and the superior temporal polysensoiy area (STP) o f 2 month old infant 
rhesus monkeys. An interesting experiment would be to determine differences in response 
between pictures o f  the mother versus other familiar and non-familiar monkeys. Face- 
responsive neurons in the amygdala may differentiate based in hedonic (emotional) value 
o f  the mother’s face compared to unknown faces. Behaviourally, 12 week old Japanese 
macaques can discriminate their mothers from three unfamiliar females (Nakamichi and 
Yoshida 1986), when proximity, speed o f  approach and orientation are taken as measures 
o f  the infant’s preference.
Chimpanzees and orangutans would be expected to recognise individuals, as they 
can distinguish reflections o f  themselves in mirrors as being distinct from conspecifics 
(Gallup 1970). Recognising the self as an individual distinct from others, may be an 
advanced form o f individual recognition (Gallup 1970, 1982). Monkeys and gorillas do 
not appear to recognise themselves in mirrors (Povinelli 1987 for review, although see 
positive results for a New World monkey; cotton-top tamarin in Hauser et al 1995). This 
does not mean that monkeys and gorillas have deficits in individual recognition as they 
may still recognise other individuals from their vocal or olfactoiy signals, or may class 
others by their appearance, whilst having no knowledge o f their own physical features. 
(The complex arguments surrounding self-recognition, the mirror test and connections to 
discussions about the presence o f a non-human primate theoiy o f  mind will not be 
discussed here, but the reader is directed to various discussions; Gallup 1982, Povinelli 
1987, Heyes 1993, 1997.)
Chimpanzees tend to differentiate individuals by physical features. Boy sen and 
Bertson (1986) displayed slide photographs o f familiar human caregivers, familiar 
individuals, strangers and control slides to a 3.5 year old female chimpanzee. Electrodes 
were attached to the chimpanzee to measure heart rate before, during and after 
presentation o f  the photographs. The subject’s heart rate changed in response to all 
photographs, but the largest change (decrease) and variability in heart rate response was 
apparent when the subject looked at pictures o f caregivers. The emotional response
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associated with this decrease in heart rate correlated with the identity o f  the human 
caregiver (who provides food, water, social bonding, etc.). The same subject was also 
presented with pictures o f  conspecifics, who were either friendly and familiar, aggressive 
and familiar, or unfamiliar (Boysen and Bertson 1989). Heart rate was measured again 
and an accelerated response was associated with the aggressive chimpanzee, a 
deceleration with the unfamiliar conspecific and a minimal change with the friendly 
chimpanzee. The subject was therefore able to, not only recognise individuals, but also to 
link subjective feelings with these individuals.
Monkeys and apes also classify conspecifcs dependent on previous social 
interactions and social histoiy. Female baboons, for example, appear to produce long­
term bonds or friendships with other females and males (Smuts 1985). This form o f  
behaviour is ultimately dependent on recognising an individual from physical features and 
linking basic perceptual details with information about an individual’s social history, such 
as whether the individual aided the observer in a previous aggressive encounter. Such 
friendships provide many benefits such as relaxation and comfort (from females) and 
protection (from other males and predators) and increased access to preferred foods 
(Smuts 1985, Cheney et al 1986).
Dasser tested long-tailed macaque’s ability to recognise kin associations in the 
laboratory. First, Dasser trained the subjects to respond to one o f  a pair o f  simultaneously 
presented pictures o f unknown individuals or family members (Dasser 1987). The 
subjects then had to transfer to a novel set o f stimuli, which included familiar individuals 
(not seen in training) or novel slides o f animals used during training. During the transfer 
trials the subjects correctly discriminated 44 out o f  60 slides o f familiar individuals, but 
only 7 out o f 18 unknown animals. In a matching-to-sample task, the sample slide was a 
familiar animal. The subject was then presented with an identical or similar slide o f  the 
same animal or a slide o f  a different animal. The subject was able to successfully match to 
the sample when novel slides o f the face, novel slides o f the whole body and slides o f  
non-overlapping body parts were presented (e.g. face and feet).
Long-tailed macaques were also able to determine social relationships from slide 
representations (Dasser 1988). First, the subjects were trained to respond to pictures
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with pairs o f animals versus not to respond to pictures with single animals. Then, using 
similar paradigms to above, the subjects had to transfer to pictures with novel 
combinations o f  previously seen animals or novel animals. In the discrimination 
experiment, one subject were presented with two slides, one with a mother-infant pair, 
the other with unrelated female-infant pairs. The subject correctly identified all 14 o f the 
mother-infant pairs. In the matching-to-sample experiment, a second subject was 
presented with a sample (mother) and two choices (offspring or a similar infant). The 
subject also performed well, matching 20 out o f 22 infants with their mothers. This effect 
was reduced, however, when the infants were 2-3 years older (10 out o f  16 correct).
8.1.2 Neiirobiology of Couspecific Recognition
If  monkeys have the behavioural capacity to distinguish between closely related 
species, kin and individuals, some system in the brain must be driving these processes o f  
recognition. Cells which are responsive to faces have been described in many parts o f  the 
monkey brain (see Chapters II and VII). The response o f  face-selective cells is usually to 
the presentation o f human faces, however, some studies have tested cells with non-human 
primate faces. In one o f the first full accounts o f face-selective cells, Desimone et al 
(1984) reported a number o f  cells in inferotemporal cortex which either respoded to 
photographs o f monkeys and photographs o f  the experimenters. The stimuli were used 
interchangeably, not simultaneously, i.e. the differential effects o f  species on cell response 
was not tested. Perret et al (1984) reported that the responses o f  a small number o f  cells 
were greater to monkeys compared to humans. Rolls (1984) used pictures o f  monkeys 
(with neutral and threatening faces) to elicit responses from cells in the STS and 
amygdala. (Cells tested for response to different facial expressions were tested mainly 
with monkey stimuli; see Chapter II.)
Cells responsive to faces have also been found within comparable areas o f  the 
temporal lobe o f  sheep (Kendrick and Baldwin 1987). The responses o f  these cells were 
dependent on the species o f the animal face. Kendrick (1994) presented faces o f different 
types o f  sheep, such as those with long or short horns, curved versus straight horns, etc.
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and some cells differentiated between categories. Other cells responded to sheep dogs 
and humans, but the majority preferred pictures o f  the same breed.
Perrett et al (1984) found a small subset o f  neurons in the STP which were 
specific for the identity o f  two particular human experimenters. Hasselmo, Rolls and 
Baylis (1989) found that the responses o f  cells in the inferior temporal gyrus were 
affected by the identity o f  three individual monkeys. Three different facial expressions 
were also tested, with expression and identity effecting cell responses depending on the 
cell location (STS; facial expression or IT; identity).
None o f  the studies to date, in macaques, have tested the response o f  face- 
selective cells to more than two species. The studies which have tested responses to 
specific monkey and human faces (Desimone et al 1984, Perett et al 1984, Rolls 1984, 
Young and Yamnae 1992) reported comparable responses to humans and monkeys for 
the majority o f  cells (but see Perrett et al 1984). The studies in sheep tested at least three 
species; sheep, sheepdog and human (Kendrick 1994). The behavioural evidence 
discussed in section 7.1.1 suggested that monkeys can diffferentiate between the sight o f  
a number o f  different animal species. It is probable, that the process o f  species 
recognition can be localised to populations o f  single cells within the anterior temporal 
cortex.
Disorders o f human face identity recognition, such as prosopagnosia (Damasio 
1985) and Capgras syndrome (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997) occur through brain 
trauma (organic or surgical). Prosopagnosia is a form o f  agnosia restricted to face 
recognition; where recognition o f  previously familiar faces is either dismpted or 
completely absent (Milders and Perrett 1993). This disorder can develop after unilateral 
damage to the occipto-temporal region o f the fusiform gyrus (Damasio 1985). Recently, 
neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies in humans have revealed significant levels 
o f  activation in the midfusiform and inferior temporal gyri to the presentation o f  face- 
stimuli (normal and scrambled; Allison et al 1994, Puce et al 1995). Failure to identify 
previously known faces has also been shown in some patients with bilateral amygdala 
damage (Young et al 1995).
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Capgras syndrome is a misidentification syndrome. Patients suffering from this 
disorder do not suffer from prosopagnosia, but fail to attribute the correct emotional 
valence to the faces they can recognise (Hirstein and Ramachandran 1997). Capgras 
syndrome is similar to the delusions o f  people in the movie, ’’'Invaders o f  the B ody  
Snatchers”. The patient recognises family and friends but suggest that they are 
“impostors” and are not really who they look like. Hirstein and Ramachandran (1997) 
have suggested that Capgras syndrome may be attributable to a disconnection o f  the 
inferior temporal cortex with the amygdala, or damage to the right fronto-parietal cortex.
Attempts to produce prosopagnosia in monkeys has so far failed (Heywood and 
Cowey 1992). The monkeys were tested on discriminations o f  familiar from non-familiar 
individuals and pre-operatively the monkeys were good at this discrimination. Bilateral 
lesions o f  the STS were performed (due to the large number o f face responsive neurons 
found within the STS), but deficits in face-recognition (such as discriminating familar 
individuals) were not seen post-operatively. Right temporal lobe damage is sufficient to 
cause prosopagnosia in humans. Monkeys do not have latéralisation o f  function, i.e. both 
hemispheres perform the same flmction, whereas in humans each hemisphere performs a 
different function. Bilateral damage, therefore, would be required to effect face- 
processing, but this causes deficits in other forms o f processing, such as object 
recognition (Perrett et al 1992, Milders and Perrett 1993).
It would have been interesting if Heywood and Cowey (1992) had tested 
monkeys with pictures o f  extremely familiar monkeys (such as siblings, alpha male or 
breeding females), rather than pictures o f  novel monkeys, which were learnt briefly pre- 
operatively. This could be achieved by choosing subjects within an established social 
group, where pictures o f  individuals could be easily obtained.
8.1.3 Aims and predictions
The ability to recognise a class o f  animate/biological objects as conspecifics or 
distinct individuals within a species is vitally important for a social animal. Recognising
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an animate object as belonging to the class ‘dangerous animal’ or predator requires a 
similar level o f  recognition to recognising a conspecific. Primates may categorise animals 
by matching percepts o f  objects, with templates o f  previously obseiwed examples or 
templates present from birth, e.g. object X  matches the template for predator.
Recognising another individual as being a conspecific requires a further level o f  
processing (is the conspecific kin?, what is the identity o f  the conspecific?, what is the 
conspecific’s social histoi^?). Chapter II discussed certain brain regions that may have 
evolved to process information utilised in social relationships. The first step in evaluating 
social signals provided by another individual is recognising that the other individual is o f  
a specific categoi*y with which interaction is possible (i.e. specific species, kin or 
individual). It is invalid and inappropriate to attempt to socially interact with a species 
which can not understand or act appropriately to species specific social signals.
The purpose o f  this chapter is to examine the responses o f  neurons within the 
cortex o f  the STPa which are sensitive to the differences between distinct animal species, 
humans and monkeys. The function o f these particular type o f  cells may be for species 
recognition. The cells may also be precursors to the types o f  cells described in Chapter 
VII, which are responsive to more complex forms o f social interaction (such as motion, 
attention and action).
It is predicted that the responses o f face-selective cells within this brain region 
may respond in three ways, dependent on the test used. Previous authors have described 
the responses o f  face-selective neurons to human and monkey faces. A number o f  cells 
may respond to either monkey or human faces (as both species are equally salient to 
laboratoiy primates). Humans provide food, but are also aversive stimuli. Conspecifics 
provide opportunities for social interaction, including copulation. Some neurons may 
respond only to the sight o f  monkey faces (when tested with human and other animal 
faces). The responses o f these neurons would reflect a high level o f  species recognition.
Some neurons may also respond only to the presence o f  human faces (when 
tested with monkey and non-primate animal faces). The responses o f  these neurons 
would also reflect a high level o f  species processing. The responses o f  a further collection 
o f  cells may correspond to the cat ego ly/ o f prim ate face, i.e. cells may respond to the
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sight o f  all different primate faces, including human and monkey faces. Primate faces are 
similar in features and the configuration o f  features (see Chapter II) and may be classed 
together as similar objects. Other non-primate animal faces are physically different from 
primate faces and therefore, may be classed differently to primate faces.
It is also predicted that some cells may respond equally to the presentation o f  all 
faces (independent on species). The responses o f  these neurons would reflect coding 
faces as a broad categoiy o f  object, which would be at a lower level o f  recognition. Cells 
coding for faces as a categoiy o f  objects should respond equally to all species where a 
face, in a normal configuration, is presented. The predictions made above can be made, 
not only for faces, but also for body parts. The responses o f numbers o f  cells selective for 
the front views o f the head are dependent on the position o f  the eyes in relation to head 
view (Perrett et al 1992, see Chapter VII). Eye gaze is an important social signal for 
monkeys (see Chapters VII and IX). A final prediction is that the responses o f  a number 
o f  cells selective for monkey faces may also be dependent on the position o f  the eyes, as 
with the response o f cells to human eye gaze.
The results o f  the previous chapter demonstrated that neurons within the STS 
were sensitive to head view, eye gaze and body parts. The responses o f  neurons were 
tested predominantly with human face and body stimuli. The studies described in this 




The general physiological methods are described in the previous chapter. Two 
subjects described in the general methods were used. Subject Esther for 6 months from 
Januaiy 1994 to June 1994 and subject Steve for 23 months from January 1995 to 
December 1996 (with 9 months break to take part in the behavioural experiment (see 
Chapter IX). Esther was used in previous neurophysiological experiments (from March
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1993) and Steve is currently being used in neurophysiological and behavioural 




Neurons were tested for their responses to static real 3D “junk” objects (such as 
toys, tools, foods, pieces o f  material, boxes, etc.), real 3D biological objects (heads and 
bodies o f the experimenters) and 2D slide representations o f  the same biological objects. 
Static cells responsive to the head (face) were tested for response to different species 
(see Chapter VII for head responsive cells). Two basic species tests were produced onto 
slide. Slide stimuli were photographed using 200 ASA ectochrome slide film in a Nikon 
camera. Photographs were taken o f colony rhesus and stumptailed macaque monkeys, 
with a either a dark background, or the cage as background. Monkey body parts were 
obtained in the same way. Slides o f  animal head and body stimuli were rephotographed 
from colour photographs in animal books and a guide to the San Diego Zoo. Extraneous 
details in the background were minimised by rephotographing the animal only. Other 
slides were created by removing digital images o f  animals off a CD-ROM containing 
animal photographs (Corel CD). Photographs o f  humans were taken using the same 
photographic set-up described for monkeys.
h) Testing methods
Every cell in which a clear continuous spontaneous activity (S/A) could be 
evoked, was tested with a variety o f stimuli. The modality preferred by the cell was 
tested using junk objects, changing light levels, auditory stimuli (such as hitting objects, 
jangling keys, foot stamping, etc.) and tactile stimuli (stroking or grooming the monkey). 
Those cells found to be visually responsive were further tested (clinically) with a number 
o f  objects including faces and bodies, and faces and bodies in motion. Protocols using 
static slide stimuli o f  human and monkey faces, or monkey body parts were then used to
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further study the precise response characteristics o f the cell being investigated (see below  
for details).
1. Anim al faces.
A  cell’s response to faces as a categoiy o f  object were tested using photographic 
slide stimuli o f  faces o f  multiple species o f  animals. Cell responses were compared using 
slides o f  a wide variety o f species, a series o f  control objects and S/A. A  minimum test 
for species differences, used slides o f  two species o f monkey (stumptailed and rhesus 
macaque), two individual humans, a hawk and different control objects. A  larger test for 
species differences used a number o f  stimuli from a pool o f slides o f  27 different species 
o f  animal (including felids, canids, elephants, bears, frogs, birds, prosimians, monkeys, 
apes, insects and snakes) presented for only one or two trials each (see Figure 8.1 for 
examples o f the stimuli). Intermediate tests used slides o f smaller numbers o f  animal 
species, monkey body parts, random dot patterns, jumbled faces and different control 
objects.
2. Httman and monkey faces.
A cell’s differential response to human and/or monkey faces was tested using 
photographic slides o f  monkey and human faces. Cell responses were compared between 
monkey and human faces, a collection o f  control objects and S/A. A minimum test, 
consisted slides o f  a rhesus monkey face compared with one individual human face and a 
range o f  different control objects. A maximum test used slides o f  two species o f  monkey 
(stumptailed macaque and rhesus macaque), two individual humans and control objects.
3. M onkey body parts.
A cell’s response to different monkey body parts was tested using photographic 
slides o f  monkeys’ bodies, either presented whole, with the head only present (removed 
by occlusion), or with the body only present (also removed by occlusion). Cell responses 
were compared between head only, body only or whole body, different control objects 
and S/A. The body parts were presented in different horizontal views from the face (e.g.
Figure 8.1. Schematic representations of photographic slides used to test cell responses 
to different animal faces. Examples of photographs include stumptailed macaque, golden 
monkey, prosimian, hawk, gorilla, cheetah, parrot, toad, dog and lemur.
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0®, 90°, 180°or 270° from the front view), dependent on the maximal response o f  the cell, 
which was previously established. See Figure 8.2 for drawings o f  the monkey stimuli 
used to test the effects o f  view on responses to different body parts.
A cell’s response to a large number o f  different monkey body parts was tested 
using photographic slides o f  monkey body parts tested in isolation. Cell responses were 
compared between head only, body only, whole body, hand only, top o f  the head, tail 
only, perineal region, face with the eyes closed, different control objects and S/A.
4. M onkey eye gaze.
Detailed protocols used to test for the effects o f eye position on the neuronal 
responses to the sight o f the front view o f the human head (i.e. views 0°, 90° or 270° 
from the face) were presented in Chapter VII. The sensitivity o f  the position o f  the eyes 
on cells responsive to monkey heads, were only tested with head view 0°. Cell responses 
were tested using photographic slides o f  monkey heads with eyes foi*ward (view 0° facing 
the viewer), eyes left o f the viewer (view 45°), eyes right o f the viewer (view 315°), eyes 
up, eyes down, different control objects and S/A.
c) D ata  analysis
Neuronal responses to the optimum presented species, were compared with other 
species, control objects and S/A using either one-way or two-way ANOVA’s, and 
protected least significant difference, post-hoc  tests to determine significant differences 
between conditions (PLSD, Snedecor and Cochran 1980). Cells were determined 
responsive to a stimulus if the cells responded to one or more o f  the stimuli presented, 
and the responses to the preferential stimulus were significantly different from S/A. Cells 
which did not respond to any o f  the presented stimuli were deemed to be inhibitory to 
those stimuli. In all cases, the results o f the statistical analysis were plotted as histograms, 
displaying data as neuronal discharge during presentation o f the stimulus (spikes per 
second).
Figure 8.2. Schematic representation of photographic slides used to test cell responses to 
different rhesus monkey head views, (a) monkey head view 0®, (b) monkey head view 
90®, (c) monkey head view 180®, (d) monkey head view 270®, (e) monkey head view 0®, 





8.3 Results & Discussion
8.3.1 General Response Characteristics
The general response characteristics o f cells in the superior temporal cortex 
recording areas (for location o f  recording sites, see 8.3.3) are described thoroughly in 
Chapter VII.
8.3.2 Specific cell responses
The responses o f  the visual cells were divided into two main categories; response 
to animal slides (this chapter) and responses to attention and intention cues (purposive 
behaviour, see Chapter VII).
]. Species
Twelve cells responsive to human faces were further tested for their response to a 
number o f  different animal species’ faces (and bodies). One cell was broadly tuned to 
species face (see Figure 8.3). The cell was maximally responsive to stumptailed and 
rhesus macaques, but the responses to the monkey stimuli were not significantly different 
from the blue frog (p>0.05, PLSD). The responses to monkey stimuli were significantly 
different from the responses to human heads, a toad, a bushbaby, S/A and an owl 
(p<0.05, PLSD, all comparisons). A second cell (S49_2391) was tested for a larger range 
o f  species (mammals, birds, reptiles and amphibians; 27 species in total), with no clear 
responses to specific stimuli.
The response o f cells which are broadly tuned for species (i.e. respond to a 
number o f  different species’ faces) may be related to coding for the global object; faces, 
with differential responses between species o f  the face. All vertebrate faces have some 
common attributes; two eyes, two foiward facing nasal openings (nostrils and a nose), a 
mouth and two aural openings (ears) on each side o f the head. The position o f  the
Figure 8.3. NeuroHial responses of a ceil broadly tuned for different species’ faces. 
Mean responses {+/- SEM, n=5 each categoiy) to two stumptailed macaques, an adult 
rhesus macaque, an infant rhesus macaque, a frog, a human, a bushbaby, a toad, an owl, a 
stumptailed macaque perineal region and S/A for one cell (E82_3700). There was a 
significant effect of condition, ANOVA: F(10,44) = 5.88,/? < 0.00001. Responses to the 
two stumptailed macaques, the rhesus macaque and the blue frog were significantly 






features on the face may be different between species (e.g. the eyes may be on the side o f  
the head instead o f  the front o f  the head), but the components o f the face are universal 
for the majority o f  vertebrates.
Three cells were more responsive to monkey faces than human faces. One cell 
was highly responsive to the presentation o f monkey stimuli compared to the 
presentation o f  human stimuli, with response greater than controls and S/A (PLSD, p  < 
0,05). The responses o f  this cell are displayed as a histogram in Figure 8.4. N o other 
species (apart from monkeys and humans) were tested with this cell.
A second cell was originally tested for differences in the size o f  3D heads and 
bodies where the chin was raised. The large and medium sized bodies were a model 
stumptailed macaque (large) and a toy monkey (medium). The medium-small and the 
small body were human dolls (all with movable parts). The cell was previously tested 
with a human (live presentation) raising their chin. The cell was responsive to the larger 
heads greater than the smaller heads, (PLSD, p  < 0.05 all comparisons), with responses 
greater than controls and S/A (PLSD, p  < 0.05). The cell was probably not responding to 
differences between the size o f the objects, as the control objects (i.e. a broom head, a 
cereal box, a screwdriver handle, a plastic container and a piece o f  cloth, all moving 
upwards) were o f  a comparable size to the range o f  heads. The responses o f  this cell are 
displayed as histograms in Figure 8.5.
One cell (S52_2484) was tested for responses to monkeys, humans, hawks, 
controls and S/A. There was no significant main effect o f condition, F(8,36) = 2.01,/? = 
0.07. The responses, however, suggest a difference between monkeys and humans.
The cell responses o f  the above cells appear to distinguish between different 
primate faces (although many primate species were not tested). Primate faces are more 
similar than faces o f  different mammalian orders or between different vertebrate groups. 
The processes used to distinguish between visually similar faces must be functioning at a 
high level o f  processing. The responses o f these cells may be dependent on the subtle 
differences between monkey and human faces (recognition mechanism only) or the 
salience o f  the individual faces (recognition and emotional mechanisms). The latter 
proposition is possible due to the extensive connections between the STS and the
Figure 8.4. NeuroBial responses of a ceil sensitive to a monkey face compared to a 
human face. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to a monkey head (view 0®), 
a human head (view 0®), control objects and S/A for one cell (E82 3700). There was a 
significant effect of condition, ANOVA: F(3,16) = 26.16,/? < 0.0001. Responses to the 
monkey face were significantly different from responses to the human face, controls and 













Monkey Human Control >/A
Figure 8.5. Neuroua! responses o f a cell responsive to large m onkey figures 
com pared to small human figures. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to a 
large-sized 3D monlcey figure, a medium-sized 3D monlcey figure, a small-medium-sized 
3D human figure, a small-sized 3D human figure, large, medium and small 3D control 
objects and S/A for one cell (E97_3988). There was a significant effect o f  condition, 
ANOVA: F(5,24) =  7.62,/? < 0.0001, with responses to the large and medium-sized 
monkey figures significantly different from the small-medium-sized and small human 
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amygdala (see Chapter III), one o f the functions o f  which may be to attach emotional 
significance to objects and events (Nishijo, Ono andNishino 1988b, LeDoux 1996). The 
cell responsive to monkeys, humans and hawks may have been tuned to respond to low  
level features o f  faces, common to many vertebrates such as faces with forward facing 
eyes, with dark features (e.g. hair/feathers on the face, not skin).
One cell was significantly more responsive to the presentation o f  humans 
compared to monkeys. The cell was tested for two views (0^, 180^) o f  monkeys and 
humans. The cell's response was sensitive to human view 180° compared to monkeys 
(both views) and human view 0° (PLSD,/? < 0.05, all comparisons) and significantly 
greater than controls and S/A (PLSD, p  < 0.05). The responses o f  this cell are displayed 
as histograms in Figure 8.6.
Cells with responses which are sensitive to the differences between monkey and 
human faces (i.e. cells which are more responsive to one species over another), may be 
responding to features which differ between human and monkey faces. The cells may, 
however, be components o f  a system coding for human faces as a fraction o f  a larger 
category coding for primates’ faces. More than two species o f  macaques, for example, 
were not tested for differential influences on cell response. The results o f  behavioural 
experiments described in the introduction suggested that macaques have a preference for 
rhesus macaques and closely related species. This ultimately suggests that macaques can 
process the differences between closely related species from visual cues. Further studies 
o f  cells must test multiple closely related species to determine whether single cells in the 
STS have the capacity to differentiate between different species o f  non-human primates.
One cell was equally responsive to a human and a monkey when compared with 
other species, different objects (jumbled human face, infant rhesus monkey, seal, toad, 
stumptailed macaque perineal region, room view, random dots, a syringe) and S/A. The 
cell was responsive to a human (whole body) and a rhesus monkey head (PLSD,/? < 0.05 
all comparisons). The response o f this cell are displayed as a histogram in Figure 8.7.
The results presented above suggest that cells responsive to human faces are also 
responsive to other animal species. Some cells respond greater to humans, some to 
monkeys, some to monkeys and humans and some to a number o f  different species. The
FiguB*e 8.6. Neuronal responses of a cell sensitive for one view o f a human head and 
body compared to two views o f a monkey head and body. Mean responses (+/- SEM, 
n=5 each category) to two views (0°, 180°) o f  human and monkey’s whole bodies, 
control objects and S/A for one cell (S18_2285). There was a significant effect o f  
condition, ANOVA; F(5,24) = 4.27,/? < 0.01. The cell response was selective for human 
view 180° compared to monkeys (views 0° and 180°) and human view 0°, controls and 
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Figure 8.7. Neuronal responses o f a cell responsive for human and monkey faces. 
Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to a human (head only and whole body, 
view 0®), an adult rhesus macaque (whole view 0®), an infant stumptailed monlcey, a 
jumbled human face, a seal, a toad, stumptailed macaque perineal region, a room view, a 
random dot pattern, a syringe and S/A for one cell (E83_3831). There was a significant 
effect o f  condition, ANOVA: F (1 1,48) =  17.88, p  <  0.0001. The responses to the human 
whole body and adult rhesus macaque were significantly different from all other species, 
control objects and S/A (PLSD ,^ < 0.05 all comparisons).
2 3 8
sensitivity o f  the cells tested does not appear to cluster around particular species. The 
ceils reported in this section may code for species’ faces as a population rather than 
coding for monkey face only or human face only. Primate faces are basically similar in 
appearance, particularly between closely related species (for example bonobos and 
chimpanzees have veiy similar faces, but humans and lemurs have similar features, but 
dissimilar faces).
To date, a number o f physiological studies have tested differential responses to 
human and monkey faces (Desimone et al 1984, Perrett et al 1984, Rolls 1984, Bay lis 
and Rolls 1987). The differences between responses to different species may be as great 
as between different individual human faces (Perrett et al 1994, 1987, Hasselmo et al 
1989, Young and Yamane 1992, 1993). Young and Yamane (1993), for example, report 
that some cells (in AIT and STP) reponded to a small subset o f  human faces, whereas the 
response o f one cell (in AIT) was narrowly tuned to the presentation o f  one particular 
human face (when tested with 27 different human faces).
2, M onkey body parts
Chapter VII reported that a number o f  neurons within the STS were responsive 
to human head and body view specificity. Other neurons with responses to front views o f  
the human head, were sensitive to the position o f the eyes. The previous section 
suggested that cells within the STS may either be equally responsive or more reseponsive 
to monkey faces than human faces (and bodies). Overall, five cells with responses to 
human body parts, were tested for sensitivity to monkey body parts. Two cells were 
tested for multiple views o f  monkey body parts. One cell was tested for view (45°, 180°) 
o f  different body parts (head only, body only and/or the whole body). The cell was 
selectively responsive to rhesus monkey head and whole body (classified as a cell 
responsive to the head, see Wachsmuth 1995) when oriented to present a half-profile 
view (45° from the face). The responses to the head and whole body (view 45°) were 
significantly different from all body parts, view 180°, body only, view 45°, control objects 
and S/A (PLSD,/? < 0.05, all comparisons). The responses o f this cell are displayed as a 
histogram in Figure 8.8.
Figure 8.8. Neuronal responses o f a cell sensitive for monkey head (view 4S"). Mean 
responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to two views (45®, 180®) o f  rhesus monkey 
body parts (head only, body only, whole body), and S/A for one cell (E82 3799). There 
was a significant effect o f  condition, ANOVA: F(7,28) =  3.28,/? < 0.05. The responses 
to the head only and whole body (both view 45®) were significantly different from body 
only (view 45®), head only, body only and whole body (all view 180®) and S/A (PLSD, p  
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Two cells were tested for sensitivity to monkey body parts directed towards one 
view. One cell was more responsive to a rhesus monkey head and whole body, view 90® 
than to body only, view 90®, control objects and S/A (PLSD, p  < 0.05, all comparisons). 
The responses o f this cell are displayed as a histogram in Figure 8.9a. A second cell was 
more responsive to a rhesus monkey head and whole body, view 0®, than to body only, 
view 0®, control objects and S/A (PLSD ,/; < 0.05, all comparisons). The responses o f  
this cell are displayed as a histogram in Figure 8,9b.
A further cell (E84 3850) was responsive to multiple views o f a rhesus monkey 
head and whole body (views 0® and 180®), ANOVA; F  (4,33)=5.14, p  < 0.01. There was 
no difference in response between the two views (PLSD,/; > 0.05). The response to the 
whole body was greater than to the body alone, controls and S/A (PLSD, p  < 0.05, all 
comparisons), but not greater than the response to the head alone (PLSD,/? > 0.05).
One cell was tested with multiple body parts (head only, body only, whole body, 
top o f  the head, head with eyes closed, hand and tail). The images were taken from the 
same species, but from different individuals. The head only stimulus was larger than the 
head on the whole body slide. The response to the head, view 0® was significantly greater 
than to all other body parts, control objects and S/A (PLSD ,/; < 0.05, all comparisons).
It is possible that the cell was responding to the size o f the head, however as there was a 
drammatic reduction in response with the presentation o f the monkey face with the eyes 
closed. A histogram displaying the responses o f this cell is presented in Figure 8.10.
The responses o f the first three cells were view tuned and the responses could be 
attributed to visual features o f  the head. The presence o f  the head was necessary and 
sufficient to evoke responses. By contrast the body was not necessai"y or sufficient to 
evoke responses. Wachsmuth et al (1994) and Wachsmuth (1995) reported that a number 
o f  cells within the STS were responsive to the presentation o f  human body parts (head 
only, body only or the whole body). It is not surprising that neurons within the same area 
o f  cortex are also responsive to monkey body parts.
Fujita (1993b) suggested that pig-tail macaques made preferences for species, 
based on combinations o f  body features (including the head), not just single features. The 
majority o f  cells reported in this section required the presence o f  the head, but not the
Figure S.9, (a) Neus'oual responses o f a ceîl sensitive for monkey whole body (view  
90®). Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to rhesus monkey head only, body 
only and whole body (view 90®), control objects and S/A for one cell (E90 3500). There 
was a significant effect o f  condition, ANOVA: F(4,20) = 5.5, p  <  0.01. The responses to 
head only and whole body were significantly different from controls and S/A (PLSD, p  < 
0.05, all comparisons). The response to head only was significantly different from body 
only (PLSD, p  <  0.05), but the difference between whole body and body only was not 
significant (PLSD, p  >  0.05). (b) Neuronal responses o f a cell sensitive for monkey 
whole body (view 0®), Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to rhesus monkey 
head only, body only and whole body (view 0®), control objects and S/A for one cell 
(E 9 9 4 0 1 6 ). There was a significant effect o f  condition, ANOVA: i^(4,20) =  5.16,/? <  
0.01. The responses to monkey whole body and head only were significantly different to 
controls and S/A (PLSD, p  <  0.05, all comparisons). The response to body only was 
significantly different to control objects (PLSD, p < 0.05), but not significantly different 
from S/A (PLSD, p > 0.05).
(a)























Figure S.IO. Neuronal responses o f a ceil sensitive for monkey head, compared to 
other monkey body parts. Mean responses (+/«■ SEM, n=5 each category) to monlcey 
multiple body parts (head only, body only, whole body, top o f  the head, head with eyes 
closed, hand and tail, control objects and S/A for one cell (E80_3700). There was a 
significant effect o f  condition, ANOVA: /^(8,36) = 3 L 5 ,p  < 0,0001. The cell response to 





body presented without the head. One cell was responsive to the head alone compared to 
a number o f  body parts, but the cell may have differentiated between body parts on size 
alone. It is unlikely that the body suppresses information from the head (as would be 
suggested by a maximal response to the head, but a reduced response to the whole body, 
which includes the head). Dittrich (1994) suggested that a monkey’s ability to recognise 
another species was only dependent on the presence o f the torso (not requiring the 
presence o f  the head or the extremities). This suggestion appears to be at odds with the 
data presented here and Wachsmuth (1995) and the behavioural results o f  Fujita (1993b) 
which all emphasised the importance o f  the head in recognition. Differences in stimuli, 
may account for the differences in results. Dittrich (1994) used black and white line 
drawings o f  profiled whole bodies as stimuli, whereas Fujita (1993b), this study and 
Wachsmuth (1995) all used clear, colour, photographic stimuli.
5. M onkey eye gaze
The responses o f two cells were dependent on the position o f the eyes in a 
monkey head, view 0®. The responses o f  one cell were found to be sensitive to the eyes 
averted (right, left or up), with responses greater than when the eyes were facing the 
viewer (ahead), control objects and S/A (PLSD,/? < 0.05, all comparisons). Responses to 
eyes right and eyes left were significantly different from responses to eyes up, eyes down 
(i.e. partially occluded), eyes ahead (PLSD ,/; < 0.05, all comparisons). Responses to 
eyes up were significantly different from eyes ahead, controls and S/A (PLSD,/? < 0.05, 
all comparisons). A histogram displaying the responses o f  this cell are presented in Figure 
8 . 1 1 .
The second cell was also responsive when the eyes were averted from the viewer 
in a monkey head, view 0®, compared to the eyes ahead. The responses to the eyes right 
and eyes left were significantly different from eyes ahead, eyes down, eyes up, controls 
and S/A (PLSD, /? < 0.05, all comparisons). The responses o f  this cell are displayed as a 
histogram in Figure 8.12.
Figure 8.11. Neuronal responses o f a cell selective for a monkey with the eyes 
averted. Mean responses (+/- SEM, n=5 each category) to monkey head view 0“, with 
different eye positions relative to the viewer (eyes right, eyes left, eyes up, eyes down and 
eyes facing the viewer), control objects and S/A for one cell (E82_3700). There was a 
significant effect o f  condition, ANOVA: F(6,28) =  9.52,/? < 0.0001. The responses to 
eyes right, eyes left and eyes up were significantly different from eyes down, eyes facing 
















Figure 8.12. Neuronaî responses o f a cell selective for m onkey eyes, horizontally 
averted. Mean responses (+ /_ SEM, n=5 each categoiy) to monkey head view 0®, with 
different eye positions relative to the viewer (eyes right, eyes left, eyes up, eyes down and 
eyes facing the viewer), control objects and S/A for one cell (B 8 1 3 6 0 9 ). There was a 
significant effect o f  condition, ANOVA: i^(6,28) = 4.07, /? < 0.01. The cell responses to 
eyes right were significantly different from eyes facing the viewer, eyes down, eyes up, 
control objects and S/A (PLSD,/? < 0.05, all comparisons). There was no difference 
between the responses to eyes right and eyes left ^ L S D , /? < 0.05). The response to eyes 
left was not significantly different to eyes facing the view or eyes down, but was 













Eye gaze is as important a means o f  social communication in monkeys and apes, 
as it is in humans (see Chapters VII and IX for reviews). Rhesus monkeys interpret direct 
gaze as a threat, and averted gaze as a submissive gesture (Redican 1975). Stimuli 
consisting o f  monkey faces with different eye positions would be expected to elicit cell 
responses as strong or stronger than those seen after presentation o f  similar human 
stimuli. The response o f  the cells described in this section were both responsive to the 
sight o f  monkey faces (view 0^) with eyes averted from the obseiwer. The cells may 
therefore be responding to submissive, rather than threatening gestures. Again, this may a 
component o f  coding an emotional response (possibly conducted by the amygdala).
8.3,3 Histological reconstruction
Histological data is not available from subject Steve as this monkey is still being 
used in ongoing neurophysiological and behavioural experiments. The reconstmction o f  
cell postions within subject Esther (see Chapter VI for methods), indicated that cells 
responsive to the stimuli discussed in this chapter were located in the upper and lower 
banks o f  the anterior STS (see Figure 8.13).
8.4 General Discussion
It is difficult to make assumptions about the function o f  a brain region from the 
results o f  a small number o f  cells. A large number o f  studies have established that one o f  
the functions o f the superior temporal sulcus is to recognise faces as a distinct class o f  
objects, which have functional importance in social behaviour and communication o f  
social signals. The physiological studies described in the introduction and in the results 
section o f  this chapter, provide some evidence that the responses o f  a number o f  neurons 
in the STS are not only specific for the sight o f  faces, but also sensitive to different 
species’ faces. Behavioural studies suggest that monkeys can differentiate between the 
sight o f  different species (and individuals within the same species). The responses o f  the
Figure 8.13, H istological reconstruction: Species, Series o f frontal sections o f the STS 
every 1mm (6.5 (bottom) to 15.5mm (top) anterior to the interaural plane) 
reconstructed from one monkey (E) showing the location o f cells responsive to monkeys 
= humans (filled circles), monkeys > humans (open circles), humans > monkeys (open 
triangles), general species (filled triangles), monkey body parts (filled diamonds) and 
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cells reported here may be pooled together to aid the recognition o f  sub-categories o f  
different animal faces within a larger categoiy o f faces.
The question arises, why would it be adaptive for the primate brain to contain 
specific neural systems which respond to the sight o f  conspecifics? Conspecifics are likely 
to produce or react to species-typical behaviours (including social signals) than non- 
conspecifics and therefore are more likely to take part in social interactions. There is a 
large benefit o f  the brain containing dedicated neural subsystems which process the visual 
appearance o f  conspecifics versus other animals.
There are a number o f  possible reasons why the monkey brain contains cells 
which are responsive to the sight o f  both humans and monkeys. First, the cells may be 
responding to a large categoiy (e.g. faces). This proposition only explains the responses 
o f  neurons to presentations o f different species’ faces. It does not explain the responses 
o f  cells described above or in earlier studies, which were biased to respond to one 
species’ face (monkeys > humans or humans > monkeys). Second, the cells may be 
responding to a smaller categoiy o f faces (e.g. primates), to which monkeys and humans 
belong. The responses o f  these cells may be processed earlier than the responses o f  
category specific cells (e.g. cells which respond only to the sight o f  monkeys or humans). 
Finally, laboratory primates may gain equal (or almost equal) benefits from caregiving 
humans (food and drink) and from other monkeys (social interaction, play, sex, etc.). 
Cells responsive to the sight o f  monkey and human faces may equate to the salience and 
benefits provided by humans and other monkeys.
Cells which respond to monkeys, humans and other animals may be responding to 
specific categories such as animal faces, facial components (eyes, mouths, noses) or a 
general categoiy o f animate objects, which include faces. A number o f  studies suggest 
that the human and non-human primate brain may contain domain-specific regions which 
code for knowledge o f  animate and inanimate objects.
Farah, McMullen and Meyer (1991) studied two patients with visual agnosia and 
tested the patients’ knowledge o f  living and non-living things. Some authors (e.g. 
Damasio 1990) have suggested that difficulties in processing living things are due to the 
similarity o f visual features o f  living things (see also Gaffan and Heywood 1993). A
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second suggestion is that non-living things have a function and that recognition is 
enhanced by visualising the use o f the object as well as the visual organisation o f the 
object. For example, a pair o f  scissors can be visualised as an object with two blades, but 
recognition may be enhanced by visualising the cutting action o f  the scissors. Farah et al. 
found that the deficit in processing living things was still present after using multiple 
regression analysis to partial out the effects o f similarity, visual complexity, familiarity 
and function. This effect was replicated by Farah, Meyer and McMullen (1996) using 
multiple presentations o f the same object. Funnell and Sheridan (1992) found that the 
living/non-living distinction was removed when single presentations o f  the same object 
were introduced to the subjects. Farah et al suggested that the results were not due to a 
deficit in categoiy-specific processing (living versus non-living), but a deficit in modality- 
specific coding o f  objects (see also Gaffan and Heywood 1993).
Gaffan and Heywood (1993) used normal human and monkey subjects to test the 
hypothesis that processing differences between living and non-living objects, were due to 
the similarity between living things (i.e. all have legs, a face, a body). This was also 
counter to previous arguments that all living things are classified together in a large 
category o f  animate objects. Gaffan and Heywood found that there was an increase in the 
number o f  errors made by human subjects during recognition o f living things (versus 
recognition o f  non-living things). (The stimuli were only presented for 20 ms and in low  
contrast, to produce a high number o f  errors.) A similar result was obtained with normal 
rhesus monkey subjects. The monkeys were trained to make a choice between a picture 
o f  a living versus a non-living thing, with reward. When the number o f  pictures to 
discriminate was increased from the number presented in training, the dissociation 
between living and non-living was clear. More errors were made for discriminating living 
things.
Gaffan and Heywood suggested that “categoiy-specific impairment o f  knowledge 
o f  living things in patients with visual agnosia can ..be explained as arising directly from 
the visual similarity to each other as members o f a visually crowded categoiy” (1993, p. 
126).
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The data presented in this chapter suggests that two mechanisms o f  coding faces 
may be working in the monkey brain. Cells coding for all species (i.e. living things) or 
monkeys AND humans (i.e. primates) may not be coding for categoiy, but the visual 
similarity between species faces (two eyes, a nose, a mouth, etc.). These cells may be 
low-level feature detectors and may respond earlier than more complex feature detectors. 
Cells coding for the sight o f  either monkeys only or humans only may be category- 
specific, as the gross features are similar, but the functional properties o f  the face are 
different (i.e. monkey = social interaction, human = fear). A third system may code for 
the recognition o f  inanimate objects (such as food, tools), such as many o f  the control 
objects presented in tests. Coding for the sight o f  geometrical features and complex 
objects, which may form parts o f inanimate (such as tools) and animate objects (such as 
faces) occurs mainly within the inferotemporal cortex (Tanaka et al 1990, Tanaka 1993). 
Some neurons responsive to the sight o f  different foods have been reported in the 
orbitofrontal cortex (Thorpe et al 1983), amygdala (Ono et al 1983, 1989) and lateral 
hypothalamus (Rolls, Burton and Mora 1976, Ono et al 1989).
Recent evidence suggests that different neural systems code for the differences 
between animate and inanimate objects. Martin et al (1996) tested normal subjects in a 
PET scanner, whilst the subjects viewed pictures o f animals and tools. Effects o f  naming 
aloud were removed by making one half o f the subjects name the objects loudly and the 
other subjects name the objects silently. Martin et al concluded that naming biological 
objects requires basic recognition (possibly also how an animal moves). Naming tools 
requires processing the function and action o f  that tool. Martin et al. Found that there 
was a neural dissociation between naming the two categories o f objects. Naming animals 
was associated with bilateral activation o f the ventral temporal lobes (parahippocampal 
gyms, fusiform gyrus) and the left medial occipital lobe. Tool naming was also associated 
with bilateral activation o f the ventral temporal lobes, the middle temporal gyms and the 
left premotor cortex (A6).
Activity in the premotor cortex corresponds with PET studies in human subjects, 
where subjects imagined grasping objects and this was associated with a significant 
activation in the premotor area (Decety et al 1994). Activation o f  the ventral temporal
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lobes with the presentation o f  animal stimuli (Martin et al 1996) may relate to studies o f  
neurons within the macaque ventral temporal cortex (STS) which respond to bodies 
walking (Perrett et al 1985a, Oram and Perrett 1996, see Chapter VII). The response o f  
cells in the anterior STS to monkeys and humans walking quadmpedally, bipedally and 
while crouched down have been tested, with some cells sensitive to each type o f  motion 
(Perrett et al 1984). The response o f  cells responsive to walking bodies have not been 
tested with other types o f animal motion which involve four limbs (such as a horse 
cantering, a cat pouncing or a rat scuriying). A prediction would be that these types o f  
motion would elicit different responses to bipedal human walking. Recognition o f  animals 
in humans, may be dependent on imagining the method by which an animal moves.
As stated previously, it is impossible to make any concrete conclusions about the 
function o f  this brain area from the results o f  a small number o f  cells. Face-selective 
neurons have been found within a large number o f brain areas (see Perrett et al 1992 for 
review o f  temporal cortex cells; amygdala, Rolls 1984; temporal pole, Nakamura et al 
1994; prefrontal cortex, Wilson et al 1993). It is probable that each area (or sub-area) is 
performing a different function in which faces are important.
The results o f chapter VII suggested that the function o f  other neurons within the 
monkey anterior temporal cortex may be to code for the sight o f  attention (where others 
are looking), action (what others are doing) and intention (how others are going to 
interact with objects). The function o f  these neurons may be dependent on inputs from 
the cells described above (as social interaction is impossible without recognising other 
protagonists in the interaction). This idea is discussed further in Chapter IX.
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Chapter IX
Gaze Processing in Monkeys: A Behavioural Investigation
(a shortened version o f  this chapter, in press J. Comp. Psych.)
‘'Non-human prim ates may use visual signals not only to signal their intentions, but also  
to communicate about the direction, amount and quality o f  external objects ”
Zeller (1987, p. 439)
9,0 Summary
Gaze direction provides an important source o f  social information for primates. A  
large body o f evidence suggests that feral primates can follow gaze. Monkeys and apes 
can gain information about available food sources, social dominance and the location o f  
predators from the attention direction o f  conspecifics (Chance 1967, Menzel and 
Halperin 1975, van Schaik et al. 1983, Whiten and Byrne 1988a). Behavioural studies 
show chimpanzees spontaneously follow human gaze direction. By contrast, macaque 
and capuchin monkeys are reported to fail or have difficulty learning to use human gaze 
as a discriminative cue. This chapter provides results o f  the spontaneous reactions (eye 
movements) o f  rhesus macaques to social attention cues o f conspecifics. Two subjects 
were presented with videotaped images o f  a stimulus monkey with its attention directed 
to one o f  two identical objects. Analysis o f  their eye movements revealed that both 
subjects inspected the target (object or position attended by the stimulus monkey) more 
often than the distracter (non-attended object or position). These results provide the first
247
experimental evidence that rhesus monkeys spontaneously use the direction o f  attention 
cues o f  other monkeys to orient their own attention.
9.1 Introduction
9.1.2 Definitions of gaze behaviour
When describing visual behaviour, the terminology used to summarise such a 
seemingly simple action as seeing is unhelpful at the least. Problems arise when individual 
authors fail to define the nomenclature they have decided to incorporate in their own 
particular studies. Before outlining the background to this study, the terms to be used 
will described and in what context they will be used.
'Gaze following' can be defined as the ability o f  one individual (X) to follow the 
direction o f  gaze o f  a second individual (Y) to some position in space (Povinelli and 
Eddy 1996b, Perrett & Emeiy 1994, Baron-Cohen 1994). Note that such a definition 
does not require that the individuals X  and Y  look at the same object it requires only that 
they look in the same direction (Figure 9.1a).
The direction o f another's attention can be signalled not only by eye direction but 
also by a variety o f  cues such as head direction, body posture and the orientation body 
parts (e.g. pointing). In most situations, however, a subject's direction o f  attention will 
coincide with the direction o f their eye gaze. Gaze direction has therefore often been 
used as a shorthand for direction o f  attention. In many cases it remains to be determined 
which cues (eye direction, head posture etc.) are used by subjects when 'gaze' following. 
The term gaze following will refer to the use o f any o f the available sources o f  
information (eyes, head, body and movement cues) when one individual redirects its own 
gaze direction to match the direction o f  attention o f a second individual.
'Joint attention' can be defined in the same way as gaze following but with the 
additional requirement that X follows the direction o f gaze o f  Y  to the object (Z) that is 
the focus o f  Y's attention (Figure 9. lb). Note that this definition does not require mutual
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attention between X  and Y. X does not have to interact with Y  to follow the direction o f  
Y's attention.
'Shared attention' can be defined as the ability o f  one individual to interact with a 
second individual and to follow the attention direction o f the other's attention to an 
object. The concept o f  sharing requires a mutual awareness that both individuals are 
attending to the same object (see Figure 9.1c). One cannot infer from gaze monitoring 
that the individuals necessarily are sharing anything. The terms above have been used 
interchangeably in previous literature (Baron-Cohen 1994, 1995).
9.1.3 Evolution of gaze recognition
The eyes have long held special interest to humans; they are said to be the window  
to the soul (Baron-Cohen 1996), they are often used as symbols o f  a curse {evil eye) or 
as warning signals, but are also one o f  the first points o f  contact between newborn infants 
and their mothers (Haith, Bergman and M oore 1977). Non-human primates are also 
attracted to the eyes, and use their eyes for many communicative functions, such as 
warning others o f  their disposition (threatening or submissive). This small review 
discusses the attraction o f  the eyes to a number o f  animals focusing on how primates 
process information about the eyes, head and bodies o f others and how information from 
body parts can be used in communication.
An important function o f  recognising the presence o f  eyes and eye-like stimuli is 
to determine whether they are looking at or away from you. A large number o f  species 
appear to perform this discrimination. Black iguanas (Cienosaurua similis) appear to 
discriminate that an approaching human is looking towards or away from the iguanas 
(Burger et al. 1992). Burger et al suggested that iguanas associate gaze contact and 
direct approach as threatening and escape quicker than when the same experimenter is 
directly approaching, but looking away from them. Iguanas also appear to be sensitive to 
the size o f  the approaching eyes, by responding when the eyes are larger (Burger et 
al.l991).
Figure 9.1. Levels of social interaction using gaze, (a) Schematic representation of gaze 
following (dyadic relationship), where an Observer (X) follows the direction of gaze of 
the Observed individual (Y). (b) Joint attention behavior (triadic relationship) where an 
Observer (X) follows the gaze of the Observed (Y) onto an object (Z). (c) Shared 
attention behaviour (triadic relationship), where the above criteria for joint attention are 
present, but also the Observer (X) and Observed (Y) are mutually attending to each other 
so X and Y are shifting gaze between the object and the other individual (Perrett and 
Emery 1994).
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Some species o f  bird can also perform this discrimination. Ristau (1991) studied 
plovers’ (CharadrUis) reactions to human experimenters who walked past their nests 
either looking at the plover’s nests in the dunes, or in the opposite direction towards the 
ocean. Ristau determined that plovers incubating their young remained o ff the nest for 
longer under threatening situations. Plovers remained off the nests for longer when an 
experimenter was gazing towards the plover’s nest than when the experimenter was 
gazing towards the sea.
Gallup, Cummings and Nash (1972) also looked at birds responsivity to human 
gaze. Chickens (Gallus gallus) respond to staring humans by becoming rigid {tonic 
immobility). This is said to correlate highly with fear (Gallup et al 1972). The length o f  
immobility was greatly reduced when the eyes o f an experimenter were directed away 
from the chickens. The same phenomenon has also been reported in anoles {Anolis 
carolinensis), a species o f  lizard (Hennig 1977).
A  related phenomenon to tonic immobility is death feigning  (as seen in hog-nosed 
snakes). This occurs in reaction to eyes directed towards the snakes (Burghardt 1990). 
Whether these actions are innate behaviours or learnt through extensive experience with 
predators is not known and out o f the scope o f  this review. Scaife (1976a, b) suggests 
that the ability to discriminate eyes as a stimulus which is part o f the face, is an innate 
ability.
Other avian species have been tested for their responsivity to specific human head 
orientations and gaze directions. House sparrows {Passer domesticus) were found to 
increase flight responses (escape response) when a face was directed towards the birds, 
but the sparrows were unresponsive to the direction o f  the eyes, whether pointed away 
or toward the subjects (Hampton 1994). The sparrows, however, could determine the 
line o f  gaze from the number o f  eyes visible. This result has significant evolutionary 
consequences as most predators have two forward facing eyes, so when only one eye is 
visible, this signals to the prey that the predator’s head is turned away, and that the 
predator’s attention is elsewhere.
Primates possess a great interest in the eyes and the region around them. How  
primates itse the information transmitted by the eyes will be discussed in the next
250
sections. Experimental laboratoiy studies o f  face recognition in monkeys have highlighted 
the interest some species o f  primate have in the eyes. Keating and Keating (1982) studied 
the eye movement responses o f  two rhesus monkeys while the subjects viewed different 
primate faces (rhesus monkey, chimpanzee and human) with neutral expressions, and also 
to schematic faces. The subjects showed an extreme bias o f  looking at the eyes and the 
small region surrounding the eyes compared with the nose and the mouth for all four 
neutral face stimuli regardless o f  species.
Laboratoiy studies have also shown that baboons appear to look at the eye region 
more than other parts o f  the face. Kyes and Candland (1987) had baboon subjects study 
slides o f  other baboon faces and parts o f faces. Although the subjects looked longer at 
the slides o f full (complete) faces, they also inspect pictures which contained eyes longer 
than slides containing just the nose, or the mouth, or the nose and mouth.
Colour performs an important function in highlighting the eye region o f  some 
primate species. Kingdon (1980) described fully the facial patterns and colourations o f  
the different species o f  guenon {Cercopithecus, Old World monkey). For example, C. 
mona and C. cephus cephus have bright blue colouration around the eyes, but no 
colouration o f  the genital area (white instead o f  the bright red colour o f  the majority o f  
Cercopithecines, Gautier and Gautier 1977). This may be interpreted as an increased 
importance o f  the face and eyes and therefore use in facial expressions during sexual or 
social signalling, or an attempt to further enhance the differentiation between the face and 
the genital region. Cercopilhecus m glectus  have a wide orange-coloured brow-ridge 
which highlights the position o f  the eyes (Kingdon 1980). Species o f  guenon which do 
not have brightly coloured facial features, usually have brightly coloured genitals. It is 
interesting to note that the brightly coloured genitals are blue, and that the colour around 
the eyes o f  those species without the genital colouration is blue.
In all descriptions o f  primate facial expressions, the eyes play a pivotal role 
(Andrews 1963, 1964, Jolly 1972, Redican 1975, Bertrand 1969). Any discussion o f  the 
role o f  the eyes in primate emotional communication must mention the role o f  the whole 
face. The eyes are not processed separately from the rest o f  the face, they are analysed in 
concert with the other features o f  the face such as the nose, and mouth, and in particular
251
the ocular muscles surrounding and controlling the movements o f  the eyes. This is not to 
say that the eyes are not powerful tools in the expression o f  emotion alone. In some 
primates the effect o f  a stare without the accompanying facial movements is very 
effective in eliciting fear responses from conspecifics.
The majority o f  primates have very darkened eyes compared to humans. 
Kobayashi and Kohshima (1997) found that o f eighty-eight primate species, only humans 
had eyes with a white sclera and a dark iris. The sclera o f most primate’s eyes was found 
to be brown, with two species (Old World macaques) having a pale brown sclera and 
four species (Old and N ew  World monkeys) having a partly white sclera. The sclera o f  
macaque infants is less pigmented than adults. Perrett and Mistlin (1990) discussed the 
reason why the sclera o f  adult macaques may become darker compared to infants. One 
possible function o f  the large dark iris/pupil may be for deceptive or protective purposes. 
Determining the precise direction o f another’s attention is difficult to assess when there is 
no differentiation between the sclera and the iris. In humans, interpreting gaze direction is 
made easier by the morphology o f the eyes. Gaze following can be performed using a 
simple aile (dark in the centre o f the eye equals eye contact; dark to the left o f  the eye 
equals looking left; dark to the right o f  the eye equals looking right). Perrett and Mistlin 
(1990) suggested that because the iris and sclera o f non-human primates was dark, the 
monkeys could look out o f  the corner o f their eye without invoking threatening gestures 
usually associated with eye contact from conspecifics.
Kaplan and Rogers (1996) discussed a similar behaviour in re-habilitant 
orangutans. Orangutans rarely look directly into the eyes o f conspecifics. It is usual to 
see orangutans point their heads away from conspecifics, but with the eyes towards other 
individuals.
Primates have excellent discriminative abilities for determining whether they are 
being looked at or whether another’s gaze is directed away from them. Keating and 
Keating (1982) studied two monkey subjects’ eye movements in response to viewing 
slides o f  rhesus monkey gesturing faces. The expressive stimuli included a slide o f  a 
threatening rhesus face with a direct stare, a slide o f  a rhesus grinning with direct gaze, a 
slide o f  a rhesus with a neutral expression with direct gaze and a slide o f a rhesus
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submissive face with averted gaze. Both subjects looked at the eye region more often 
than the nose and mouth and looked at the faces with direct gaze (irrespective o f  facial 
expression) more than the face with averted gaze. This pattern was repeated when the 
subjects were presented with slides o f  human faces. Only slides o f  two human gestures 
were presented to the subjects, raised eyebrows and lowered eyebrows. The eye region 
elicited a higher number o f  fixations than the nose and mouth regions, but there were a 
higher number o f fixations on the human faces with raised eyebrows.
Perrett and Mistlin (1990) reported the number o f  submissive gestures (lip- 
smacking and teeth-chattering) given in response to the presentation o f  either a head 
horizontally oriented towards the viewer or away from the viewer. The largest number o f  
submissive gestures were made by the subjects independent o f the position o f the head, 
when the eyes were in contact with the obseiwing monkey. This experiment was repeated 
for elevation o f  the head (Mistlin 1988). The raised head received less appeasement 
(submissive) gestures compared to a normal, level head position or a head averted 
laterally by 45 degrees. This was also found when Mistlin (1988) tested the emotional 
reactions o f  stumptailed monkeys to a life-sized model o f a dominant male stumptailed 
macaque. The model’s head and eyes could be positioned to give any head and eyes 
orientation or elevation combination. The lowered head received more appeasement 
gestures compared to the head raised or level.
A  recent study o f  stump-tailed macaques has proposed another function for eye 
contact between male and females (Linnankoski et al 1993). Presenting females to single 
males caused the males to masturbate and ejaculate, but only when eye contact was 
established between the male and female. Other visual or olfactory cues such as 
inspecting the females perineal region were not as effective initiators o f  ejaculation as eye 
contact.
Physiological measures in non-human primates accompany the detection o f  eye 
contact. Wada (1961) studied the EE G responses from the brainstem o f  macaques to 
electrical stimulation o f the cortex. He found that if he looked at the monkey subjects the 
EEG trace would change dramatically.
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“When the animal discovered it was being watched, the response was depressed  
as long as the animal could see the expert men ter.... Such fla tten w g  regularly occured  
whenever the animal realized that the experimenter's gaze fix ed  on it....the direct 
meaning o f  the experimenter's gaze... suggests concentratedfocusing o f  discriminatory 
attention o f  a quality necessary for self-preservation ”
Wada (1961, p. 41)
Although monkeys (Old and N ew  world) do not appear to make distinctions 
between direct staring and mutual eye contact, the case would seem to be different for 
humans and great apes. Direct staring is different from mutual gaze or eye contact in a 
number o f  ways. Staring involves the eyes but also the eyebrows and brow ridges being 
raised to increase the visibility o f  the eyes, the ears being pulled back and the hair on the 
head standing up. Face-to-face sex is an example o f the way that great apes such as 
bonobos (de Waal 1982), orangutans (Galdikas 1996) and humans (Morris 1967) may 
use looking into each other’s eyes as a method for confirming and strengthening the 
sexual and affiliative bond (de Waal 1989).
It can, therefore, be concluded that primates (and other animals) class eyes as a 
separate class o f objects, that direction o f  the eyes can be discriminated relatively easily 
by primates and that communication using the eyes maybe independent on head view. 
The next sections review evidence that primates can follow gaze (head and eyes in a 
specific direction) or body postures (such as pointing) to objects in the environment.
9.1.4 Gaze following and joint attention
Determining the precise direction o f another’s attention or social attention  is an 
extremely important ability for non-human primates. Gaze provides salient cues about the 
location o f  objects, but may also function in complex forms o f  social cognition, such as 
visual perspective-taking, deception, empathy and theoi-y o f  mind (see Chapter VII and 
Whiten 1996b, 1997a, b).
An important use for gaze following is in determining the position o f  an individual 
in a dominance hierarchy. Chance (1967) called this social attention, where “each 
individual [/// a social groupl accords and receives attention as a function o f  his or her
254
rank”. The most dominant animal in a social hierarchy receives the highest number o f  
glances (attention from less dominant animals), and glances at other animals the least. 
Chance states that members o f a social group must have the capacity to determine 1) that 
the dominant individual is the focus o f  the others attention, 2) that these glances total 
more than those directed towards less dominant animals, and 3) that the group members 
extrapolate the information that the animal is dominant due to the large number o f  
glances.
Obseiwational learning would be almost impossible without gaze following. In a 
interesting series o f  experiments, Mineka et al (1984) tried to determine whether fear o f  
snakes in rhesus macaques originated through obsei'vational or social learning. Young 
rhesus monkeys became fearful o f  snakes (this is not an innate behaviour, as it is not 
present in laboratory reared monkeys), when they obseiwed their wild-reared parents 
showing fear responses to real, toy and model snakes. For the infant monkeys to become 
fearful o f  the snakes by obsei'vational learning, they may well have used the principles o f  
social attention; X is producing a fearful response, and X ’s attention is directed to the 
object on the ground, therefore, they must be fearful o f  the object on the ground. 
Observational learning would seem to use, not only social attention, but also so-called 
jo in t attention  between the individual X  following the direction o f  conspecific Y ’s 
attention onto object Z. During obsei'vational learning or conditioning, the observer (X) 
determines where the obsei"ved (Y) is looking, and what Y is looking at, to be able to 
learn something about that object.
Laboratory studies o f gaze following and joint attention per se are limited to a 
small number o f  species. The ability to gaze follow has been demonstrated most 
successfully in human infants. The age at which an infant first follows another’s gaze is 
controversial, ranging from 6 to 18 months o f  age (Butterworth and Cochran 1980, 
Buttei'woi'th and Jarrett 1991, Corkum and Moore 1994, Scaife and Bmner 1975). These 
age differences may be due to differences in methods (variation in angle o f  gaze, the use 
o f  an experimenter versus the infant’s mother) or in the definitions. Before 12 months 
old, human infants follow their mother's gaze but do not direct their attention to the 
object o f  her attention. At around 12 months old, infants begin to follow the gaze o f  their
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mother towards particular objects in their visual field, and at around 18 months old they 
can direct their attention to objects outside o f  their field o f view (e.g. behind them, 
Butterworth 1991).
The clearest evidence for the ability to follow gaze in non-human primates comes 
from experimental work on the great apes, in particular studies with chimpanzees, 
Povinelli and Eddy (1994, 1996a, b, 1997) have concluded that chimpanzees can follow a 
human experimenter’s gaze. Povinelli and Eddy trained chimpanzee subjects to enter an 
experimental room, and respond to an experimenter by placing a hand in front o f  the 
experimenter for a food reward (which signified the end o f a trial). Once trained to do 
this, the human experimenters performed prepared attention sequences for the subjects. 
The three conditions were 1) eyes and head, where the experimenter shifted his head and 
eye gaze to behind and to the left or right o f  the subject. The second condition was 
similar to the first, but the experimenter only shifted the direction o f  his/her eyes. The 
final condition was no change in attention. These three conditions were randomly 
assigned to test sessions. In the eyes and head condition, 50% o f  the trials (10 trials in 
each o f  8 test sessions), elicited a gaze-following response from the subjects to the 
correct side, and in the eyes only condition, 30% o f the trials elicited a gaze-following 
response to the correct side. Povinelli and Eddy interpreted this as shared or joint 
attention on the part o f  the chimpanzee subjects.
In a further series o f  experiments, Povinelli and Eddy (1996b) obstmcted the 
subjects’ line o f  sight with an opaque shield. The experimenters used head and eyes to 
look at an object out o f  sight o f the subjects (on the same side as the experimenters 
behind the shield). Subjects could follow the experimenter’s line o f  sight to the unseen 
object (i.e. the subjects would look at the point on the opaque barrier where the 
experimenter’s line o f  sight hit the barrier). This ability may be important when trying to 
extrapolate information from other’s attention, when the focus o f  attention is out o f  
sight.
The presence o f  gaze following in chimpanzees and absence in Old and N ew  
World monkeys has been replicated by other investigators. Itakura (1996) recently 
studied eleven species o f  prosimians, monkeys and apes in their ability to follow a human
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experimenter’s gaze (eyes, head and pointing in a corresponding direction). Only the 
orangutan and chimpanzee subjects made greater than 70% correct responses, with the 
orangutan making 100% correct responses. This may be attributed to enculturation o f  the 
orangutan as suggested by Carpenter et al (1995) for chimpanzees. The non-ape subjects 
(brown lemur, black lemur, squirrel monkey, brown capuchin, white-face capuchin, 
stump-tailed macaque, rhesus macaque, pig-tailed macaque, tonkean macaque) did not 
respond above chance level.
A number o f  primate species have been shown experimentally to follow other 
cues to another’s attention such as pointed fingers. These results are interesting because 
in the wild no non-human primates use or follow pointing cues. Blasche and Ettlinger 
(1987) trained rhesus monkeys to point at one o f two boxes (one o f the boxes was baited 
by an experimenter out o f sight o f  the subjects). Next, an experimenter baited one o f  the 
boxes in the presence o f  the monkey subject. The monkey gained the food reward if  it 
pointed to the baited box. Finally, the subject had to perform a role-reversal where the 
experimenter pointed at one o f  the boxes and the subject had to choose the correct box 
to gain the reward (see also Anderson et al 1995, 1996). The monkeys learnt to point to 
the box chosen by the experimenter after an average o f 428 trials and learnt to choose the 
box indicated by an experimenter by 100 trials. It is unlikely that the subjects were 
pointing at the boxes, but were reaching towards them using the whole hand, as they 
never extended the index finger (as deemed a crucial component o f pointing by Povinelli 
and Davis 1994). Hess, Novak and Povinelli (1993) reported a 16 year old hand-reared 
rhesus monkey who spontaneously pointed at objects and events. Again, it is unclear 
whether the monkey pointed at object using the index finger o f  her hand, rather than just 
the whole hand (using the whole hand suggests reaching for objects, not directing other’s 
attention towards objects).
Orangutans (Call and Tomasello 1994b) and chimpanzees (Leavens et al 1996) 
have also been shown to follow pointing (either an extended index finger or a chin raise 
and glance), used to direct attention to objects. Call and Tomasello (1994b) found that 
one captive and one enculturated orangutan would spontaneously point to a baited box 
containing food. An experimenter baited the box in the presence o f  the subject and then
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left the room. A second experimenter entered and waited for a response from the subject. 
The experimenter was naive as to the location o f  the food. The experimenter required 
that the subject pointed to a tool, which the experimenter would give to the subject to 
reach the baited box. The tool (a rake) had previously been used by the subjects to 
retrieve food (Call and Tomasello 1994a). The enculturated orangutan pointed to the 
tool, then to the baited container (above chance). The captive orangutan did not point to 
the tool, only to the baited box. A second captive orangutan, was tested and performed 
by directing the experimenter’s attention to the tool and the box. The subjects were then 
tested for their levels o f  comprehension. An experimenter entered the room and baited 
one o f  three containers, pointed at baited container and then left. A second, naive 
experimenter entered the room and waited for the subject to point to the baited container. 
Again, the enculturated orangutan pointed to the baited container (on 33/63 trials). The 
captive subject did not perform above chance.
Leavens et al (1996) tested the responses o f a captive chimpanzee who would 
vocalise, point with the index finger and alternate gaze between food and an 
experimenter, when the chimpanzee’s food was dropped. Leavens et al found that the 
subject pointed 175 times (out o f  18 hours obsei-vation) when the experimenter was 
present. During 76% o f  instances the subject also used gaze alternation. The subject also 
tended to point to non-food objects with the whole hand, but to food objects with the 
index finger. This subject was not language trained, enculturated or trained to point.
Anderson, Sallaberiy, & Barbier (1995) investigated three capuchin monkeys 
{Cebus apelld) for monkey’s use o f  human attention cues in the laboratory. This 
paradigm was replicated with three rhesus macaques by Anderson, Montant, & Schmitt 
(1996). Both studies used a forced choice paradigm in which the monkey was allowed to 
choose one o f  two wells. A human experimenter would stand between and behind two 
covered food wells and demonstrate attention to the baited food well using different 
cues; "pointing only", "gaze only" (which included both head and eye cues), and "gaze 
and pointing" (combining both these cues). None o f  the macaque or capuchin subjects 
could be trained to use the "gaze only" cues to guide choice o f  food well. Two subjects 
o f  each species could be trained to use either “pointing only” or “gaze and pointing”. It is
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likely that the success with the "gaze and pointing" situation can be attributed to cues 
arising from pointing rather than the monitoring o f  gaze direction cues. Pettigrew, 
Forsyth and Perrett (1993, unpublished studies) using a similar protocol, obtained 
equivalent results. Despite extensive training (>100 trials) they found 4 out o f  6 rhesus 
monkeys failed to learn the rule that the head and gaze direction o f  a human experimenter 
predicted the location o f  food reward.
In a gaze paradigm similar to that o f  Anderson et al (1995, 1996), Itakura and 
Tanaka (1997) found that chimpanzees, an enculturated orangutan and human infants (3- 
4 years old) could all use gaze (head and eyes) cues (near and close to the baited food 
wells), pointing and glancing (eyes only directed towards the food wells) to chose the 
well baited with food. The responses o f  all subjects appeared to be spontaneous, not 
requiring learning. Povinelli et al (1997) have also tested chimpanzees with a paradigm 
similar to that used by Anderson et al (1995, 1996). They found that the chimpanzee 
subjects could not determine which well was baited with food when using the 
experimenter’s eyes only as a cue. When the experimenter’s head and eyes were directed 
towards the baited well or slightly above the well, the subjects responded well above 
chance. The subjects could also follow active gaze (head and eyes, not eyes only), i.e. 
attention initially directed to between the two wells then shifting gaze to the baited well. 
The negative glancing (eyes only) result reported by Povinelli et al (1997) could have 
differed from the positive glancing result in the Itakura and Tanaka (1997) study due to 
the age, experimental experience and enculturation o f  the different sets o f  subjects.
Recently, Itakura and Anderson (1996) reported success training one juvenile 
capuchin monkey to use the experimenter's head direction to choose between two 
presented objects. In general, however, it seems that macaque and capuchin monkeys do 
not readily utilise attention cues from human demonstrators.
9.1.5 Aims of study
The study presented in this chapter attempts to resolve the differences between 
the physiological evidence o f  macaque brain mechanisms processing gaze cues (see
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Chapters II and VII) and the lack o f behavioural demonstration o f  gaze following in 
captive macaques. An experimental paradigm was constructed which would not require 
extensive training and which would specifically record the responses o f  monkey subjects 
viewing another individual’s gaze behaviour. This paradigm used conspecific stimulus 
monkeys to provide attention direction cues and measured the spontaneous eye 
movements o f  test subjects, rather than requiring the subjects to provide an action for a 




The subjects were two male rhesus macaques, Steve, aged 4 years, and Teriy, 
aged 3 years, who were also subjects in ongoing neurophysiological studies that required 
stable eye movement recording (see Perrett et al. 1985b for details o f  neurophysiological 
procedures). The subjects had previously been shown videofilm o f  conspecific monkeys 
and other animals. They had also been exposed to slides and videodisk images o f  humans, 
monkeys and other animals. The subjects were born and reared in a social colony o f  
rhesus monkeys. During the period o f  the experiment, the subjects were housed 
individually but remained in auditory and visual contact with the other monkeys. The 
subjects were familiarised with the test room and a primate chair with head restraint. 
During testing finit juice was available a d  libitum. All experiments were performed under 
a UK Home Office Project and Personal License and all experiments were regulated by 
the University o f  St Andrews Animal Code o f  Practice.
9.2.2 Test stimuli
Test stimuli were created by videotaping (Panasonic SVHS video camera) a 
stimulus monkey sitting at a square window (width 26.5 cm) with the area surrounding 
the window blacked out. The stimulus monkey was filmed maintaining attention in one
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direction (either down left [DL], down right [DR], up left [UL] or up right [UR]). The 
stimulus monkey was attracted to look intently in one direction by presenting interesting 
stimuli at the desired locations. A JVC colour monitor was set up on a stand in one o f  the 
four desired attention locations (DL/DR/UL/UR). From the stimulus monkey's 
perspective the left and right positions o f the monitor were separated by 120 degrees. 
Various images were presented over the monitor, played on an Akai Video Cassette 
Recorder (VCR), including videotaped images o f  various animals in a zoo, cartoons and 
pictures o f  monkeys. Particular hand-puppets, face masks and toys were also presented 
from behind an occluder to achieve the same purpose. These methods were sufficient to 
allow video recording o f  20 segments o f  film (5 each o f  DL, DR, UL and UR), which 
would be converted to test trials. These segments were edited using a Panasonic SVHS 
VCR (NV-FS200B) and a Panasonic VHS video mixer (WJAVE7) to blank off the area 
on either side o f the window, leaving only the centrally positioned stimulus monkey 
visible.
Two objects were added to each trial segment. The objects were identical mirror 
images o f  each other and were recorded onto videotape at the same time and at opposite 
lateral corners o f  the screen. This was achieved using a Fairlight CVI (computer-video 
effects machine). One object was filmed using a Panasonic SVHS video camera 
(FIOCCD) at either the bottom left or top left o f the screen, and mirrored about the 
centre o f  the screen (Fairlight CVI). This provided the illusion that two identical objects 
were entering the screen at the same time and at the same mirrored spatial location, for 
example, one object enters bottom left, while the other enters bottom right. A different 
object was used for each trial. The objects were all novel to the subject, all approximately 
the same size and made small movements up and down.
The specific object or position that the stimulus monkey was attending to is 
referred to as the target object or attended target position (T), and the object at the 
opposite position as the distracter object or non-attended distracter position (D). The 
contents o f  the central window are referred to as stimulus monkey, and everywhere else 
on the screen is referred to as elsewhere (E). An idealised example o f  a frame from the 
test tape is presented in Figure 9.2. The projected distance between target and distracter
Figure 9.2. Spatial representation o f  test stimuli. The stimulus monkey is positioned 
relatively central attending down left to the target object and away ftom an identical 
distracter object (condition 1, Monkey and Objects time period). During testing, the 
subject's eye movements and a frame/time code are mixed onto a copy o f  this test-tape 
(not shown). For test stimuli eyes, head and body o f  the stimulus monkey had the same 
direction o f  orientation.
»iÊÊ
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on the actual test tape was 40 degrees (physical distance 150 cm) and the physical 
distance between the stimulus monkey's head and the target was on average 90 cm 
(minimum 80 cm, maximum 100 cm). During some trials the stimulus monkey’s head 
moved towards and away from the target. Measurement showed that on average across 
trials the stimulus monkey’s head was marginally closer to the distracter than to the 
target. In all trials the orientation o f  the stimulus monkey’s gaze was identical to the 
orientation o f  the head.
Two final test tapes were prepared. Condition 1 included 20 trials with target and 
distracters down left and down right. Condition 2 included 20 trials with target and 
distracters up left and up right. The left/right position o f the target and distracter were 
randomised across trials.
9.2.3 Experimental Procedure
The subject was seated 4 m from the projector screen, at the same height as the 
projected stimulus monkey. An infra-red camera and a half-silvered mirror were attached 
to the front o f  the primate chair. This arrangement allowed the subject's eye movements 
to be videotaped while viewing test stimuli through the mirror (see Figure 9.3). A  VITC 
time-code generator and frame counter (Horita VG50) allowed the addition o f  a time and 
frame code to the bottom o f  the eye movement recording tape. The video stimuli were 
projected in a darkened room to avoid any visual distraction for the subject. The test tape 
was presented on a VCR (Panasonic NV-FS200B), with an output to a Sony colour 
video projector (VPH-1041 QM). The output from the eye movement camera was video­
mixed (Panasonic VHS video mixer, WJATO7) onto a copy o f  the test stimuli tape with 
the frame code, and recorded onto \fH S tape on a VCR (Panasonic NV-FS200B).
Three time periods were present during each trial. A 1.0 second tone preceded 
the beginning o f  the trial where the stimulus monkey appears (Monkey Only). After 2-3 
seconds, the objects appear (Monkey and Objects). The stimulus monkey and objects 
remained on screen for 7-9 seconds, after which the stimulus monkey disappeared off 
screen. The objects remained on screen for a ftirther 2-3 seconds (Objects Only). There
Figure 9.3. Recording and stimulus presentation set-up. The test video was presented on 
a large white screen 4 meters from the subject. The subject's eye movements were 
recorded by an infra-red camera positioned in front o f  the subject. The eye movements 
were then mixed onto a copy o f  the test tape for off-line analysis. A  frame/time code is 
also added to this copy o f  the test tape.
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was an inter-trial period o f  5-6 seconds before the next tone and trial. Trials varied in 
duration, due to changes in the length o f time which the stimulus monkey’s attention was 
captured in the test direction during the original filming o f  the test tapes.
9.2.4 Scoring gaze direction
For each trial, the frame counts (1 frame = 40 ms) o f the critical events (trial 
begins, targets appear, stimulus monkey disappears and trial ends) and stimulus monkey’s 
orientation were recorded onto score sheets by one obseiwer by projecting the test video 
with the stimulus monkey, objects and eye movements present.
Analysis o f  the location o f  inspections was performed by two observers ‘blind’ to 
the orientation o f  the stimulus monkey. This analysis was achieved by blanking off the 
region o f  the test tape containing the stimulus monkey with the video mixer. The 
resulting image contained the subject's eyes and the objects when they appeared. Analysis 
was performed on the test video (minus the central region) projected onto the screen so 
that the distance between the eyes in the projected image o f the subject's face was 18 cm 
(i.e. 32 cm between pupils).
Attribution judgements were made by blind scorers for each o f  the subject's 
inspections. A fixation was defined as the subject's eyes remaining static for at least 2-3 
frames duration (80-120 ms). Multiple successive fixations on different regions o f  the 
same object without inteiwening fixations o f other objects and/or positions were scored 
as a single inspection. During a saccade the subject was scored as not looking at 
anything. Inspections were attributed to one o f  four areas: 1) left target, 2) right target, 
3) centre (stimulus monkey) and 4) elsewhere. The position o f  each inspection and its 
frame count were recorded for analysis.
An off-line analysis, which combined blind scoring o f inspections (by one rater) 
and records o f  stimulus monkey orientation, reclassified the 4 inspection positions to 
inspection o f  target, distracter, stimulus monkey and elsewhere. Inter-observer reliability 
was calculated for a sample o f  20 trials by correlating the number o f  inspections 
attributed to different positions per trial by two blind scorers analysing videos
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independently. The independent blind scoring correlated highly for the different positions; 
stimulus monkey, Pearson's (19) = 0.59, p  < 0.01; target, (19) = 0.69, p  < 0.01 and 
distracter, r  ^(19) = 0.76, p < 0.01.
9.2.5 D ata analysis
From the score sheets, the mean number o f  inspections made o f  each o f  the four 
positions were calculated for each trial. The duration o f  each inspection was also 
calculated from the frame count. The number o f  inspections and duration per inspection 
were compared for the whole trial using a three-way Analysis o f  Variance (ANOVA) 
where the factors were subject (Steve, Teriy), condition (Down/Up) and position (T, D, 
M, E), and Newman-Keuls (Nl<) posl-hoc  tests were used to determine specific 
significant differences. The number o f  inspections at each position (T, D, M  and E) was 
also measured for each individual time period. For each time period, the proportion (%) 
o f  inspections o f  the target plus distracter positions were compared using a Binomial test, 
combining data for each subject.
9.3 Results
Both subjects’ (S, T) eye movements were recorded for condition 1 (down) and 
condition 2 (up) for 20 trials each. The results were analysed for the whole trial using a 
three-way ANOVA (subjects, condition (down/up) and inspection position as main 
factors). There was a significant main effect o f  position on the number o f inspections 
made (F(3,3) = 16.05, p  <  0.05). O f greatest importance, the number o f  inspections on 
the target position was significantly greater than the number o f  inspections on the 
distracter position (NK, p  < 0.05). Figure 9.4 illustrates that although Steve made more 
inspections than Teriy (main effect o f  subjects F (l,7 6 ) = 81.46,/? < 0.001), the pattern o f  
inspection across different positions was constant across the 2 subjects (no interaction 
between subjects and position (F(3,228) = 1.32,/? = 0.27).
Figure 9,4. Pattern o f  inspections within test stimuli. Mean number o f  inspections (+/- 
SEM) made to each position (target, distracter, stimulus monlcey and elsewhere) for the 
Whole trial. Data is averaged for the 40 trials (in conditions 1 and 2) separately for each 
o f  the two subjects. N ote the pattern o f  inspections across positions is the same for both 










O f less importance, there was no significant main effect o f  condition ( F ( l , l )  — 
33.28, /? = 0.11), as the number o f  inspections was not different between the up and 
down conditions. Other interactions between the main factors were all non-significant 
(subjects and condition (F (l,76 ) = 0.18,/? = 0.68), condition and position (F(3,3) = 1.55, 
p  =  0.36), subjects, condition and position (F(3,228) = 1.0/? = 0.39).
Behaviour during the individual time periods was analysed using a Binomial test. 
The number o f  inspections made by each subject o f the target position (T) or the 
distracter position (D), for each time period for the total 40 trials, was calculated as a 
percentage o f  the total number o f  inspections o f  the target position plus the distracter 
position (T+D). For the Monkey Only time period, the proportion o f inspections o f  the 
target position was significantly greater than that for the distracter position (Binomial 
test, Z = 4.7, p<0.01). During the Monkey and Objects time period, the number o f  
inspections o f  the target was also significantly greater than that for the distracter 
(Binomial test, Z = 2.6,/? < 0.05). There was no significant difference between the 
proportion o f  inspections o f  the target and distracter for the final Objects Only time 
period (Binomial test, Z =  0.9,/? = 0.18). See Figure 9.5 for these results.
The number o f frames at each o f the four positions, for the two subjects and 
conditions were analysed using a three-way ANOVA. There was no significant main 
effect o f  position (F(3, 3) == 3.6,/? = 0.16) and therefore no difference between the 
number o f  frames spent looking at the target and the distracter (see Figure 9.6). There 
was no significant main effect o f subjects (F (l, 76) = 1.52,/? = 0.22) or condition (F (l,
1) =  2.41,/? = 0.36) and no interaction between subjects and condition (F (l, 76) = 0.51, 
p  =  0.48), or between condition and position (7^(3, 3) = 0.94, p  = 0.52). There was a 
significant interaction between the subjects and position (F(3, 3) = 5.5,/? < 0.001). Steve 
spent significantly more time looking at the target than the distracter (NK, p  < 0.05), 
whereas the difference for Teriy was non-significant.
The duration o f inspections over the whole trial was further analysed using 
comparable methods to those above, with time spent inspecting the target and distracter 
expressed as a proportion o f  total time spent inspecting both the target and distracter for 
each o f  40 trials. The average o f  both subjects indicated that subjects spent a greater
Figure 9.5, Proportion o f  target and distracter inspections across different trial periods. 
Upper: stimuli during the successive periods o f  the trial (Monkey Only, Monkey + 
Objects, Objects Only). Lower: mean proportion o f  inspections made to the target (T) 
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Figure 9.6. Duration of inspections. The average number of frames, +/- SEM spent 
inspecting the different stimulus positions for the Whole trial. Data for the 40 trials for 








Target Distracter Monkey Elsewhere
265
proportion of time inspecting the target position than the distracter position (Binomial 
test, Z =  12.2,/) < 0.01).
9.4 Discussion
The results presented above provide the first experimental evidence that rhesus 
monkeys follow another monkey’s gaze, and use their gaze cues to orient their own 
attention to a specific object. The subjects followed the stimulus monkey’s line of sight 
before any objects were presented, and inspected the attended target object more than the 
identical non-distracter object when the objects appeared. These results contrast with a 
recent study of non-human primate gaze following by Itakura (1996), as they provide 
evidence that monkeys, like great apes (Povinelli and Eddy 1994, 1996a, b), can follow 
gaze cues onto specific objects.
In the first part of the trial (Monkey Only), the stimulus monkey exhibited intense 
interest to a particular point in space and the subjects appear to have followed the 
stimulus monkey's direction of attention to this position. In terms of the definition stated 
in the introduction, the subjects have followed the stimulus monkey’s gaze, but are not 
joined in attention with the stimulus monkey. In the second time period (Monkey and 
Objects), a specific object appeared as a focus of the stimulus monkey’s attention. The 
subjects looked significantly more at this target object than at the alternative distracter 
object. During this section of the trial, the subjects and the stimulus monkey had joint 
attention, as they both attended the same object (Perrett and Emeiy 1994).
One might have expected that any salience that the target object gained from 10 
seconds attention of the stimulus monkey would persist into the final part of the trial 
(Objects Only), when the stimulus monkey disappeared and only the objects remained. 
This was not the case. The trend for the target object to be inspected more frequently 
that the distracter in the final period of the trials did not reach significance. Rhesus 
monkeys follow conspecifics’ gaze to objects but may not understand the mental 
significance of another's attention (i.e. that the other individual is interested in the object).
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This would be compatible with a phmilive orienling reflex (Povinelli and Eddy 1996a) 
where monkeys follow other’s gaze cues automatically.
Methodological differences may explain the discrepancies in results between this 
and the Itakura (1996) study. Itakura attempted to determine whether prosimians, 
monkeys and apes were able to follow the gaze, head and pointing cues of a human 
experimenter. Itakura required a large angle of gaze change (90 degrees) before scoring 
the subject’s gaze following positively. This angular change is larger than that required of 
the subjects in the present study. Furthermore, before providing the attention cues, the 
experimenter attempted to gain eye contact with each subject. Monkeys do not readily 
look into the eyes of humans or conspecifics (especially a more dominant individual) but 
apes do (Redican 1975). Apes are therefore more likely to look into the eyes of humans 
and therefore are more likely to use gaze cues. Indeed, apes may learn to utilise human 
gaze cues through socialisation or enculturation, during extensive interaction with human 
experimenters and caregivers (Carpenter, Tomasello and Savage-Rumbaugh 1995). In 
contrast to apes, macaque monkeys may be less willing to use the gaze of human 
experimenters in operant tasks because humans are perceived as more threatening. Any 
reluctance of macaques in this respect was circumvented in the present study by using 
videofilm of conspecifics as stimuli.
The eye region is particularly salient in primate species (Ai'gyle and Cook 1976, 
Keating and Keating 1982, Perrett and Mistlin 1990, Chapter VII). Baron-Cohen (1994) 
has proposed a cognitive (and neural) module, the Eye Direction Detector (EDD) which 
codes attention direction from eye gaze alone. Perrett and Emery (1994) note that the 
brain mechanisms for detecting attention direction (DAD) use multiple visual cues 
including eye gaze, head direction and body posture. In this study several cues to 
attention were oriented in the same directions. The subjects in the present study may have 
used eye gaze, head orientation and posture, or body posture to follow the stimulus 
monkey’s direction of attention. The behavioural ability of monkeys to follow attention 
demonstrated here is consistent with the neurophysiological finding described in the 
introduction. Cell populations have been found which respond to direction of eyes, head 
and body (Brothers and Ring 1993, Leonard et al. 1985, Perrett et al. 1985, 1992, Perrett
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& Mistlin 1990, Wachsmuth et al. 1994). Such cells may contribute the appropriate 
neural machinery required to process the direction of another's attention from a variety 
o f visual cues.
An unpublished study by Tomasello, Call and Hare (1997) has confirmed the 
results of this study using semi-free ranging primates in a large enclosure. Tomasello et al 
found that five species of non-human primate; rhesus, stumptailed and pigtailed 
macaques, sooty mangabeys and chimpanzees; could follow the gaze cues of 
conspecifics. The experimenter waited for two conspecifics to be proximal to one 
another, then the experimenters would attempt to gain the first conspecific’s attention by 
holding up some food. The experimenter would then record the second conspecific’s 
(named the subject) behaviour. The experimental trials were spilt into two sections; 
questionable and valid. The questionable trials were designated as trials where the 
conspecific looked at the food, but the subject did not notice the conspecific’s attention 
cue, but did look at the food. The valid trials were designated as trials where the subject 
looked at the conspecific (and hence gaze cues) and then looked at the food. In the 
control trials, the food was presented when only the conspecific was present. Tomasello 
et al found that in all species tested, the subjects looked at the food on a highly significant 
number of valid trials (79-100%). Interestingly, the stumptailed macaque subjects 
responded 100% correctly (significantly better than chimpanzees). Stumptails may use 
gaze cues more often in affiliative gestures than other species. This may be due to the 
gentle, relaxed manner with which stumptailed macaques interact with conspecifics (such 
as alerting others to danger; de Waal 1989).
Primatologists have begun to test non-human primates’ knowledge of the mental 
significance of attention (Gomez 1991, 1996, Anderson et al. 1995, 1996, Povinelli 1996, 
Whiten 1997a, b). Even though monkeys can spontaneously follow the gaze cues of 
other monkeys, monkeys’ abilities to utilise gaze cues in experimental tasks appears more 
limited than ethological observations might suggest. Povinelli and Eddy (1996b) 
suggested that the ability to understand the mental significance of another’s gaze is a 
dissociable ability from simple gaze following, although one may be a precursor to the 
other (Baron-Cohen 1994, Perrett and Emei-y 1994). Whiten (1996a) has speculated that
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behaviour-reading, or inferring goal-directed behaviour, emotion and intention from 
external perceptual signals and a representation of an individual's behavioural patterns, 
may have developed through evolution into a 'mind-reading' ability or a ‘theory of mind 
mechanism’ (Premack and Woodruff 1978).
Neurons in the STS and basolateral (BL) complex of the amygdala are selective 
to the sight of a second individual’s eyes, heads and bodies horizontally oriented to one 
specific view (see Chapters II and VII) The amygdala (and probably STS) appear to 
have evolved throughout the evolution of the primates to process highly processed visual 
social signals. This assumption would appear to be suggestive as results of the 
comparative analysis (Chapter V) show strong relationships between social groups size 
and the volume of the BL complex of the amygdala). Cues of another’s attention may be 
used to process another’s intentions within a purposive behavioural framework, rather 
than a mentalistic framework. Such a high level method of analysing another’s 
behavioural patterns may be a precursor to the analysis of another’s mental state (as 




The results described within this thesis suggest a role for the cortex of the 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) and the lateral basal nucleus (LB) of the amygdala in 
coding for aspects of macaques’ social behaviour. In particular, these stmctures are 
involved in the perception of visual social signals, that may aid an individual in 
understanding another individual’s purposive behaviour.
The main results of this thesis were as follows:
(1) Lesions of the amygdala, anterior temporal cortex and orbitofrontal cortex in 
monkeys cause various deficits in processing information about other individuals. 
Perceiving others’ appearance, actions, purposive behaviour and emotions (social 
perception) appears to be compromised by lesions of the anterior temporal cortex and 
amygdala, and using social information in complex situations (social cognition) appears 
to be affected by lesions of the orbitofrontal cortex. Unfortunately, the specific control of 
social perception and social cognition by these three regions is not known from lesion 
studies, as the lesions were unspecific to individual amygdala nuclei or cortical region.
(2) The anatomy of the individual amygdala nuclei suggests differences in 
function between the different nuclei. This was tested using a novel method of analysing 
the inter-relationships between anatomical areas. Non-metric multidimensional scaling 
(NMDS) was used to analyse the similarities between different brain areas’ connectional 
architecture. Statistical analysis (e.g. NMDS) of the similarities in connectivity between 
amygdala nuclei or cortical regions (an objective measure) enabled a subjective measure 
of the relatedness between areas to be proposed. NMDS (and cluster analysis) found that 
the individual nuclei of the amygdala differed in their connectivity with other brain areas
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and that the amygdala split into three groups; the basolateral complex (BL), the 
centromedial complex (CM) and the peripheral nuclei. The BL was positioned close to 
areas of the sensory cortex involved in complex levels of sensoiy processing, such as the 
STS which processes features such as faces. This suggests that highly processed sensory 
(social) information enters the BL complex. The CM complex was positioned close to the 
prefrontal cortex which suggests that neurons of the nuclei of the CM complex project 
out of the amygdala, passing on highly processed social information to the prefrontal 
cortex. The LB nucleus is separated from the rest of the BL complex (placed next to 
areas within both processing streams of the cortical visual system). This suggests that the 
LB nucleus may be the most important area within the amygdala which communicates 
with the visual system. This is also indicated by the profuse back connections from the 
LB nucleus to the occipital lobe (including primary visual cortex).
(3) The probable link between the LB nucleus and social behaviour was tested 
further across a large number of primate species (haplorhines and strepserhines) using the 
comparative method. The volume of the LB nucleus, the BL and CM complexes and the 
amygdala were correlated with measures of primate social cognition (e.g. social group 
size, number of females in a group, percentage time spent grooming) and also with 
indices of ecological processing (percentage fruit in the diet and home range size). The 
LB nucleus was the only structure to correlate significantly with all indices of socio­
ecology. The role of the LB nucleus in behaviour may be more generalised than the rest 
of the nuclei of the amygdala. High correlations between the volume of the LB nucleus 
and social cognition m d between the volume of LB nucleus and ecology suggest that this 
nucleus may be functioning in attributing value (reward) to
objects. For example, information concerning the basic perceptual attributes of social 
interaction (such as facial expressions, body movements, vocalisations, etc.) may reach 
the amygdala via the lateral (L) nucleus, but the function of interpreting the interaction as 
rewarding or aversive may be performed by the LB nucleus. Similarly, information 
concerning basic perceptual details about the location, smell and taste of food (fruit, 
leaves, nuts, meat, etc.) may be processed by the anterior temporal cortex and L nucleus.
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(4) The above results would suggest that recording from single units within the 
LB nucleus would be futile when studying the neural mechanisms of social perception. 
Complex visual social information appears to reach the L nucleus from the STS, so 
further processing of complex features may not be required during the next step of the 
processing pathway in the amygdala (the LB nucleus), It is possible that the L nucleus is 
integrating sensoiy information about complex objects (their smell, appearance, taste and 
sound). The coding of visual information in the STS is extremely complex. Recording 
within this region of the awake macaque brain found neurons which were responsive to 
multiple features of faces (monkey, human and other species’ faces), bodies and body 
parts; static or in motion; and interacting with other objects in the environment. These 
neurons may function in processing information about other individuals and their actions 
within the environment. Such a type of processing may enable an individual to predict 
anothers’ behaviour in relation to the world and the viewing individual, such as in forms 
of social interaction. How similar levels of social information processing may be 
compromised in the psychopathological disorder of autism is discussed below.
(5) Some of the cells found in anterior STS were responsive to the sight of the 
head and/or the eyes. It is unlikely that neurons selectively responsive to one view of the 
head are used to code for the appearance of the head. Intermediate head views from the 4 
(0 \ 90\ 180° and 270°) or 8 (0°, 45°, 90°, 135°, 180°, 225°, 270° and 315°) canonical 
views, such as 22.5° are represented by single neurons. It would seem logical to suggest 
that such cells are coding for the appearance of the head directed towards one view. No 
cells have been reported where their response is contingent on only one direction of the 
eyes. This would tend to indicate that the eyes are not in themselves important indicators 
of attention direction in macaques. The behavioural literature also reports negative 
findings of eye gaze following in non-ape species. This lack of evidence may be due to 
the fact that the eyes have a large emotional meaning attached to them for the majority of 
Old and New World monkeys. Eye gaze, in the form of a direct stare is used as a 
threatening gesture. Monkeys may be unable to use other forms of information from the 
eyes, such as references to objects and locations in the environment or as a means of 
affiliation, as seen in the great apes and humans.
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If monkeys did use information from the bodies of other individuals to learn about 
things in the world, it is likely that they do not use eye gaze specifically, but do use the 
direction of the head and/or body. This would also appear to be the case from the large 
number of single neurons which are selectively responsive to one view of the head. There 
were contradictions in the literature on the ability of monkeys to use others’ gaze (eyes 
or head). Ethological studies suggested that monkeys do use gaze, whereas laboratory 
studies suggested that monkeys do not use gaze. The results of the study described in the 
last chapter suggest that monkeys use conspecifics’ head (and possibly eyes) as indicators 
of their attention. This form of processing has been suggested to be a precursor step to 
learning about anothers’ mental state (see below), but even as a precursor stage the level 
of information which may be transferred using this means of communication is complex.
The anterior STS may therefore function as an advanced processor of complex 
features, which may be utilised in social cognition. The next steps in the processing 
pathway in the amygdala, i.e. the BL complex (in particular the LB nucleus) are unlikely 
to be processing basic perceptual features of an object, as more complex attributes of 
biological objects appear to be processed by neurons within the STS.
These results have may important implications for the disorder of autism. Baron- 
Cohen (1994) stated that the ability to attribute mental states to other beings or the 
‘theory of mind mechanism’ (ToMM) is reliant on a number of precursor modules. The 
first module, the ‘intentionality detector’ (ID) functions to interpret others’ behaviour in 
relation to objects in the environment (i.e. actions with an end purpose; see Chapter VII). 
For example, perceiving a hand reaching towards an object, the viewer can predict the 
outcome of the action; the hand will reach the object and pick it up. This is dependent on 
a number of variables, such as the configuration of the fingers in the hand, the size and 
weight of the object, the function of the object, etc.). Neurons in anterior STS have 
already been described which respond to the motion of bodies and hands towards and 
away from objects. These neurons may form part of an ID.
The second module which would be required for ToMM to function correctly is 
an ‘eye direction detector’ (EDD). This would detect the presence of the eyes as a class 
of object and the direction in which the eyes are directed. Similar to the ID, some cells
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within the anterior STS have been found which respond to the presence of the eyes and 
to different eye gaze directions. As stated earlier, no cells have been found which respond 
to only one eye direction (all cells respond to multiple directions, whilst are also 
inhibitory to one direction). Perrett and Emery (1994) therefore proposed a ‘direction of 
attention detector’ (DAD), based on the neurophysiological evidence. This module 
would function in similar ways to the EDD, but would enable a viewer to infer anothers’ 
attention direction from multiple cues, such as the eyes, the head or the body. Such a 
system would be strictly hierarchical, where the eyes would be the best indicators of 
attention direction, followed by the head and then the body. In situations where two 
direction cues are in conflict (e.g. when the eyes are looking to the left, but the head is 
looking foiward) the eyes would be presumed to be correct indicators to attention 
direction.
The final precursor to ToîVDVI would be the ‘shared attention mechanism’ (SAM). 
This module enables the analysis of triadic relationships between a viewer (X), an 
observed individual (Y) and an object or location (Z). For attention to be shared, X and 
Y must both be directing their attention to object Z and must have knowledge that the 
other is aware of their attention and vice versa. A more basic form of this level of 
processing (joint attention) was discussed in chapter IX, where both X and Y’s attention 
was directed onto the same object. No neural correlates have been found for either 
shared or joint attention, i.e. no cells were found to be significantly different in their 
response between perceiving a head directed to one view and the same head view with 
attention towards (or away) from an object. Such cells may not exist in the rhesus 
monkey brain and this may go some way to explaining why there is no positive evidence 
which suggests that macaques can attribute mental states to others. It appears that they 
do not have the neural architecture required for such feats of social information 
processing.
Individuals with autism seem to be deficient in processing shared attention. It can 
reasonably be predicted that the brains of normal functioning human adults and children 
have neurons which correspond to those found in rhesus macaques and which correspond 
to the three modules described above (also including neurons which function in the
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ToMM). It is, however, more difficult to say anything about the brains of autistic 
individuals, when there is no convincing evidence which suggests that these individuals 
are affected at gross neural levels (i.e. which can be detected on positron emission 
tomography; PET or magnetic resonance imaging; MRI scans). Three possibilities arise 
from a neurological explanation of functional deficits in autistic individuals. First, the 
brain systems which code for shared attention (amongst many other social and non-social 
deficits) fail to develop properly or at all. Second, damage may occur to precise systems 
of neurons at the microscopic level. Finally, there may be a disruption of the individual 
firing patterns of neuronal circuits. All three possible explanations unfortunately are 
difficult (if not impossible) to investigate under present situations, so continued work 
using non-human primates is essential to further investigate the subtleties of the neural 
coding of social perception and cognition.
There is a problem with extrapolating results of studies from non-human primates 
to humans. The effects of lesions in monkeys appear to cause different effects from 
lesions to the same brain area in humans. Amygdala damage in humans after 
neurosurgeiy or disease, causes very specific, but minor deficits in socio-emotional 
behaviour, whereas in monkeys, the deficits are more generalised and substantial. For 
example, the processing of others’ expressions of fear (visual and auditory) is 
pronounced in human patients with extensive amygdala damage, but other socio- 
emotional behaviours are relatively unaffected (Young et al 1995, Scott et al 1997). 
However, many behaviours have not been tested. Processing others’ gaze, however, 
appears to be compromised equally in rhesus monkeys and humans (Young et al 1995, 
Campbell et al 1990, Heywood and Cowey 1992). Similar sized lesions in Old World 
monkeys affect many other forms of socio-emotional behaviour. This may be due in part 
to differences between monkey and human social behaviour or to a shift of social 
function from the amygdala (and other parts of the ‘limbic system’) to the cortex (in 
particular, the prefrontal cortex). Monkey social behaviour is complex (see Chapter II), 
but may be said to be less subtle than human social behaviour. This would make 
behavioural comparisons between monkeys and humans extremely difficult, as a large 
number of the subtle social behaviours usually available to normal functioning humans
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would not be present in the behavioural repertoire of most monkeys and apes. This may 
explain the differences in social behaviour deficits after amygdala damage in monkeys and 
humans.
Future research into the neural basis of social behaviour in human and non-human 
primates could target a number of areas. A close examination of human social behaviour, 
such as from studying the human social perception and social cognition literature, may 
reveal a number of subtle differences between monkeys and humans, which may be 
utilised in studies of brain damaged human patients (see, for example, papers by the 
Damasio group).
When studying the effects of brain lesions on monkey social behaviour, the 
question of damage to adjacent brain areas or to fibres of passage must be addressed. 
Recently, David Amaral’s group at the University of California, Davis have been 
attempting to lesion the rhesus monkey amygdala (and L nucleus) with an axon-sparing 
excitotoxin; ibotenic acid. Preliminary results (Amaral, personal communication) suggest 
that a large number of the deficits in social behaviour (especially affiliative behaviours) 
are seen after ibotenic acid lesions of the whole amygdala. Amaral’s group are also using 
sophisticated measurements of the monkeys’ behaviour to help resolve previous 
discrepancies between amygdala lesion effects.
Specific questions need to be raised about the precise anatomical location of the areas 
coding individual social behaviours. Complex levels of processing social information can 
be located to single neurons in the STS and amygdala. Area X may contain 15 regions, 
where each region may function in one behaviour. Lesioning area X will disrupt all 15 
functions. It is therefore important to attempt to localise lesions to single structures. This 
is extremely difficult at present, especially in veiy small brain structures. It may be 
attempted by use of better lesion localisation methods, such as MRI.
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Appendix One; Anatomical database of amygdalo-coitical and amygdalo-amygdala 
connections in the macaque brain. This table displays the general connections of each 
individual amygdala nucleus (efferent, afferetn and reciprocal connections) and the 
references the connections were reported in.
A m y g d a l a  N u c l e i
Lateral Nucleus
C o m i e c t e d  A r e a s  
( C o r t i c a l / A m y g d a l a )
R e f e r e n c e s
E f f e r e n t :  M T ,  V 4 t ,  A 3 5 ,  H ip p ,  K A ,  
A 1 2 ,  A 6 ,  A 2 5 ,  L B ,  M B ,  C T A ,  P A C ,  
C o , M e ,  A A A ,  A H A  
A f f e r e n t :  A 7 a ,  A 2 3 ,  A 9 ,  A lO ,  A 1 4 ,  
P a l ,  T S 2 ,  T p t ,  T H , T F  
R e c ip r o c a l :  P I T v ,  P I T d ,  C I T v , C I T d ,  
A l T v ,  A I T d ,  S T P p ,  S T P a ,  E R , T G v ,  
T G d , I g ,  I d , A 1 3 ,  A B ,  C e
B &  D e O  9 0 , 1 &  Y  8 7 ,  S & R  8 8 a ,  
A  &  P  8 4 ,  M &  Muf 82,1, A  &  C  
8 7 ,  M e t  a l  8 5 ,  M, Muf &  M 8 7 ,  A  
8 5 ,  Muf, M &  P  8 1 ,  N  6 1 ,  S & W  
9 3 , 1 e t  a l  8 7 ,  F  e t  a l  8 6 ,  A  P  &  A  
8 3 ,  H  &  V a n  H  7 6 ,  Muf & M 8 2 ,  L 
&  A  7 7 ,  T ,  M &  K  8 0 ,  A  B  &  P  8 0 ,  
M e t  a l  8 1 ,  A  e t  a l  9 2
Lateral Basal Nucleus E ff e r e n t :  H ip p ,  A 3 5 ,  E R , T H , T F ,  
T G d , T S l ,  G , A 4 5 ,  A Ô , A 2 5 ,  A 2 5 ,  
A 7 b ,  A 7 a ,  L I P , V I P ,  M S T d ,  M S T l ,  
M T ,  V I ,  V 2 ,  V 4 ,  V 3 ,  C o , C T A ,
P A C
A f f e r e n t :  L , P a l
R e c ip r o c a l :  P I T d , P I T v ,  C I T d , C I T v ,  
A I T d ,  A I T v ,  S T P p ,  S T P a ,  T G v ,  I g ,  
I d , A I 4 ,  A 1 2 ,  A 9 ,  A I O , A 4 6 ,  A 3 2 ,  
A 2 4 ,  A A A  M B ,  A B ,  M e ,  C e
B  &  D e O  9 0 , 1 &  Y  8 7 ,  S  &  R  a b , A  
&  P  8 4 , 1, A  &  C  8 7 ,  P e t  a l 8 L  J &  
T 7 5 ,  A 8 5 ,  M u f ,  M & P 8 I , T e t  a l  
8 2 ,  T ,  W  &  T  8 3 ,  N  6 1 ,  B ,  D  &  U  
9 3 ,  S  &  W  9 3 , 1 e t  a l  8 7 ,  F  e t  a l  8 6 ,  
A , P  &  A  8 3 ,  M  e t  a l  8 1 .  H  &  V a n  H  
7 6 ,  P ,  V a n  H  &  D  7 3 ,  P ,  V a n  H  &  M  
8 1 ,  W & N 5 6 , L & A 7 7 ,  T , M & K
8 0 ,  A  B &  P 8 0 ,  L &  G  8 8 ,  Van H
8 1 ,  L 4 5 ,  A e t  al 9 2
Medial Basal Nucleus
E ff e r e n t :  T G d ,  G , A 1 4 ,  A 1 3 ,  A 1 2 ,  B  &  D e O  9 0 , 1 &  Y  8 7 ,  S  &  R  8 8 a b ,
A 4 5 ,  A 6 ,  A 2 3 ,  A 2 4 ,  A 2 5 ,  A 3 2 ,  A 7 b ,  A  &  P  8 4 ,  M ,  M  &  M e s  8 7 ,  P  e t  a l
A 7 a ,  L I P ,  V I P ,  L B ,  C T A ,  C o , M e ,  8 1 ,  A  8 5 ,  M u f ,  M  &  P  8 1 ,  N  6 1 ,  B ,
A B ,  C e  D  &  V  9 3 ,  S  &  W  9 3 , 1 e t  a l  8 7 ,  F  e t
A f f e r e n t :  L a l  8 6 ,  H  &  V a n  H  7 6 ,  M i i f  &  M  8 2 ,
R e c ip r o c a l :  A I T d ,  A I T v ,  A 3 5 ,  H ip p ,  I , A  &  C  8 7 ,  L  &  A  7 7 ,  T .  M  &  K
E R , T G v ,  I g ,  I d ,  A 9 ,  A l O ,  A 4 6 ,  
A H A ,  P A C
8 0 ,  R  &  V a n  H  7 7 ,  A  e t  a l  9 2
Accessory Basal Nucleus E ff e r e n t :  A 3 5 ,  T S 3 ,  T G d ,  p a A r ,  
p a  A c ,  p a A l ,  K A  T S l ,  G , R I ,  A 1 3 ,  
A 1 2 ,  A l l ,  A 4 6 ,  A 2 3 ,  A 2 4 ,  A 2 5 ,  
A 3 2 ,  A l ,  A 2 ,  A 3 a ,  A 3 b ,  S 2 ,  A 7 b ,  
A 7 a ,  L I P , V I P ,  M B ,  C o  
A f f e r e n t :  A 9 ,  M e ,  P A C  
R e c ip r o c a l :  C I T d , C I T v ,  A I T d ,  
A I T v ,  H ip p ,  E R ,  T G v ,  P a l ,  I g ,  Id , 
A I 4 ,  A I O , C e ,  A H A ,  L B ,  L
B  & DeO 9 0 , 1 & Y  8 7 ,  S  &  R  8 8 a b ,  
A & P 8 4 , 1 ,  A & C 8 7 , M e t a l  8 5 ,  
M , M u f  M  8 7 ,  P  e t  a l  8 1 ,  A  85, 
Muf, M  &  P  8 1 ,  N  6 1 ,  S  &  W  9 3 , 1 
e t  a l  8 7 ,  H  &  V a n  H  7 6 ,  L  &  A  7 7 ,  
T ,  M  &  K  80, A B  &  P  8 0 ,  M  e t  a l  
8 1 ,  A e t a l  9 2
Central Nulceus E ff e r e n t :  T G d ,  A H A ,  C T A M  &  M i i f  8 2 ,  M  e t  a l  8 5 ,  M ,  M u f  &
A ff e r e n t :  A I T d ,  A I T v ,  S T P p , S T P a , M  8 7 ,  A  8 5 ,  F  e t  a l  8 6 , 1, A  &  C  8 7 ,
T S 2 ,  P a l ,  A I O , A 9 ,  M e W  &  N  5 6 ,  L  &  A  7 7 ,  T ,  M  &  K  8 0 .
R e c ip r o c a l :  A 3  5 ,  E R , H ip p ,  T G v ,  I g ,  A ,  B  &  P  8 0 ,  H  &  V a n  H  7 6 ,  M u f ,
I d , L ,  L B ,  A B ,  M B ,  P A C M  &  P  8 1 ,  A  e t  a l  9 2
Cortical Nulceus E ff e r e n t :  C I T d , C I T v ,  A 3 5 ,  T S l ,  I g ,  B  &  D e O  9 0 , 1 &  Y  8 7 ,  S & R  8 8 a b ,
A 1 3 ,  A 1 2 ,  A 2 3 ,  A 2 5 ,  A 3 2 M  &  M u f  8 2 ,  M ,  M u f  &  M  8 7 ,  M u f ,
A f f e r e n t :  T G d , C e ,  L ,  L B ,  A B ,  M B  M & P  8 1 ,  N  6 1 ,  F  e t  a l  8 6 , 1, A  &  C
R e c ip r o c a l :  H ip p ,  E R ,  T G v ,  I d ,  M e ,  8 7 ,  T .  M  &  K  8 0 ,  A  B  &  P  8 0 ,  A  e t
P A C a l  9 2
Medial Nulceus E f f e r e n t :  E R ,  I g ,  A H A ,  A B ,  C T A ,  I  &  Y  8 7 ,  S  &  R  8 8 a ,  M ,  M u f  &  M
P A C ,  C o 8 7 ,  A  8 5 ,  M u f ,  M  &  P  8 1 ,  F  e t  a l  8 6 ,
A f f e r e n t :  S T P p ,  S T P a ,  I d , A l l ,  A 1 3 ,  A ,  B  &  P  8 0 ,  A  e t  a l  9 2
Periamygdaloi d  Complex
A I O , A 9 ,  A 4 6 ,  A 2 3 ,  A 2 5 ,  L ,  M B  
R e c ip r o c a l :  H ip p ,  T G v ,  T G d , C e ,  L B
E f f e r e n t :  C I T d , A I T d ,  A I T v ,  I g ,  I d , 
T S l ,  P a l ,  R I ,  G , A l ,  A 2 ,  A 3 a ,  A 3 b ,  
S 2
A f f e r e n t :  H ip p ,  L ,  L B ,  C o  
R e c ip r o c a l :  E R , T G v ,  T G d , M e ,  C e ,  
A B .  M B
I &  Y  8 7 ,  A  &  P  8 4 , 1, A  &  C  8 7 , 1
e t  a l  8 7 .  A  8 5 ,  A  e t  a l  9 2
Anterior Amygdaloid Area E f f e r e n t :  A 3 2 ,  T G v ,  T G d , C e ,  L  
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